Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage

Book Series edited by
Giuseppe D’Angelo and Emiliana Mangone

This Book Series, published in an electronic open access format, serves as a permanent platform for discussion and comparison, experimentation and dissemination, promoting the achievement of research goals related to three key topics:

Mediterranean: The study of southern Europe and the Mediterranean world offers a historical perspective that can inform our understanding of the region today. The findings collected in this series speak to the myriad policy debates and challenges – from immigration to economic disparity – facing contemporary societies across the Great Sea.

Knowledge: At its core, this series is committed to the social production of knowledge through the cooperation and collaboration between international scholars across geographical, cultural, and disciplinary boundaries.

Culture and Heritage: This series respects and encourages sharing multiple perspectives on cultural heritage. It promotes investigating the full scope of the complexity, hybridity, and morphology of cultural heritage within the Mediterranean world.

Each manuscript will be submitted to double-blind peer reviewing.

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Preface by the Series Editors

Narration and Representation of the Mediterranean

This new book, edited by Erminio Fonzo and Hilary A. Haakenson, addresses several little known subjects in the history of the Mediterranean world as well as artistic representations of this dynamic world created over the centuries.

As Marcus Tullius Cicero stated in a famous passage of his *Orator ad M. Brutum*, “Nescire autem quid ante quam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum. Quid enim est aetas hominis, nisi ea memoria rerum veterum cum superiorum aetate contextur” or “To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child. For what is the worth of human life, unless it is woven into the life of our ancestors by the records of history” (Cicero, *Orator ad M. Brutum*, 120). Taking this dictum to heart, the case studies in this volume, move beyond a one-dimensional vision of the “Great Sea” by contributing to the growth and development of a nuanced and complete understanding of the Mediterranean world across time.

This book is an achievement that explores the interconnections between two academic disciplines – history and art history - both essential to understanding the region. Building upon seminal scholarship produced during the 20th century, its essays address long-standing themes as well as little-known historical subjects from and artistic representations of the Mediterranean World.

We, the series editors of Mediterranean Knowledge, believe that creating new synergies and epistemological relationships between different but complementary disciplines is critical to advancing research on the cultures of the “Great Sea.” As we have elsewhere stated:

In the present world, the multidimensionality of the daily problems and the quick succession of social transformations urge us to re-compose the different points of view and the perspectives of various disciplines to create the fertile grounds for the cooperation between them. Opening a dialogue that can overcome “formal” disciplinary and terminological barriers is necessary. Only the permeability and the flexibility of the disciplinary borders - going “beyond the disciplines” and acknowledging them as “different disciplines” – will allow us to open ourselves to knowledge free from positivism (D’Angelo & Mangone, 2016, p. 5).

These theoretical and methodological premises drive the new scientific journey of Mediterranean Knowledge because:
The Mediterranean is not merely geography. Its boundaries are drawn in neither space nor time. There is in fact no way of drawing them: they are neither ethnic nor historical, state nor national; they are like a chalk circle that is constantly traced and erased, that the winds and waves, that obligations and inspirations, expand or reduce (Matvejević, 1999, p. 7).

It is precisely for this reason that narration and representation are important subjects not only in themselves, but also for understanding the present state of the Mediterranean World and the challenges that it faces today.

The three parts of the present volume speak to some of the most interesting historical and aesthetic themes emerging across the “Great Sea”: the relationships between the people of the Mediterranean Basin, their contact with other worlds, particularly the Americas, and the artistic representations and interpretations of both sets of interactions.

In bringing their respective contributions together, this volume’s authors, writing from a wide range of different countries and diverse academic backgrounds, provide a fresh and significant contribution to Mediterranean Studies.

The ICSR Mediterranean Knowledge is therefore particularly pleased to welcome this new book into its series “Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage” and hopes that new studies may deepen other subjects related to this sacred Sea.

Fisciano, Italy
February 2019

Giuseppe D’Angelo
Emiliana Mangone

References


Erminio FONZO - Hilary A. HAAKENSON
Editors

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Editors and Contributors

Editors

Erminio Fonzo holds a Ph.D. in History and is a Research Fellow at the University of Salerno. His research in social and political history focuses on the history of associations and labor movements, nationalism, the rise of Italian fascism, narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the history of sports and the public use of history and memory. His publications include the monographs: Il mondo antico negli scritti di Antonio Gramsci (Salerno: Paguro, 2019); Storia dell’Associazione nazionalista italiana (1910-1923) (Napoli: ESI, 2017); Il fascismo conformista. Le origini del regime nella provincia di Salerno (1920-1926) (Salerno: Paguro, 2011); «L’unione fa la forza». Le organizzazioni dei lavoratori a Napoli dall’Unità alla crisi di fine secolo (Soveria Mannelli (Catanzaro): Rubbettino, 2010). Dr. Fonzo has also published numerous articles in books and journals and participated in several national and international conferences.
e-mail: efonzo@unisa.it

Hilary A. Haakenson is Assistant Professor in the Department of Interdisciplinary General Education (IGE) at California Polytechnic University in Pomona, California. She holds a Ph.D. in Art History from Rutgers University. Her research and teaching interests include: Medieval and Early Modern cartography; aesthetic projections of empire; cultural encounters and exchanges across the Mediterranean world; cultural myths and geographies; social/political commitment in art; and the intersections between art and philosophy. She has been the recipient of several awards and honors including a Fulbright IIE Fellowship for research in Venice, Italy, and has participated in the Fulbright Group Project Abroad “East Meets West-Morocco Crossroads and Meeting Ground” as well as in the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar “Empires and Interactions Across the Early Modern World”. She is the author of the recent article, “Casting the Continents: Sacred History and Spiritual Odyssey in the Camposanto of Pisa,” in Maryanne Cline Horowitz and Louise Arizzoli, eds., Bodies and Maps: Early Modern Personifications of the Continents (Brill, 2019) and she is curator of the traveling art exhibition, “Morocco-Crossroads and Meeting Ground” (April-September, 2018, Don B. Huntley Gallery, California Polytechnic University; & March-May, 2019, Citrus College Visual Arts Gallery and Hayden Library Study Room).
e-mail: hahaakenson@cpp.edu
Contributors

Anthony J. Antonucci is a scholar of Transnational U.S. history whose research investigates the intersections of foreign relations, literary nationalism, ethno-racial formation and immigration policy in American politics and culture since 1750. He holds a Ph.D. in U.S. History from the University of Connecticut, Storrs; an M.A. in American Studies from the University of Southern Maine, Portland; and a B.A. in Political Science from Bard College, Annandale, NY. Dr. Antonucci’s research on U.S. history, culture and ties to the Mediterranean world has been supported by multiple awards, including a Fulbright IIE Research Fellowship based in Naples, Italy and a Research Fellowship at the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston, Massachusetts. Dr. Antonucci is the author of several articles, the most recent of which is titled, Darkest Italy Revisited: Race, Character, and Criminality in the History of Italian Immigration to the United States 1790-1924, “Journal of American Studies in Italy” (2019). He teaches courses in U.S., World and California history, as well as in African-American history, Chicano/Latino Studies and Women’s Studies at California Polytechnic University, La Verne University and Citrus College in the San Gabriel Valley of greater Los Angeles, California. e-mail: anthony.antonucci@uconn.edu

Ekin Can Göksoy is a Ph.D. candidate in the History Department at Boğaziçi University. After receiving his B.S. in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from Middle East Technical University, he earned his M.A. in Cultural Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. His research areas include: architectural and urban history and cultural exchange in the Mediterranean world as well as non-Muslim minorities in the Ottoman Empire. His latest article is “Istanbul United: A Short Lived Experience of Agonistic Pluralism,” in Christian Brandt, Fabian Hertel, Sean Huddleston, eds., Football Fans, Rivalry and Cooperation (Routledge, 2017). e-mail: ekincangoksoy@gmail.com

Pietro Corrao is Professor of Medieval History at the University of Palermo. His fields of research include the social and constitutional history of the Mediterranean monarchies, especially Sicily and the Crown of Aragon in the Late Middle Ages. He is the author of the well-known book, Governare un regno. Potere, società e istituzioni in Sicilia fra Trecento e Quattrocento (Naples, 1991). His most recent academic article is Un Medioevo «globale»? A proposito della Storia mondiale dell’Italia, in “Memoria e ricerca”, n. 59 (3/2018). e-mail: pietro.corrao@unipa.it

Irena Avsenik Nabergoj is Associate Professor at the University of Ljubljana. She completed her first doctorate in Slovenian and Comparative Literature in 2004 and her second doctorate in the Bible and Judaism in 2015. Her research work
Editors and Contributors

Irena Avsenik-Nabaršoj investigates: literary history and comparative literature, with a focus on the Slovenian writers of the 19th and 20th centuries; sources and transformations of biblical, antique and folk motifs and symbols in literature; images of Jews in Slovenian and European history, literature, theatre, art, film and music; and representations of truth and love in literature from antiquity to the present. She works as a Researcher and Associated Professor at the Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, University of Nova Gorica and University of Ljubljana. In 2009, she received the Slovenian State prize for important research achievements. Since 2015, she has been a member of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg).

e-mail: irena.avsenik-nabargoj@guest.arnes.si

Olga Nefedova is an art historian and the former Director of the Orientalist Museum in Doha, Qatar. She has worked for many years with private and government collections in the Far East, Middle East and the Gulf countries. Her recent projects include the following international exhibitions and publications: *The Art and Life of Jean-Baptiste Vanmour (1671-1737), A Journey into the World of the Ottomans* (2010), *Bartholomäus Schachman (1559-1614): the Art of Travel* (2012), *Heritage of Art Diplomacy: Memoirs of an Ambassador* (2013), and many others. Olga Nefedova is one of the organizers of the series of international biannual conferences “Orientality” (Cambridge University, 2013), and the editor of “Orientality” journal. She has been teaching fellow at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, and currently works at the Orient-Institut, Beirut.

e-mail: ovnefedova@hotmail.com

Zeynep Olgun is a graduate of the Bilkent University, Department of International Relations. She has participated in several junior and senior conferences on the history of the Medieval and Modern Mediterranean world and is the author of a number of articles on visual culture and identity in the Early Modern Mediterranean, including: *Picking Up the Brush for Emperors and Sultans. Imperial Portraits as Representations of Power in The Early Modern Mediterranean* (ca. 1450-ca. 1650), in “Journal of Mediterranean Knowledge” 1 (2). She is currently completing research on the urbanization of Byzantine Anatolia through the lens of Byzantine art, architecture and archaeology.

e-mail: zeynep.olgun21@gmail.com

Franca Pirolo received her Ph.D. in the History of Industry and Sociology of Mass Media from the University of Salerno. She was awarded a scholarship for Concentration Study in Economic International History at the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini” in Prato. She has been a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Economics at the University of Salerno. Currently, Pirolo teaches the History of Economic Thought at the University of...
Catania. Her publications include the monograph, *L’industria conciaria italiana tra tradizione e innovazione. Il caso della fabbrica Buonanno a Solofra tra Ottocento e Novecento* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2011).

e-mail: francapirolo@gmail.com

**Mariarosaria Salerno**, Ph.D., is Associate Professor at the University of Calabria in Italy, where she teaches the economic and social history of the Middle Ages and the history of the Medieval Mediterranean. Her research focuses on military orders and the Crusades, the history of Medieval Southern Italy, and the movements of goods and people across the Mediterranean world, with a particular emphasis on North Africa and the Levant. Her publications include a book co-edited with Anelya Barnes, *Symbols and Models in the Mediterranean: Perceiving through Cultures* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), and the monograph, *L’Ordine di Malta in Calabria e la Commenda di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano di Cosenza. Secoli 12-16* (Cosenza: Pellegrini, 2010).

e-mail: mariarosaria.salerno@unical.it

**Maria Sirago** is a teacher of literary subjects at Liceo Classico Jacopo Sannazaro in Naples. She has published scholarship on the navy and port system in Southern Italy during the Spanish, Austrian and Bourbon periods and on many areas of maritime history including: merchant ships, marine insurance, naval schools, trade, and the fishing industry. Her recent publications include: *The Shipbuilding Industry and Trade Exchanges between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Countries of the Baltic and the Black Sea (1734-1861)*, in “Mediterranean Review” 5 (2) 2012; “The Development of the New Steamships and the History of the Shipping Industry in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (1816-1861),” in R. Pisano, ed., *A Bridge between Conceptual Frameworks, Sciences, Society and Technology Studies* (Springer, Amsterdam, 2015).

e-mail: maria.sirago@gmail.com

**Luca Zavagno** is Assistant Professor in the Department of History at Bilkent University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Birmingham with a dissertation on the society, economics and politics of Byzantine cities in the early Middle Ages. He is the author of many articles on the early Medieval Mediterranean as well as two monographs: *Cities in Transition: Urbanism in Byzantium Between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (British Archaeological Reports-International Series, 2009), and *Cyprus between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. An Island in Transition* (Routledge, 2017). He is also the co-organizer of the Conference of the Mediterranean Worlds; Associate Scholar of the Mediterranean Seminar; and former Visiting Professor in Byzantine Art History at the University of Venice.

e-mail: luca.zavagno@bilkent.edu.tr
Repositioning the Great Sea at the Centre of the World: an International Collaboration

ERMINIO FONZO & HILARY A. HAAKENSON*

The Mediterranean is far more than a sea. For millennia, it has been a place of cross-fertilization between the diverse cultures and people who, on its shores and across its waters have met, spoken, traded, exchanged knowledge, quarrelled, played, fought, died and been remembered.

As a consequence of its dynamic, layered history, the Sea has many stories to tell. As Predrag Matvejević, the Croatian writer and academic, wrote, in the Mediterranean world:

> Everywhere the eye can see – from vista to vista, event to event – there are stories about the sea and the coast, the islands and isolation, the body and incarceration, about winds, rivers, and estuaries, about ourselves: the eternal rituals of rise and fall, departure and return, grandiloquence and parody, palingenesis and palimpsest, circlemaking and circlebreaking. The moment we try to penetrate these oppositions, they become eschatology or prosody, yet I do not see how we can avoid them (Matvejević, 1999, p. 92).

When we listen to the Great Sea’s many voices, it is evident that, while the Mediterranean is not a homogenous world, it is one united by geography and exchange. It is not by chance that some of the most cosmopolitan cities of the world, from which knowledge and innovation have long radiated, lie on or near the coasts of the Mediterranean. Among their numbers are Jerusalem, Istanbul, Rome, Alexandria, Athens, Tangier, Naples, and Venice. The Sea’s legacy of cultural exchange is commemorated through the splendour of sites like al-Andalus and Medieval Sicily, both created through the combined contributions of different cultures.

In his recent book, The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean, renowned scholar, David Abulafia, illuminates this essential point of departure in an effort to navigate the history of the Mediterranean World:

> The unity of Mediterranean history…lies, paradoxically, in its swirling changeability, in the diasporas of merchants and exiles, in the people hurrying to cross its surface as quickly as possible,

* The editors thank Dr. Anthony J. Antonucci for his valuable contributions to the editing and publishing processes for this volume.
not seeking to linger at sea, especially in winter, when travel became dangerous, like the long-suffering pilgrims ibn Jubayr and Felix Fabri. Its opposing shores are close enough to permit easy contact, but far enough apart to allow societies to develop distinctively under the influence of their hinterland as well as one another (Abulafia, 2011, p. 648).

Today, as in the past, the Mediterranean Basin is affected by great challenges: mass migrations from the Southern and Eastern shores; strained relations between parts of Europe, the Arabo-Islamic World, and the Jewish State of Israel; the threat of terror – real, imagined, and exploited to negative ends; the civil wars and political instability in countries such as Syria and Libya; and the widespread and persistent problem of social inequality – both within individual countries and between the Sea’s northern and southern shores. All of these factors jeopardize attempts at civil coexistence in today’s world.

Many scholarly and historical accounts of the Sea have also divided the Mediterranean region, focusing not on cooperation and exchange but on difference and opposition – a position that has encouraged interpretations of Mediterranean history as a “clash of nations and civilizations.” We believe that this approach is woefully incomplete. As the pioneering scholar of Mediterranean studies, Fernand Braudel, argued:

Too often, indeed, civilizations exist with nothing but misunderstanding, scorn, and loathing for the other. But they are not only this. They are also sacrifice, effusion, the accumulation of cultural wealth, and the legacy of knowledge. If, to the civilizations on its shores, the sea owes the wars that disrupted its waters, it also owes them its multiplicity of exchanges (technologies, ideas and even beliefs), as well as the multicoloured heterogeneity of the sights it offers our eyes today. The Mediterranean is a mosaic of all the existing colours (Braudel, 1985, p. 173).

For Braudel, as for the contributors to this volume, Mediterranean history forms a mosaic. Its picture emerges through the structured arrangement and interaction of so many unique tiles. Today, the magisterial works of scholars – from Pirenne (1937) and Braudel (1949; 1985) to Matvejević (1999), Horden and Purcell (2000) and Abulafia (2013) – have inspired a thriving field of Mediterranean studies that seeks to reconstruct that mosaic. Yet, the Mediterranean is immense, its exchanges are legion and we have only begun to understand their implications. It is, therefore, necessary that scholars and researchers continue to analyze and produce the critical knowledge that will deepen our understanding of the Sea while favouring the dialogue, and not the clash among its cultures.

The present book contributes to the unfolding project of interpreting the history of the Mediterranean mosaic in its full scope. Its diverse authors are united foremost by their study of the relations that connect and entangle Mediterranean cultures and people across continents. The working articles contained within this volume derive from discussions developed on the occasion of Cultures, Hopes and Conflicts. The Mediterranean between Land and Sea – the 3rd International Conference of ICSR Mediterranean Knowledge, and the 8th International Conference of MedWorld network – held at the University of Salerno from 26 to
28 September 2017. During the conference, scholars from around the world, with expertise in various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, debated important questions related to the past, present and future of the Mediterranean. This volume collects participating scholars’ reflections on the region’s history and art from the Medieval Era to the present.

We have selected these two organizing principles, art and history, because of the close connection between them. Art is part of history. It is inseparable from historical currents, materials and rebellions. Inversely, art shapes attitudes and events. For evidence, we need only consider the importance of graphic representations for popular religiosity from the Medieval Era to the present or the effectiveness of art propaganda made by political regimes seeking to secure popular support over the same broad historical period. In other words, understanding the evolution of “men in time” (Bloch, 1954, p. 23) necessitates considering the interpretations of reality provided by artists and intellectuals who represent part of the societies in which they live and work. It is towards this end that the present compendium of scholarly research offers its collective contribution to furthering our understanding of the great mosaic history of the Mediterranean Sea.

Three major themes organize the presentation of the essays that follow: 1) geographical sites of change and exchange within the Mediterranean, 2) the cosmopolitan tenor of much art produced in the Mediterranean, and 3) the transatlantic reach of Mediterranean people and power.

The first three articles investigate cultural transformations through geographical sites of contact and exchange. Luca Zavagno and Zeynep Olgun argue that, while historians have traditionally perceived western provinces – once controlled by the Byzantine Empire, and including Sardinia and the Balearics – as peripheral to the goals and identity of the Empire, sigillographic, artistic, naval, and textual evidence demonstrates continued Byzantine investment in the region and a fruitful exchange with the Islamic world across this western “frontier.” Pietro Corrao provides an overview of the historiography of the Mediterranean world in the late Medieval Era, which he places in dialogue with a case study of the Aragon-Catalan Kingdom. Finally, Ekin Can Göksoy traces an urban history of Galata, a dynamic nexus of international trade in Istanbul, through its merchant lodgings, which accommodated the shifting presence of the Byzantines, Venetians, Genoese, Ottomans, and, ultimately, the French.

The three articles on the arts examine the cosmopolitanism often manifested in the art of the Mediterranean world. Hilary Haakenson demonstrates how, in the 14th-century sculptural program of the Doge’s Palace in Venice, and in contemporary manuscripts, the Venetians utilized a layered vision of history, which anticipated that of Braudel, to visualize a multi-cultural, Mediterranean worldview. Irena Avsenik Nabergoj underlines the importance of music to Jewish identity as she analyzes how Jewish music responded to various conflicts and contacts experienced by the Jews over time, including the destruction of the Temple, periods of diaspora and migration, and interactions with international
audiences. Finally, Olga Nefedova uses archival sources to investigate an official program by the USSR to educate Arab artists in the 1950-70s; she observes that, for these artists from Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia, the USSR offered a free education, firsthand experience with communism, and exposure to the splendour of the foreign cultural tradition, factors which then shaped their professional practices.

In its third thematic section, this book explores how diplomatic relationships and political refugees have connected the continents around the Mediterranean Sea to each other as well as to the Americas. Speaking to this theme, Maria Rosaria Salerno utilizes a survey of the embassies of the Kingdom of Naples under Angevin rule to draw conclusions about the typical goals, destinations, types of ambassadors and details of missions supported, with a particular focus on the Balkan region. Maria Sirago and Anthony Antonucci both investigate the development of diplomatic relationships between the United States and the Bourbon Kingdom of Naples and the Two Sicilies in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Sirago analyzes this burgeoning relationship principally from the Southern Italian perspective; Antonucci recovers a critical vantage point on the making of an “American Mediterranean” in the “Age of Thomas Jefferson” through an examination of the US alliance with Naples in its war with Tripoli (1801-05). Franca Pirolo builds on Sirago’s research to investigate the interactions between the Kingdom of Naples and the Barbary States in the 17th and 18th centuries. Lastly, Erminio Fonzo discusses the role of sanctuary played by Italian institutions in Chile after the establishment of Pinochet’s dictatorship and the asylum granted to Chilean refugees in Italy thereafter. These five articles underline how the Mediterranean “expanded” on other continents through encounters with foreign civilizations and cultures, and how, thanks to these encounters, its people developed new ideas and new knowledge.

In short, *Mediterranean Mosaic* offers a fresh contribution to research on the Mediterranean worlds, continuing a “tradition” of the ICSR Mediterranean Knowledge, which, since its establishment, has addressed urgent and difficult questions related to the Sea. As a whole, this book highlights the risks and advantages of connecting across cultures: the fruitful exchanges as well as the bloody fights. In the present global world, the “other” is too often portrayed as a threat, which beats the drums of divisive fervour against foreign immigrants, ideas, and religions. Conversely, the history of the Mediterranean should teach that, in a world flooded by exchange through proximity, common experience, and shared resources, dialogue that facilitates understanding can create a path to peaceful and productive interaction.

**References**


Repositioning the Great Sea at the Centre of the World

Part I

Changes and Exchanges within the Mediterranean World
The Emperors, the Caliph(s) and the Doctor: Cross-Cultural Encounters and Interactions on the “Periphery” of Byzantium (ca. 650-950)

LUCA ZAVAGNO & ZEYNEP OLGUN

1. The Iberian Peninsula between the 5th and the 9th centuries.

In his recent book, entitled The Empire that Would Not Die, John Haldon (2016) investigates the survival of the Byzantine Empire during and after the Arab and Lombard invasions (between the mid-7th and mid-8th centuries). Haldon contends that, during this transformative period, the Empire faced collapse after losing its wealthiest provinces in Syria, Palestine, Egypt and North Africa. Haldon further observes that, as a result of these changes, the Empire experienced reduced fiscal income, a general demographic decline and the localization of Mediterranean commerce. In response to these conditions, the court in Constantinople attempted to renegotiate the complex interrelationships among state policy, local identities and religion throughout the realm. Haldon argues that the changes wrought by the 8th-century invasions led to the creation of “an overarching belief system represented by the Christian Roman Empire serving as a powerful unifying force, reflected in the official political and theological discourse” (2016, p. 110). The vested interests of the provincial state and church elites were aligned with those of the Empire only through a combination of coercive military power and ideological solidarity with the imperial church, and because no viable alternative political authority existed. Examining these interrelationships, Haldon observes that provincial ruling elites’ loyalty to the Christian-Imperial ideology was at its strongest in those regions closest to the Emperor, such as Anatolia and the Aegean basin, where the social, military, and fiscal power of Constantinople could be exerted most directly.

Haldon’s interpretative approach has the merit of providing an all-encompassing and systemic explanation for the survival of the Byzantine Empire from the 7th to 9th centuries. However, in our view, his thesis overlooks critical areas of the Empire, especially those that Herrin (2013) calls the “margins of the metropolis,” located far from the so-called Byzantine heartland. Re-enforcing this line of critique, Wickham (2005) famously described the polarities of these peripheral regions of the Empire as, “the uneasy coupling of two wildly different geographical zones: the Anatolian
plateau and the Aegean. One of them ecologically poor and devastated by political events, the other in parallel systemic crises” (p. 626). In part, because the differences and the crises of these peripheral zones have made them more difficult to analyze, the Byzantine “heartland” has become the gravitational center of the Empire’s historiography, leaving other regions, including the Byzantine “Italies” and the islands of Sardinia and the Balearics largely uninvestigated. Sicily presents a partial exception. It has been more thoroughly studied than any other peripheral territory because it was a critical source of grain for Constantinople following the Empire’s loss of Egypt in 642, and because it was the island where Constans II famously met his fate in 668 (Nef-Prigent, 2005). By contrast, mainland Italy has been the focus of far less scholarship on Constantinopolitan political or territorial hegemonies. Byzantinists seldom regard the western parts of the former Roman Empire as critical actors in the history of Byzantium (Von Falkenhausen, 1982, Zanini 1998; and Ravegnani, 2004).

In this paper, we will therefore address the importance of the ideological, cultural and socio-political dimensions of those imperial territories perceived as 1) marginally relevant to the Empire because of their geographical distance from the Basileusa, the Queen of cities, and 2) expendable military strongholds defending a supposedly static frontier with the Muslim powers of the Mediterranean world. In particular, this study investigates the Empire’s western provinces including Sardinia, the Balearics, and parts of Iberia. Byzantine historiography has largely dismissed these provinces as distant Byzantine outposts soon to be lost to Islamic forces, or as territories that, although part of the imperial politeia on paper, were de facto independent polities. On the contrary, we argue that these territories were an integral part of the Byzantine Empire. To demonstrate this point, we will examine the “civic identities” of their populations in order to show how residents of the Empire’s frontier provinces negotiated and maintained solidarity with the Empire by promoting the Christian-Roman ideology and by adopting cross-cultural practices that would help them survive along the borderlands of a dynamic and conflict-ridden Mediterranean world.

Our investigation begins with Iberia and the Balearics. The Byzantines ruled the Iberian Peninsula for only 70 years, whereas they loosely ruled over the Balearics until the beginning of the 10th century. Justinian conquered the southwestern coast of Spain in 552, and the Byzantines controlled the region until the fall of Carthago Spataria, the capital of Byzantine Spain, at the hands of the Visigothic King Suinthila (621-31) (Vallejo Girvés, 2005; Vallejo Girvés, 2009; Vallejo Girvés, 2012). Thereafter, only Septem-Ceuta and the Balearics remained under Constantinopolitan rule. The traditional interpretative narratives about this region of the Byzantine Empire revolve only around crises and defeats such as the loss of Carthago Spataria, the Leovigild unification of the region in 570 and the Arab conquest of 711. Yet, the Empire would continue to invest extensive time, energy and resources in the region for centuries after these events.
Framing relations between the Byzantines, the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearics through a broader Mediterranean perspective calls into question the traditional historical narratives. Certainly, the noted crises are significant political events, but, as we will discuss below, material evidence, including pottery, seals, metalwork and literary sources, tells a different story.

It is instructive to compare the socio-political and cultural impact of the arrival of the so-called “conquistadores” - the Berber and Arab troops that conquered the Iberian peninsula in the first half of the 8th century (Manzano, 2006, pp. 40-41 and 27-176) - with the relatively smooth transition scholars describe when Syria-Palestine passed from Byzantine to Umayyad rule in the mid-7th century (Walmsley, 2007). According to Walmsley, “The expansion of Islam into Syria-Palestine in the 630s was accompanied by only minimal disruption to socio-economic life in both towns and the countryside” (p. 48). Indeed, the rapid Arab conquest of the Byzantine Levant can be partially attributed to economic and socio-political distress that had arisen in the aftermath of a 30-year war with the Sassanids as well as to the religious conflicts between the local monophysite communities and those supporting the official dyophysite doctrine of the Constantinopolitan governments (Gregory, 2005, pp. 177-84; Haldon, 1990, pp. 286-298). In other words, a long period of warfare followed by religious dissent, political factionalism and an economic crisis helped facilitate the Arab invasion of Syria, Palestine and Egypt. Instability led cities across the region to voluntarily open their doors to the newcomers. However, the local non-Muslims populations were forced to pay an annual four dinār poll tax (jizyah) to the Muslim fiscus, rendering them so-called dhimmis (Heck, 2010, p. 109).

In a parallel example, Martínez Jiménez (2013) concludes that, when the Moors entered Visigoth Spain in 711, they too found a kingdom in crisis, plagued by famines and civil wars. A full analysis of the political trajectories of the Visigoth kingdom leading up to this period is beyond the scope of this paper (Wickham, 2005, pp. 219-32). However, Sarris (2011) argues that, despite their promotion of a united Catholic Hispania, by 711, Visigoth society had already grown more fragmented and localized as the economic and political power of the elites increased. Under Arab control this fragmented paradigm persisted; as Martínez Jiménez describes, “towns that surrendered to the conquerors through a treaty (known as a sulh) kept their autonomy, while paying a tax to the Islamic community” (2013, p. 85). For instance, the Ostrogothic aristocrat, Theodimer, who bore the lofty title of Count, was allowed to keep his authority over 7 cities in southern Spain in return for a payment of tribute (Manzano, 2006, pp. 43-6; Collins, 1983, pp. 205-6). As Wickham (2005) states, during this period, “Inside the Arab emirate of Al-Andalus, Berber communities are seen as dominating large sections of eastern mountains” (p. 228), whereas Roman-Visigoth aristocracies control the settlements in the southern areas of the Iberian peninsula.

Despite fragmentation, treaties sealed political and economic unions between the Visigoth aristocracy and the “conquistadores”. Moreover, the two groups often
intermarried, solidifying their alliance and securing the social role of the local Church in the conquered regions (Manzano, 2006, 52-3). Thus, in many ways, the fate of the Spanish cities paralleled the transition of Syria-Palestine from Byzantine to Arab rule: in the towns that surrendered, there were no major immediate changes to the urban landscape. In particular, no new mosques were built in the early period. Instead, Christian cathedrals were used by both Christians and Muslims, often in ceremonies that bound their interests together (Manzano, 2006, p. 256). In this regard, the Visigoth-Muslim treaties contributed to the creation of a hybrid culture.

The interaction of cultures continued unabated during the consolidation of the Umayyad Emirate following the arrival of Abd al-Rahman I in Iberia in 755. Al-Rahman I had fled from Damascus as a result of the Abbasid coup that had overthrown the sovereignty of his family and the Umayyad caliphate. Notably, Al-Rahman I is considered the last prince of the Umayyads, and his authoritative presence inaugurated a period later known as “la convivencia,” the era of co-existence. This term has varied meanings, and its significance for 8th-century Iberia is hotly debated. Many scholars see this as a period when Muslims, Christians and Jews lived together in a relatively peaceful society characterized by flourishing cultural exchange (Cohen, 2007; Menocal, 2002; Fernández-Morera, 2016; Nirenberg, 2002). Yet, other scholars envision the era as defined by constant warfare and invasion that destabilized potential cross-cultural harmony. What is certain is that between the early 8th and 10th centuries, the convivencia of Al-Andalus, this “together-living,” occurred in a versatile manner, taking on various socio-cultural and artistic forms that were shaped by cross-cultural encounters. In what follows, we will explore the Byzantine contributions to culture, society and politics in this dynamic space. Specifically, we will show that 1) the Empire often used the Balearics and Sardinia, the westernmost outposts of its territorial domain, to strategically shape cultural and political developments in the region, and that 2) the contributions of the Byzantines living and operating in the region persisted into the 10th century, when Abd al-Rahman III proclaimed himself Caliph in 929, and beyond.

2. Byzantium and Umayyad al-Andalus.

When analyzing the continuous and complex relationship between Constantinople and the western Mediterranean from the first naval sieges of the Byzantine capital in the 650s to the Byzantine “reconquista” of Crete and Cyprus in 960s, one cannot ignore the episodic military confrontations between the Arabs and Byzantines, which took place before and after the 8th-century establishment of the Umayyad Emirate. Indeed, repeated maritime raids on the Christian settlements of the Balearics and Sardinia as well as on the southern coast of France are recorded between 708 and 903. In Sardinia, the raids culminated when Abd al-

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1 Crete was conquered by al-Andalusian pirates in the 820s, whereas Cyprus had been paying taxes to both the Umayyad Caliphate and the Empire from 686-88 (Loughis, 2010).
Rahman b. Habib sacked the island in 752-53 and forced the local inhabitants to pay the *jizyah* (Stasolla, 2002); after this decree, Ibn al-Ahtir asserts that raids on the island ceased (al-Ahtir, IV, p. 1). However, Andalusian pirates posed a further threat in other regions. For instance, they attacked and conquered Crete via Alexandria in 821-23 (Tsougarakis, 1988, pp. 30-41; Signes-Codoñer, 2004, pp. 186-99). A detailed list of the known Arab raids in the region has been compiled by Jeffreys and Pryor (Jeffreys and Pryor 2004, pp. 33-43).

Fois (2016, pp. 51-52) and others argue that the Arab raids caused the end of Byzantine political rule over the islands of the western Mediterranean and turned them into mere outposts, which he describes as a *limes insulare* [insular border]. Correspondingly, scholars including Fois (2011) and Loughis (2010) have stressed that, since the loss of Africa and Spain reduced the territories under Constantinopolitan rule to Rome, southern Italy and the islands of Sicily, Corsica, the Balearics and Sardinia, the Byzantines shifted their political and military attention to the eastern Mediterranean. However, while it is important to account for the significance of the persistent raids, we should not leap to the conclusion that this activity turned the western Mediterranean into a no-man’s land that was ignored by Constantinople (Ahrweiler, 1961).

On the contrary, there is abundant evidence of local Byzantine squadron fleets (likely based on Sardinia or the Balearics), acting on behalf of the Empire to oppose Arab naval forces or Andalusian pirates. Several examples can be named. In 760, Constantine V staged a naval expedition aimed at reasserting Byzantine power in the Tyrrhenian Sea; further, the *Annales Rhemenses* mention a Byzantine fleet that attacked the fortress of Fraxinetum, in present day Provence in 931 (Frodoardus Remensis, p. 441)²; and, according to Liutprand of Cremon, in 942, a fleet sent by the Byzantine Emperor, Romanus Lecapenus, assaulted the same fortress both by land and by sea in a bid to break the power of the Andalusians in the trans-Alpine region (*Antapodosis* 5.16, p. 181; Ballan, 2010). These active campaigns of the Byzantine navy were reinforced by secular and ecclesiastical elites in the provincial structures of governance.

Our analysis of literary and material evidence from the period confirms that both Sardinia and the Balearics remained a celebrated part of the Constantinopolitan governmental and ideological structures. Several examples demonstrate this point. First, many religious buildings dotting both the rural and urban landscape of Sardinia were dedicated to Byzantine military saints between the 6ᵗʰ and 10ᵗʰ centuries. Some of these churches boasted celebratory inscriptions, which were typically written in high Greek and commissioned by local aristocratic families in the late 9ᵗʰ or 10ᵗʰ centuries. Stouraidis argues that “cultural and territorial discontinuities between the ancient and the medieval Romans were completely irrelevant [to any local community]. What legitimised [their] perception of Roman

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² *Graeci Sarracenos per mare inequentes usque in Fraxinidum saltum, ubi crat refugium ipsorum, et unde egredientes Italiam sedulis praedatontur incursibus, Alpibus eciam occupatis, celeri i ileo propitio internetionc proterunt.*
political culture [...] was the belief in an unbroken continuity of the Roman city-state” (2017, p. 82). Local communities thus expressed their “Romanness” through luxury objects, decorative motifs and architectural structures. Accordingly, the patron families of Sardinia and the Balearics sought to establish their socio-political legitimacy by adopting visual symbols of power that drew upon familiar Constantinopolitan models.

Likewise, in Turris Libysonis (modern Porto Torres), a city on the northern coast of Sicily, an apsidal building – which encroaches on the so-called Baths of King Barbaros (possibly a Roman thermae), and may have formed part of a later fortification – still elevates a famous Greek lintel inscription exalting the great victory of the Sardinian dux Constantine (Spanu 1998, p. 105; Cosentino, 2002, p. 7). It has been dated to the mid-6th century, is written in high Greek and boasts a dedicatory formulation aligned with the Christian-Imperial ideology. As Haldon argues: “there was clearly a shared Christian identity [...] together with a vision of a God protected Roman Empire ruled by a Christ-loving emperor; such beliefs served to reinforce [a Byzantine] community identity and lent to [local] societies a degree of cultural cohesion” (Haldon, 2016, p. 289). The local elites who commissioned such inscriptions had a vested interest in promoting unity through the Christian-Imperial ideology since their survival depended on the continued effectiveness of the Byzantine state apparatus (Haldon, 2016, p. 291).

Similar elements of Imperial ideology also appear on a major cache of over 90 Byzantine lead-seals bearing text in Latin and Greek, which were discovered in the area of San George of Sinis near Cagliari (Spanu-Zucca, 2004; Rowland Jr, 2001; Cosentino, 2002a, p. 74). Lead seals are always produced a short distance from the destination of the documents to which they were attached. In turn, they can help historians reconstruct historical maps of the correspondence between local, provincial and central authorities. In addition, they can point to the persistence of the administrative machinery of government, the role of military commanders (like the archontes or the strategoi), and the importance of leading members of the local elite and ecclesiastical authorities.

The seals in the San George cache date to the period between the 6th and 8th centuries, and provide evidence of regular correspondence between the local authorities in Sardinia and the Constantinopolitan court. A close inspection reveals that until the late 8th century, and possibly even into the 9th century, local officials continued to hold important positions bearing Greek titles that closely mirrored earlier positions. On one seal, a certain Theodatos is, for instance, referred to as upatos kai doux, possibly the same office as the late 7th-century-position of apoeparchon, which had been held by one Theopemptos, possibly dux of Chrisopolis (Forum Traiani) (Zucca, 2002, p. 112). As this seal indicates, in Sardinia the representative of the Byzantine government was not a thematic strategos (like the one ruling Sicily), but rather first a dux and later (perhaps from the late 8th century onward) an archon Sardiniae, a position mentioned in the 10th-century De Caerimoniiis Aulae Byzantinae (De Caerimonii, II, 48; Cosentino, 2002, pp. 9-
The archon had jurisdiction over the commercial activity of the local harbors. He probably wielded a degree of independence from Constantinople since he was likely also in charge of a local naval detachment (Guillou, 1987; Jeffreys-Pryor, 2004, p. 397), which may have helped the local government defend itself against Arab incursions.

Although Sardinia appears to have retained a resilient political, military and ideological connection to Constantinople, Byzantines in these territories sometimes adopted distinct cross-cultural strategies for political survival. These strategies often employed “unorthodox” political initiatives to navigate the complex socio-political nexus that shaped their lives. Most immediately, they paid tribute to the Umayyad Emirate. They also engaged external allies. For instance, in 815, they sent an embassy to the Carolingians requesting help in fighting against the Andalusians (Ehinard, 202). Evidently, being loyal to the Empire did not exclude political experiments and cross-cultural fertilization or preclude the emergence of seemingly contradictory political alliances.

From its location off the eastern Al-Andalusian coast, the Balearic archipelago retained strong, if fraught, religious links and political parallels with Byzantine Sardinia. On the one hand, the famous petitions of 892 and 897, sent from the Bishopric of Gerona on the northeastern coast of Spain to Popes Formosus and Romanus clearly sought to claim ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the islands at the expense of the Byzantine Metropolitan of Sardinia (Signes-Codoñer, 2005, p. 52). On the other hand, a cache of 7th- and 8th-century lead seals, boasting Constantinopolitan honorific titles, show that the Balearics were bound to the Byzantine political authorities through models shared by the Sardinians (Vallejo Girvès, 2005, p. 471). They make clear, for instance, that the organization of the four Sardinian giudiclates that governed the islands in the late Middle Ages was based upon the Byzantine institution of the archontate (Spanu, 2006). A recently discovered seal belonging to one Górdio, archon of Mallorca, and dated to the 8th century also suggests that, as in Sardinia, in the Balearics, a “Byzantine” maritime archontate was also established. It appears to have lasted until the 10th century when the archipelago became part of the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordoba (de Nicolás-Moll, 2013). Finally, the lead seals attest to the presence of mulūk, a term referring to local notables who loosely represented Byzantine political power; the seals therefore seem to indicate that, in Balearic society, a large degree of the political coherence revolved around local elites.

The sigillographic evidence from the Balearics and Sardinia thus reveals strong military, administrative and religious links with Constantinople, and demonstrates the use of “highly developed and multi-cultural skills on the part of human agents to move between different spheres characterized by a distinct cultural heritage.” (König 2012, p. 57). In the Balearics, local elites seem to have used such skills to occupy a

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3 The strategos was the main civil and military officer ruling a theme—the main military/administrative territorial district of the Byzantine Empire. Sicily was the only island to be elevated to the rank of theme in the period under analysis (see Haldon, 2016, pp. 266-282 for further bibliography).
mediating role in Byzantine-Umayyad cross-cultural interaction. They facilitated commerce and communication across the political and religious boundaries of the western Mediterranean, and, in doing so, adopted flexible tactics for political survival. For instance, according to Signes-Codoñer (2005, p. 32), the *Annales Regni Francorum* recounts how, in 789, Moors and Saracens attacked the Balearic Islands, the population of which “ven obligadas a pedir ayuda a los carolingios para su efectiva defensa” or “were forced to ask for help from the Carolingians to ensure effective defence”. Like their subsequent plea to the Carolingians in 815, the request was granted: the 798 Balearic petition for aid from the Carolingian empire brought the Frankish fleet into the fight and resulted in the defeat of the Muslim navy in Mallorcan waters (*Annales Regni Francorum*, p. 104).

A similar process has been documented for Medieval Cyprus where the local population paid taxes to both the Byzantines and the Arabs. Again, local elites acted as cultural brokers while fostering the creation of a middle ground between the Caliphate and the Empire (Zavagno, 2017). In this light, it is notable that Cyprus and the Balearics were the only regions defined by the Arab sources as *Dar al-ahd*, or “the area of the pact,” a region operating on a nominal truce involving three parties: the Caliphate, the Empire and the local population and elites (who were regarded as independent despite paying a tribute to Cordoba) (Mansouri, 2001). By examining the early Islamic legal and historiographical evidence, Lynch (2016) has recently advanced our understanding of the intricate nexus between the socio-political, cultural and economic relationships that lay at the very heart of these agreements. Lynch’s work reveals that such arrangements occurred only in territories regarded by the Arabs as “unlike any others as [their] status, location and shared influence presented the Muslim jurists and administrators with a number of challenges [not easy to address]” (p. 549). In all probability, it was left to the local population and elites to navigate through these challenges and to create solutions that allowed daily life and business to continue whenever possible.

Shaped by the immense gravitational pull of two massive Mediterranean polities - the Empire and the Caliphate - the geo-strategic location of islands like the Balearics and Cyprus was both an advantage and a problem. On the one hand, these islands were plagued by tensions and wars. Cyprus experienced repeated episodes of forced population relocation as well as frequent raids and military confrontations between the late 7th and 9th centuries. Likewise, the Balearics were continuously targeted by the Umayyads and by pirates in the 9th century.

On the other hand, these islands were loci where unique socio-political relationships and cross-cultural interactions could take place. For instance, the 839-40 correspondence between Emir Abd al-Rahman II and Emperor Teophilos aimed to foster an alliance between Byzantium and the Umayyad Emirate of Cordoba against the Abbasid Caliphate. Although the Balearics were not explicitly mentioned in this correspondence, Signes-Codoñer (2005) has analyzed how this letter implicitly affirms Byzantine sovereignty on the Balearics and attests to the good political relationships between the Emirate and the Empire. Signes-Codoñer
also asserts that, if there was any major political or military conflict between Byzantium and Cordoba, it would have been mentioned explicitly in the evidence since the Emir gave Byzantium full liberty to fight against the Andalusian pirates who had recently occupied Crete (Signes-Codoñer, 2005, p. 51).

In light of Byzantium’s cordial political and diplomatic relations with Cordoba from the mid-9th through early 10th centuries, we contend that it is crucial to reassess the Umayyad occupation of the Balearics. At this time, a remarkable degree of realpolitik began to shape the policies of the court in Constantinople. A new flexible approach to diplomacy promoted working with the Spanish Caliphate to advance “common commercial interests,” and, especially, to ward off the “danger that the emergence of Fatimid power represented for both of them” (p. 64). Notably, the establishment of this new Fatimid power and its firm control of Egypt spurred the Caliphate and the Empire to act decisively to form an alliance. Byzantium used the Balearics as a bargaining chip, which it sacrificed to change the political balance in the Mediterranean; the alliance ultimately led to the final capitulation of the Balearics to the Umayyads in 903 (p. 65).

As a result of the Fatimid shift to the East and the Ottonian interference in Italy, from the 960s onwards the western Islamic lands of Spain, North Africa and Sicily lost much of their former importance for the Byzantine government. Only the short-lived attempt by Michael IV and Basil II to re-conquer Sicily in the first decade of the 11th century extended the long arc of Byzantine investment in the Western Mediterranean into the late Medieval Era.


Material evidence can act as a non-verbal indicator of long-term exchange and the blending of cultural elements, and it helps us explore the creation and expression of new or hybrid identities beyond ethnic or religious borders. Political and administrative records are the ideal complement to such material evidence. In “Reading Art and Material Culture: Greeks, Slavs and Arabs in the Byzantine Aegean,” Vionis analyses a set of aniconic fresco decorations painted in the churches of Naxos between the late 8th and the early 9th centuries (2013). The frescoes lead Vionis to conclude that true convivencia results from the degree to which a specific group retains its own identity and characteristics while at the same time accommodating or appropriating qualities from its counterparts. Although Vionis’ research centers on the small island of Naxos, an insular context at the very core of the Byzantine heartland, like the outposts in the Western Mediterranean, Naxos suffered repeated Arab raids in the 8th century. Vionis’ analysis of the frescoes has relevance for the western outposts of the Byzantine Empire.

Vionis himself looks far beyond the Aegean to the iconic Great Mosque of Cordoba to find a comparable example of art forged by a combination of foreign
Luca Zavagno & Zeynep Olgun

and local elements. He points out that the Cordoba Mosque united architectural practices and decorative motifs from different cultures, including the Byzantine culture, to simultaneously articulate a newly acquired socio-political identity and legitimize the recently established Caliphate. For instance, the use of mosaics to embellish the *mihrab* and the dome of the mosque in the second half of the 10th century drew upon Byzantine cultural and artistic practices. Ibn *'Idhari*, the early 14th-century Arab historian, described how, when al-Hakam II (the 2nd Caliph of Cordoba after Abd al-Rahman III) claimed the Caliphate in 929, he sent an ambassador to the Emperor of “Rum” (presumably Nikaphoros II Phokas) in Constantinople requesting craftsmen to help decorate part of the Great Mosque of Córdoba (*al-Bayan al-Mughrīb* 2:237-38). The Emperor provided workers and mosaic masters, and also sent *tesserae*, or mosaic cubes, as a gift. In June 965, both the dome and the *mihrab* of the Great Mosque were completed.

According to Ibn *'Idhari*, the Caliph’s motive was to follow the famous example set in the 8th century by al-Walid, the 6th Umayyad Caliph and son of Caliph Abd al-Malik. Through his expansionist policies, al-Walid had initiated the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. The Caliph also commissioned the Great Mosque of Damascus, one of the most revered early monuments to Umayyad power (Bloom, 1993, p. 26). During its construction, al-Walid established an arrangement with the Byzantines that set a precedent for the aesthetic program of al-Hakam II. Indeed, the mosaics in Damascus are attributed to Byzantine craftsmen, and one Arab source recalls that the 8th-century mosaics were made of gold and silver transported by 18 mules from Cyprus.

Did the Byzantine artisans working in Cordoba travel from Constantinople? Or were they part of local communities living on the edge of the two empires? We may never know. Certainly, as scholars like Fairchild Ruggles argue, “the mosaics must have had strong Umayyad associations that out-weighted any Byzantine resonance, [...] they referred to an Umayyad time and place that was quite far from 10th-century Córdoba” (Fairchild Ruggles, 2004, p. 83). The decision to use Byzantine mosaic styles and craftsmen in Cordoba arose, Fairchild Ruggles argues, from more than admiration for Byzantine art (and its Venetian and Norman derivations), or from the appropriation of techniques used in early Islamic architecture in the Levant. Regardless, the appropriation of Byzantine artistic practices served as a mediating process - which was cross-cultural in nature and thus characteristic of western Mediterranean socio-political dynamics - to legitimize and display a legacy in Cordoba.

Indeed, the Byzantine aesthetic is not the only one evident in the mosque. As Dodds (1990, p. 100) suggests, the additions made by al-Hakam II, are built on an arch-like apse commonly found in western European Christian churches. Moreover, the unprecedented integration of the octagonal *mihrab* resonates with architectural features of Spanish Christian churches, and Roman *spolia* were used for the column capitals, a common practice in European churches.
By imitating the aesthetic practices of the Umayyads of Damascus as well as the Byzantines and western European Christians, the caliphs of Cordoba linked their identity and heritage to their Syrian roots while also appropriating cultural traditions they encountered in Europe (Fairchild Ruggles, 2004, p. 83). Ultimately, through its cross-cultural elements and its connection to Damascus, the Great Mosque stood as a testament to the prestige of Andalusian Umayyad rule.

**Conclusions**

The extant political and diplomatic records point to the continued importance that the western Mediterranean held for Byzantium. In turn, they reveal that Sardinian and Balearic elites retained a degree of loyalty towards their distant Emperor despite the absence of a strong central army or political institutions that enacted Byzantine imperial practice. To strengthen their association with Constantinople and negotiate their position on the frontier between competing cultural and political systems, the islands’ elites used various strategies including the creative application of the Christian-Roman ideology to shape their communal identities in art and life. As Holmes (2012) points out, communal identities should be understood less as the imposition of boundaries and more as the development of shared beliefs and practices. Accordingly, Stouraidis (2017) has recently proposed a reassessment of how the form and content of Byzantine Roman identity developed. He suggests that for local Byzantine identities, “loyalty and disloyalty to the center remained principally a matter of power relations, personal ties of provincial magnates to the imperial court and the bilateral relationship between the local/regional community to the imperial capital” (p. 82). Following suit, we observe that, along the frontier zone of the Western Mediterranean, power relations often overrode the ethnic bonds or common interest of the united Roman community. Frontiersmen of the Empire experimented with new ways of turning bilateral relationships into multilateral socio-political tactics for survival. The result was a fluid nexus of political, administrative and fiscal (as well as aesthetic) structures ambiguously defined in the evidence, including in the Arab legal sources. It is well-documented that in the eastern Mediterranean and, in particular, in Cyprus, Christians and Muslims shared the same buildings for prayer, and merchants and religious authorities regularly traveled to and from the Levant under Umayyad and Abbasid rule (Zavagno, 2017). Similarly, the Byzantines actively participated in fertile cultural exchange on the western bounds of the Mediterranean Empire.

Thus, the available material and documentary evidence demonstrates that the Balearics and Sardinia served as mediating grounds between the cultures of the western Mediterranean.
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The Emperors, the Caliph(s) and the Doctor


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**Medieval sources**


Conflicts, Equilibria, Hegemonies: the Case for Catalan-Aragonese Expansion as a Starting Point in Late Medieval Mediterranean Studies Based on a Survey of Recent Scholarship

PIETRO CORRAO

1. The Mediterranean in 20th-Century Medieval Studies

The broken Mediterranean of Henri Pirenne

In the 1920s, the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne proposed an influential thesis: the spread of Islam across the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean and the end of political, economic and cultural unity in the ancient Mediterranean world “made” the European Middle Ages. Pirenne famously concluded that the “lack” of a cohesive Mediterranean shaped the Medieval West as a continental civilization that differed radically from the ancient, Mediterranean-centered world of the Romans; “feudalism” and the agrarian economy of the Early Middle Ages in Europe emerged in response to the new power of Islam in the Mediterranean (Pirenne, 1987).

Although strongly criticized, the core of the Pirenne thesis remains alive today, and continues to shape contemporary scholarship on Medieval Mediterranean history. Indeed, in accord with Pirenne’s thesis, the Great Sea is still frequently conceived as a moving and permeable border between two allegedly distinct, yet interdependent civilizations (Havighurst, 1958; Lopez, 1945; Petralia, 1995). Nevertheless, since Pirenne’s publication, several generations of scholars have transformed our understanding of the Mediterranean’s apparent divisions against a backdrop of cross-cultural interconnectivity. This essay surveys developments in the study of the late Medieval Mediterranean world and concludes by advancing a new research agenda for future scholarship on this dynamic period through the lens of Southern Italy.

The Crusaders’ Mediterranean

For many years, British, French and American historians in particular, saw Europe’s Christian crusaders as protagonists in Mediterranean history (Riley Smith, 1977; Riley Smith, 1981). According to this interpretive paradigm, the crusading Christian knights were a major catalyst behind the growing power of the West during the late Medieval Era. As the seminal “event” of the period, the Crusades are alleged to have established an enduring frontier between Christendom
and the Islamic worlds and to have provided a consequential stimulus for Western economic penetration into Eastern routes and markets. Recent historiography has, however, recognized the limited duration of the crusader states in the Levant and questioned the role the Crusades played in creating a period of Western hegemony over Eastern markets. The new research on this topic has focused on understanding the meaning and significance of the Crusades for European society; the importance of Eastern science, technology and tools of warfare for Early Modern Europe; and the rallying of Christendom around the Papacy during this dynamic period in Europe’s past (Cahen, 1992; Riley Smith, 2003).

**The scenery of the “Commercial Revolution” (R.S. Lopez)**

In the 1960s, beginning with his seminal study of the Genoese notarial archives, Roberto Sabatino Lopez reconstructed a narrative of Western economic growth based upon the powerful commercial economies of great Italian cities (Lopez & Raymond, 1955; Lopez, 1971). According to Lopez, Genoa, Venice and Pisa led the dramatic growth of long-distance commerce and military control of Mediterranean trade routes by Western Europeans. The emphasis placed by Lopez (1971) on the role of Italian merchants confirmed and enhanced Pirenne’s earlier statement that the 11th century was a turning point in Western history, while also recognizing, to a greater extent than Pirenne, the importance of West-East commerce in the Medieval Mediterranean.

Lopez’s work marks the peak of a historiographical trend that focused attention on the Genoese or Venetian colonies in the East and on the origins of an economic dualism between Northern and Southern Europe. However, as subsequent scholars recognized, a framework built by these studies remains incomplete if we do not consider the political side of the Mediterranean’s history (Goitein, 1967-93; Lane, 1973; Ashtor, 1982; Abulafia, 1994; Lopez, 1996). In what follows, I offer a critical survey of a countervailing tradition in the historiography by surveying a body of scholarly works that foregrounds the importance of politics in the history of the people and places that border the Mediterranean Sea.

**The Mediterranean of political struggles (D. Abulafia)**

In 1997, D. Abulafia dedicated an important book to the “struggle for dominion” over the Mediterranean region in the Late Middle Ages (Abulafia, 1997). For the first time since Michele Amari’s work of 1848, Abulafia acknowledged the war between the Crown of Aragon, the Angevins of Naples and the Kingdom of Sicily as a critical event in late Medieval Mediterranean politics. Abulafia’s political and military perspective in the text, far from putting aside the economic and commercial features of Mediterranean history, focuses on the central role played by these powerful late Medieval kingdoms in shaping the Sea’s hegemonies.
The Mediterranean in the “Making of Europe” (R. Bartlett)

The Medieval Mediterranean also appears as the protagonist in one of the most impressive and original studies of an even broader subject: the development of Europe’s modern borders.

In 1994, R. Bartlett published The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization, Cultural Change. 950-1350. This book posits that the origins of current European geography are to be found in a great demographic increase combined with the “colonization” of North-Eastern and Southern European lands through military and economic strategies by a “post-Carolingian core” of nobles, bishops and free farmers. Within this context, the Spanish Reconquista, the Norman conquest of Southern Italy, the Crusades and the aggressive commercial initiatives of Italian merchants on the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean routes all played critical roles. The renewed bond between continental Europe and the Mediterranean world appears here as one - maybe the most important - of the stones on which modern European society was built.

Beyond the Middle Ages: the Mediterranean as a “world” (F. Braudel)

Much like Pirenne’s foundational work on this topic, Braudel’s seminal studies on the Mediterranean world need not be discussed at length. Beginning with the region’s political history, Braudel later widened his purview to investigate all aspects of Mediterranean civilizations. For Braudel, the geographical features of the Mediterranean, as well as some lasting economic phenomena, helped to establish what he called the long durée characteristics of the history of the Mediterranean world. These characteristics included: the borders between arid and temperate lands; the chains of islands that allow safe navigation; the permanent shape of the navigation routes; the role of the seaports; and the region’s relations with outer economies. After Braudel, historians of the Mediterranean could no longer ignore these features (Braudel, 1949; Braudel, 1987).

Since the publication of Braudel’s works, the Mediterranean world has been the subject of a wide range of interdisciplinary studies, both historical and anthropological, which have stressed the Medieval Era as a turning point in its history (Horden, Purcell, 2000, Abulafia, 2003; Abulafia, 2011; Guarracino, 2007; Benigno, 2013).

2. A late Medieval Mediterranean protagonist: the Crown of Aragon

The Crown of Aragon

Since the mid-20th century, a rich Spanish and Italian historiography has analyzed the so-called “Aragonese-Catalan expansion in the Mediterranean”. Surprisingly, this important subject has been neglected by mainstream Medieval Studies. In the second part of this paper, I have chosen to focus on the history of the Crown of Aragon because I contend that this subject shows, better than many
Pietro Corrao

others, how commerce and military-political trends shaped late Medieval Mediterranean history. Specifically, I argue that at the end of the 13th century, a new political, military and economic power appeared in the Mediterranean, changing the equilibria among the sovereigns acting in that area. From the conquest of Sicily by the king of Aragon in 1283 to the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous, the Papacy, as well as both the primary Mediterranean commercial forces of Venice, Genoa and Florence and the less influential Mediterranean kingdoms, had to face an unexpected and unbowed competitor.

The Crown of Aragon: from a small Iberian kingdom to a powerful Mediterranean multi-state (12th-13th centuries)

The so-called “Crown of Aragon” was created from the dominions of Ramiro the Monk, Count of Barcelona, who became king of Aragon by marriage in 1136. From that point forward, the Kingdom became a major figure in the Reconquista. In fact, the expansion on Muslim lands affected the Mediterranean coast of the Peninsula and islands, generating different kingdoms (Valencia, Mallorca) ruled by the same king (Sesma Muñoz, 2000).

In the early 13th century, the King of Aragon’s efforts to expand his dominion towards Southern France were frustrated. In response, his foreign policy looked towards the closer Mediterranean islands. This shift in policy occurred in part because the main social and economic power of the Kingdom was composed of the vibrant merchant class of Barcelona, Majorca and Perpignan, who, for many decades, maintained close commercial relations with the North-West African coast.

In 1282, the rebellion of Sicily against Charles of Anjou gave Peter of Aragon the opportunity to take the Crown of the island’s ancient kingdom. This was the first step in an expansion policy that would follow the “ruta de las islas” (the route of islands) towards the Eastern Mediterranean; this route matched the “ruta de las especias” (spice route), and promised to open the rich Eastern markets to Catalan commerce (Del Treppo, 1972). Although countered by the Pope, the Italian merchant cities and the Anjou established a well-built dominion on Sicily and Greece—regions where they built bases of operation that supported the merchants’ expanding activities in the wealthy seaports of the East.

Towards the Mediterranean “Imperi” of Alphonse the Magnanimous (14th-15th centuries)

In the early years of the 13th century, James of Aragon, who had been appointed Church Admiral by the Pope, proclaimed his plan for expansion, “We work to follow our route towards the East”. This was the first overt statement of a military and political program that would guide Aragonese-Catalan foreign policy for over two centuries. After a temporary halt in the 14th century, the program was re-adopted by King Alfonso the Magnanimous. Following this policy led the Crown of Aragon to control the Kingdom of Naples; support Greek and Albanian resistance against Ottomans in the Balkans; and attempt to wrest control of the Kingdom of Hungary.
These actions reflect the King’s expansionist aims in the name of Empire, and indeed, the word “Imperi” (Empire) appears frequently in the King’s political lexicon (Hillgarth, 1975; Ryder, 1992; Ferrer & Mutgé, 2005; Sabaté, 2017).

Notably, the structure of a multi-state monarchy allowed the King to maintain the fidelity of his dominions, preserve local laws and constitutional buildings, and rely on the varied resources of diverse lands (Gonzalez Antón, 1989). From this perspective, it is clear that Alfonso planned a kind of “Mediterranean commonwealth”, in which the Crown would be the center of an economic policy that would add value to the Kingdom’s resources through exchange (Del Treppo, 1978).

**The Crown of Aragon as a Mediterranean network: immigration and repopulation**

The early assimilation of the Mediterranean countries into Aragonese domains formed the groundwork on which the later Spanish Monarchy could found its Empire. The Aragonese-Catalan expansion in Sicily, Sardinia, and Southern Italy (and also temporarily Greece) heavily affected the societies of these countries. For example, after the Reconquista, Islamic lands in Iberia were heavily repopulated by both the Aragonese and the Catalans. Sardinia too was settled by Catalan merchants, soldiers, nobles and officers who often intermarried with the local women. More populated and wealthy, Sicily experienced a strong immigration of Iberian nobles at the same time that a tight network of merchant communities spread throughout the towns of the island, often becoming part of the ruling class.

Moreover, in Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples, a great number of officers came from Spain to serve the King and, in many cases, they became citizens of Italian towns. The prevalence of Catalan - or generally Spanish - names in Southern Italy, Sardinia and Sicily today attests to the intermarriage between Iberians and natives during this period (Corrao, 1991).

**The Crown of Aragon as a Mediterranean network: merchants and ship owners**

Although shifting continuously over time, the activities of the Catalan merchants generated a vibrant network of trade throughout the Mediterranean. Their early activities were bolstered by the King of Aragon’s conquest of the Balearic islands in the early 13th century, but the “Great Leap Forward” for the Aragonese came with the integration of Sicily, the central Mediterranean island, into the Catalan-Aragonese dominion. From the seaports of Sicily, where Catalans were given privileges and built a network of consulates, they began traveling the Eastern maritime routes towards Syria, Cyprus, Crete and Constantinople, and challenging the strength of their rivals, the Italian merchant cities (Del Treppo, 1972; Abulafia, 1994, Ferrer & Coulon, 1999; Ferrer, 2003; Coulon, 2004). Very often, merchants were both businessmen and royal ambassadors or spies, and their activities were eased by the privileges that they obtained in the Crown’s dominions or by the treaties that kings made with both Christian and Islamic foreign states (Dufourcq, 1966). In addition, a crowd of small and large ship builders and ship owners provided services to merchants from all nations. From the great *Atarazanas*
(Arsenal) in Barcelona to the smaller shipyards on the Catalan coast, the facilities offered irreplaceable aid to Mediterranean sea traffic and strong support for the policy of the king (Del Treppo, 1972).

The wars fought by the Crown against the Genoese in the 14th century and against the Florentines in the 15th century have their roots in the commercial competitions that developed between Catalan and Italian merchants during the formative years of Aragonese overseas expansion.

The circulation of constitutional models

The Crown of Aragon provided a framework for the continuous exchange of models of government: by copying and borrowing single institutions or offices, aspects of the constitutional structures of the different kingdoms were slowly, but effectively spread throughout the vast Aragon domains. For instance, the King’s court adopted the model of the Papal Chancery, which had been the root of a similar Sicilian office; the Kingdom also imported the long Sicilian tradition of a central office to control accounts; and Sicily itself created another central financial office on a model imported from Castile (D’Agostino, 2000; Corrao, 2005).

Perhaps the most important cases of assimilation are those of the Viceroy and the Parliament. In the 13th century, Sicily adopted the Iberian parliamentary system (the Cortes), which was later brought to the Neapolitan kingdom. Sicily, the Crown’s first dominion outside the Iberian peninsula, also became the grounds for experimenting with the Vice-royal system: stemming from the Iberian tradition of delegating royal powers, it offered a method for ruling any “foreign” country under the Aragon, and even provided the basis on which the vice-royal system was developed in the New World under the Spanish Empire.

3. Final remarks

Through a historiographical survey of a few key texts and a small “case study”, I have tried to represent a late Medieval history of the rich Mediterranean world, a domain comprised of Muslims, Jews, and Christians, merchants and spices, kingdoms and maritime republics. I find the region’s deepest meaning in the long-lasting interactions between its various elements. I hope that the flourishing of new studies about the Catalan-Aragonese expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean will add new tiles to the complex mosaic that is the late Medieval Mediterranean world.

References

Conflicts, Equilibria, Hegemonies


Ekin Can Göksoy

Introduction

Galata, a historic neighborhood in Istanbul, Turkey, lies on the northern shore of the Golden Horn in the Bosporus Strait. If you walk through the steep and narrow streets of Galata today, it is still possible to find a detail that will transport you back in time, or to enter an area where this neighborhood is suddenly and completely unrecognizable - even to locals. Throughout Istanbul, years of continuous urban transformation and so-called renewal projects have demolished great features of the city’s Byzantine culture and have heavily altered many of the historical buildings in Galata, as well as in the districts of Pera, Beyoğlu, Karaköy and Şişli. These neighborhoods lie in the western region of the city, where most of the European and non-Muslim population lived during the Ottoman era. Many of Istanbul’s modern changes occurred in the 19th century when municipality work commenced in Pera. Thereafter, during the 1950s, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes led another major movement promoting grand transformations, a process that surged again 30 years later in the 1980s when Mayor Bedrettin Dalan destroyed an entire neighborhood in Beyoğlu to open space for a wide boulevard. More recently, the drastic urban renovation and reconstruction has continued under the rule of the Justice and Development Party or AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), especially in neighborhoods such as Sulukule and Tarlabası. Together, these and other projects have transformed the old neighborhoods’ unique architectural styles, distinctive façades, appealing ornamentation and patterning into all-too-familiar urban settings characterized by a bland “shopping mall” aesthetic. A walk down the formerly illustrious İstiklal Street is now a stroll through the type of open-air mall that can be found in any other major European city.

Yet down the side streets of Galata, it is still possible to glimpse the contours of the old city, to breath its history and to feel a sense of authenticity. From this vantage point, it is clear that the old and the new do not always harmonize easily in contemporary Istanbul. Investigating this juxtaposition, my paper contends that the disjointed sense of time and space a visitor feels in Galata derives, in part, from its history as a commercial district. In particular, I posit that the development of
accommodations and privileges for foreign merchants shaped the outstanding features of the historic neighborhood that remain today.

In the first part of this paper, I offer a general history of how municipal and state authorities accommodated foreign merchants across the Mediterranean in order to frame the unique example of Galata within a wider history of commercial and cultural exchange. Specifically, I show how, in the Medieval Era, Mediterranean trade between highly diverse countries impacted the structural evolution of urban trading centers, setting in motion a pattern of urban development central to the history of Galata. In the paper’s second half, I examine how these trends were manifested in Istanbul’s built-environment through the history of one of Galata’s most iconic buildings: Saint Pierre Inn.

Despite their transformations over time, modern cities are often built upon the same basic parts that constituted the early cities from which they emerged. In his book, *The City Assembled*, architectural historian Spiro Kostof (1999, p. 92) characterized these component parts as: (i) administrative, (ii) religious, (iii) business & commercial and (iv) residential; he argued that each region of the city has its own dynamics connected to its internal operations.

For Kostof, merchants’ quarters are historically unique, in part because they bring people of diverse backgrounds together in complex and unusual ways. Even when clear segregation exists in the social and cultural spheres of a merchant quarter, the imperatives of doing business often bridge apparent divisions (Kostof, 1999, p. 107). As both Kostof and Nora (1994, p. 663) demonstrate through the examples of Moscow and Galata, respectively, over time, the cross-cultural dimensions of commercial districts, aided by their status as sites of accumulated capital, render them distinct from the cities’ other residential and/or administrative zones.

Kostof and Nora’s observations speak to patterns of historical development that have taken shape in commercial cities around the Mediterranean world. For example, in North Africa and the Byzantine Empire, a type of institution variously called a *funduq*, *fondaco*, *embolon* etc., was frequently built to host European merchants. Although this type of institution’s name changed from place to place, its urban form maintained consistent characteristics that brought an element of uniformity to port cities across the Mediterranean Sea. In the late Medieval Era, this institution was adopted and further developed by the Italian maritime republics, including in Galata, a city where Venetian and Genoese merchants received unique trading privileges, and which became an official Genoese colony with charters obtained from the Byzantine Empire in the 14th century.

Even after the Fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, the Genoese initially maintained many privileges. Gradually, however, they ceded power to the Ottomans. Galata lost its semi-autonomous status, but preserved the nature of its traditional operations; by the 17th century, the district was integrated into the commercial part of the city.

Although the power that the maritime empires of Italy held in the region had declined, their authority remained inscribed in the collective memory of local
Accommodating Foreign Merchants in a Changing Mediterranean

merchants and the fabric of the cities they had occupied. This was decidedly the case in Galata. When the Ottoman Empire took control of Constantinople, the accommodations that had characterized the district under Byzantine rule were transformed. The funduqs that had essentially functioned as inns became trading centers, lodges and banks for Europeans who hailed from various ports and who enjoyed privileges similar to those that had been given to the Genoese by the Byzantines. Still, recalling the district’s history, the European travelers and merchants continued to call the evolving complexes funduqs in their firsthand accounts.

Today, the Medieval and Early Modern sites of lodging and accommodation have become sites of memory for the merchants’ descendants living in contemporary Istanbul. The second part of this paper examines one such site closely: the 18th-century case of Saint Pierre Han. Through an analysis of the structure, I explore the continuities and changes in the merchant tradition of Galata and its impact on the district’s built environment from the 18th century to the present day.

1. From pandocheion to han

Olivia Constable (2003, pp. 2-3) argues that, since the Mediterranean Sea has always been a “home” for travelers, the region naturally developed a family of institutions to provide visiting foreigners with shelter, food, sanctuary and other basic needs. Consequently, these needs fundamentally shaped the history of urban development in many cities of the region (Kostof 1999, p. 94). This family of institutions finds common origin in the pandocheion (Constable, 2003, p. 1), and, although the terms changed, the structures shared continuities that endured over 2 millennia. The term pandocheion means inn or hostelry in classical Greek. It provides the etymological root from which the terms funduq in Arabic and fondaco in Italian were derived, attesting to the long tradition of cultural exchanges between the Greeks, Arabs and Western Christians around the Mediterranean littoral (Constable, 2003, p. 147).

In Dar al-Islam (the lands of Islam), however, the role of the funduq was especially important for foreign merchants because of their unique and at times ambiguous status within the sovereign realms in which the merchants plied their trade. Non-Muslims living in Muslim territory were typically dhimmis who paid a head tax and whose commercial activities were restricted. To overcome these barriers to commerce, by the late 12th century, the Muslim sultanates of Northern Africa began granting an aman, or a permission for safe conduct, to merchants from certain nations. As Constable explores (2003, p. 115), technically, an aman, could only be granted by one individual to another. Yet, the Fatimids and Ayyubids alike offered these documents/allowances to merchants from Christian nations, giving them special status and privileges of which other dhimmis were deprived.
Christian merchants were even permitted to build their own churches, operate their own ovens, etc. Correspondingly, between the 10th and 13th centuries, funduqs developed as complexes that hosted Christian merchants in Mediterranean cities under Fatimid and Ayyubid rule.

The buildings typically had a bakery and other facilities crucial for daily life, as well as gates encompassing and protecting the sanctuary. The gates closed at certain times and regulated which merchants could enter and stay in the complex. Although the funduqs were principally owned and maintained by Muslim governments, they were often staffed by Western European Christians (Constable 2003, p. 8). A consul was typically appointed for each, either by the merchants’ home state or through a local merchant election. This type of consul was not an ambassador in the modern sense, but more akin to a Medieval bailo or podestà, who represented the foreign population of their funduq complex and held status within it. Kostof (1999, p. 94) argues that the foreign merchant complexes were, in fact, called “nations” and that, due to the nature of their work, they were in essence “consulates”. However, it is important to point out that they did not represent their homelands directly in state-level relations; rather, they were only responsible for their own citizens and subjects in the foreign country.

The Eastern Christian world had its own counterparts to the funduqs. In Byzantine Constantinople, for example, instead of funduqs or fondacos, from as early as 6th century CE to the late 13th century CE, similar institutions housing foreign merchants were called mitaton. When the mitaton no longer fulfilled the needs of the growing number of merchants, the Byzantine Empire allowed another type of structure called the embolo/embolon. This term came to connote various, related structures over the centuries that followed. In general, however, embolons were also territorial enclaves composed of houses, ovens, baths, warehouses, and churches (Constable, 2003, pp. 147-150). One such embolo was built on the location currently occupied by the Yer Altı Mosque (“the Underground Mosque”) in Istanbul near the shoreline of Galata. It began as a self-contained building, but, as economic relations developed with the Genoese and the Venetians, it was transformed into what might be called a “commercial colony”.

A third iteration of the structure used as an inn or lodging for foreign residents in Byzantium was called a han. In Galata, hans such as Saint Pierre Han also functioned on the model of a funduq/embolon/mitaton. Saint Pierre Han was built inside Galata’s walls; it was not only located in the commercial district, it was the very heart of it.

2. Galata as a commercial district

Today, a multi-million-dollar project to renovate Galata Port is underway. But the phenomenon of re-inventing this historic neighborhood for commercial purposes is nothing new. In fact, Galata has been a battleground for maritime powers seeking
trading privileges since the 10th century. In the late Medieval period, it was a site of regular conflict between the Byzantine Empire and the Italian maritime republics, especially Genoa and Venice (Eyice, 1969, p. 46-8; Arseven, 1989, pp. 34-38). The Amalfi, Venetians, Pisans and Genoese all established colonies in Galata, each with its own, somewhat autonomous facilities and administration. In their respective colonies, the Pisans ruled through a consul, the Genoese through a podestà and the Venetians through a bailo (Arseven 1989, p. 31).

In 1276, Galata became a Genoese colony, quasi-independent from the Byzantine Empire, and, by 1303, the Genoese had acquired the right to build walls in the city (Doğan Kuban 1996, p. 185), which lead to the construction of Galata Tower in 1349. From this point until the Fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, the colony remained the central district for Istanbul’s trade and commerce. It provided the grounds for a lively and cross-cultural merchant life full of indoor markets, bazaars, stores and lodgings for foreigners.

During the Fall of Constantinople, most of the city’s residents had fled to safety as Sultan Mehmed II demolished large sections of the Genoese walls. Although scholars debate the motivation behind the action, it signaled a new era in Galata’s urban development. Arseven (1989, p. 40) argues that the Sultan destroyed these walls as an act of retaliation since the Genoese, though ostensibly neutral, had secretly aided the Byzantines. Eyice, on the other hand, suggests that the Ottomans destroyed only the battlements as a symbolic act to honor the power and superiority of the Genoese (1969, p. 62). Regardless, after the Ottomans conquered Galata in 1453, an agreement was signed partially preserving the rights of its residents, and thus maintaining the unique status of Galata as a center of trade under the Sultan’s new regime.

After the siege ended, Mehmed II beckoned the refugees back to their homes and stores. When they did not come, the sovereign made a new call in the name of repopulation; he invited the people of Anatolia to move to Galata and occupy any building they desired (İnalçık, 2012, pp. 1-9). But Galata was in ruins; nobody would resettle it voluntarily. As a last resort, Jewish subjects of the Ottoman Empire were forced to migrate to the abandoned city. Galata became, like Constantinople itself, an exception with regard to the Ottoman policy of expatriating non-Muslims from conquered regions. However, the new Jewish presence further amplified the reluctance of Muslims to settle in Galata. As Louis Mitler (1979) demonstrates, the Islamic population did not increase quickly. In the 17th century, Muslims comprised only 1/4 of the population, though by the 18th century, the ratio had finally grown to more than 1/2 (pp. 72-73).

During the late 15th century, three other non-Ottoman groups also migrated to Galata. The first was composed of Spanish Moors fleeing Iberia; the second of Genoese merchants; and the third of Karaim Jews fleeing the fall of Caffa, another Genoese colony in the Black Sea. Again, this influx of foreigners impacted the development of Galata’s urban space. In 1475, shortly after the Ottoman conquest, the church of San Domenico was converted to a mosque (camî in Turkish) and
renamed *Galata Cami / Ulu Cami / Cami-i Kebir* (Krstic, 2014, pp. 277-278). Thereafter, as a growing population of Spanish Moors settled around Galata Cami, the mosque came to be known as *Arap Cami* (Arab Mosque) (Bulunur, 2014, p. 93).

3. Administration

Kerim İlker Bulunur (2014, p. 93) has shown that after the Fall of Constantinople, the administrative concept of *mahalle*, meaning the neighborhood as an administrative unit, was introduced. One of the most important of these *mahalles* was the Lonca Mahallesi. This neighborhood was the heart of trade in Galata. Before the conquest, its administrative center had included the *Palazzo del Commune*, the palace of the Genoese *podestà*.

The term “*lonca*” connects the area of Genoese governance to its correlated merchant presence. In Italian trading cities, merchants and bankers often interacted in a *loggia dei mercanti* (Kostof, 1999, p. 92). Bulunur (2014) claims that *lonca* is the Turkified word for *loggia*. Furthermore, he suggests that this term was used in the region as a synonym for *fondaco*. While the latter claim is difficult to prove, Constable (2003, p. 155-6) supports the notion that, especially in Constantinople, the term *loggia/lonca* came to signify a commercial center that often included a *fondaco* or *embolo*. Thus, like the term *Arap Cami*, the term Lonca Mahallesi, which designates the merchant quarter of Galata, draws upon the physical and functional relationship of the place to the history of its foreign inhabitants.

After the Ottoman conquest, the *Palazzo del Commune* in the Lonca Mahallesi was replaced by the *Magnifica comunità di Pera*. While this Christian organization became responsible for the administration of Galata, the Ottomans assigned a *voyvoda* (tax collection officer) and a *kadi* (judge) to the district (Semavi Eyice 1969, pp. 50-51). According to Eldem (2016, pp. 133-134), after 1682, the Venetians took control of the *Magnifica*. Despite the influence of this body, during the period of Ottoman rule, the Sublime Porte repeatedly denied foreign occupants the right to rebuild ruined churches and others under reconstruction were pulled down. Mitler (1979, p. 91) suggests that this issue provoked internal conflict within the *Magnifica*, and ultimately led to the dissolution of the organization.

As Halil İnalcık (2012, pp. 9-10) demonstrates, although the landscape of the Western Christian settlement of Galata changed after the Fall of Constantinople, many commercial (and some cultural) institutions and their buildings continued to serve the same functions that they had in the Byzantine period. The area’s flourishing post-1453 environment, with its markets and merchant accommodations, built upon and perpetuated the historic commercial life of the district.
4. Saint Pierre Han

Saint Pierre Han is one of the oldest surviving buildings in Galata, and its history reveals a great deal about the city’s past. It is located on the doorstep of some of Galata’s most well-known tourist attractions, including the Catholic Church of SS. Peter and Paul, rebuilt in the 19th century. Yet, despite its proximity to important sites, the historic han is deteriorating. Even after Bahçeşehir University rented the structure in 2011, bureaucratic delays continued to stall its renovation. Still, the structure of Saint Pierre Han stands as a testament to the history of the district.

In the 18th century, when the han was constructed, economic relations between France and the Ottoman Empire were thriving. French merchants had begun to see the Ottoman Empire as “one of the richest colonies of France” (Eldem, 1999, p. 259). Trade in the Sultan’s domains promised great profits, which were increased through the creation of échelles, or scaled trading models used in Ottoman provinces, by which the French could buy low and sell high. Through échelles, French merchants could make 20 times the profit of that from selling imports in France (Eldem, 1999, p. 292). Alongside the creation of échelles, the construction of hans increased the power of French traders in the Ottoman economy.

Writing in the early 20th century, the French archaeologist Gaston Deschamps described Saint Pierre as akin to the “fondouks on the Barbary coasts where our compatriots of former days, exiled in these parts, were sometimes obliged to be fortified and resist the enterprises of Arabs or Turks” (A Constantinople, 1913, p. 344). Deschamps knew of Galata’s evolution from a Genoese city to an Ottoman district as well as its status as an enclave in the Muslim city where Europeans and their embassies were tolerated, if not embraced (Seni, p. 674). This knowledge must have inspired the archeologist to connect the French han to the genealogy of the funduq (and by proxy the mitaton and embolon). Indeed, Saint Pierre was built much like a funduq, featuring offices and lodgings for foreign merchants. However, unlike a typical funduq, it was financially supported by the French embassy. It was used strategically, and, by the beginning of the 19th century, the structure had become a symbol of French economic power within the Ottoman Empire. In turn, a careful examination of the structural layers of the Saint Pierre Han sheds light on both the Medieval and Early Modern history of the district and on the commercial development of Galata from the 18th century onwards. It furthermore reveals changes and continuities in the practices of accommodating foreign merchants in the city.

If you visit Galata, you can reach the han by ascending the Camondo Stairs, commissioned by a Sephardic Jewish banking family from the district. From the top of the stairs, walk down a new street bearing the scars of urban transformation, through covered buildings, scaffolding, and on-going construction. Next wander down Eski Bankalar Sokak (Old Banks Street), where, in certain seasons, the scent of spice production is overwhelming as you approach Özyer Hardal (Özyer Mustard), a mustard factory now located within the old han at the end of a seemingly
dead-end street. The building’s façade exposes four plaques from different time periods. The newest, likely added in the last decade, hangs above the entrance. It reads: “Sen Piyer Han”, the Turkification of its foreign name, Saint Pierre Han. The bulbous shape of the second plaque is made of finely cut stone. Though worn by time and partially obscured by shades of grey, a French sentence frequently noted by travelers is still visible inscribed across its surface: “André Chénier naquit dans cette maison le 30 octobre 1762” (André Chénier was born in this house on 30 October 1762). The third and fourth plaques are likewise old and beautiful. They bear two coats of arms, that of the family of Comte de Saint Priest, an 18th-century French ambassador to the Ottoman Empire who contributed funds for the han’s construction (Kösebay, 2000, p. 57), and the fleur-de-lis of the French Kingdom.

5. From merchants to bankers

Saint Pierre Han is composed of a complex of structures built after a fire of 1771 swept through the wooden buildings that had occupied the location since 1732 (Kösebay, 2000, p. 53-4). In his book, La Maison Natale d’André Chénier (1963), the Galata historian, E. Dalleggio D’Alessio, charted the layout of the newer structures. What remains today are the buildings numbered 5 and 6 in D’Alessio’s plan (1963, p. 11). The new complex was initially used for the Bank à la Nation Française and as offices for merchants, stores, and condominiums.

Nearly 100 years after the construction of the Bank à la Nation Française, a second bank, the so-called Ottoman Bank, occupied the grounds. The exact period over which it operated there has been a contentious issue because, at first glance, the primary sources seem to present conflicting accounts. However, the findings of André Autheman help clarify the apparent discrepancy. What has been called the Ottoman Bank was, in fact, two separate banks that operated on the same site at different times. The first, “the Ottoman Bank,” was an initiative of the British firm, Layard and Glyn (Autheman, 2002, p. 20). The second was called the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Although Autheman’s scholarship does not specify the location of the banks within Galata, he presents evidence that the Imperial Ottoman Bank took over the location of the Ottoman Bank (Autheman, 2002, p. 136). As it has generally been assumed that only the Imperial Ottoman Bank was located in Saint Pierre Han,1 Autheman’s discovery that the two banks shared the same structure offers a critical insight into the site’s history.

Nur Akın has proposed reconstructing the chronology of the two Ottoman Banks (1998, p. 230) using key meetings. First, the Journal de Constantinople records that, on 12 June 1856, an English merchant met with a group of investors in Galata to arrange the opening of a bank. Indeed, the first Ottoman Bank opened for operation the next day (Autheman, 2002, p. 24). Then, in 1857, Akin suggests

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1 See Kösebay, 2000, p. 51. On the contrary, Nur Akın (1998, p. 209) implies that Saint Pierre Han hosted the Ottoman Bank only until 1863.
that noted meetings about a so-called Banque de Turquie were intended to initiate the second bank, the Imperial Ottoman Bank [Bank-ı Osmani-i Şahane]. However, as Autheman (2002, p. 34) has demonstrated, the Banque de Turquie was a rival banking enterprise, which never opened.

On the other hand, using the archives of Saint Pierre Church, Lorans Baruh convincingly argues that the Imperial Ottoman Bank opened in Saint Pierre Han in 1863, where it operated until 1893; it then moved to Alexandre Vallaury’s building, where it remained until it closed in 2001 (Baruh, 2009, p. 200). The “Annuaire Oriental 1885” (p. 305), the earliest commercial annual found in the Salt Archives, also supports this argument. It states that the “Banque Imperiale Ottomane” was located on “Rue de la Banque”, which today is “Eski Bankalar Sokakı” or “Old Banks Street”, the same location where it appears on contemporary maps such as that in Celal Esad’s appendix to his book, Eski Galata ve binaları. Thus, it appears that Saint Pierre Han on Eski Bankalar Sokakı hosted both “Ottoman” banks over a period of nearly 40 years stretching from 1856 to 1893.

In addition to housing the banks, Saint Pierre Han also hosted another important economic and commercial institution, the Dersaadet Rihtım Şirketi [Société des Quais et Entrepots de Contsantinople], a company that manages ports and warehouses in Istanbul (Devran, 2009, p. 70). And the structure’s commercial importance did not end at the turn of the century. As Hasan Kuruyacızı (2000, p. 60) has shown, after the Imperial Ottoman Bank was relocated, the han housed the offices of architects, mostly of Levantine or other foreign origin, including Alexandre Vallaury, the architect who designed the final site of the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

In the 20th century, although the han was transformed again, it nevertheless maintained its commercial function. It became the Özyer Mustard Factory. On its website, the factory claims to have opened in 1933 (2017), and in an interview that Mete Göktdown and I conducted in 2016, Derniği, the previous president of the company, stated that the name was derived from its founder, a man named Ozier. A rental contract from 1933 – the earliest in a series of such contracts – substantiates this claim, stating that a room in Saint Pierre Han was rented to “Şarl Ozier”.

Seni suggests that banks, including those of the Jewish Camondo family, played an active role in “making” Galata a prosperous commercial district (1994, p. 674). Certainly, the two “Ottoman” banks contributed to the life of Galata. However, as we have seen, the district’s commercial success did not begin in the 19th century. Galata had fostered a dynamic commercial and economic life since before it was governed by the Genoese, nearly seven centuries before.

Beginning in the 1950s, however, the changing commercial operations of Istanbul slowed Galata’s long-flourishing economy. Still, in many ways Saint Pierre Han resisted change. As of 2017, the complex housed the mustard factory, and in the second half of the 20th century, the han hosted a second major commercial enterprise; the first Jeans workshop in Turkey was opened by
Muhteşem Kot, whose surname later became the synonym for blue jeans in Turkish (Gözler, 2003).

6. A place of memory

In Galata - a district whose governance changed frequently, and which was enlivened by thriving communities of foreigners for centuries - structures like Saint Pierre Han and Arap Cami have become embodied sites of memory shrouded in myths and adorned with markers of their history. Around Arap Cami (the Dominican church converted into a mosque under the Ottomans), a myth developed suggesting it was the first Islamic sanctuary in Istanbul and had been built by Arabs during the siege of 717-18. According to Nil Nadire Gelişkan (2016, p. 57), this myth served as a powerful tool, providing Muslim residents in the city with a shared past and a sense of belonging; a plaque was even commissioned commemorating the Arab General Maslama - its mythic patron - and his supposed grave.

The case of Saint Pierre Han offered Christians of Galata a parallel space of memory, and discussions of the birthplace of the poet André Chénier served a purpose similar to that of the myth of Arap Cami’s foundation. In turn, extensive time and energy have been devoted to locating the exact birthplace of Chénier in Saint Pierre Han, and to tracing the origin of the plaque that still commemorates him there today. Régis Delbeuf, a French art critic and the editor of the newspaper, “Stamboul”, led the charge in the early 20th century (Uslu, 2013, p. 141). In 1904, he claimed to have definitely located the precise house and the exact room where Chénier was born (Delbeuf, 1904, p. 8). He commissioned the plaque honoring Chénier’s birthplace, still visible today, from the famous architect Vallaury, (1904, p. 10). Throughout Delbeuf’s life he continued to promote the poet’s connection to the Han. In a 1910 volume of “Stamboul”, he even advocated the commemoration of the poet through the construction of a museum.

The Italian journalist Gilberto Primi, however, later questioned whether the Saint Pierre Han of today could have been the place where the poet was born (Eyice, 1989, p. 54). Primi’s suspicions are well-founded. Indeed, Chénier was born in 1762 and left Galata when he was three years old. The great fire of 1771 scorched the old wooden buildings, leading to the construction of the new stone buildings, now known as Saint Pierre Han (Kösebay, 2000, p. 53). Only in 1963, with the publication of E. Dalleggio D’Alessio’s book, La Maison Natale d’André Chénier, was the mystery of the poet’s birthplace solved (1963, p. 5-14). Using documents from church archives, he proved the accuracy of Primi’s argument; Chénier was born in the old wooden buildings that once stood on the location of Saint Pierre Han.

The extensive efforts to locate the poet’s birthplace, made by an international group of scholars and thinkers including E. D’Alessio, Regis Delbeuf, Gilberto Primi, and Semavi Eyice, point to a remarkable desire to create, connect to, and
maintain a sense of place through Saint Pierre Han. What started as a simple han during a period of French domination of Eastern Mediterranean trade, has transformed into an important site of memory and identity for the descendants of the merchants or denizens of the city.

Pierre Nora (1989) says that the desire for sites of memory begins in a particular historical moment, often when people feel a break with the past; it is deeply connected to the feeling that our memory has been torn away, and it pushes people to cultivate a sense of place. Furthermore, as Aspa Gospodini (2002, p. 28) argues, a self-fashioned heritage provides a “spatial membership” that residents can draw upon in the construction of their own selves. It is precisely in this sense that Saint Pierre Han stands as a landmark that provides identity and continuity in Galata, a place made and remade continuously over the centuries (Blumenfeld, 1975, p. 136).

7. A sense of place

In a Getty Institute discussion entitled Balancing Continuity and Change (2011), Knox argue that the dissolution of social networks and the fragmentation of social interactions are increasingly motivating people to reconnect their identities to place by cultivating a sense of heritage. In the same discussion, Vines suggests that the depression many people feel today results, at least in part, from an alienation from their surroundings. Our sense of place dissipates if the spatial dimension of our history, culture, and myth are transformed or destroyed.

Hans Blumenfeld (1975, pp. 146-147) argues that the landscape of a city is not, however, fixed; each generation adds elements and changes according to its needs. A city has no absolute core or absolute meaning; rather, as seen through the example of Galata, it can be a process, which we, its dwellers, can contribute to, change, transform, work for, protest and oppose in order to create a sense of place on which we can rely.

References


Part II

Representations and Interpretations
of the Mediterranean World
For Fernand Braudel (1995), the Early Modern Mediterranean was a “complex of seas” whose unity was “created by the movements of men, the relationships they imply, and the routes they follow” (p. 17). To examine the Sea’s elaborate matrix, Braudel divided his history into “geographical,” “social,” and “individual time.” In this chapter, I demonstrate how fourteenth-century Venetians anticipated elements of this historical model. Like Braudel, they conceived of the Mediterranean world as a region unified by geography and trade, and defined by three historical strata. These included: 1) a connected geography that formed the groundwork for history; 2) a matrix of comparable, albeit competing, social structures interacting across the region; and 3) the major events and individuals that punctuated the matrix within which they operated.

In what follows I argue that, in fourteenth-century Venice, this trivalent vision shaped burgeoning traditions of cartography and history writing as well as civic art and architecture, most notably, the form of the Trecento sculptural program adorning the southern facade of the Doge’s Palace. Through text and image, this vision allowed Venetians to organize their knowledge of the vast Mediterranean world and to proclaim their mastery over it. In analyzing how Venetians pictured the movements and relationships of people across the Great Sea, my goal is not to examine the political and economic role of Venice in the fourteenth-century Mediterranean world; rather, I demonstrate how Venetians used a prefiguration of Braudel’s layered historical model to anchor and project the power of their imagined empire.
An extensive, interconnected geography formed the bedrock of the Venetian concept of the Mediterranean world, and a prime example of this vision is pictured in Pietro Vesconte’s nautical charts created between 1311 and circa 1327. Vesconte, a Genoese working principally in Venice, is the earliest professional cartographer of record in late Medieval Europe. With the exception of the Carta Pisane (c. 1290), his nautical charts and bound atlases are generally agreed to be the oldest surviving, topographically accurate maps of the region.

On the atlases Vesconte created after 1318, colorful saints and figures on gold-leaf backgrounds animate the corners. Together these images comprise a unifying Christian framework for the charts (De Marchi, 2015, pp. 51-54; Haakenson, forthcoming). Notably, Vesconte’s earlier 1311 and 1313 charts do not contain the same figures or degree of illumination as the later charts, yet they do share many characteristics.

We know little about who commissioned Vesconte’s charts or precisely how they were used or displayed. Tony Campbell (1987) and others have shown that sailors were employing nautical charts as aids to navigation in the thirteenth century. However, the 1311 and 1313 charts show no evidence of use at sea (Pujades, 2007, 454). Scholars typically agree that highly decorated charts, like the famous Catalan Atlas (ca. 1375), were often produced for gift or display. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that, even if they were used at sea, an elite audience would have valued them both as archives of maritime knowledge and for the ideological messages they conveyed. With this context in view, we can infer that the cultural meaning of Vesconte’s charts was at least as important as their potential utility (Dalche, 1992).

Vesconte’s first chart, a single folio dated to 1311 (Florence, Archivio di Stato, C.N.1.), establishes the basic geographical scope of his subsequent atlases where
Fig. 2. Pietro Vesconte, *Nautical chart*, 1311.

Source: © Florence, Archivio di Stato, C.N.1
the same depicted region is divided into several charts bound together as a book\(^1\). Significantly, in the 1311 map, the near-contiguous littorals of the Black, Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, and Aegean Seas are rendered as an expansive, yet cohesive region. Thus, anticipating Braudel, the map indicates that Vesconte perceived the Mediterranean world as a single body defined by its relationship to navigable water and inseparable from the Black Sea.

Throughout the charted territory on the 1311 map, as well as on his later atlases, Vesconte uses a fixed set of symbols to mark topographical features, including rivers and dangers to nautical navigation. For instance, he designates shoals with red stippling, a practice not seen on the Carta Pisane, but widely used on subsequent Early Modern nautical charts.

Fig. 3. Vesconte, Atlas, 1313. Detail, Black Sea

Unlike Vesconte’s later atlases, on which the cartographer’s signatures denote the maps’ production in Venice, the 1311 chart does not record a location of creation. It is, therefore, possible that it was completed prior to Vesconte’s unknown date of arrival in Venice. Regardless, the cartographic worldview that emerges from reading the chart could have been easily shared and appreciated by the various powers vying for control across the Mediterranean world. In fact, while in this essay I concentrate on the case of Venice, many of my conclusions about Trecento forms of cartography and history in the Serenissima find important parallels in the cartography and history of contemporary maritime republics such as Genoa and Pisa. For example, as depicted on the 1311 map, the littorals of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea delimit the maritime domain frequently navigated and sought after by the republics of Venice and Genoa in the Trecento.

\(^1\) The only major addition in the atlases is a chart representing the coasts of the far western Mediterranean and northwestern Europe.
Notably, Vesconte’s 1311 chart does not visualize religious or political demarcations, a decision that enhances the pictured cohesion of the Mediterranean world. By contrast, the cartographer’s later charts appearing in Marino Sanudo’s Liber secretorum fidelium crucis Terrae Sanctae recuperatione et conservatione (Vatican Library, Pal. Lat. 1362A and 2972), created circa 1321, plant pictorial flags along the coastline to announce political presence. The discrepancy is perhaps explained by the fact that the Liber secretorum wielded a specific agenda. Composed between 1306 and 1321, this treatise employs geography as a critical link between Medieval encyclopedic history and contemporary political knowledge, two fields which the author brought together to advocate for renewed crusading efforts in Egypt and the Holy Land. Sanudo offered the first of the three books comprising the Liber secretorum, the Conditiones Terrae Sanctae, to Pope Clement V in 1307. He composed two subsequent books in 1312-13 and 1319-21, and presented the full Liber secretorum, together with Vesconte’s maps, to Pope John XXII in 1321 (Lock, 2011, pp. 21 and 124; Kretschmer, 1962, p. 113).²

Fig. 4. Marino Sanudo giving his text to Pope John XXII as depicted in the Liber secretorum.

In the Liber secretorum, the charts’ inclusion of flags clearly foregrounded the political motive of the text for its papal audience by visualizing potential allies and enemies. The purpose of Vesconte’s 1311 and 1313 charts, however, seems to have

² The text exists in six manuscript copies. Subsequent editions incorporated minor changes and bring the total number to nineteen complete manuscripts and four fragments listed in Lock, 2011, 13-14.
been different. These two earlier charts display a collection of sights that are linked by their shared littoral, and whose only impediments to accessibility seem to be the region’s geographical obstacles. Otherwise, the depicted territory appears interconnected, navigable, and enticing.

As the final unifying touch on his 1311 chart, Vesconte imposed a chevron border. Its rhythmic pattern binds the region together and its directionality implies movement within, and perhaps even a circular trade route around, the graphed territory. The border detaches only in the northeast corner where the River Don and the Sea of Azov meet the Black Sea. The significant break in the chevron frame draws attention to what would have been for Venice and Genoa – the maritime republics with which Vesconte was associated - a juncture between two worlds; it denotes how, although Mediterranean trade networks continued beyond that point, permeating Asia to the East and Russia and the Mongol territories to the North, after the gateway of the Black Sea, the path shifted away from the familiar features of the open water and the trade network it boasted. Correspondingly, the social structures that animated the geography, the type of structures that would later define Braudel’s “social time,” also morphed beyond the hinge in space marked by the break in the frame.

Thus, Vesconte’s early maps differentiate a cohesive Mediterranean region that includes the Black Sea ports from that which lies beyond. Within this extended zone of shared geography, the 1311 and 1313 charts erase markers of cultural difference, preferring instead to conjure a cogent and accessible region that could form the basis for a fluid network of trade. Vesconte’s early charts critically influenced developments in European cartography. As a model for later maps, they set visual and ideological precedents for projecting a Mediterranean world defined by shared geography, travel, and commerce, rather than by marking the region’s persistent political conflicts.

Vesconte’s maps also heralded the official use of cartography by the Venetian empire to proclaim the scope of its cosmopolitan knowledge and claims to global power. For instance, although it is a subject of ongoing scholarly debate, evidence suggests that, under Francesco Dandolo (r. 1329-1339), monumental painted maps may have been commissioned for one sala del mappamondo, perhaps the anticamera used by the Collegio dei Savi in the Doge’s Palace (Gallo, 1943, pp. 43-113; Romanelli and Andreozzi, 2004, p. 126.). By the late fifteenth century, painted maps commemorating the intercontinental travels of Marco Polo would enliven the walls of the palace’s Sala di Scudo (Cosgrove, 1992, 69; Harvey, 1987, p. 480). The Council of Ten, a major governing body in the Venetian oligarchy, also demanded the production of maps of Venetian territories on land and across the Stato da Mar. These and other examples have allowed scholars from Juergen Schulz (1978) to Denis Cosgrove (1992) and Mark Rosen (2014) to show that maps increasingly served as a tool to promote the Venetian State well into the sixteenth century. I contend that Vesconte’s charts were the avant garde of this imperial strategy. Following the production of the cartographer’s Trecento maps,
the Venetian understanding of the wider world in which its empire acted became ever more rooted in visualizing dominion over an extensive, interconnected geography linking the Mediterranean proper to the Black Sea.

While nautical charts were not new, the degree to which these and other maps were integrated into Venetian histories in the fourteenth century was novel. Prime examples of such texts include: Sanudo’s *Liber secretorum*, introduced above, and the *Compendium gestarum rerum* or *Chronologia magna*, written by the Venetian friar and diplomat Paolino Minorita. Despite these two books’ differing aims—one a universal history with a heavy emphasis on Venetian history and the other a treatise promoting crusading efforts—both texts position Venice powerfully in the greater Mediterranean world, and both construct their contemporary visions of that world upon a shared foundation of physical and cultural geography. As noted above, unlike Vesconte’s 1311 and 1313 maps, the *Liber secretorum* uses a combination of text and image to immediately invest its geography with evidence of social divisions. The *Chronologia magna* does the same. In both texts, shared geography becomes the stage upon which the tensions of what Braudel would call “social” and “individual” time play out.

1. *Strata of history in the Chronologia Magna and the Liber Secretorum*

An analysis of Zanetti Latino 399 - considered the oldest copy of the *Chronologia* and Paolino’s authorial text - demonstrates how “geographical,” “social,” and “individual time” structure the three layers of the *Chronologia*’s history through text and image. Unless otherwise specified, I will refer to this copy of the manuscript in my discussion hereafter.

Zanetti Latino 399 is one of three surviving Latin copies of the *Chronologia*. Its inclusion of a depiction of Thomas Aquinas—canonized in 1323—as a saint, has given scholars its *terminus post quem* (Degenhart and Schmitt, 1973, 25 and 21, 42-54). Although it is typically dated to the years shortly thereafter, its lineage of Venetian Doges terminates on folio 88r. with Andrea Dandolo (r. 1343 to 1354) and Marino Faliero. The latter reigned briefly from 1354 to 1355, when he was beheaded for conspiring in a *coup d’état* to wrest autocratic control from the State. While the name and image of Faliero seem to be executed in a different hand, his remembrance here is ironic given that the traitor’s official portrait in the Sala Grande was blacked out in *damnatio memoriae*. Regardless, the fictive heads of both Trecento doges suggest that additions continued to be made long after the text’s tentative completion in the 1320s.

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3 The remaining copies include the manuscript in the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris MS. lat. 4939 and an abridged copy in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS. Vat. Lat. 1960. British Library, EG. MS. 1500 is the sole surviving copy rewritten in the vernacular.
Paolino’s *Chronologia* draws heavily upon various sources cited in his prologue, and especially upon his own *Notabilium ystoriaeum epitoma*, written in 1313. It also reveals strong correlations with Book III of Sanudo’s *Liber secretorum*. Sanudo’s prologue records how, upon submission of the *Liber secretorum* to Pope John XXII, Paolino (noted as the Pope’s “confessor”) was assigned, along with three other men, to “examine it diligently and report to [the Pope] personally” (Lock, 2011, 22; Ghinato, 1951, 53-7). In two manuscript copies of the *Liber secretorum*, Paolino is, moreover, named as the author of Book III (Vat. lat. 2972 and the copy transcribed somewhat unreliably by Jacques Bongars in the first published edition of the text of 1611, noted in Bouloux, 2002, 49). The acquaintance between the two Venetians accounts for the exchange of ideas and the strong correlations between their texts. However, as Evelyn Edson (2007) states, “It is impossible to determine the true prime mover in this close collaboration” (pp. 60-73). Sanudo came from an established Venetian family of maritime merchants, and traveled widely. In his own words:

I shall have passed over the sea five times in Cyprus, in Alexandria, in Armenia, and indeed in Rhodes...I have been many times in Alexandria and Acre...indeed in Romania I spent the greater part of my life where the condition and state [of that region], especially the principality of Achaea I can claim to know well (Lock, 2011, 8-9, 21, 420-432).

Given the breadth of his maritime experience in the Mediterranean, Sanudo may have introduced his fellow Venetian, Paolino, to the value of cartography as an epistemological tool (Edson, 2007, 73). Inversely, Paolino’s approach to geography may have offered Sanudo the biblical and historical justification for his crusading plan.

Nevertheless, the layout of Paolino’s *Chronologia* is unprecedented. It employs a complex matrix of synoptic tables with up to twenty-eight columns per two-page
spread to diagram what Braudel might have called his “social” history in a grid-like format that helps readers trace concurrent chronological developments across major lineages of global power. Synoptic histories had been used by authors from Eusebius of Caesarea to Hugo of St. Victor and Vincent of Beauvais—all authors Paolino draws upon directly. Yet, as Tanja Michalsky noted, “no other medieval author applied such effort to the detailed, planar distribution of the juxtaposition and succession of interrelationships between genealogies of rulers and officeholders, political events and historical authorities” (Michalsky, 2015, p. 46; Heullant-Donat pp. 409-410).

Each two-page spread is intended to be read as a unit. Paolino himself writes that the Linea regularis, a column containing each of the two-page spread’s most important sequence of connected rulers, serves as the “rule and measure” (Botana, 2013, pp. 8-9). It provides the viewer with the chronological meter for the synchronous historical developments the manuscript charts. Red ink defines regnal relationships and black ink defines blood relationships.

Expounding upon the associations between particular figures and events, the Chronologia also embeds fictive portrait heads, schematic symbols, and narrative scenes in his grid alongside the text. In his prologue, Paolino calls his methodical if complex combination of grid, gloss, and image his grata pictura, which he claims he uses to “beautify” the history of the world like an “organic body” whose value is greater than the sum of its parts (Z. 399, folio 1r). He states that he has striven to make the roots, imminent consequences, and larger significance of each particular in the universal history quick and clear (prompte ac clare) for his reader to grasp. Indeed, he wants the reader to recognize historical causation as easily as understanding that the harvest comes from the seed and the tree is already in its roots (quasi in semine segetem et arborem radicalem) (Degenhart and Schmitt, 1973, p. 393, n.44; Michalsky, 2016, p. 49).

To establish the groundwork for their respective histories, both Sanudo and Paolino turned to the geography in the Old Testament. Both authors employ the archetypal divisions of the continents established by Noah’s three sons in Genesis as precisely what Paolino calls the “seeds” and “roots” of ensuing developments in world history. According to Biblical tradition, after Noah’s ark landed on Mount Ararat in Armenia, his sons Ham, Shem and Japheth dispersed over the receding flood waters to inhabit and populate Africa, Asia, and Europe, respectively (Lock, 2011, 160).

Sanudo and Paolino were not alone in setting the stage for geo-political developments in history by using the sons of Noah. Medieval Europeans embraced the sons’ maritime diaspora as the earliest geography and history of the world; a common convention lends the postdiluvian exodus story symbolic status on schematic Medieval maps called T-O maps, which often specifically label the continents with the names Ham, Shem, and Japheth. By the twelfth century, the desire to lay claim to this first geographical history led Roman texts to narrate how Noah or his son Japheth had sailed to Italy and had built Rome’s foundations on
the Janiculum (Benes, 2011; Sanford, 1944). Always eager to surpass Rome, other Italian cities quickly followed suit in embracing Noah and Old Testament geography as parts of their lineages and histories.

Paolino too appropriates this tradition in the interest of promoting Venetian power and authority through sacred history. On folio 2v., the first row includes, from left to right, a schematic depiction of the Ark, the labeled head of Noah in the *Linea regularis*, and a textual explanation of Noah and the Ark. Beneath this row, on folio 2v. and 3r., Paolino proceeds to diagram how, according to Genesis 9:18 and 10:32:

The sons of Noah, who came out of the ark, were Shem, Ham, and Japheth: and Ham is the father of Canaan. These three are the sons of Noah: and from these was all mankind spread over the whole

![Fig. 6. Genealogy of Noah showing descendants of Shem and Japheth](source: © Biblioteca Marciana, Venice, *Chronologia Magna*, Zanetti Latino 399, fol. 2v.)
earth... These were the descendants that sprang from Noah, divided according to their peoples and their races; this was how the nations were scattered over the earth after the flood.

Paolino then pictures, like a great family tree unified across the Mediterranean, what Braudel might call the early “social history” of the continents, descending from each of Noah’s sons.

Indeed, the first notation in the manuscript regarding Shem is geographical. It describes how Shem built Jerusalem as well as how he was also known as Melchisedech and Salem (Lock, 2011, 163). The spatial structure of the diagrammatic family tree is also geographical. To indicate that Shem and his progeny remained in Asia, Paolino places Shem’s sons and the nations they founded directly beneath the patriarch, and notes:

“Arphaxat from whom the Chaldeans”; “Aelam from whom the Ilamite Princes of Persia”; “Asur from whom the Assyrians”; and “Aram from whom the Armenians”.

To the right, Paolino charts the children of Japheth and the people to which they gave rise:

“Gomer from whom the Galatians”; “Magog from whom the Schythians and the Goths”; “Madai from whom the Medes”; “Javan from whom the Ionians”; “Tubal from whom the Iberians”; “Mosoch from whom the Capadocians”; and “Tyras from whom the Thracians”.

According to the manuscript, the descendants of Japheth comprise the lineage that gives rise to Europe. Moreover, they establish the sacred history of Venice by creating an eschatological framework, which links the Serenissima to Noah and Japheth as well as Christ and Jerusalem, and which ultimately presages the success and salvation of the Venetians.

On the facing page, folio 3r., at an isolated distance from the figure of Noah, Paolino charts the African lineage of Ham who fathers:

“Chanaan”; “Phuth from whom the Lybians”; “Mesraim from whom the Egyptians and Philistines”; and “Chus” (father of Nemrod and the lineage of Babylon).

Paolino traces one more generation in the early branches of this Noahic lineage before proceeding with his history.

Likewise, the Liber secretorum also appropriates the history of Noah’s sons as the source and augury of its history. At the beginning of Book III, Sanudo writes, “From the three sons of Noah all people are descended and were divided on the earth after the flood. And the whole world knows that it is bound together and united by the descendants of these three” (Lock, 2011, 159). In later editions of the Liber secretorum, completed on or after 1323 and including MS. Tanner 190 (Fig. 7.), Sanudo adds a diagram of the Noahic family tree, which is strikingly similar to that in Paolino’s text. On folio 69r., this type of diagram adorns a margin of chapter four, entitled “How the said sons of Shem conducted themselves under fourteen
judges.” Thus, Sanudo, like Paolino, employs the diagram tracing the roots of the races and their diaspora in order to illustrate the roots of his argument.

Fig. 7. Marino Sanudo, *Genealogy of Noah*

The names in the two authors’ diagrams are drawn principally from Genesis 10:1-32, and their geographic correlations emerge from various disconnected references throughout the Old Testament. As noted by Heullant-Donat (2003), Paolino (and similarly Sanudo) uses the Old Testament in the same manner as Cicero or Hugh of Fleury. The Old Testament references provide authoritative accounts, “epistemological foundations and justifications” of historical progress (pp. 420-21). Although perhaps mediated through texts like the encyclopedia of Isidore of Seville, for both authors, the Old Testament serves simultaneously as chronological and geographical evidence that combines to lay the groundwork for developments in their written histories, a process which culminates with fourteenth-century events. In these texts, geography and society are thus rendered as both distinct and inseparable; sacred geography and sacred history form the explicit foundation for the Venetian place in world history.

Accordingly, to the left of the *Chronologia*’s genealogy of Noah’s sons, and beneath the schematic depiction of the Ark, Paolino integrates a T-O map. This symbolic map provides a succinct geographical template of the archetypal diaspora of Noah’s sons, and it serves to preface Paolino’s novel integration of more complex maps. In Zanetti Latino 399, the larger, more detailed maps are embedded amidst the text and include: 1) Venice labeled *Civitas Venetie* on folio 7v, 2) Antioch labeled *Descriptio et situs Antiochie* and inserted in the text on folio 74v, 3) Jerusalem on folio 75r, 4) Acre on folio 84r, 5) the plane of the Po River and the city of Ferrara on folio 99v, with the sources of the Po River on 99r, and finally, 6) the oval-shaped map of Rome on folio 98r.

Paolino famously articulates his epistemological rationale for these maps in an introductory passage of the *Chronologia*, titled *De mappa mundi* where he states:
I think that it is not just difficult but impossible without a world map to make [oneself] an image of, or even for the mind to grasp, what is said of the children and grandchildren of Noah and of the Four Kingdoms and other nations and regions, both in divine and human writings. There is needed moreover a twofold map (mapa duplex), [composed] of painting and writing. Nor wilt thou deem one sufficient without the other, because painting without writing indicates regions or nations unclearly, [and] writing without the aid of painting truly does not mark the boundaries of the provinces of a region in their various parts sufficiently [clearly] for them to be descried almost at a glance (Vat. Lat. 1960, fol. 13, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Translated in Schulz, 1978, p. 452).

As Paolino makes clear, he predicates his world history upon the fundamental divisions in space and time that occurred and garnered meaning through the postdiluvian diaspora of Noah’s sons. Building upon these origins, he seeks to make history immediately legible to the reader through the pairing of maps with descriptions of the events and communities developing upon the charted territories.

Both his maps and his complex synoptic tables bear the fruit born from this geocultural division. Accordingly, on folio 2v. and 3r., in the rows beneath Noah’s immediate family tree, Paolino begins to synchronically introduce the co-existing lineages of power, which were all born of that early genealogical tree and which structure his Chronologia diachronically as they unfold over time. The lineages commence with the reigns of Egypt, Scythia, Parthia, Bactria, the Amazons, Assyria, Babylonia, and Sicyon. On subsequent pages, the lineages branch out farther as they progress. Paolino adds those of Italy, Crete, and Sicily in the time of Isaac.

Perhaps the most meaningful and remarkable segment of the Old Testament section in Paolino’s Chronologia occurs on folios 6v. and 7r., just before the conclusion of the “Third Age of Man.” This two-page spread presents the earliest surviving map of Venice. With remarkable detail, it depicts the Grand Canal winding through the island, which is peppered by its Medieval churches and important edifices such as the Arsenale and the Doge’s Palace. The smaller island of the Giudecca appears labeled to the south of Venice, and trails of darker ink trace deeper waterways used for navigating the shallow Venetian lagoon. Ronchese (2005) and others have provided careful analysis of this extraordinary map, but, to date, important considerations have been overlooked. In my view, its full significance within the manuscript emerges from its relationship to the surrounding text.

Accordingly, I argue that the map situates the physical presence of contemporary Venice amidst the converging strands of its ancient pedigree. Late Medieval origin myths of Venice often cast the Serenissima as a new Jerusalem (or Constantinople) and variously recounted how the city was descended from or founded by Noah, his sons, Hercules or the Trojans. Paolino’s two-page spread on folios 6r. and 7v. synthesizes these elements and roots them in the Old Testament lineage of Japheth and Noah. In this schema, Venice becomes the proud descendant of Noah, Hercules, and the Trojans all at once.
Fig. 8. Earliest surviving map of Venice

In Zanetti Latino 399, Paolino’s *Linea regularis* on 6r. (and 7r.) and the corresponding gloss on 7v. above the marvelous Medieval map of Venice, depict
and describe the Judges of Israel beginning with Abimelech. Sanudo had similarly paired a genealogical diagram of the Judges with chapter four, entitled “How the said sons of Shem conducted themselves under fourteen judges.” This chapter narrates the origins of Jerusalem under Shem and, like Paolino’s introduction of Shem on folio 2v., states that Shem “was Melchisedech” and also “King Salem.” Following this introduction of Shem’s founding of Jerusalem, Sanudo’s Liber secretorum next presents the various names and descriptions of Jerusalem under the descendants of Shem. King Salomon, for instance, is said to have “decorated [the city] with gold and jewels and called it Jerosolyma as if it was Jerosolomoia” (Lock, 2011, p. 163). Ultimately, the Liber secretorum concludes that Shem’s descendents “angered god,” whereupon they “lived in the Promised Land, now sinners, now turning their back on the path of prudence” (Lock, 2011, p. 165). For Sanudo, this narrative conveniently establishes the historical fact that the sons of Noah were the founders of Jerusalem, while also justifying the conquest of the Holy City by the sons of Japheth. In turn, the narrative legitimizes the right of Japheth’s Medieval European lineage to reconquer Jerusalem, an event recounted towards the end of the manuscript’s history.

Paolino’s genealogy of Judges and its placement around the earliest surviving map of Venice, operates, at least in part, like the genealogy in Sanudo’s Liber secretorum. The Old Testament, it makes clear, defines the ancient history of Venice. Moreover, its geographical rendering subtly identifies Venice as a New Jerusalem. Like the Holy City, it asserts that Venice is intimately connected to and shaped by the Eastern descendants of Shem but is rightfully under the sovereignty of the favored descendents of Japheth.

Unlike Jerusalem, however, folio 6v. implies that Venice was in fact founded by the lineage of Japheth and his Trojan descendents. A fictive head and several combined glosses describe how after Hercules initiated the Trojan War, which it states ultimately led to the fall of Troy, a “young Priam,” the nephew of King Priam of the Trojans, traveled by ship to the end of the Adriatic Sea. There he built the city of Venice (civitatem venecem edificavit). Sanudo gives the same account, but Paolino’s grata pictura charts how the Trojans, depicted in a column paralleling the Judges, were descended from Gomer, son of Japheth. Taken holistically, this page of the Chronologia manuscript therefore visually unites the various strands of the famously manifold Venetian origin myth. It simultaneously links the foundation of Venice to the lineage of Noah’s favored son, to Priam and Troy, and even to Hercules, a figure famously appearing in two prominent reliefs on the façade of San Marco Basilica. Thus, in the Chronologia, the oldest surviving map of Venice is embedded, with its beautifully and meticulously rendered waterways and edifices, amidst the story of La Serenissima’s geo-historical roots.
For Venice, these roots anchor what Braudel later called the “social time” of Mediterranean history. On folio 7v., following the map, the Chronologia concludes the “Second Age of Man” with Samuel, represented both as the last of the judges and first in the line of prophets. From there, Paolino traces various lineages from the time of David and Salomon to the lives of the Virgin and Christ, whereupon he enters and charts aspects of the Christian era. As the “social time” of the manuscript progresses, the number of coexisting nations appearing in collateral columns increases. Concurrent rulers hang like apples on the same level of the universal family tree and written glosses elaborate crucial interactions that bridged cultures across the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Finally, with his account of the crusades, Paolino invests the Chronologia more explicitly with what Braudel might call “individual time.” He begins to insert simple narrative scenes that highlight events critical to the Mediterranean world as well as accounts of key figures like Godfrey of Bouillon and Bohemund I of Antioch.

Several scenes spotlight the contributions of Paolino’s Venetian compatriots to the crusades. For instance, on folio 76v., in the time of Doge Domenico Michiel, a scene depicting either the Battle of Jaffa or the Siege of Tyre (both described) shows the flag of Saint Mark sailing above the Venetian fleet as it overpowers its enemies. One “Saracen” falls overboard and three float dead in the water. This particular image bridges the columns of the grid that chart the major Mediterranean powers of Venice, Hungary, Antioch, Tripoli, Damascus, and Jerusalem. The placement of the image across the separate columns denotes the event’s impact on the diverse sovereign powers the columns represent. Even Duqaq of Damascus is given his own column in connection with the event. Through the grata pictura’s combination of columns, pictures, and textual asides, Paolino thus visualizes what scholars today might call “connected Mediterranean histories.” Like Braudel, Paolino constructs a three-layered history. It is grounded on geography, structured through large-scale institutions connecting time and space, and ultimately animated.
Fig. 10. Battle of Jaffa or Siege of Tyre

Source: © Biblioteca Marciana, Venice, *Chronologia Magna*, Zanetti Latino 399, fol. 76v.

by key individuals and events. Moreover, this trivalent model of history fuses biblical and classical sources of authority in a manner calculated to buttress Venetian power. In doing so, it constructs, legitimizes, and advertises the image of Venetian dominion over extensive parts of the greater Mediterranean world.

2. The *mapa duplex* in later copies of the *Chronologia*

In the Paris edition of the *Chronologia* (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Latin 4939), considered a later copy, several structural changes enhance Paolino’s layered history. The small symbols of Noah’s Ark and the T-O map appear larger and more complex. The images now dominate the two facing folios (8v. and 9r. respectively) that follow the introduction to Adam and Eve. An ornate world map, which expands the T-O map form, floats above Paolino’s *De mapa mundi* gloss, which, as discussed above, expounds upon the effectiveness of maps paired with text. The elaborate illuminations are now the most visually engaging elements of the manuscript. Whereas in Zanetti Latino 399, the maps appear in the middle and at the end of the text, in the Paris manuscript, the map and text operate precisely as the *mapa duplex* Paolino endorses. The world map immediately serves to assist the reader in grasping “what is said of the children and grandchildren of Noah and of the Four Kingdoms and other nations and regions with the description of the genealogy of Noah”.

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4 The Tower of Babel is also enlarged on 12v.
Fig. 11. Fra Paolino, *Noah's Ark*

On the following page, folio 10r., the map of Egypt and the far eastern Mediterranean (*mapa regnorum Syrie et Egypti*) presents the geographical template for the *Regno Egypti* described in its accompanying text. Finally, the map of the Holy Land (*Mapa terre sancte*) on folio 10v.-11r. provides the immediate groundwork for the text beneath it. Thus, in form and position, the maps of the Paris manuscript more directly set the stage for the history that unfolds thereafter⁵. The importance of geography and the geographical history embodied by Noah and his sons more explicitly and comprehensively provide the roots for subsequent historical developments.

⁵ The maps of Rome, Antioch, and Acre emerge mid-text on folios 27, 98v, and 113v.
Following its pointedly geographical introduction, the Paris manuscript shifts to articulate its conception of social history using the collateral columns of Paolino’s trademark *grata pictura*. It begins anew with Noah and his sons on folio 11v. As in the Marciana manuscript, the columns multiply as the social history progresses chronologically. Around folio 38 however, the Paris manuscript’s format notably shifts for a third time. The tabular synopsis is minimized. Folios often feature only one or two columns. Instead of parallel nations, iconic individuals or events are described in greater depth. The format becomes less schematic and instead employs narrative to highlight persons and events. This creates a strata akin to what Braudel might read as the text’s attention to “individual time.” Thus, Paolino employs three levels of Mediterranean time that anticipate Braudel’s layered model of history. To reiterate, for Paolino these layers include: 1) the geographical template personified by the diaspora of Noah’s three sons; 2) social time, here defined by the connected histories of the great Mediterranean nations; and finally, 3) individual time, highlighting a rapidly unfolding sequence of events and the individuals involved.

3. Monumental history: echoes of the trivalent model on the façade of the Doge’s Palace

I argue that the layered structure of history evident in the *Chronologia Magna* and the *Liber secretorum* also informed one of the most famous monumental artistic programs in Trecento Venice, the sculptural façade of the Doge’s Palace. Between 1340 and 1365, the Venetian State drastically renovated the southern façade of the palace overlooking the lagoon to accommodate an expanded meeting hall. From that room, members of the Great Council, the main governing body of the Venetian oligarchy, would preside over matters of the Republic for centuries to come. The façade’s elaborate new sculptural program, perhaps by the sculptor Filippo Calendario, comprised:

- an encyclopedic array of small-scale sculpture on the ground and second level loggia capitals which, I argue, represent the complex world over which Venice sought dominion.
- the monumental reliefs of the *Fall of Adam and Eve* and the *Drunkenness of Noah*, which, I will show, introduce the principle message of Venetian geo-political power.
- the Archangels Michael and Raphael with Tobias on the third level, which underpin the message of the larger program but will not be addressed in this paper for the sake of brevity.

Some allusion has been made to the correlation between Paolino’s *Chronologia* and the Trecento program, especially in the subjects of various capitals (Wolters, 1990, p. 125; Lermer, 2005, p. 224). The parallels deserve closer examination and
analysis. I will demonstrate that this comprehensive program not only shared, but perhaps even drew upon the layered historical model of Paolino’s *Chronologia Magna*. On closer inspection, it is clear that the program used a comparable model to organize its menagerie of sculpted people, animals, and objects into a schematic microcosm of the Mediterranean world as it sought to advertise the global hegemony of the Venetian empire.

The most prominent sculptures on the facade are the monumental *Fall of Adam and Eve* on the southwest corner and the *Drunkenness of Noah* on the southeast

Figg. 13 (left) and 14 (right). *Fall of Adam and Eve; Drunkenness of Noah*, 1340-65. Doge's Palace (southwest and southeast corners), Venice.

These subjects correspond with the figures of Adam and Eve introducing the first two-page spread of Zanetti Latino 399 and the figure of Noah heading the second two-page spread of the manuscript. As in the text, on the façade, the

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6 The Judgment of Solomon on the northwestern corner was added in the fifteenth century.
monumental relief of Noah and his sons also receives greater space and emphasis than Adam and Eve, perhaps because it structures the rest of the program.

Viewers first encounter the *Drunkenness of Noah* at eye level while crossing the *Ponte della Paglia*. The relief portrays the Genesis story (also seen in the mosaic entrance to San Marco) of how, after the Flood receded, Noah planted a vineyard. He harvested and fermented the grapes to become the first wine-maker, but unfamiliar with the potency of his intoxicating creation, he drank himself into a deep sleep. His middle son Ham discovered him lying with his genitalia exposed and laughed malevolently. Ham beckoned for his brothers Shem and Japheth to join in the mockery. Yet, with great discretion, Japheth instead led Shem in covering their father. According to Genesis, when Noah awoke:

He said: “Cursed be Canaan [son of Ham], a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren”. And he said: “Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, be Canaan his servant”. May God enlarge Japheth, and may he dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan be his servant.

Thus, Noah condemned Ham’s lineage to perpetual servitude.

In late Medieval Italy, Noah was seen to prefigure Christ. The pain he suffered through his vintage foreshadowed the shedding of Christ’s blood and the wine of the Christian Eucharist. The patriarch’s heavy sleep was understood to parallel the death of Christ. In turn, his awakening, whereupon he came to know whom he should honor for loyalty and whom he should condemn for disloyalty, came to symbolize the resurrection of Christ and the future salvation of his pious, chosen followers. Through this curse, the epic journeys of the great patriarch and his sons catalyzed for Medieval Christians a type of socio-geographical determinism that set the paths of the Chosen and the Damned. The European descendants of Japheth deserved privilege, sovereignty, and salvation, while those of Ham should serve their brethren.

Monumentalizing this moralizing narrative, on the façade of the Doge’s Palace, Japheth, who according to Paolino’s *Chronologia* was the Old Testament forbearer of Venice, supports his inebriated father. He holds Noah up by his garment, which is hung across a rugged grape vine and stretched like a sling to suspend Noah and cover his genitalia. Shem stands close behind Japheth, ready to assist, while Ham has been relegated to the far corner of the arch.

The three sons frame the entrance to the lower arcade and they lead physically and ideologically to the vast array of sculpted capitals it contains. The reliefs on each capital catalogue aspects of the greater Mediterranean world, from prominent nations to trade networks and family structures. Together, they represent the men sired by Noah’s sons and the diverse worldly elements over which they inherited dominion according to Genesis 9:1-2, which reads:

And God pronounced his blessing on Noah and his sons; Increase, he said, and multiply, and fill the earth. All the beasts of earth, and the winged things of the sky, and the creeping things of earth, are to go in fear and dread of you, and I give you dominion over all the fishes of the sea.
A full evaluation of the encyclopedic program of sculpted reliefs lies beyond the scope of this paper (Lermer, 2004; Haakenson, 2015). Nevertheless, an analysis of selected capitals serves to illustrate the connection of the reliefs to the underlying cultural geography of the program. The order of the capitals might be said to begin with those often called USW35 and GSW18, located on the southwest corner above and below the large-scale relief of *Adam and Eve*. On the ground level, the reliefs of the *Creation of Adam* and the *Signs of the Zodiac in the Houses of the Planets* (including the sun) appear to orbit around the octagonal capital, GSW18. The *Creation* relief depicts God enthroned creating Adam and is accompanied by an inscription reading: “From the dust the Lord made Adam, and from the rib Eve”. This relief serves as an appropriate introductory image both because it depicts the first forefather and because it portends the first *Fall* monumentalized above it. A systematic rendering of the zodiacal signs is also commonly used as an introductory symbol for Medieval calendars and histories. On the capital, the personifications and inscriptions include:
Aquarius pouring water from a vessel and representing the house of Saturn with the inscription “Aquarius is in the house of Saturn”. The face was partially damaged. The later copy depicts Aquarius seated upon a goat with a scythe in the other hand. Its inscription indicates that “Aquarius and Capricorn are in the house of Saturn”.

Jupiter seated upon a bearded centaur archer, representing Sagittarius, with two fish representing Pisces and the inscription: “Pisces and Sagittarius together in the house of Jupiter”.

Mars seated on the ram of Aries, wielding a shield inscribed: “I am of Iron” and holding the scorpion of Scorpio with the inscription: “Aries and also Scorpio are part of Mars”.

Apollo as the God of the sun seated upon the lion of Leo with the inscription: “The house of the sun is also the sign of Leo”.

Venus seated upon the bull of Taurus with the scales of Libra in her left hand and a mirror in her right. The inscription reads: “Libra with Taurus in the house of Venus...pure of Gold”.

Mercury with twins representing Gemini emerging from one side of the seat and another child representing Virgo peeking out from the other. The inscription reads: “With good style Gemini and also Virgo occupy Mercury”.

A female personification of the moon aboard a boat with the crab of Cancer and the inscription: “The moon shows cancer in the orbit of its sign.

The signs and planets on the introductory capital of the Doge’s Palace program find close parallel in the calendars that introduce the fourteenth-century atlases by Pietro Vesconte. These calendar pages, such as the frontispiece (Fig. 15) of Vesconte’s signed 1318 atlas at the Correr Museum in Venice (Port. 28), coordinate the months, festival days, zodiac signs, humors of man, and planets in concentric circles around a square graphing the days of the lunar cycle.

Like the reliefs on capital GSW18 of the Doge’s Palace, Vesconte’s prefatory calendars depict the zodiac signs in their planetary houses. While the calendar divides the circle of the zodiac into the twelve signs, the capital, restricted by its eight faces, combines signs sharing the same house. Yet, both place the planets in identical houses: Sagittarius and Pisces in Jupiter, Capricorn and Aquarius in Saturn, Leo in the Sun, etc. The capital therefore introduces the sculptural program much as the calendars preface the maps; the capital replicates the orbital format of the calendars and their precise planetary schema. Most importantly, both the palace capital and the calendar pages introduce the larger aim of their respective works to explore the connection between historical chronology and geography. Furthermore,

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7 The calendars connect the zodiac to the humors. For instance, the calendar of Portolan 28 states that scorpio frigidus et humidus et facit membrum et est domus maris or “Scorpio is cold and humid and is a member of and is in the house of Mars”.

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Vesconte’s calendars and the palace capital associate human activities on earth with the movements of celestial time and space. Not only were these celestial

Fig. 16. Pietro Vesconte, Calendar page of Atlas, 1318.

movements critical for the maritime navigation of Venetian sailors, but, by connecting the two, these introductory artworks also endow their programs with a cosmological framework. The history and geography of Venice and its world, articulated in both the sculptural and cartographic formats, become inseparable from God’s cosmic plan.

The cartographic references embedded in the sculptural program of the Doge’s Palace continue on USW35, the square capital located in the second-level loggia and above the monumental relief of Adam and Eve. Like a compass or the winds of a weather vane (Manno, Romanelli and Tigler, 1999, pp. 176-177), its vernacular inscriptions designate the cardinal directions and their winds. Tramontana, the
northern wind, carries the North Star, a tool for mariners and a symbol of Paradise for Christian pilgrims.

Fig. 17. *Tramontana with the North Star*, 1340-65, Doge’s Palace (upper loggia, southwest corner, facing north, USW35), Venice.

The three other personifications on capital USW35 assist the sun on its daily course through the sky. *Levante*, the east wind, holds the sun low in its rising arc above rippling water, while *Hostro*, the south wind, lifts it high. This sun is imprinted on a disc resembling that held by Leo on the capital below. The two suns connect subjects of the two capitals – the celestial zodiac, and the terrestrial directions and winds, which together structure the geography of the cosmos. Facing the lagoon from their position at the southwest edge of the Doge’s Palace, together the two capitals imply the harmony of the Venetian state with the elements in a cosmic order initiated by Adam, Eve, and Noah. Like Vesconte’s calendars, the capitals coordinate time and space to preface proclamations of Venetian power across their maritime empire and the Mediterranean world.

The third strata of Braudelian history, that of “individual time,” is less immediately apparent on the facade of the Doge’s Palace. However, it can be argued that this strata of history is layered into the facade program in two ways: first, through the decisions and actions of Venetian oligarchy unfolding in the room behind that facade, and second, through the contemporary political references embedded in the “social time” of the capitals.

As articulated above, Sanudo and Paolino recount the story of Ham’s curse to justify the lesser status of the sons of Canaan, who became the Saracens of Africa. In the *Liber secretorum*, the hierarchy of the sons’ lineages plays out in patterns seen throughout the narrative. For instance, Sanudo explains how the Holy Land reveals itself as a threefold masterpiece of the highest creator... namely a work of creation, of redemption and of the last judgment... By reason of the creation the sons of [Ham] lived in that land: just as the first created man [laughed] at God, so he laughed at his father. On account of the redemption, the sons of Shem lived together in that land, from whom sprung Abraham, to whom the
first covenant was made in which there were blessings for all his seed in the whole earth...By reason of the last judgment the sons of Japheth lived in that land and now live in Europe where they became faithful Christians (Lock, 2011, p. 159).

In this passage, Sanudo deploys the hierarchy of the sons. He implies that Ham, like Adam, disrespected the father who had created him, thereby cursing his people to servitude and relinquishing their right to the Holy Land; the descendants of Shem are associated with the Second Age of Man, a period of redemption in which Shem’s lineage lived in Jerusalem. But it is the European Christians who follow the example of their forebear Japheth. As he had honored his father, they faithfully honor God the Father, justifying their return to the Holy Land and their ultimate salvation.

Sanudo also employs Shem’s piety and aid to Japheth to promote greater European tolerance of Asian cultures. In particular, he advocates trade with the Mongols and fostering their allegiance in the name of a new crusade to weaken the Muslims. He states that:

Although it may be shown that the Tartars might in some ways resist the faithful of Jesus Christ, nevertheless in all ways it is praiseworthy and therefore advisable that if the friendship of the aforesaid can be had as outlined in the first part of this work then it should be obtained by sparing no expense: and not only the love and friendship of the Tartars is to be sought: but also roused in all other nations that seem useful in carrying out this business (Lock, 2011, p. 154).

Correspondingly, folio 7v. of Vat. Lat. 2972 of Sanudo’s Liber secretorum, includes a Mongol, armed with his infamous bow, valiantly riding in on a lion to

Fig. 18. Mongol riding a lion shooting arrows at a panther held on a rope by a cleric.


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8 Sanudo uses the term Tartar to refer to both the people of Northeastern Europe and Asia. For instance, he describes the land of the Mongol as “Mongal or Tartaria,” which is “located in the region where the east meets the north” (Lock, 2011, 372).
help a cleric trap a panther. Later in the text, Sanudo describes and symbolically portrays the Mongols as a lion and the Sultan—representing the Mamluks—as a panther that “daily ravages the Christians” (see folio 15v.; Lock, 2011, p. 65). The illumination on folio 7v. depicts the same panther. Thus, the image expresses the Christian desire to collaborate with the Mongols in order to trap and defeat the Mamluks and other Muslims.

Sanudo reiterates his message about the potential of the Mongols repeatedly. He articulates how despite their rogue behavior, it would be wise to “attend to [them] solicitously with gifts” and “sweet words” for they provided the best opportunity to control African and Asian markets and maintain the trade routes to India that were prospering between 1320 and 1345 (Jackson, 2005, pp. 290-304). The Venetians followed such advice. For instance, in 1338 they agreed to send five to ten horses and expensive crystals to the Great Khan through ambassadors (noted in Lopez, “Nuove Luci,” in Su e Giu, pp. 88-89). Indeed, relations with the Mongols also paid off as treaties of 1333, 1347, and 1350 stabilized the Venetian stake in the flourishing markets of western Asia (Jackson, 2005, p. 312).

On the Doge’s Palace, the many, little-studied Mongol faces adorning the capitals of the loggia should be read in this context. They are particularly prevalent in the upper loggia.

Fig. 19. Small selection of Mongol heads (U32, U17, U3 - Museo del Opera, and U11), 1340-1365, Doge's Palace, Venice
The numerous Mongol figures include two individuals labeled as the “optimistic,” and, most unusually, the “Tartar” disciples. They appear on a capital that also includes depictions of a figure labeled the “incredulous Tartar” as well as the Diocletian martyrs – labeled Claudius, Castorius, Symphorianus, Nicostratus, and Simplicius - who were drowned in lead chests at the behest of Diocletian after

Fig. 20. Optimistic disciple, G19, original and copy, Doge's Palace, Venice.
Fig. 21. *Tartar disciple*, G19, original and copy, Doge's Palace, Venice.

![Tartar disciple, G19, original and copy, Doge's Palace, Venice.](image1)

Source: 2018 © Archivio Fotografico - Fondazione Musei Civici di Venezia.

Fig. 22. *Incredulous disciple*, G19, original and copy, Doge's Palace, Venice.

![Incredulous disciple, G19, original and copy, Doge's Palace, Venice.](image2)

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Source: 2018 © Archivio Fotografico - Fondazione Musei Civici di Venezia.
refusing to sculpt the idols he requested. Unlike the Diocletian martyrs, the “optimistic” and “Tartar” disciples exhibit Mongol characteristics while the “incredulous” disciple appears in a turban. Each “disciple” figure is depicted laboring to carve a work of art and each artwork is embedded with real pieces of porphyry, a material imported from and associated with Venetian triumphs in the East. The five martyrs, like the stonemasons of Venice, were revered for building and maintaining a Christian empire. The three additional figures thus demonstrate the Venetian belief that the Mongols had the “optimistic” potential to aid in expanding the interests of the Venetian Empire. Contrarily, the turbaned figure, presumably a Muslim, is labeled as “incredulous” or unbelieving, and therefore, untrustworthy as part of the Venetian imperial project.

The perceived unwillingness of the Muslims to follow the path of the martyrs in renouncing the production and worship of idols reoccurs on the capital depicting the virtues and vices (G7). Here, a turbaned Muslim holds a small nude. As the personification of idol worship and infidelity, he forms the visual and ideological antithesis to the sculpted scene of God creating the nude figure of Adam. Both the Muslim and God sit, turned at a three quarter angle, touching their creation with their closer hand and gesturing towards it with their other arm that is bent across their bodies. While God’s head is framed by a halo, the Muslim’s similarly positioned turban sinks over his forehead casting an ominous shadow across his face and signifying the dark inverse of the halo’s holy light. Both small nude male creations, with their tightly curled hair, stand in contrapposto. Yet, while God places his hand above his boy, indicating his ascendancy above his creation, the Muslim lifts his upwards and raises his eyes to meet those of his idol. God forms man in his image. Contrarily, the Muslim worships the image as his God, one more premise for renewed crusade (Lermer, 2005, fig. 86-88). The irony of this schema is self-evident: the visual play on idols belies the staunch iconoclastic arguments of Muslims who eschew imagery and decry pagans and Christians as idol worshippers. The turbaned figure breaks Muslim aniconic principles explicitly as he worships the idol sculpted by the Christian sculptor.

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9 This representation is ironic given the Muslim beliefs regarding images.
The reliefs throughout the upper and lower loggias on the Doge’s palace appear couched in sculpted marble leaves. The foliage organically connects the capitals and their subjects to the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge in the monumental reliefs of the Fall of Adam and Eve and the Drunkenness of Noah. In turn, the Doge’s Palace looms before the lagoon like a giant Mediterranean family tree, its corners curved by the sinuous yet rugged trunks of the two archetypical trees. The capitals emerge like outgrowths of this tree.

From its position on the facade, looking out across the vibrant waters of the Venetian lagoon, the Drunkenness of Noah espouses the same geo-cultural hierarchy, based on the sons of Noah, that Paolino had employed in his Chronologia. Medieval visitors arriving in Venice by boat docked in front of this facade and the lower loggia was accessible to both locals and foreigners alike. As men and women walked between the reliefs, the columns and their shadows framed them, rendering the audience part of a monumental marble grata pictura. Thus, the marble framework subsumed the international audience of Venice and the multiple histories of that audience into the artistic program of the palace that, more than any other building, defined Venetian power in the Mediterranean world. The prominent relief sculpture of Noah and his sons on the facade of the Doge’s palace therefore articulates for the sculptural program a geographical meta-history akin to Braudel’s geographical time. It wielded this meta-history to advertise an unsurpassable Venetian pedigree and appropriates for the maritime empire the dominion granted to Noah’s sons, especially Japheth.

Considered together, Vesconte’s early maps, Paolino’s Chronologia magna, Sanudo’s Liber secretorum, and the sculptural program on the Doge’s Palace
present a Trecento vision of the Mediterranean world that anticipates the Braudelian model. Within this interpretive framework, the Great Sea, as the Venetians often called the Mediterranean, acted foremost to connect cultures, and fashion the geographical template for envisioning a cosmic and terrestrial history. In Venetian hands, this geography shaped a second “social” level of history in which enduring nations, empires, and religions created both lasting networks and conflicts. Ultimately, Venice sought to articulate, explain, and justify the events of recent history as partially predetermined through developments of geographical and social time. For fourteenth-century Venetians, this trivalent historical model helped to picture and legitimize the primacy of their maritime empire within the “complex of seas” and “movements of men” that comprised the greater Mediterranean world.

References


Introduction

Heskes, an American musicologist and specialist in Jewish music (1994), argues that “Music is central to the human spirit. It is the most universal and yet most personal of godly gifts. It is our continuity from past to present, and into the timeless future” (p. xii). The history of Jewish music reflects all the grandeur of this statement. Evolving largely in the Mediterranean world, Jewish music records and expresses the conflicts, transformations and assimilations that characterize both the region and the experience of Jews within it. Reciprocally, since the early centuries of the Diaspora (b. 8th century BCE), Jewish people have used music to commemorate their roots and foster a sense of communal identity.

Until the destruction of the Temple in 70 BCE, sacred Jewish music was cultivated in the shared space of the Temple. Thereafter, it emerged through the community of the synagogue, where it often drew upon ancient traditions – both sacred and secular – that had been best preserved by Oriental Jews, especially in the regions that are now Yemen and Iraq. Even as it persistently looked to the past, Jewish music was never static. Across many centuries, Jewish musical traditions have shown great flexibility in adapting to changing artistic environments and developing new traditions that reflect the engagement of Jews with the predominantly Christian and Muslim cultures of many of the countries in which they lived. The pervasiveness of cross-cultural encounters in the Early Modern era and the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) (18th and 19th centuries), in particular, increased the versatility of Jewish music. In turn, in the 20th century, when the concept and creation of the State of Israel united Jews from around the world, they brought with them music touched by religions and cultures from across the Mediterranean and wider worlds. As Bohlman (2015, p. 23) articulates:

The Exile, displacement, and return that rerouted modern Jewish history in the early twentieth century … (was) dramatic in resituating the ontological questions about the meaning of Jewish music. Rather than being posed primarily in the lands of the diaspora and the Holocaust, the new questions began to equate Jewish and Israeli music, and they searched for answers in the culture and ideology of the State of Israel, even before its founding in 1948.
With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, many Jews from the Mediterranean region and the wider Islamic and Christian worlds moved to the biblical lands. Situated at the nexus of global Jewish emigration, the State of Israel has served as the gathering point for collecting a wide range of the oral traditions of sacred and secular Jewish music. Recent scholarship on this growing archive of sources reveals how music documents the processes of acculturation, transformation and democratization across the history of the global Jewish diaspora. Research on music in the State of Israel therefore allows us to better understand the historical development and transformation of Jewish music in the making of contemporary Jewish culture and identity.

1. The History of Jewish Music in Dialogue and Conflict with Civilizations up to the Enlightenment

The periodization of the history of Jewish music revolves around two major historical turning points – the destruction of the Temple in 70 BCE during the Roman occupation of Jerusalem and the development of modern Jewish music in the period following World War II. In analysing the first so-called “biblical period” of Jewish music, researchers draw upon literary evidence from the Old Testament, archaeological remains of musical instruments, descriptions of musical scenes, comparative material from other contemporary cultures and later sources including the writings of Philo of Alexandria (25 BCE– 50 CE) and Titus Flavius Josephus (37–100 CE), apocrypha, and Misha (exegetical texts on the Jewish oral traditions) from the early 3rd century.

From this evidence, scholars have derived various conclusions about the biblical period of Jewish music. For instance, there is consensus that the roots of Jewish music were primarily cultivated in the Temple where Levitical singers played an important role. Although these ancient vocal traditions have been lost, their musical forms are still partially discernible in biblical poetry, especially in the poetic structure of the Psalms, which were recited and sung. It is also apparent that music played an important role in public as well as family life. For example, Genesis explains that Lamech’s son Jubal became “the ancestor of all those who play the lyre and pipe” (4:21). At the end of Exodus 15, a song of praise celebrating the victory over the Egyptians after crossing the Dead Sea describes how: “Then the prophet Miriam, Aaron’s sister, took a tambourine in her hand; and all the women went out after her with tambourines and with dancing” (5:20).1

1 The English translation is from The Holy Bible containing the Old and New Testaments with the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books. New Revised Standard Version. Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers 1989. This passage suggests that women were less marginalized in the classical period than they would later become through the institution of the synagogue.
Several important monographs on Jewish music in the biblical period have been published in the past 25 years. Gorali (1993) was the first to research musical creativity inspired by the Old Testament biblical texts on a global scale. A few years later, Isaacs (1997) investigated the development of various genres of Jewish music from the biblical period to the 20th century. In 2002, two critical texts on the musical instruments of early Jewish music were published: Montagu identified and described the instruments named in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and Braun explored the types of instruments and music played in the biblical and Hellenistic-Roman period. Most recently, Walden (2015) brought together 16 experts in an attempt to comprehensively examine the characteristics of what is broadly labelled “Jewish music” and to analyse the historical development of these characteristics over the past 3,000 years.

Together, these texts have revealed the importance of instruments in the Jewish music of the biblical period. They have also shown the evolution of both a vocal tradition and a tradition of rich instrumental music utilizing multiple instruments. Perhaps more surprisingly, this recent scholarship demonstrates that, in this early phase of Jewish music history, vocal and instrumental music were often highly integrated. One testimony of the integration is found in Psalm 150: 3-6, which depicts worship at the Temple:

Praise him with the bray of the trumpet, praise him with harp and zither. Praise him with the tambour and the dance, praise him with the music of string and of reed. Praise him with the clang of the cymbals, the cymbals that ring merrily. All creatures that have breath, praise the Lord. Alleluia.

Throughout the Old Testament we find passages that confirm the crucial role of voice and instruments in early Jewish music. In the late biblical period, however, the understanding of music in relation to God changed, catalyzing the separation of the two traditions. Accordingly, in the years leading up to the Roman occupation of Jerusalem, the Jewish discourse on music created a clear distinction between three separate categories of music: musica mundana (music of the earth and other celestial bodies), musica humana (music produced by man, that is, song) and musica instrumentalis (music played with musical instruments) (Bohlman, 2012, p. xxii).

The separation of the voice from the instrumental music continued after the Romans occupied Jerusalem and destroyed the Temple in 70 BCE. Much of the surviving Jewish population fled to other parts of the Roman Empire ending the biblical period when Jewish music was centred on worship at the Temple. Thereafter, smaller Jewish communities were created in Palestine and elsewhere. Synagogues became the new places of worship, and consequently, religious, liturgical and musical life—especially in Eastern synagogues—experienced a radical reorganization that was pivotal for Jewish music around the world.

In particular, the new service of the synagogue became principally vocal. The customs employed in the synagogues were modelled on ancient Temple practice and concentrated on psalmody, chanted Bible reading, and prayer tunes based on a
simple melodic pattern. The characteristics of the service developed at this time have been preserved in Sephardi, Ashkenazi, and Mizrahi communities alike ever since.

In pagan Hellenistic environments, Jewish music initially rejected the outside influence of the Greek cultural traditions of theatres, arenas and circuses, as well as professional singers and performers. In this context, sacred music began to exclude the rich Jewish folk music tradition; reciting and singing Psalms became the fundamental component of worship for Jewish communities belonging to the Aramaic language group. Perhaps the most far-reaching new cultural developments took place in the liturgy where musical instruments were prohibited, voice was restricted, and women’s voices were banned. As Avenary argues, “Early synagogue song intentionally foregoes artistic perfection, renounces the playing of instruments, and attaches itself entirely to ‘the Word’ – the text of the Bible” (1974, p. 566). Instead of “artificial music” and abstract aesthetics, the Jews cultivated a reading culture that involved the recitation of biblical texts and the exploration of the human emotional world as well as the solo voice. To quote Avenary, it investigated: “joy, thanksgiving, and praise, but also supplication, consciousness of guilt, and contrition. All these emotions urge subjective expression in song and human warmth, rather than abstract beauty. The strong human element in synagogue music made itself acutely felt as soon as the professional solo singer began to appear” (Avenary, 1974, p. 571). Thus, in many Jewish communities, vocalization and the human voice took precedence over instrumental music.

The reorganization of religious, liturgical and musical life in Middle Eastern synagogues during the period from 70 BCE until the mid-10th century was pivotal to the subsequent development of Jewish music. Although different views on the nature and purpose of sacred Jewish music appeared in new Jewish musical circles, the ideal of the harmony of human voices glorifying God remained. As is known, Early Christian communities emerged, in part, from the Jewish synagogues and, in the same way, Early Christian musical practice shows evidence of strong parallels with early Jewish musical practice. This can be seen through the singing of Psalms and other biblical texts. However, there are also differences that define how Jewish and Christian communities understood the nature and role of music in worship: Jewish sacred music prioritized encouraging emotion in the worshipper who seeks contact with God, whereas, Christian sacred music strove to echo the angelic music of eternity. As Jacobson (2015) has articulated, for example, Ashkenazi synagogue music and Catholic sacred music can be differentiated as follows:

For centuries, the musical soundscape of the Ashkenazi synagogue remained essentially insular. The core of the service was the ‘reading’ of the Bible utilizing a set of fixed traditional cantillation motifs, performed modally and monophonically by a soloist in free rhythm. The rest of the service, the chanting of prayers, allowed for slightly more improvisation, but, like biblical cantillation, was based on traditional modes, in free rhythm, with no harmony or instrumental accompaniment. The emphasis was on piety rather than on beauty. At the same time, music in Catholic churches was evolving in a strikingly different direction, with the addition of new compositions by professional
composers complementing the ancient chant, with harmony and counterpoint in performances by trained choirs, organists, and other instrumentalists (p. 143).

By the time of the Muslim conquests in the 7th century however, continued contact with Islamic and Christian cultures in the Mediterranean world contributed to changing ideas about the nature and role of sacred Jewish music. The traditions engaged in cross-cultural exchange. For instance, the famous Egyptian philosopher Sa’adiah ben Yosef Gaon (882–942), and his pupil, the poet and grammian Dunash ha-Levi ben Labrat (920–990), who both lived and worked in Spain, were responsible for the creation and propagation of early Judeo-Arabic literature. Jewish biblical poetry had traditionally been free rhythm, stressing both accented and unaccented syllables, but Arabic poets had accepted the ancient Greek metrics based upon measured syllable durations as early as the 8th century” (p. 593). Sa’adiah and Dunash added the measured rhythms of the Greco-Arabic tradition to Jewish poetry. This was, to quote Avenary (1974), “a revolutionary act of immense influence.” Jewish intellectual circles expressed early wariness towards these metrics, but ultimately their adoption transformed the direction of both Hebrew poetry and Jewish music. As Avenary (1974) argues, “the new development in poetry and music may be reduced to one common formula: both arts are given periodic ordering, an artificial structuring of the dimension of time acquired from Greco-Arabic precedents. The mere sound of speech and song thereby becomes an experience of its own” (p. 595). The integration of the Greco-Arabic rhythms did, however, sacrifice much from the tradition of free rhythm and the original emphasis on the function of the “word”, its natural accents, and its message.

Through an equally radical evolution, in Medieval Spain under Islamic rule, secular Jewish poetry and music began to develop freely alongside the sacred music of the synagogue, and after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, and the spread of the Ashkenazi Jews across Central and Eastern Europe, secular Jewish musicians and singers became increasingly popular, even appearing in the company of troubadours. Ironically, these Jewish singers held special status as “foreigners,” considered neither Jewish nor Christian.

2. The Transformation of the Jewish Musical Tradition leading up to and during the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah)

From the Spanish expulsion of Jews in 1492 to circa 1800, the development of Jewish music was marked by successive waves of forced exodus and Jewish migration. Most exiles from Spain (i.e. the Sephardi) moved to the lands of the Ottoman Empire. Jews expelled from Central Europe (Ashkenazi), on the other hand, typically moved to the Kingdom of Poland. Both the Sephardi and the Ashkenazi carried with them many of their daily and liturgical customs and habits, including their musical traditions.
These Early Modern forced migrations were concurrent with the spread of Renaissance Humanism in Europe, which embraced the study of ancient texts, cultures, and languages. Together with a general flourishing of the arts, this fascination with antiquity helped support a great number of Jewish musicians locally and internationally, and encouraged a fertile exchange between Jews and other cultural traditions such as Italian music. In turn, the combination of migration and cultural exchange catalyzed the rapid developments that came to define the most famous and dramatic era of modern Jewish music in Central Europe, Jewish Modernism and the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah).

Jewish Modernism began in the 16th century and reached its peak during the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) of the 18th and 19th centuries. Haskalah, in particular, marks the greatest historical turning point in the development of Jewish music. As Bohlman (2012, p. xix) notes:

Before the modernity articulated by Moses Mendelssohn and other maskilim, the Jewish Enlightenment thinkers, ‘music’ was largely vague as an aesthetically autonomous object in Jewish society. In a strict sense, everything in the synagogue was music – prayer, Torah and Haftorah, cantillations, ritual and liturgical interjection – therefore it was impossible to limit it to any single category. Both liturgy and ritual were extensively cyclical, thereby juxtaposing sacred and secular time. The cyclical nature of liturgical practices bounded music within ritual and prevented it from flowing over into the temporal world outside the synagogue.

If, before the Modern period, Jewish music had been transmitted orally and restricted to the realm of the synagogue, Jewish modernism opened the synagogue doors to the wider world. Insisting on the oral tradition was rather paradoxical as Jewish life and literacy are greatly intertwined, and, unsurprisingly, the written tradition gained more importance over time. At first, when manuals for prayers and other texts began to be published, prayer melodies were not yet notated, thus musical experts played an important role in synagogues (Elbogen, 1993). However, the number of specialists shrank over time, so print notes became increasingly necessary. Printed notation, in turn, made Jewish music accessible to the wider world, thus opening the gateway between the sacred and the secular. Art music entered the synagogue, while choirs that had traditionally sung only in the synagogues began to perform in secular contexts. Some choirs and ensembles even

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2 Philip V. Bohlman deals extensively with the transformation of Jewish music through the process of urbanization and the changing nature of the public sphere, and he notes several examples in part III of his book, *Jewish Music and Modernity*, under the subtitle “Beyond Jewish Music” (pp. 145–236). He states: “In the transformation to Early Modern and then to Modern Europe, Jewish sacred music increasingly became connected to urban spaces. Virtually every kind of music that began to acquire cultural markers of Jewishness displayed discrete processes of urbanization. Traditional concepts of local or city character in sacred Jewish music – particularly that of the synagogue, the genealogy of cantors, and other Jewish musical specialists – absorbed the customs and laws, written and unwritten known as minhag (Hebrew, suctoms; plurl. minhagim)” (2012, p. 164). Concerning the extensive and contested transformation of the public sphere, Bohlman states: “At the beginning of the twentieth century the print traditions of popular song had begun also to transfrom the vernacular into serious and socially critical musical and literary production” (p. 171).
surrendered to secular demand and left the synagogue altogether. As Gerson-Kiwi (1980) has investigated, the extension of the sacred tradition to the public sphere also led to the emergence of polyphony in the public sphere, a shift that symbolized structural transformations in the Jewish communities themselves.

When sacred music crossed the threshold of the synagogue, Jewish thinkers began to redefine the notion of Jewish music. As Bohlman notes (2012, p. 86):

Paradoxically, the shift of musical life to an increasingly secular and public sphere also relocated some music within Jewish religious tradition, in essence reinventing its position in traditional Jewish societies. The paradox arose because a real separation of music from Jewish traditions or within Jewish traditions was not possible until the modern era. Prayer was prayer, liturgy was liturgy, biblical text conveyed through music. Music was not a separate phenomenon with an ontology of its own, but rather it was embedded in the phenomena of worship. The conscious relocation of music in Jewish tradition required a new historiographic language, and again the cantor-composer invented this language.

Thus, the cross-fertilization between the sacred and secular realms inspired revolutionary musical innovations and ultimately produced the rapid development of a dramatic genre of Modern Jewish music across Central Europe. This music was inseparable from Central European modernism more generally (Bohlman, p. xviii). New avenues of Modern Jewish music – such as folk music, sacred music, popular music, world music and classical music – became signs of modernism and of belonging to a common culture. Bohlman (2012) notes some main characteristics of the development of modern Jewish music in Central and Eastern Europe present at the beginning of the twenty-first century. He argues that “Jewish music is exotic, all the more so because of its patina of pastness. Jewish music has become popular music, commoditized world music and Weltmusik … Jewish music today is great music, and that is reason enough for giving it a place in the state of the present” (p. 240). Secondly, “Jewish music today is the product of revival, particularly the folk-music revivals that began in Europe in the 1900s” (p. 240). According to Bohlman, revitalization, rather than revival, provides the desire “to discover the vitality of a tradition that can live in the present rather than an urge to salvage one that had already died in its own day” (p. 240). He concludes: “The end of modernity and modernism did not bring about the end of Jewish music” (p. 241).

One of the first Jewish musicians to perform and gain prestige outside the synagogue was the Jewish Italian violinist and composer Salomone Rossi (c. 1570-1628). He worked as a court musician in Mantua (Harrán 1999) and earned a living performing for both Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Rossi’s advocates have regarded him as a reviver of old music (musica antica) that had been cultivated in the Temple in Jerusalem in the period before the Diaspora. Ironically, however, because the ancient musical models had not been preserved, Rossi could not have revived them in the traditional sense. He must therefore have come to his “ancient music” through creative new beginnings – that is through what Jews and non-Jews alike understood as modern music (musica moderna). As Bohlman notes:
If Jewish music was to begin with Salamone Rossi, it had to begin anew. By beginning anew, Jewish music would also take its place in early modernism, the stylistic border region between medieval and modern Europe. In these contrasting beginnings lay the contradictions of Rossi’s life, which were both musical and Jewish. (2012, xxviii)3.

Indeed, Harrán’s 13-volume edition of Rossi’s collected works shows that most of Rossi’s compositions are not strictly-speaking Jewish. The first 8 volumes include vocal works with Italian texts, and the next 4 volumes are made up of instrumental music. Rossi was, of course, a Jew working primarily for and responding to a Christian Italian audience. His struggle thus reflects the complicated search, experienced by Rossi and many of his contemporaries, for a modern Jewish identity in Muslim and Christian lands. In many ways, his work reconciled contradictory impulses to embrace new foreign influences while also escaping them through a real or imagined return to his ancient roots.

This process marked the beginning of the emancipatory movement that gave rise to the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah). During this period, many of the greatest developments in Jewish music and culture transpired, and a new historical consciousness was born. “With the Haskala”, Bohlman argues, “it was possible to speak for the first time about an ontology of Jewish music” (p. xix).4 Consequently, for participants in Haskalah, two fundamental questions arose: how should they respond to the increasing intertwining of Jewish and Christian culture? And, how could they preserve and build a bridge between sacred and secular musical traditions? These two questions continued to shape the making and re-making of Jewish culture into the 20th century.

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3 In this regard, we see a common refrain between Jewish modernism and many other modernist projects – especially nation building/the building of national cultures, which involved the imagining/expression of ancient origins in the name of (re)formed /recently invented group identities.

4 Under the title “Ontologies of Jewish Music” (2012, pp. 73–143), Bohlman treats markers of “Jewishness” of Jewish music in all its complexity: “Tracing the trope of Jewishness in music through the disciplinary history of Jewish music scholarship, I draw us closer to the contemporary dilemma confronting the modern study of Jewish music, namely that it has become a field trapped in a discursive space between Jewish studies, cultural studies, and the anthropology of music. The ontology of Jewish music in modern scholarship is physically – and racially – instantiated, derived from the surface of the body, especially through the production of melody, but remapped on the inner landscapes of the body. Because the object reproduced by Jewishness in music has always existed in a historical timelessness and geographical placelessness, critical reflexivity and comparative analysis became to a large degree impossible, and ethnography was reduced to discovering a cultural object whose existence was not open to question. Jewish music scholarship, even in a post-Holocaust, postmodern world, has been slow to discard the very language and racial imagery that have historically stigmatized Jewishness in music” (pp. 189–190).
The aesthetic quality and message of Jewish Modernism attracted international attention in the 19th and 20th centuries. It was especially prominent in Central Europe. In Germany, for instance, the peak of symbiosis between German and Jewish culture occurred between 1925 and 1929; Jewish high schools as well as evening academies in Frankfurt and Munich taught Modern Hebrew as a modern foreign language, and “Jewish choruses in those cities perform[ed] the ‘Old Testament’ works of Bach, Handel, and Mozart in Hebrew” (p. 83). During this time, Martin Buber (1878–1965) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886–1929) also prepared their lauded translation of the Hebrew Bible on the principle of a radical return to ancient sources and the original emphasis on spoken word. The cross-cultural embrace of Jewish music echoed across the Mediterranean world, including on its eastern shores where the German Jewish composer, conductor and educator Paul Ben-Haim (1897–1984) wrote and performed songs with Hebrew texts (pp. 83–84).

Yet, the very categorization of music as Jewish made it a target for attack by anti-Semites. Reform musicians were often treated as outsiders by both Jewish communities and non-Jewish society. Richard Wagner infamously published Das Judentum in der Music (1869), his scathing pamphlet attacking the influence of Jews and Jewish composers. In 1908, at the height of Gustav Mahler’s (1860–1911) success and creativity, anti-Semitism forced the famous composer and conductor to leave Vienna for New York. As the American musicologist Knittel (2010) noted in analysing the contradictions in contemporary criticism, for many critics, “the real problem […] was not Mahler’s actual compositional technique, but rather the fact that he was composing at all” (p. 80). After this time, Mahler remained in New York for three years before returning to Vienna in exhaustion just before his death in 1911.

Still, Mahler’s experiences were not the worst conditions Jewish musicians would face. As Haas (2013) has demonstrated, Jewish musicians transmitted important traditions and ideals of German culture before the rise of Hitler, but in Nazi Germany, many Jewish composers and musicians could not work at all. After WWII, traditional Jewish culture was threatened with destruction.

5 Bohlman states his “message of Jewish Modernism” in the end of his book: “The historicism of the twenty-first century may not be substantially different from that of the early modern seventeenth century or the eighteenth-century Haskala. Jewish music entered modernity at those historical moments also as fragments, and it was challenged by discussions about its Jewishness. Jewish music today draws us to the discourses of European history in many of the same ways it did before and during modernity. As Europeans, Jewish and non-Jewish seek to rethink and reimagine what European selfness has meant historically and can mean today in a unified New Europe. Jewish music is crucial to the picture and its wholeness, not because Jewish music assumes place in the selfness, but rather because it contrasts through its complex otherness, an otherness inseparable from European and Jewish identities” (2012, 245).

6 The basic guideline, Bohlman (2012) notes, was the belief that in its original context, the Hebrew Bible was intended for spoken word, so the translation must take into account all the grammatical and stylistic characteristics of the original.
the exiled Jewish musicians experienced a crisis of identity. They felt divided between their birthplace in Germany and their loyalty to their new host countries.

In turn, the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 signalled a new era in Jewish identity and music. For many Jews, Israel provided a symbol of physical and spiritual return to a long promised Jewish homeland in Palestine. During the Diaspora, a cultural divide had developed between Eastern and Western Jews – between the Sephardi who migrated to and lived in Istanbul under the Ottoman Empire and the Ashkenazi living in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, in the modern State of Israel, these traditions came together. As Bahat (1980, p. 54) concludes:

A pluralistic and multicultural centre of Oriental [Eastern Jewish] musical activity has been created there, developing side by side with the manifestations of Western culture. In the generations ahead, this pluralism may lead to a new, truly Israeli culture; still, the present situation is one of a variety of flourishing traditions which enrich not only each other, but the general cultural life of the country as well.

Shiloah and Cohen (1983) were the first to chart changes in Jewish music before and after the creation of the State of Israel. They note the cultural and artistic complexity that emigration created for the new population of Israel:

Immigration to Israel exposed these people to a new and complex reality. They had been removed from their natural environment and found themselves in a new one, where, in the realm of arts, Western concepts enjoyed exclusive sway. Moreover, as a result of the state of belligerence between Israel and its neighbours, they experienced an emotional conflict. They had to reconcile their national identification and their emotional attachments to the culture of those who now became their enemy. To complicate matters, in Israel they were asked to be “integrated” into an alien, Western culture, and it was frequently denied that they even had a culture of their own (Shiloah & Cohen, 1983, p. 234).

In the multi-cultural environment of Israel, Shiloah and Cohen found that few musical forms have remained unchanged. Western musical traditions have had the greatest influence, especially on secular music, which offered an arena for innovation and modernization outside the control of conservative religious traditions (Shiloah and Cohen, p. 229). Secular Jewish musicians could freely adopt aspects of the cultures around them and drew heavily upon theatre, radio and television.

In pluralistic cultural settings, the transformation of music also entails the transformation of identity: “The art of an ethnic group, as it comes to be oriented toward a new, external, national or international audience, creates an awareness of the group’s existence in ever wider circles and helps to endow it with a new identity. This, in turn, may contribute to the transformation of its self-perception” (Shiloah & Cohen, 1983, p. 245). In Israel, the process of transformation has not meant the amalgamation of different ethnic traditions into an all-encompassing “national music style.” Instead, it “shows that the emergent Israeli cultural identity is becoming less monolithic and more pluralistic than it has been conceived of in the past. The acceptance of diversity, however, is achieved at the expense of preservation of ‘authentic’ traditional forms” (Shiloah and Cohen 1983, p. 248).
Horowitz (1999, p. 462) notes that Israeli Mediterranean music is now a hybrid musical genre created by the Eastern – that is, African and Asian Israeli Jews – with roots in Islamic countries who integrated various musical styles. Initially, the Jewish music from the European countries resisted hybridization, but after 1990 it began adopting predominant trends from Israel furthering the emergence of a new, Israeli identity. Horowitz summarizes his findings thus:

Israeli Mediterranean music, like all hybrid cultural forms, is an intentional process through which Mizrahi artists combine memories with innovations in a complex scoring of emotional and social life. Their hybridity is more than a cultural offspring that somehow reproduces characteristics of its parent forms. In its hybridness, Israeli Mediterranean music is an intricate, interconnected practice with national, ethnic, emotional, and social dimensions. It is a tool constructed by and for the music makers themselves with which they fashion a livelihood and a cultural identity (p. 462).

4. Summarizing Conclusions: Jewish Identity in Music throughout Three Millennia

The long history of Jewish music has shared roots stretching back to the biblical era when the Psalms were chanted in the Temple by Levitical singers accompanied by instruments like those mentioned in Psalm 150. Over time instrumental music decreased in importance. In particular, the destruction of the Temple in 70 BCE put an end to the Temple-centred music of the biblical era and heralded a new period in which the synagogue became the innovative milieu for creativity in word and tone. Instrumental music was banned in the synagogue, and prayers and hymns were usually chanted. Only the traditional antiphonal singing was allowed and it retained its essential character. Vocal harmony was essential, but the female voice was banned.

The second period of radical change occurred between 1492 and 1800 when forced Jewish migrations led to the formation of new centres of Jewish religious and cultural life. Both Sephardi and Ashkenazi emigrants preserved their original vernacular and liturgical customs. Yet, in the European Jewish centres, change was afoot. Humanism inspired enthusiasm for ancient Temple music, the study of Hebrew, and the westernization of Ashkenazi song traditions. Finally, sacred and secular Jewish music experienced a fruitful exchange with secular world music.

Jewish music experienced its greatest transformations in the 18th and 19th centuries during the period of the Jewish Enlightenment. As Frühauf (2015, p. 198) describes:

Processes of change in synagogue music occurred throughout early modernity, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but never in ways as radical, visible, and lasting as in the nineteenth century. Several stages of reform took place simultaneously in different communities, ranging from extreme acculturation to assimilatory tendencies that preserved some traditions. Although the organ’s use was not widespread and was embraced by some congregations that did not consider themselves reformed, it nonetheless became a symbol for the schism between Orthodox and Reform. Choral music of different styles and arrangements, however, became an integral part of many synagogues’ music.
Finally, in the 20th century, the creation of the State of Israel provided a musical bridge between the old and the new and between the Eastern and Western Jewish traditions. As Bohlman (2015) states:

The new music of Israel provided contexts for reconfiguring the ontological moments of Jewish music as national – and as international. Israeli folk music, for example, would differ from Jewish folk music insofar as it resulted from the musical repertories and practices of immigrant and ethnic communities in Israel. Musical scholars turned their attention to the musical cultures of Yemenite-, Iraqi-, or Syrian-Israelis, many of which developed repertories and rituals in languages that were identifiable Jewish, such as the Judeo-Arabic of the Yemenite Jewish diwan tradition. The study of liturgical music in Israel spread to Moroccan baqqashot and Sephardi romances in the South American, Greek, or Turkish community. Israeli music was vast enough to embrace the multitude of differences that had historically distinguished Jewish music (p. 24).

Jacobson (1993) analyzes the challenges of synthesizing the musical traditions of the East and West. He notes that Israeli nationalism has its roots in the nationalism that emerged among Jews in Russia at the end of the 19th century in response to anti-Semitism and pogroms. In imperial Russia and elsewhere, the Jews rejected the monarchy and advocated an idealistic community. Many nationalist-inspired Jewish musicians have since turned away from Western musical models and searched for their inspiration in both new and old melodies from the Middle East, especially the Hebrew Bible:

For textual inspiration, these composers turned most often to the Bible. Certain Biblical verses represented for the modern Jewish settlers a historical link with the ancient Hebrew kingdom: songs of praise from the Psalms, songs of love from Solomon’s Canticle, songs from the Pentateuch describing Israel’s earliest connection with the land, and verses from the Prophets predicting their nation’s eventual restoration to that land. There were hardly any songs dealing with life in the diaspora or in the languages of the diaspora. Hebrew was used exclusively (Jacobson, 1993, p. 10).

Among modern, especially secularized, Jewish musicians, there is a paradox in returning to biblical sources. Biblical sources offer the most convincing examples of intercultural and interreligious dialogue at the spiritual and material level in a common cultural heritage. Braun (2002) is the first scholar to highlight the value of considering ethnicity in analyzing primary sources of Jewish music and discussing local Jewish musical histories. His publication includes several different sections investigating the Philistine, Phoenician, Nabatean-Safaitic, Idumaic, and Samaritan musical cultures. Insufficient archaeological material unfortunately prevents more than a peripheral understanding of Edomite, Moabite, Ammonite, and Amorite music.

The musical culture of ancient Israel/Palestine was quite clearly influenced by both ethnic and religious factors. Both “non-simultaneity within simultaneity” and “heterogeneity within homogeneity” characterize the development of ancient Israel/Palestine and of its music. Perhaps the most revealing way to examine the music is, therefore, as a rich and diverse mosaic dominated by syncretic tendencies. The small dimensions of the country and its on-going amalgamation of local peoples undoubtedly influenced its processes of cultural and musical syncretism.
Only such a constellation of geographical and cultural factors can explain how the homogeneous musical styles and types of musical instruments could have developed from the various local but also extremely heterogeneous musical phenomena. It is obvious now that ancient Israel/Palestine generated an autochthonous local musical culture which was, in many ways, congenial to the great neighbouring musical cultures of Egypt and Mesopotamia/Babylon. (p. 5)

Embracing its history of syncretism and diversity, the return of the Jewish “exiles” to biblical lands throughout the 20th century, and the coinciding development of Modern Jewish music, have meant that so-called “Jewish music” transcends the liturgical framework of the synagogue and permeates all areas of the secular sphere from vocal folk songs to fine symphonies, operas and other artistic genres.

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Irena Avsenik Nabergoj


Turbulent political and social events occurring in the Arab world during the early 20th century challenged the traditional creative threads of Islamic art and the earlier system of aesthetic training, which, in turn, stimulated an artistic evolution. Traditional forms of architecture and visual arts were slowly replaced as attention turned towards the artistic practices of the West. Fascination with new materials, technology and styles charted a new course for the development of visual culture by Arab artists. In turn, from the early 20th century onwards, easel painting and modern sculpture were favoured over traditional arts in the Arab world.

During recent decades, interest in different facets of contemporary Arab art has increased significantly (Shabout, 2007). Although this interest has brought modern and contemporary Arab art into wider focus, significant gaps remain in the scholarly discussion. Speaking to one such absence, this essay analyzes the new artistic practices and art heritage of Arab artists from Syria, Lebanon and Algeria who graduated from the Vasily Surikov Moscow State Art Institute. It examines artists who graduated or were continuing as postgraduate students between 1959, when the first group of Arab art students arrived in the USSR, and 19791. The study is based on previously unpublished material from the archives of the Moscow Art Institute (specifically, from the Personal Files Archive, the Graduation Artworks Archive, and the Foreign Students Admission Department Archive) as well as from the archive of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR (1950-1970), the

1 During the decades under consideration, the Moscow State Art Institute also hosted graduates and postgraduates from Arab countries including Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Sudan. Not all the students mentioned in this essay were ethnically Arab, but they were born, raised and educated in Arab states. In the context of this research, the term “Arab artists” does not indicate an ethnic group, but is “an umbrella term that signifies a pluralization of experiences arising from Islam, ethnos, language and the West”, i.e. artists from Arab nations whose majority embraces the faith of Islam (Shabout, 2007, p. 8).
archive of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education (1959-1988) and the archive of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation (1959-1965). Finally, this paper draws upon other archival material from the Russian State Archive of Literature and Arts and the State Archive of the Russian Federation. The research for this paper was undertaken and written with the aid of artists and their relatives and based on the materials gathered through meetings, interviews and correspondence with these people. It also considers information from large collections of press clippings from Soviet newspapers, journals and magazines dating from the 1950s-80s. Brief biographical notes related to the graduates and postgraduates are also included.

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Beginning in the 1950s, after WWII, improved political relations between the USSR and Arab states contributed to dynamic growth in the cultural sector. For instance, in the fall of 1955, a delegation of Soviet performing artists first visited Lebanon, Egypt and Syria to perform the Arab countries. The first exhibitions of Soviet art were also organized in these countries shortly thereafter.

In addition, the 1950s saw the organization and staging of a number of successful exhibitions in the USSR, which were dedicated to the contemporary art of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and other Arab countries. One such exhibit appeared at the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students. It opened in Moscow on 28 July 1957 and attracted 34,000 people from 130 countries. It was the first World Festival of Youth and Students held in the Soviet Union and a sign of new doors opening to the world. Among the various festival activities was an exhibition of contemporary art, which displayed work by artists from more than 50 countries, including several in the Arab world: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Tunis, and Sudan. The pieces exhibited were created specifically for the festival between 1955 and 1957 by both an elder generation of renowned masters and also young artists including: Ahmed Sabri (1889-1955), Hassan Mohamed Hassan (1906-1990), Gamal El-Sagini (1917-1977), Nazem Al-Jaafari (b. 1918), Affif Bahnasi (b. 1928), Simone Baltaxe-Martayan (1925-2009), Nazem Irani (1930-2014), Ibrahim El-Salahi (b. 1930), and many others (Darsky & Prokof’ev, 1959).

In 1957, two other exhibitions of contemporary Arab art were also organized in the USSR. In September, the first, presenting contemporary art of Lebanon, was organized by the Union of the USSR artists in Moscow. It introduced the Soviet public to artists such as: César Gemayel (1898-1958), Omar Onsi (1901-1969), Rachid Wehbé (1917-1993), Simone Baltaxe-Martayan, Jean Khalife (1923-1978), Paul Guiragossian (1925-1993), Michele El-Mir (1930-1973), Amine Sfeir (1932-2001), Nadia Saikali (b. 1936), Elie Kanaan (1926-2009) and Michel Basbous

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2 Russian State Archive of Literature and Arts (from now RGALI), Fund 2329, Inventory 8, File 675. Ministry of Culture of the USSR. Department of External Relations.
(1921-1981). On 20 December of the same year, an exhibition of Syrian plastic and decorative art opened in the State Museum of Oriental Art in Moscow; it was then transferred to the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg (then – Leningrad) (Vojtov, 2006, pp. 156-158). The exhibition was curated by Hafez Imam and Hassan Kamal (a curator of the National Museum in Damascus) (Kamal, 1958, pp. 45-47; Vojtov, 2006, p. 157). Both men were experts in the realist style of painting, an attribute noted in a report by the Ministry of Culture of the USSR. The contemporary art of Syria at the exhibit was represented by more than 60 paintings by Mahmoud Jalal (1911-1975), Michel Kurché (1900-1973), Adham Isma’il (1923-1963), Mahmoud Hammad (1923-1988), Fateh Al-Moudarres (1922-1999), Salah Al Nashif (1924-1971), Nazem al-Jaafari, Nasir Shoura (1920-1992) and many others (“Sirijskoe iskusstvo”, 1957).

At least two exhibitions of the art of the United Arab Republic - a short-lived presidential republic uniting Syria with Egypt under Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser between 1958 and 1961 – were erected in the Soviet Union in 1958. On 28 April, the Pushkin Fine Art Museum (in collaboration with the State Museum of Oriental Art) presented works from the region dating to the period between the 4th century BCE and the contemporary era. While the main exposition was dedicated to the art of the ancient world, one of the small exhibition halls was allotted for contemporary art (Hodzhash, Shuripova & Pevzner, 1958; Vojtov, 2006, p. 178). Then, from 23 December to the 22 January 1959, the State Museum of Oriental Art also presented an extensive survey of contemporary art from Syria and Egypt, bringing together more than 150 works. The exhibition travelled; on 28 January, it was packed and sent to the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg (Vojtov, 2006, pp. 178-179 & p. 197).

Cross-cultural activities like these exhibitions created mutual awareness of the relevant art world in various locations around the Mediterranean Sea and the USSR, a process that led to the development of exchange programs in music, cinema, fine art, performing art, etc. Eventually, such programs also extended into the arena of higher education. The government-sponsored international exchange programs that brought Arab students to the Soviet Union encouraged an increasingly global post-WWII art world. As the Arab bloc was emerging under the leadership of Egypt, the geopolitical region of the “Middle East” accrued strategic importance as a Cold War battleground. A report on a 1957 Syrian art exhibition by the Ministry of Culture of the USSR states: “The prospects and directions of contemporary art development in Syria are yet unknown. However they tend toward realistic art. It is important to influence the development of this art …”

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3 RGALI, Fund 2926, Inventory 1, File 188. Materials of an Exhibition of Contemporary Art of Lebanon in Moscow in September 1957 and RGALI, Fund 2932, Inventory 3, File 1445, Exhibition of Contemporary Art of Lebanon on the 19th of September 1957.
5 RGALI, Fund 2329, Inventory 8, File 386.
The education program for Arab art students in the USSR became one method by which to “influence” the aesthetic trends.

Easel painting is a relatively recent phenomenon in the Arab world. Most Arab artists of the pre-1950 era were self-taught amateurs. Over the course of the 1950s, however, this changed, in part because the Soviet Union, like various European governments, created a program dedicated to attracting Arab artists and scholars from around the world. Various prominent art institutions in the Soviet Union participated in these early exchange programs. In the 1950s, the group of leading institutions included: the Vasily Surikov Moscow State Art Institute; the Moscow State Stroganov Academy of Industrial and Applied Arts; the Ilya Repin St. Petersburg State Academic Institute of Fine Arts, Sculpture and Architecture; the Moscow Academic Art College in Memory of 1905; the Russian Institute of Theatre Arts in Moscow (known today as the Russian University of Theatre Arts), the Tbilisi State Academy of Arts, the Tashkent State Institute of Culture and the Uzbekistan State Institute of Arts (two institutes that merged in 2012 to become the Uzbekistan State Institute of Arts and Culture), the All-Ukrainian Art Institute in Kiev (now known as the National Academy of Visual Arts and Architecture), the Kharkiv State Institute of Culture (known today as the Kharkiv State Academy of Culture) and the Yerevan Institute of Theatre and Fine Art (now called the Yerevan State Institute of Theatre and Cinematography). The present research examines the legacy of the most popular among the institutions with programs for Arab art students – the Vasily Surikov Moscow State Art Institute – still one of the leading centers of higher art education in Russia today.

The Moscow Art Institute was established on the basis of the Moscow School of Painting and Sculpture of the Moscow Art Society, an institute founded in 1843. After the 1917 Revolution, the school merged with the Stroganov School of Applied Arts, and a new organization was formed by 1920 – the Higher Art and Technical Studios – better known internationally by the acronym VKHUTEMAS. This school fostered the development of three main movements in avant-garde art and architecture: Constructivism, Rationalism and Suprematism. In 1930, however, political and internal pressure forced this new school to dissolve and divide into 6 other schools, which ultimately led to the opening of the Moscow Art Institute in 1934. In 1948, to celebrate the centenary of the Russian artist Vasily Surikov’s birth, the Institute was renamed in his honor. Today, the institute is composed of 5 faculties: the Faculty of Painting; the Faculty of Graphic Art; the Faculty of Sculpture; the Faculty of Architecture and the Faculty of Theory and the History of Arts. The Faculty of Painting includes: the Workshops of Easel Painting; the Workshops of Monumental Art (where students can master the technique of mosaic, wall painting and stained glass); and the Workshop of Theatrical-decorative Art (which offers the study of the history of theatre and costume). The Faculty of Graphic Art includes: the Workshop of Easel Drawing; the Workshop of

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Graphic Design and Posters; and the Workshop of Book Illustrations. The curriculum of the Faculty of Graphic Art offers, not only painting and drawing lessons, but also the study of different publishing processes and graphic techniques such as etching, lithography, linocut, xylography, and serigraphy. The Faculty of Sculpture Workshop teaches the basics for training sculptors, including: sketching, easel painting, monumental and decorative sculpture, bas-relief, high relief, and animal sculpture, as well as experiments in various materials.

Foreign students have studied at the Institute since 1937, and today it continues to accept foreign students with secondary education and special pre-institute art training. According to education exchange agreements, or MOU, between various countries, foreigners can join the Institute with a full scholarship granted by the Ministry of Education of Russia or, if a grant cannot be obtained, with fully paid tuition fees and a study contract signed between the students and the Institute. As a prerequisite, all foreign students must complete a one-year Russian language preparatory course. In 1983, the Institute opened its own Foreign Language Department where students could fulfil this language requirement and learn the basics of Russian art, history, and literature while also undertaking special training and practicing their drawing, composition and sculpture skills. Based on the results of these prerequisite courses, students were (or were not) admitted to the institute.

In the 1950s-70s, foreign students, considered invited guests of the government, drew a small stipend (with their home countries as guarantor) and received a grant for art supplies. In the 1958 UNESCO “Study Abroad” international handbook, it states that scholarships in the USSR were “available for students… who have completed their secondary education. Instruction is in Russian; preparatory courses arranged for study of the Russian language…” (“Unesco”, 1958, p. 586). In addition, the document stipulates that students were to receive a “monthly allowance of 90 roubles for undergraduates, and 100 roubles for graduates (tax free), plus free tuition, medical care, [and] transportation to and from the USSR, paid by the government of the USSR at the end of studies. Students from Asia, Africa and Latin America [were to] receive an allowance of 300 roubles for purchase of warm clothing; an annual allowance of 80 roubles (maximum) [was to be] made to graduate students for the purchase of technical and scientific literature for their personal use. Hostel accommodation available…; students spending their summer and winter holidays in the USSR [could] visit rest homes, sanatoria, participate in excursions throughout the country, etc., free of charge” (“Unesco”, 1961, p. 445). Arab students also availed themselves of facilities in Moscow that had been expressly dedicated to them, including the Arab Cultural Centre, which housed a club and library, and organized outings and exhibition opportunities.

The first two post-WWII Arab students to study at the institute – Milaad Chaib (1918-2000) and Abdel Mannan Shamma (b. 1937) – joined in September 1959.

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7 I have striven to verify the biographical entries to the best of my ability, but some dates of exhibitions and of degrees earned by artists and administrators may be off by a year or two. Conflicting dates are recorded even between biographical accounts provided by the artists themselves. I also found
Both were Syrians. Prior to arriving in Moscow, Milaad Chaib had worked as a secondary school Deputy Director in Syria, teaching a class in drawing. He completed his basic drawing training under the Syrian artist, Tariq Tawfiq (1875-1940), who encouraged him to continue his art education. Chaib arrived in Moscow in early 1958 as a member of a delegation sent by the Patriarchate of Alexander III (Tahan) of Antioch. In September 1959, he was accepted into the Art Institute and admitted to the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Easel Painting. The second student, Abdel Mannan Shamma, received his formal education between 1950 and 1958 under the supervision of the drawing artist and teacher, Subhi Shuaib (1909-1974). In 1958, Shamma won first prize in an art competition and was sent with a scholarship to Moscow to study art. In September 1959, Shamma was admitted to the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art of the Moscow Art Institute. At the Institute, the two Syrian students joined a vibrant international community, including both foreign and Russian students.

In 1959, the largest group of foreign students up to that point arrived at the Institute. According to the 1959-60 Activities Report, there were a total of 14 foreign students, 12 of whom were 1st year students. Of those, 11 (9 1st year, one 3rd year, and one 4th year student) were in the Faculty of Painting, and three 1st year students were in the Faculty of Sculpture. The majority of foreign students took their prerequisite one-year Russian language course at Moscow State University until 1983, when the Moscow Art Institute opened its own Russian language preparatory course. Upon completion of this course, students would receive a certificate and a personal reference letter in which their teacher or course supervisor presented a short description of the skills they had learned and an evaluation of their class attendance and performance in class activities. Recommendations also included general assessments of the students’ characters and religious behaviours and descriptions of their attitude towards the politics and regime of the Soviet Union. The content of these personal reference letters varied since they addressed students of different nationalities, religious beliefs, social statuses, and leadership skills. However, none of the letters, even the negative ones, ever prevented students from continuing their education at various institutes and universities in the USSR.

Upon completion of their preparatory course and admission to their respective universities and institutes, students would receive accommodation and a stipend, the amount of which was stated and agreed upon in the international agreements between states. In the 1960s, undergraduate students from Arab countries at the varying dates on the birth and education certificates in the university students’ files. All artists’ biographical information was taken from the Archive of Personal Files in the Moscow Art Institute or from the personal communication of the artists’ families and friends (unless otherwise noted).

Moscow Art Institute received between 90 roubles and 120 roubles per month\(^9\) as well as a supplementary allotment, officially called an “adaptation allowance,” of up to 120 roubles per semester. Postgraduate students at the Institute received 150 roubles per month, plus an adaptation allowance of 150 roubles per semester\(^10\). Lastly, students were given a one-time clothing allowance as well as funds to purchase books.

In 1959, when the Syrian students, Abdel Mannan Shamma and Milaad Chaib, were accepted into the Institute, admission for Soviet applicants was highly competitive. They often studied at an art school for a few years prior to submitting an advanced art portfolio for review by faculty members. Contrarily, foreign students had no prerequisite art training. Consequently, after the first mid-term, the under-prepared Syrian students, along with other foreign students, showed rather weak results. In a report from one semi-annual meeting of the Faculties of Painting and Graphic Art, the faculty sought to address the problem of foreign students in the Institute directly. The report states:

The situation with foreign students is rather complicated. Among new foreign students there are Vietnamese, Italians, and an Arab, as well as a poorly prepared Syrian and an Italian student with rather peculiar earlier art training. For this reason, the faculty teaching staff has faced certain problems when working with the foreign students … After reviewing various drawings of the first-, second- and third-year students, questions have been raised about how to handle the foreign students. With their low level of art training, it would be difficult for them to continue into the second year when they should study the full figure in drawing courses and the half-length figure in painting courses. One suggestion has been to separate the foreign students into their own group. But this idea has been rejected, since the foreign students learn much from our Soviet students. There have also been suggestions that we give the foreign students extra assignments to address the serious gaps in their art training. They do not have basic, sometimes elementary, art skills. Extra drawing training now could give them the opportunity to excel in working with more complicated art forms later. However, it would be difficult and time consuming to give them extra training while they remain in the same group with the other Soviet students. Institute management will need to find the best way to introduce extra training for the foreign students\(^11\).

On 20 May 1960, the Faculty of Painting held another meeting to discuss the results and outcome of the study year. Again, the question of foreign students was raised. According to one faculty member, Professor Fedor Nevezhin (1902-1964):

The interactions [of the foreign students] with our students provides many benefits. It is also most unlikely that our students would be influenced by the foreign students since they do not have any distinct art style or manner. The foreign students walk around the class and watch how other students draw and paint. It is very difficult to explain drawing techniques to people that can hardly say “hello”

\(^9\) Or 900 roubles per month before 1961. A monetary reform occurred in 1961, and the value was reduced by a factor of 10, making 900 roubles equal to 90.


\(^11\) RGALI, Fund 2459, Inventory 2, File 167. Moscow Art Institute. Institute Activities Report 1959-60. Faculty of Painting and Graphic Art.
and “good bye” in Russian. When I remember Chaib drawing “suitcases” instead of human heads … and now he has significantly improved his drawing skills. … The most talented is the little Shamma, he has produced very good drawings that reach the level of the works of our students.\footnote{12 RGALI, Fund 2459, Inventory 2, File 172. Minutes of Meetings, Plans, Discussions of Exams’ Results. Report of the Faculty of Graphic Art 1959-60.}

The final decision was announced by the dean of the Institute, Professor Fedor Modorov (1890-1967): “During the first semester we might have to group the foreign students together into a single group, find tailored and specific methods of practicing so they can catch up and align themselves with our regular students; but it is useful for the foreign students to work alongside our students. We will take them with us on a field trip and teachers should teach them easel painting there.” The decision was justified. Already in the report of the following year, the students’ mentor, Nikolai Tolkunov (1917-1996), claimed there had been major advancements in the training and masterworks of the foreign students. In particular, he singled out Shamma and Chaib, stating that their drawing skills had reached the level of the other students.\footnote{13 Ibid.} Thus, it appears that the Arab students were successfully integrated into the general population of Soviet and international students.

The memoirs and scholarship of Leonid Pisarev (b. 1938), a Soviet classmate of Shamma and Chaib, recall those years at the Institute. In his article dedicated to the artistic heritage of Vjacheslav Prosvirin (1940-2008), Pisarev writes:

I will begin recounting my memories of Slava (Vjacheslav Prosvirin - ON) by remembering the Vasily Surikov Moscow State Institute, and by recalling the workshop, led by a remarkable artist, Alexander Deynega. In 1959, “San Sanuch” (Alexander Deynega – ON) admitted to his workshop six male students and one female student (“hoping that the male students would not use foul language in the presence of live models”). The number of students was becoming smaller and smaller as we studied and, in 1965, only three of us graduated from the Workshop of Monumental Art: Prosvirin, Pisarev, and Abdel Mannan Shamma from Syria. We went on to study under the supervision of Deynega, not only because we liked this outstanding artist, but also because hiding behind his broad back, we could paint more freely and liberally than in other workshops.

A few words about our classmates. … Carlo Ciccoli, son of an Italian communist, brought banned art books to the Institute – monographs of those foreign artists whom we could never have seen in the USSR. One of the most significant episodes of that time was tied to a 1962 exhibition in Manezh, organized to celebrate the 30-year anniversary of MOSSKH, the Moscow Section of the Artist’s Union, where Khruschev became enraged.\footnote{14 RGALI, Fund 2459, Inventory 2, File 183. Minutes of Meetings, Plans, Discussions of Exams’ Results. Report of the Faculty of Graphic Art 1960-61.} A journalist from the “Soviet Culture” newspaper came to the institute to question and interview students about this episode. And we, instead of scolding the show, were praising it. Carlo Ciccoli was especially fond of it. The next day an article was published in which our words had been completely misinterpreted and changed. Carlo, as a Western man, naturally decided to demand a correction, and we went to the editorial office of the newspaper. The editor-in-chief reassured the Italian, promising to publish a correction, and, of course, he deceived us!\footnote{15 The author of this passage is referring to the events of 1 December 1962 when, upon visiting "The New Reality" contemporary art exhibition in Manezh exhibition hall in Moscow, Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev became furious with what he saw and ordered the exhibition closed down. The exhibition's shutdown led to official denouncement and prohibition of non-realistic art.
Abdel Mannan Shamma was very talented in decorative art skills. He was very fond of Syrian ethnography. His works showed signs of naïve art … We spent our 1964 internship in the Leningrad Academy of Art workshops, laying out a mosaic using smalt left over from the Tsarist era construction of St. Isaac’s Cathedral. After Leningrad, we went to Tallinn, where we met the second-year students, Natasha Nesterova and Tanya Nazarenko. We invited them to join us, and together we went to Mikhajlovskoe to “visit” Alexander Pushkin. Photo slides of Pskov, Izborsk, and Novgorod have been preserved until now. How young and happy we were then! (Vjacheslav Prosvirin, 2010, pp. 21-22).

In 1960, one year after Shamma and Chaib joined the Moscow Art Institute, the first applicant from Lebanon, Nazem Irani, was admitted. Irani received a formal education at the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts between 1950 and 1953. He specialized in painting and sculpture. At the Institute, he joined the Faculty of Sculpture to study under the supervision of Nikolai Tomsky (1900-1984), the famous Soviet sculptor. In 1961, one more student from Lebanon, Whahib Btddini (1929-2011), came to the USSR. Btddini had begun his education in 1956 at the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts. In 1961, he went to Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) to continue this education. Then in 1962, he was transferred to the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art. The first Algerian postgraduate student, Ali Benrejdal (b. ?), joined the Institute in 1965.

Fig. 1. Graduation class of 1965. Milaad Chaib and Abdel Mannan Shamma (on the far right) with classmates and the Institute’s professors.

The first Arab graduates from the Institute – Milaad Chaib and Abdel Mannan Shamma – completed their work there in 1965 (fig. 1). Thereafter, the summer of 1966 saw the graduation of Nazem Irani and Wahib Btddini. The university paid for their return home; a memo written by a Deputy Dean of the Institute on 8 July 1966 instructs the only Soviet travel agency that handled international travel in the
USSR to issue Wahib Bteddini an invoice to cover the costs of his tickets for a one-way train from Moscow to Odessa, followed by a one-way trip aboard “Tourist”, a ship to Beirut.\textsuperscript{16}

Upon returning home, certifications in hand, Arab art graduates were often assigned to work as art teachers in their respective capitals or in rural preparatory schools. At that time, there was great need for professional art staff. For example, we know that employment demands were part of the reason Nazem Irani could not continue his postgraduate studies in Moscow. In January 1976, he briefly returned to the Soviet capital, intending to work on his postgraduate thesis, but he left again after only a few months. In a letter to the Institute management, Irani explained that his presence was required in Beirut because there was a serious shortage of art teachers in his home country.\textsuperscript{17}

The late 1960’s witnessed a period of strained relations between the USSR and the Arab nations of the Middle East. For this reason, the next group of Arab students came to the Institute only in the early 1970s. Assem Al Bacha (b. 1948), a Syrian graduate of “Puedo” Academy in Buenos Aires and of the Faculty of Fine Arts at Damascus University, joined the Institute’s Faculty of Sculpture in 1971. Then, in 1974, the Institute accepted Boufersaoui Belkacem (b. 1949), its first undergraduate student from Algeria.

By the mid-1970’s the international exchange experienced a resurgence. Between 1975 and 1979, the Institute received what was likely the largest group of international Arab students in its history. Among them were: the Syrian students, Nassir Al Nasser (b. 1954), Zuhair Al Tall (1953-1996), Mou‘eieber Hawara (b. 1954), Fayrouz Toufik Hezzi (b. 1954) and Mohammad Qasem Khleif (b. 1952); the Algerian students, Rabehi Lakhdar (b. 1956), Madjid Mouna (1954), Farid Ouis (1955), and Tayeb Mustapha (b. 1953); and the Lebanese student, Milad Ouaida (b. 1955).

The persistence of such an active international student exchange program raises the following questions: Why did Arab artists select the Soviet Institute as their alma mater? And, why, when they could have gone to Paris or Rome, did they go to Moscow? I asked these questions in numerous interviews and correspondences with the artists and their relatives. While the responses I received varied greatly, the artists’ motivations generally fell under three categories. First, education in the USSR was free and students were provided with scholarships, places to live, book allowances, clothes, and tickets to and from the USSR. These perks were major motivating factors in the artists’ decision to study in the USSR since many students came from rural areas, had no financial support from home and received no governmental grants or scholarships. The second motivating factor was admiration of the communist regime and the Soviet way of life. A few students were even members of their countries’ respective communist parties or youth communist parties, and claimed to be faithful communists in their application papers. Several

\textsuperscript{16} RGALI, Fund 2459, Inventory 3, File 29. Correspondence with the Ministry of Culture of USSR and other government entities regarding foreign students’ education.

\textsuperscript{17} Archive of personal files, Moscow Art Institute. Personal file of Nazem Irani.
of these students were accepted, not through the international exchange program, but through decrees from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. As noted, for instance, the Communist party of Iraq circumvented the traditional exchange student application process by sending requests for admission directly to the Communist Party of the USSR. The splendour of the artistic and cultural heritage of Russia was the final major motivating factor noted by the artists. The Russian people had created and maintained the country’s immortal works of classic literature, music and fine art, which were well-known throughout the world. Regardless of the foreign students’ initial motivation for studying at the Soviet Institute, and despite the hardships they sometimes faced, the majority of the Arab students recalled their study, professors and mentors with praise and kind words, and found the years they spent working under the Institute’s faculty deeply memorable. The students were young, open minded, and impressionable.

Throughout the period under study, the USSR had close, albeit sometimes complex and multi-faceted, relations with many of the Arab states with whom it cooperated in both military and economic capacities. These relations also helped facilitate cultural connections. As this essay documents, hundreds of Arab nationals from home countries allied with the Soviet Union spent years studying at schools such as the Institute in the USSR. Consequently, through its training of Arab artists, the Soviet Union had a strong impact on the development of mainstream Arab art. Upon their return home, these young Arab artists assumed positions in art schools and universities. In turn, they contributed to the establishment of a robust network of relations between the Arab states and the Soviet Union both on the institutional level and among the elites - relations that remained in place until the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, these relations declined and the influence of the Soviet school on realist Arab art nearly ceased.

“Vasily Surikov Moscow State Art Institute”: Biographical Catalogue of Graduates and Postgraduates from Syria, Lebanon and Algeria (1959-1979)\(^1\)

Al Bacha, Assem (b. 1948)

Born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the Syrian artist, Assem Al Bacha, first studied art at “Puedo” Academy in Buenos Aires. In 1969, he graduated from the Faculty of Fine Arts in Damascus, Syria, and, in 1970, he arrived in Moscow to start his Russian language preparatory course. In September 1971, he joined the Faculty of Sculpture at the Moscow Art Institute, from which he graduated in 1977 with a final project in sculpture called “Palestinian” (fig. 2).

Since 1987, Al Bacha has been based in Granada, where he has worked as a sculptor, writer and translator (“Contemporary”, 1998, p. 224-227). Since first

\(^{18}\) In alphabetical order, these are the artists for whom I have traced the available information about their post--USSR years.
exhibiting in Syria in the mid-1960s, he has gone on to participate in solo and group shows in galleries and cultural centers in locations around the world from Cuba to South Korea\(^1\). Often experimenting with different forms and techniques, Al Bacha is known for his expressionist sculpture that explores a range of subjects and themes, most of which address the human experience. In both 1975 and 1981, he exhibited his works in Moscow (Starodub, 1982, p. 52).

Before being arrested, spending time in jail, and ultimately fleeing Syria in 2012, it is widely known that Al Bacha buried his artworks underground in Yabroud in hopes that they would avoid theft and destruction in a place where humans could no longer survive\(^2\).

Fig. 2. *Assem Al Bacha. Palestinian, 1977*. Gypsum, 144 x 30 x 30 cm.

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*Benrejdal, Ali (b. ?)*

Ali Benrejdal, from Algeria, joined the Art Institute as a postgraduate in January 1965, and remained in the USSR until April 1966.
Boufersaoui, Belkacem (b. 1949)  
Born in 1949, in Larhat (El Asnam), Algeria, Belkacem Boufersaoui began his formal art education at the École Nationale des Beaux-Arts in Algiers, where he spent three years. In 1973, after completing the one-year preparatory Russian language course, he joined the Moscow Art Institute, Department of Sculpture. He graduated in 1979, after executing his work, “Algerian”, under the supervision of renowned Soviet sculptor, Pavel Bondarenko (1917-1992). After returning to Algeria, Belkacem Boufersaoui taught sculpture at the École Nationale des Beaux-Arts from 1980 to 1994. He participated in numerous group exhibitions. Among his well-known works are his bas-reliefs in Tébessa and Tipasa.\(^\text{21}\)

Bteddini, Wahib (1929-2011)  
Born in 1929, in Kfar Nabrakh-Chouf, Lebanon, Wahib Bteddini began his art training in the early 1950s when he took painting classes in Omar Onsi’s atelier and sculpture classes in Halim El Hajj’s (1915-1990) atelier.\(^\text{22}\) He was one of the first in the Druze community to take an interest in painting. Bteddini started his formal education in 1956 at the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts where he spent a few years. In 1961, without graduating from the academy, he left to continue his education in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), and then, in 1962, he was transferred to the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art. Bteddini graduated in 1966 with his work, “Harvesting” (or “The Picking of the Apples in the Mountain”) (fig. 3), executed under the supervision of the prominent artist, Alexander Myzin (1900-1984).

After returning to Lebanon, he taught in the Institute of Fine Arts at Lebanese University from 1967 to 1988, eventually becoming the head of the department. In 1988, he emigrated to the U.S.\(^\text{23}\).

Bteddini won first prize from the Lebanese Intellectual Poet Said Akl in 1970, and second prize in 2003.\(^\text{24}\) According to documents in the Richard Chahine Archive, he was also the recipient of a Lebanese Cedar Badge of Honor Presidential Award in 2004. Bteddini was a member of the Association of Lebanese Artists for Painting and Sculpture, the Union of Lebanese artists, and the House of Art and Literature. He also participated in numerous solo and group exhibitions. During the last few years of his life, the artist was busy building a museum for his own work in his home town of Kfar Nabrakh.\(^\text{25}\) Dedicated to the memory of the talented painter and sculptor, the museum now showcases 400 of

his oil paintings, pastels and watercolors, and includes approximately 50 sculptures in plaster, stone, and fiberglass (M. Bteddini, personal communication, 2016-18). There are also 16 paintings by the artist in the collection of the Ministry of Culture of Lebanon (S. Barakat, personal communication, February 2018).

Fig. 3. Wahib Bteddini. “Harvesting” (or “The Picking of the Apples in the Mountain”), 1966


Chaib, Milaad (1918-2000)

Milaad Chaib was born in the town of Maaloula, Syria. His early artistic training included his study under the supervision of the artist Tariq Tawfiq, one of the first recognized Syrian fine art oil painters, who encouraged him and gave him his first lessons in art\(^{26}\). At the age of 19, Chaib exhibited his works for the first time. For a few years, he taught a drawing class in a secondary school, eventually becoming the school’s deputy director. Chaib arrived in Moscow in 1958 as a member of a delegation sent by the Patriarchate Alexander III (Tahan) of Antioch. He lived for 6 months in the Metochion of the Orthodox Church of Antioch in Moscow before joining the Russian language preparatory course (W. Chayeb, personal communication, 2016-17). In September 1959, he was accepted into the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Easel Painting. Chaib was deeply influenced by the art of Russia and especially by the heritage of

\(^{26}\) Tariq Tawfiq was born in Damascus. He received his first artistic training at the Ottoman military academy in Istanbul, which was followed by supplemental training in art and architecture in Paris in 1923. Upon his return to Syria, he established the first independent art studio open to the public. During the French Mandate in Syria, he worked for the engineering office doing architectural surveys and restoration, and also established what was likely the first independent art studio open to the public, where he taught painting to interested pupils (Lenssen, 2014, p. 388).
the 14th-15th-century icon painter Andrei Rublev. By adapting parts of Rublev’s style and techniques, he developed his own style of icon paintings. Chaib graduated in July 1965 with the work “My Motherland” (or “The Melodies of my Motherland”) (fig. 4), executed under the supervision of the prominent artist Gennady Korolev (1913-1995) (Bogdanov, 1993, p. 3).

After graduation, Chaib became a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Fine Arts at the University of Damascus. He also participated in an exhibition of Syrian artists in Moscow in 1980 (“Khudozhniki Sirii” 1980). His one and only solo exhibition, a retrospective of his works, took place after his death in 2005 in the lounge of Ebla Arts in Damascus. Works of Milaad Chaib were in the collection of the National Museum of Damascus. Chaib was considered one of the finest icon painters in his homeland. His icons were kept in various churches around Syria, and especially in his hometown of Maaloula (currently destroyed). His oeuvre includes a substantial number of Biblical scenes and portraits of religious figures (W. Chayeb, personal communication, 2017-18).

Fig. 4. Milaad Chaib. My Motherland (or The Melodies of My Motherland), 1965

Source: Personal Archive of Wael Chayeb.

Hawara, Mou'eiber (b. 1954)

Born in 1954, in the village of Fairouza (Homs governorate), Syria, Mou'eiber Hawara started his formal education in 1973 in the Faculty of Fine Art at Damascus University. After completing his preparatory course in Russian language in 1975, he was admitted to the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Easel Painting. In 1981, he graduated with his work “Refugees”, executed under the supervision of the renowned Soviet artist, Tair Salakhov (b. 1928).
Hezzi, Fayrouz Toufik (b. 1954)

Born in Yabroud, Syria, Fayrouz Hezzi started his formal education at the Fine Art Institute in Damascus, where he spent two years. After moving to Moscow, and completing the one-year Russian language preparatory course, he was admitted in 1975 to the Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art. Fayrouz Hezzi graduated in 1981 with a project consisting of a mosaic exterior, entitled “National Epos”, for the House of Culture in Syria. The work was executed under the supervision of the prominent artist, Klavdija Tutevol (1917-1980). Fayrouz Hezzi continued with his postgraduate studies, which he completed in 1985 with the submission of his thesis “Kritika formalizma I modernizma v sovremennom izobrazitel’nom iskusstve Sirii” (Criticism of Formalism and Modernism in Syrian Contemporary Art), written under the supervision of the prominent art historian, Mikhail Alpatov (1902-1986). He currently lives and works in Russia in a small town near Moscow called Tver.

Irani, Nazem (1930-2014)

Nazem Irani was born in the town of Yaroun, Casa of Bent-Jbayl, South Lebanon. His father was a commercial painter, and young Nazem used to help him, working as a painter-decorator in local Palestinian villages and small towns near Yaroun (Lahoud, 1974, p. 217). Irani received his formal education from the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts between 1950 and 1953, having been granted a scholarship from the Ministry of Education. He specialized in painting and sculpture (Chahine, 1982, V. I. p. 60). In 1953, he briefly taught in the same institute while simultaneously working for a local magazine (Darsky, 1958, p. 46). In 1955, Irani received first prize at the Autumn exhibition for his work “Our Enterprises”, and, in 1955, he was awarded a medal for his submission of “Freedom” at the Biennale Exhibition in Egypt (Darsky, 1958, p. 46). In 1957, he brought his graphic works, “A Peasant Woman” and “The Hand”, to the Soviet Union as part of a group exhibition of contemporary art at the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students (Darsky, 1958, pp. 45-46; Darsky & Prokof’ev, 1959, p. 24).

In 1960, Nazem continued his education at the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Sculpture. He graduated with honors in 1966 with his sculpture “Sorrow”, executed under the supervision of the famous Soviet sculptor, Nikolaï Tomsky (fig. 5). Describing the sculpture in his graduation presentation, Nazem Irani stated: “This theme has a universal meaning, not only for our country, but for all the countries around the world. It is sorrow about death. This is related to periods of war as well as to periods of peace …”27. The work was positively received by the Institute’s management, and, on 14 July 1966, Professor Tomsky

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27 Extract from the graduation committee report, 1 July 1966. Archive of Personal Files, Moscow Art Institute. Personal file of Nazem Irani.
issued a letter to a director of the Department of Sculpture at the Moscow Art Fund requesting a copy of Irani’s graduation work “Sorrow” to be executed in metal.28

In January 1976, Irani briefly returned to Moscow to continue his postgraduate studies, but he left after a few months, explaining in his letter to the Institute’s management that he must return to Beirut, since there was a serious shortage of art teachers, and his help was required at home.29

Nazem Irani taught in the Faculty of Fine Arts at Lebanese University. In the early 1970s, he established an art and sculpture atelier in Badaro-Tayyouni, Beirut. During one of the air raids on Beirut between 1975 and 1976, Nazem Irani’s workshop was demolished. His graduation work “Sorrow” was destroyed (Korshunov, 1981, p. 30). With the war in Lebanon came the breakdown of economic order and the disruption of social life. In turn, the development of the arts came to a complete standstill, leaving artists in a state of despair. After the support of both government entities and individual patrons completely ceased, a considerable number of artists left the country. This included Irani, who, in the early 1980s, immigrated with his family to Sydney, Australia (N. Irani, personal communication, 2017-18).

Nazem Irani is the recipient of numerous awards, including Khalil Gibran’s Global Award, which he received in Sydney, and the 1967 sculpture prize award from the South Lebanon Exhibition (l’Exposition du Liban-Sud), where he exhibited two of his works, “Femme Orientale” and “La Campagne” (Richard Chahine, archive documents).30 Nazem Irani also participated in numerous solo and group exhibitions in Lebanon and Australia (N. Irani, personal communication, 2017-18). Among his known existing works are: a painting called “Red Horses”, which Irani executed in 1977 and gifted to the Russian Cultural Centre in Beirut, where the painting remains today (T. Chouman, personal communication, January 2018); a relief plaque called “Al-Ghadab Al-Sate”, executed in 1969, in the collection of Saleh Barakat (S. Barakat, personal communication, February 2018); and 6 works in the collection of the Ministry of Culture of Lebanon (S. Barakat, personal communication, February 2018). Although Irani was not active in political life in Lebanon, he could not stay away from the dramatic events that transpired in his own country. In the 1980s, he worked extensively on political posters, creating one of his most famous images, "We will resist", which was designed for the Lebanese National Resistance Front / Ministry of the South in 1983 (Maasri, 2009, p. 26, cover and fig. 5.8).31

28 RGALI, Fund 2459, Inventory 3, File 29. Correspondence with the Ministry of Culture of the USSR and other government entities regarding foreign students’ education.
29 Aarchive of Personal Files, Moscow Art Institute. Personal file of Nazem Irani.
31 Also, retrieved 24 January 2018, from http://www.signsofconflict.com
Khleif, Mohammad Qassem (b. 1952)

Born in 1952 in Tadmor (Palmyra), Syria, Mohammed Khleif arrived in Moscow in 1974 to complete his Russian language preparatory course. In 1975, he was admitted to the Art Institute, the Faculty of Graphic Art. He graduated in 1981 with his work “My Motherland”, created under the supervision of the prominent Soviet graphic artist, Nikolai Ponomarev (1918-1997). Not much is known about his recent artistic endeavours. In 2010, he had an exhibition in Palmyra.\(^\text{32}\)

Lakhdar, Rabehi (b. 1956)

Rabehi Lakhdar was born in El Harrach, Algeria, in 1956. After completing his Russian language preparatory course at Kiev State University in 1977-78, he was admitted to the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art in September 1978. In 1984, he graduated with an art project involving two mural decorations for Moscow State University. They were entitled “Lebanon’s Peaceful Life” and “Eternal Traditions of Algeria”, and were executed under the supervision of the Soviet artist, Klavdija Tutevol. Preparatory drawings for the graduation project were gifted to the Algerian Embassy in Moscow.

Moula, Madjid (b. 1954)

Madjid Moula was born in Blida, Algeria, in 1954. Upon completion of his preparatory Russian language course at Kiev State University in 1977-78, he was

accepted to the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Sculpture, in September 1978. He graduated in 1984 with a sculpture project called “Houari Boumédiène”, executed under the supervision of the Soviet sculptor, Pavel Bondarenko. Currently, he lives and works in France (K. Bellatreche, personal communication, February 2017).

Mustapha, Tayeb (b. 1953)

Algerian artist Tayeb Mustapha was born in Taza, Morocco. In 1977 and 1978, he studied the Russian language at Donetsk State University. Then, in 1978 he was admitted to the Art Institute in Moscow to join the Faculty of Sculpture. He graduated in 1984 with an art project called “Algeria”, executed under the supervision of the Soviet sculptor, Mikhail Baburin (1907-1984).

Al Nasser, Nassir (b. 1954)

Born in 1954 in Hama, Syria, Nassir Al Nasser was admitted to the Moscow Art Institute in 1975 after completing his one-year Russian language preparatory course. He graduated in 1981 from the Faculty of Sculpture with an art project called “Motherland”, executed under the supervision of the Soviet sculptor, Nikolai Tomsky.

Ouaida (Aouïda), Milad Boutros (b. 1955)

Milad Ouaida was born in Ghazir, Lebanon in 1955. Upon completion of his Russian language preparatory course at Donetsk State University in 1978, he joined the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art. He graduated in 1984 with an art project called “Lebanon today, yesterday, tomorrow”. In 1984, he continued his postgraduate studies at the Russian State Academy of Fine Arts - Research Institute of Art Theory and History, graduating in 1989 with his thesis, “Izobrazitel’noe iskusstvo Livana epohi novogo I noveishego vremeni” (Modern and Contemporary Art of Lebanon).

He participated in numerous group exhibitions in Lebanon, including the 1991-92 and 1995 autumn salons at the Sursock Museum (“Musee Nicolas Sursock”, 1991; “Musee Nicolas Sursock”, 1995 (as Aouïda Milad), p. 16). He has been teaching at Lebanese University for many years.

Ouis, Farid (b. 1955)

Farid Ouis was born in Hussein Dey, Algeria in 1955. He completed his Russian language preparatory course at Kiev State University in 1978 and, the same year, was admitted to the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Easel Painting. Ouis graduated in 1984 with an art project entitled “After the Earthquake”, executed under the supervision of the Soviet master, Tair Salakhov.
Abdel Mannan Shamma was born in the city of Homs, Syria. He began studying art between 1950 and 1958 under the supervision of the pioneering drawing artist and teacher, Subhi Shouaib. In 1958, Shamma won his first art prize and received a scholarship to go to Moscow to study art. In September 1959, after completing his one-year Russian language preparatory course at Moscow State University, he was admitted to the Moscow Art Institute, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art. In July 1965, he graduated with honors after completing a project called “National holiday” (last known location – the Ministry of Culture in Damascus), executed under the supervision of the Soviet artist, Alexander Deyneka (1899-1969). While staying in the USSR, Shamma took part in the design of murals for the new Young Pioneers Palace in Kostanay, Kazakhstan, which opened in February 1963 (Bogdanov, 1983, p. 48).

After his graduation, Shamma briefly returned to his native Homs, where he taught from 1965 to 1966 at the Teachers Institute. In 1966, he won a grant for post-graduate studies and left for Moscow again. In 1971, he received his post-graduate degree from the Institute, making him the first Syrian artist and researcher to be awarded an academic qualification in the fine arts. His thesis was written under the supervision of the prominent art historian, Mikhail Alpatov, and the Soviet artist, Dmitry Zhilinszky (1927-2015). It was entitled “Istoki monumental’noi zhivopisi I ee khudozhestvenne tradizii na territorii sovremennoi Siriiskoı respubliki” (Historical Sources on Mural Art and its Art Traditions in Contemporary Syria) (also see Shamma, 1971, pp. 26-29). In addition to writing a thesis, as a part of the degree requirements, he executed a decorative design for Seven Fountains Square in Damascus. After returning to Syria, he was appointed to the teaching staff of the Faculty of Fine Arts at Damascus University. Among Shamma’s well-known works is a decorative panel, “Modern Syria” (25 x 3 meters), used to adorn the main entrance of the International Fair in Damascus in 1966 (Bogdanov, 1983, p. 48). Shamma participated in numerous solo and group exhibitions, including an exhibition of Syrian artists in the USSR in 1976 (“Vustavka”, 1976). He also participated in the traveling exhibitions of the Museum of Oriental Art in 1979-83, 1980 (“Khudozhniki Sirii”, 1980), 1981 (Starodub, 1982, p. 51), 1984 (“Sovremennaya zhivopis’”, 1984), 1986 (Bogdanov, 1981, p. 167) and 1987 (“Sovremennoye”, 1987). In 1969, the Museum of Oriental Art in Moscow acquired some of Shamma’s works for its permanent collection (fig. 6) (“Sovetskaya kultura”, 1969). These were the first works by a contemporary Arab artist to enter the government museum collection of the USSR.

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33 Subhi Shouaib attended the Teachers' College in Damascus in the early 1930s, and then taught in the town of Salamiyyah. In 1933, he found employment teaching art education in secondary schools in Homs and Hama (Lenssen, 2014, p. 385).
**Fig. 6. Abdel Mannan Shamma. Palestinian Refugees, 1969.**
Oil on canvas, 100 x 120 cm

Source: Museum of Oriental Art, Moscow

*Al Tall, Zuhair (1953-1996)*

Born in 1953 in Zebdani, Syria, Zuhair Al Tall started his formal art education at the Baghdad Fine Art Institute in 1973-74, and later continued his education at the University of Damascus. In 1975, after completing his one-year preparatory course in Russian language, he was admitted to the Art Institute in Moscow, the Faculty of Painting, the Workshop of Monumental Art. He graduated in 1981 with a project called “The Eternal Road”, executed under the supervision of the prominent artist, Yuri Korolev (1929-1992). Al Tall also completed a series of stained glass windows, entitled “People of Syria”, for the reception hall of the Syrian embassy in Moscow (N. Al Tell, personal communication, November 2016). After his graduation, he returned to Moscow the following year and later completed his postgraduate studies in 1986, under the supervision of the art historian, Mikhail Alpatov, for whom he wrote his thesis on the development and formation of Syrian art after the declaration of independence in 1946 - “Razvitie sovremennoy izobrazitel'noy iskusstva Sirii” (Development and Formation of Syrian Contemporary Art).
Fig. 7. Zuhair Al Tall. Series of artworks.

Source: Personal archive of Nina Al Tell.

References


The article was researched and written with the aid of a large collection of press clippings in the archives, and the private collections of artists and critics. In some cases, it was impossible to confirm the page numbers or precise dates for the clippings. Whenever an exhibition catalogue or brochure did not have a given author, it has been listed under the title of the exhibition.
Arab Artist of the Mediterranean World


**Archives**

Archive of the Vasily Surikov Moscow State Academic Art Institute, Russian State Archive of Literature and Arts, and State Archive of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia).

Sursock Museum Library and Archive and Richard Chahine Archive - part of the Sursock Museum Library and Archive (Beirut, Lebanon).

**Interviews**

Edward Alchaib, Saleh Barakat, Kamel Bellatreche, Lida and Mazen Bteddini, Wael Chaeb, Richard Chahine, Tarek Chouman, Nizar Irani, Nina Al Tell.
Part III

The Transatlantic Reach of Mediterranean People and Power
Missions in the Eastern Mediterranean: the Ambassadors of the Angevins of Naples

MARIAROSARIA SALERNO

Introduction

Studies of late medieval diplomacy have increased greatly in number over the past few decades, perhaps because diplomacy concerns the internal mechanisms of a state, and is also inseparable from the state’s global context and temporal scope. As Donald Queller (1960) points out, however, so much confusion has prevailed about the nature of medieval diplomatic envoys that a closer interdisciplinary study of their character is necessary. Ideally, such an investigation would apply legal texts and scholarship to elucidate the diplomatic documents and, in turn, use diplomatic documents to fact check the discussions of legal writers. Moreover, it would correct critical errors in the historiography. An inquiry into the sources reveals that previous studies’ attempts to categorize the various types of medieval envoys err in two ways. First, they primarily focus on the activities of emissaries, such as legates, which were not widely employed, and they confuse the definitions of different types of envoys that were commonly used. In point of fact, most secular diplomatic agents of the 13th century were either nuncii or procuratores. The term nuncii had been in use for centuries, while procuratores appeared only around the 13th century (Queller, 1960, p. 196).

The second critical error that has shaped the discourse on medieval diplomacy was made by 19th- and early 20th-century European historians who mistakenly associated the origins of permanent diplomacy and the emergence of resident ambassadors with the growth of the Renaissance states in Italy. The historians exaggerated the consistency and rationality of the developments in an attempt to find continuity between late medieval diplomatic practices and those of the 19th century nation states (Reumont, 1857; Nys, 1883-84). That said, the new governments of 15th-century Italy sought internal and external legitimacy, which caused a substantial change in the nature of an ambassador’s office, transforming the nuncius or medieval procurator into a public official. No longer limited by a strict mandate, the nuncius or procurator became profoundly and personally involved in the conservation of the state on whose behalf he acted, both in temporary and prolonged missions. His duties included all activities aimed at mediating conflicts, achieving peace, gathering information and cultivating...
relationships that would strengthen his state (Covini et al., 2015, pp. 113-161; Duranti, 2009).

The changing structure of medieval Italian political institutions across time and space restricts methods for research on medieval diplomacy. For example, studying the diplomacy of the Italian communes in the second half of the 12th century raised questions about the public and private role of certain ambassadors, such as officials referred to as “legati” in the sources. Scholars have struggled to reach a consensus on their roles because they had no specifically defined function at that time. This was certainly the case in Milan, where, after the defeat of Barbarossa (1176), the various functions of consuls/ambassadors stimulated a debate on the purpose of those men and inspired the disputatio of Placentino, one of the most famous lawyers of the time (Conte, 2015). In addition, it is difficult to compare the communal and monarchical diplomacy of the time because the monarch’s nuncius was the emissary of a rightful authority and benefited from the full legitimacy of his mandate. The communes, on the other hand, engaged in a long struggle to achieve legitimacy outside their boundaries and to establish diplomatic representation (Gilli, 2015, pp. 57-58, 60; Gilli, 2009, pp. 173-187).

Attempting to address some of these problems in the study of medieval diplomatic history through the lens of Southern Italy without making analogies to modern diplomacy, this essay offers an initial survey of the diplomatic missions and ambassadors of the Kingdom of Naples under Angevin rule (13th-14th centuries) and of the Kingdom’s diplomatic relations with the Balkans in particular. It conceptualizes the missions as extraordinary actions for the time insofar as they aimed at carrying out single and well-defined tasks.

Through our analysis of the records, we will also attempt to better conceive of the varying roles of Angevin ambassadors by discussing their names, statuses, and characteristics. Since some states frequently added secondary tasks to their emissaries’ primary assignments, this study will consider activities such as developing and negotiating trade relations, addressing religious matters and performing other specific tasks as concomitant functions that were included among the prospective duties of an “ambassador”.

We will also investigate how ambassadors were selected, whether or not the position of ambassador added value to the cursus honorum of these men, and if they were chosen on the basis of their position in society and the role they played at court. Finally, in tracing a history of the ambassadors, this paper will seek to answer three questions: 1) For what principle purposes did the Angevins send ambassadors abroad. 2) Where were their main destinations? And, 3) what foreign countries sent ambassadors to Naples, and why?

We can begin to answer these questions by comparing the diplomatic missions of various powers before the development of so-called modern diplomacy around the 16th century. In this period, states that sent official emissaries often included overseas travels to North Africa or to the East as part of their Mediterranean
policies; sovereigns organized missions, typically comprised of men bearing honourable social status, with specific directives about their diplomatic goals.

Prior to Angevin rule, one emblematic “ambassador” who lived during the Swabian period under Frederick II is worth mentioning as a possible precursor to the Angevin ambassadors. Theodore of Antioch studied the “sciences of the ancients” in Antioch, Mosul and Baghdad. He knew Syrian and Latin as well as Arabic, and had lived in Sicily since 1238. He carried out diplomatic activity on behalf of Emperor Frederick II, especially with the emir of Tunis, and he acted as a scribe for the Emperor, for whom he translated the falconry treatise by Moamin. In sum, Theodore of Antioch was a trusted man who followed the Emperor, even into battle, and he was the first man to be named the “Philosopher of the Emperor”, a title that emphasized the multiplicity of roles he acquired by virtue of his knowledge and intellectual abilities (Salerno, 2016, pp. 66-68). The Angevins similarly employed men loyal to the King as ambassadors with varying roles.

15th-century Florence offers another point of comparison. The records indicate that the Signoria of Florence gave precise precautionary instructions to the men in charge of their missions regarding the purpose of the mission, its different stages, the procedures to be observed, the information they needed to communicate to foreign powers, and the requests they were to make. We see such evidence in two reports written by ambassadors sent by the Florentine government on missions to visit the Sultan of Egypt. The reports detail the trip, the arrangements for meeting with the Sultan, and the words used by the ambassadors as they sought to convince the Sultan to favour Florence in maritime traffic (Tripodi, 2010, p. 411; Montesano, 2007, pp. 282-291).

A comparison of the diplomatic practices of five mid-13th-mid-15th century monarchical powers – the kingdoms of Portugal, Castile, and France, the Holy Roman Empire and the Crown of Aragon – reveals that it was typical for monarchies to use different methods for the transmission of directives and documents regarding missions. Embassy reports are sparse for all of these kingdoms. However, instructions to the ambassadors and later correspondences, though rare for the Portuguese and the Castilian monarchies, are preserved by the hundreds in the archives of the Crown of Aragon and in Barcelona, and are also numerous for France and the Holy Roman Empire (Péquignot, 2015, pp. 87-111). The French court, for example, left instructions to some ambassadors regarding how they ought to speak. In January 1380, Duke Louis I of Anjou delivered a text to the men in charge of negotiating his adoption by Queen Joan of Naples. It contained abundant injunctions revealing a coherent method: go step by step and lead everything personally (the agreement, the delivery of money, castles etc.) in order to prevent incidents (Péquignot, 2015, pp. 99-100). The documents of the various monarchies, although

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1 Glessgen, 1996.
2 Catellacci, 1881, pp. 157-188, 326-334; Corti, 1958, pp. 247-266.
3 Jarry, 1906, doc.1, pp. 244-249.
different in their formulations, all stress the need for ambassadors to embody certain general qualities: fidelity, dedication, discernment, and knowledge of “manners” to ensure the success of the mandate and provide benefit, honour and utility to the rulers they represented. The documents also recognize that the ambassadors’ field of action is ever changing, so they must seize opportunities and decipher the best choices for the given situation (Péquignot, 2015, p. 110).

In the time of Charles I of Anjou (the primary focus of this paper), diplomatic contacts between Venice, the Kingdom of Sicily and the East are well-documented from the Venetian perspective (Carabellese, 1911; Nicolini, 1935, pp. 229-286; Pozza, 1982, pp. 28-74). Charles was interested in securing a long and lasting commitment from the Venetians to support his Eastern policy in locations including Negroponte, an island the Venetians viewed as strategic for establishing and maintaining hegemony in the Aegean Sea. Consequently, in 1279, a Venetian embassy travelled to Naples to establish agreements with Charles that might prevent a Byzantine attack on Negroponte (Pozza, 1982, pp. 57-58).

A problem arises, however, when we seek further documentation of the diplomacy of the Kingdom of Sicily from the Angevin point of view. Our most important primary sources, the registries of the Angevin Chancery, were heavily damaged during World War II, and the reconstruction of the archives in Naples left most acts of several rulers lost to history (Morelli, 2008). The remaining records provide a very incomplete source since the extant documents that shed some light on diplomacy are schematic and scarce. What can be pieced together from fragments of the Angevin Chancery focuses primarily on protection, financing, and payments to the men sent on various missions, as well as on the reception of foreign ambassadors. The Curia clearly took interest in the fulfilment of the ambassadors’ missions and required the submission of a certificate proving completion prior to dispensing compensation to the men. There are, however, no written or coded reports that offer the direct perspective of the men on the missions, which suggests that unlike the Florentine example, the court did not attribute great importance to the production of specific instructions or reports recording the ambassadors’ activities. There is also little information about the purposes, development and outcomes of the missions. While the dearth of records from the Angevin Chancery may mean that the Angevin court, like some of its contemporaries, did not value the production of documents recounting the ambassadors’ activities abroad, we can look to other letters and documents to better understand the diplomacy of the Angevins.

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4 For example I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina (from now RCA), V, p. 207, n. 81, p. 231; Actes Morée, 1967, n. 55, p. 61.
1. Countries and diplomatic relations

The Angevin dynasty persistently and effectively pursued diplomatic relations with the powers of the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan regions (Gillingham, 2001) as they sought to obtain territorial possessions across the sea for the Kingdom of Naples. King Charles I wrote letters to his officers ordering them to receive and offer supplies to ambassadors sent from foreign sovereigns. For instance, in a missive of 1271, addressed to the Secreti of Puglia, Principato and Terra di Lavoro, Calabria and Sicily, the King ordered his officials to provide those ambassadors bearing letters or envoys from sovereigns in Achaea, Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania, the Byzantine Empire, and the Kingdom of Sagarach, all the necessary means for their travel to come before him as well as a grant of safe-conduct\(^5\). From his letters, we know that Charles received messengers from the emperor of Trebizond; the kings of the Tartars, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Armenia; and the Sultan of Egypt.

In tracing these relationships, an important distinction must be made between the diplomatic relations the Kingdom of Naples established with the countries in which it held dominions or protectorates, and thus direct political influence, and the relations it developed with countries that were in no way directly ruled by the Angevin political sphere. The Viterbo Treaty (1267) extended the territories directly subordinate to Charles I. It gave the King many rights previously held by Baldwin II, the deposed Latin Emperor, including sovereignty over the Frankish Principality of Achaea; he also managed to subdue much of central Albania (ca. 1267-72) (Jehel, 2005, pp. 212-213, 223; Kiesewetter, 2015, pp. 266-267)\(^6\). Then, in 1277, with the support of Pope Gregory X, the King bought the title of King of Jerusalem from Mary, the prince of Antioch's daughter for 11,000 bezants (Balard, 2004, pp. 94-98; Borghese, 2008; Schein, 1991, p. 78; Baldwin, 2012, pp. 1-19).

The Angevin attitude towards and diplomacy in regions where it gained direct rule differed from its approach to areas where it held indirect power. The strategic region of the Balkans was of critical importance to understand this difference and will be the focus of the present essay from this point forward.

2. The Balkans

Once dominated by the Byzantine Empire, by the 13\(^{th}\) century the Balkans had become the scene of continuous clashes between several powers, in part resulting from the Kingdom’s calculated diplomatic strategies. To navigate this context of shifting political dynamics, the Angevins often promoted internal agreements between princes (typically from the royal family) who were entrusted to represent the Angevins in the Balkan possessions. Through this strategy, the prestige of the

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\(^6\) *Acta et Diplomata res Albaniae*, n. 253, p. 73.
Angevins found strong support in the eastern territories (Frachery, 2005, p. 7-26; Vaccaro, 2006, pp. 58-61).

In the second half of the 13th century, the Angevins pursued intense diplomatic activity across the Adriatic Sea, especially with the Principality of Achaea (Frankish Morea). The region’s conquest by the Angevins in 1267 led Charles I to invest forces and means in the country, which ironically protected them from Byzantine attacks (Sampsonis, 2008, p. 139). When Prince William of Villehardouin died in 1278, Charles I appropriated leadership of the Principality, and began to rule the Morea through its baillis (Sampsonis, 2008, p. 146; Kiesewetter, 2015, p.277).

Diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and Achaea held particular importance for both parties. In a “border” territory constantly threatened by conflicts, the nuncius of the Prince of Achaea worked with the Curia of Naples to guarantee the export of supplies, weapons, horses and other necessities to support the Principality. In 1269, for instance, Erard d’Aunoy, miles and nuncius of the Prince of Achaea, obtained rights from Charles I, including permission to export barley and wheat from the port of Brindisi. Erard – the son of Vilain d’Aunoy, Lord of Arcadia, and thus a member of the Principality’s knightly nobility – along with Elena de Bruyères – the daughter of the Prince’s sister – also carried out a delicate mission in support of Charles I as he endeavoured to persuade the Venetians to assist the Angevins in war against the Byzantine Empire (Cerone, 1916, p. 37).

In 1270, through another nuncius and miles named John Chauderon, the King again assisted the Prince of Achaea by providing Morea with a fleet of 25 galleys and other boats. John was a nephew of the prince and the son of Geoffrey Chauderon, the Constable of the Principality. At his father’s death around 1278, the political office passed to John. By then he had become a trusted figure for the King of Sicily who confidently assigned John missions aimed at maintaining good relations with Byzantium and rewarded him with land in Southern Italy and Morea (Sampsonis, 2008, p. 147, 148). The Angevin records also refer to two other nuncii sent by Charles I to the Prince of Achaea in 1276: Lambertino, a familiaris of the Curia regis, who was charged with delivering letters addressed to the prince, and one Giovanni, also known as Scottum.

The precarious Angevin domains in neighbouring Albania required “military” missions similar to those in Achaea. In 1274, Charles I sent a small group of men by boat on a mission to Durazzo to obtain from the captain-general and vicar of Albania information on two fronts: the need for military supplies and food in Durazzo, and the advance of the Byzantine troops of Emperor Michael VIII. The
Missions in the Eastern Mediterranean

cong was warranted; the Emperor’s troops defeated the Angevin troops in Albania shortly thereafter. In turn, the King sent two pages with instructions to Durazzo and Valona aimed at seeking to obtain information from the castellan of Durazzo about the conditions of the fortress and its appurtenances as well as the names and number of those dead and wounded. The mission was instructed to depart for Corfu immediately after collecting the requested information, and to deliver letters addressed to the Angevin representatives on the island, before returning quickly to Brindisi to inform the sovereign about all relevant matters.12

In early 1280, Charles I opened a new front in southern Albania, and laid siege to Berat, the most important fortress on the Via Egnazia. Perhaps he sought to open the road to Thessalonica and Constantinople. But attacking Constantinople by land through the Balkans was difficult and the Byzantine army once again defeated the Angevins. (Pozza, 1982, p. 63; Kiesewetter, 2015, pp. 285-287, 290-291). By the spring of 1281, the Angevin adventure in Albania had dissolved into a complete disaster.

Still, the Balkan domains bordering the territories of the Byzantine Empire continued to serve as a “buffer state” (Abulafia, 2001, pp. 63-64). They provided centres of defense that often served as bases from which missions between Naples, Constantinople and other locales were organized. For instance, in 1289, Charles Martel - the eldest son of Charles II and the vicar of the Kingdom of Sicily - sent a commission to Achaea to take Isabella of Villehardouin and Florent de Hainaut into the Principality’s official possession and receive homage from the barons and feudal lords of the country. This commission was formed by Riccardo of Airola, a tax lawyer at the Great Court, and Giovanni of Gallipoli, a miles. When Riccardo of Airola fell ill, he was immediately replaced by Pierre de l’Isle, a nobleman and another familiaris regis, who owned property and fiefdoms in Abruzzo and Calabria. Three years later, after Charles II’s chancery had received official documents verifying the completion of the mission in Achaea, it issued a receipt to Giovanni to facilitate the remuneration of costs. This example (and others like it) is instructive about the ambiguity of the titles and roles of ambassadors and missions in the period. In the records, the envoys are not defined as nuncii, ambassatores or procuratores; however, the collective tasks they carried out following procedures specified by the King should be characterized as a mission and the men should be considered ambassadors. Indeed, the two men would continue to be selected for high calibre assignments. In 1289, for example, they carried out a mission to Andronikos II Palaiologos, the Byzantine Emperor on behalf of the King. Notably, in the later cases, they are explicitly referred to as nuncii.

The ambassadors were also involved in negotiating marriages as a major diplomatic strategy. In 1291, the same Pierre de l’Isle, having received

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12 RCA XII, n. 393.
14 RCA X, nn. 22-23, p. 94.
considerable remuneration for his job in Romania, prepared to leave for France\textsuperscript{16}. Charles II had ordered Pierre to assist the Prince of Achaea, Florent de Hainaut, in negotiating the marriage between the King’s son, Philip I of Taranto and Thamar, daughter of Nikephoros Komnenos, Despot of Epiros\textsuperscript{17}. Epiros was the fulcrum of Charles II’s plans: in fact, maintaining good relations with this country was a prerequisite for preserving the Angevin possessions in Greece, and several testimonies to the diplomatic relationship exist from the period between 1277 and 1296. They inform us that the \textit{nuncii} of the Despot of Epiros visited Charles I and his son in Naples and Provence, and they reveal that the Angevines provided travel protection and safe-conducts to support Nikephoros’ envoys\textsuperscript{18}.

In order to render the marriage more attractive for the house of Epiros, Charles II proposed first granting the Principality of Taranto to his son Philip. Thamar, for her part, would receive a third of the Principality of Epiros as a dowry. The prospect must have seemed favourable for on 16 December 1293, Charles II granted Philip the Principality of Taranto as a fiefdom transmissible to his descendants, and gave him vast areas of the county of Acerra.

After difficult negotiations, the final marriage contract was signed in July 1294. Thamar’s dowry included the castles of Lepanto, Vonitza, Euloco, Angelocastro and Giannina. At the death of Despot Nikephoros, half of Epiros would go to Philip immediately, but he would need to wait to inherit the other half until after the death of Despoina Anna, the mother of his bride. On 13 August 1294, Charles also granted Philip the islands of Corfu and Butrint, the last Angevin bridgeheads in Albania, and gave him all the rights and Angevin claims in Achaea, Athens, Albania and Thessaly, keeping for himself only the “superioritas”, the feudal high lordship. The celebration of the marriage of Philip to Thamar of Epiros in December 1294 concluded the first phase of the grandiose project of establishing for Philip a feudal dominion that touched both sides of the Ionian Sea and was tied to the Kingdom of Naples (Kiesewetter, 1997, p. 44-45). In 1294, as a reward for facilitating the marriage contract, Philip appointed Pierre de l’Isle captain of the island of Corfu\textsuperscript{19}.

Pierre de l’Isle may not have been the first or only informal ambassador appointed by Charles II to carry out these marriage negotiations. Two years before the wedding, the King had also sent to the Greek Despot, Berardo Sangiorgio, and Ruggero of Stefanizia, the Archbishop of Santa Severina in Calabria\textsuperscript{20}, as ambassadors wielding extensive authority. The latter was a famous supporter of the Angevins during the war of the Vespers and an expert in the Greek language.

\textsuperscript{17} Actes Morée, 1967, n. 21, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{20} Camera, 1860, II, p. 40. RCA XLVII, n. 255, p. 304.
indeed this mission planted the seed for the later marriage, the duration of the negotiations is a strong indicator of their importance.

Though ambassadors had already been sent in both directions under Michael VIII, the mission of Pierre de l’Isle and Giovanni of Gallipoli in Constantinople initiated a decade of regular diplomatic relations between Naples and Michael’s son, Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos. Two examples suffice to demonstrate the consistent exchange. First, in 1291, Pierre de Sury, a knight of the land and advisor to the King was selected as the nuncius to travel to Andronikos. He accompanied the Emperor’s own nuncii on their return to Constantinople and was paid a total of 100 ounces of gold by the Royal Chamberlain to cover his expenses. Second, in 1293, Charles Martel, the eldest son of Charles II, promised assistance to the Greek mission of Leucio Corasius, the Bishop of Bitonto, who had entrusted his Church to the care of his brother and prosecutor Palmerio of Trani.

On the Byzantine front, Andronikos II Palaiologos similarly sought to resolve various problems facing his empire through diplomacy. His ambassadors, including a man called John, who is referred to as “vir nobilis, nuncius et magnus vester interpres,” were charged with negotiating a treaty of perpetual peace with the king of Naples. He also frequently used marriage as a diplomatic strategy. After the death of his first wife Anne of Hungary, he married Yolanda (renamed Irene) of Montferrat to end the Montferrat claim to the Kingdom of Thessalonica (Nicol, 1993, pp. 100, 114). Andronikos similarly attempted to marry Michael IX Palaiologos, his eldest son and co-Emperor, to the Latin Empress Catherine I of Courtenay, heir to the crown of the Latin empire, to mitigate western agitation aimed at restoring the Latin Empire (Kiesewetter, 1996, pp. 51-52). Andronikos assigned the marriage negotiations to a monk called Sophonias, who is mentioned in documents of 1295-96 after he returned to Constantinople with Leone of Reggio, a notary and Rational Master of the Great Court who had been sent as an ambassador to Byzantium by Charles II. According to Greek sources, the marriage negotiations were not, however, successful, in part because of the claims of the Angevins and the hostility of the Pope (Lamma, 1955, p. 53).

The failure of the wedding and the death of Despot Nikephoros (between 1296 and 1298) reignited Angevin interest in Epiros, provoked new tensions with Byzantium, and called forth the intervention of Philip I of Taranto, son and heir to the throne of Charles II of Anjou. In 1299, the King commissioned Geoffroy du Port, miles, vicar and general baillis under Philip in the lands of Romania, to negotiate a truce with the Andronikos. This was unquestionably a diplomatic

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21 RCA XV, n. 133, p. 31.
22 Actes Morée, 1967, n. 28, p. 45, see also nn. 29, 30, 32 p.45-47; RCA XXXVI, n. 292, p. 70.
action, yet Geoffroy, a man noted for his *experta fide, industria et legalitate*, is never referred to by the terms of his office (*nuncius*, etc.)\(^26\).

3. **Serbia and Bulgaria**

The records of diplomatic relations between the Angevins, Serbia and Bulgaria shed light on the dynasty’s attitudes toward the nascent powers that surrounded the Byzantine Empire and looked towards the west. The Angevins held no formal political control over these states; however, the kings sought to secure political ties by methods that were detrimental to the Byzantines.

Early diplomatic contact between Serbia, Bulgaria and the Catholic world occurred in 1189, during the Third Crusade, when Frederick Barbarossa led his troops across the Balkan Peninsula, marching in the direction of Constantinople and the Holy Land. The sovereigns of Serbia and Bulgaria offered logistical and military assistance to the Emperor, and proposed an alliance with Barbarossa against Byzantium in exchange for the crown (Dall’Aglio, 2013, p. 14). In the thirteenth century, Serbia was linked to Venetian power through the marriage of Doge Lorenzo Tiepolo to the daughter of King Stefan Uroš, and in 1276, the country also established a political connection to the King of Hungary, through the marriage of Dragutin, son of the Serbian King Stefan, to Catherine, the daughter of Stephen V of Hungary.

The Angevin acts reveal that diplomatic relations also existed between Serbia and Charles I as early as 1274, when Charles granted Count George, an ambassador sent by the Serbian king, free exit from the ports of Trani and Barletta, along with horses and 18 people\(^27\). Then, in 1279, a Master Guglielmo d’Orleans, a cleric, and Rainaldo (or Raimondo) Blancroy were sent on a mission to King Dragutin; they visited Durazzo and returned home with the Kings’ *nuncii*\(^28\).

With the abdication of King Dragutin in 1282, his brother Stefan Uroš II Milutin of Serbia ascended to the throne. The latter was the son of Helena of Anjou, and his position as king advanced relations between Serbia and the Angevins (Fine, 1994, pp. 217-222). However, an alliance between Serbia and the Angevins frightened the Byzantine Empire so much that, in 1298, Emperor Andronikos II married his five-year-old daughter Simonis to King Stefan. Again, a marriage alliance was used in an attempt to resolve the potential conflicts and threats.

Indeed, the intensification of Angevin relations with Serbia and Hungary had coincided with a key moment in religious history that made their alliance a powerful threat to the Byzantines: the attempt to unite the Greek and Latin Churches at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274. At this council, Emperor Michael VIII promised the Pope, among other things, to abolish the Bulgarian and

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\(^{27}\) Minieri Riccio, 1878, I, p. 114. RVC XII, n. 3.

\(^{28}\) Del Giudice, 1863, I, p. 220. RCA XXI, n. 184, p. 131; n. 501, p. 325.
Serbian Churches. Bulgaria’s relations with Rome and the Papacy had begun under Innocent III and the country had remained Catholic, at least formally, until 1235, when Ivan Asen II broke agreements with Rome to reconcile with the Nicene Patriarchate. This reconciliation granted autocephaly to the Bulgarian church (Dall’Aglio, 2013, pp. 14, 20). The Emperor’s political objective in promising the Pope to dissolve the Bulgarian and Serbian Churches was therefore to undermine any possible alliance between Charles of Anjou and the two countries that would be dangerous for the territories of his Empire.

At this time, however, the envoys of the Bulgarian king received great support from the King of Naples. To name three examples: in 1273, Nicholas of Saint Omer, miles, familiarem and fidelem of the King, received permission to export whatever was needed for himself, his family and the nuncii of the Bulgarian and Serbian kings from the ports of Apulia – namely 60 horses and 30 salme of barley29. Then, in 1275, Luchisino of Florence, captain of Aquila, and Etienne de Beaucaire, professor of law, were sent as ambassadors to Bulgaria to mediate “arduis negotiis” with the “serenissimus et carissimus” friend of Charles I, i.e. the king of the Bulgars30. Finally, in 1278, two milites and fideles regis – a Giovanni, called Yspanum, and Giracio de Nicotera – were sent to the Bulgarian king, on another mission with Bulgarian nunci. To fulfil the needs of these ambassadors and their entourage, Charles I organized a convenient transfer of money, mounts and foodstuffs to Ragusa or Zadar31. The resources expended by Charles in the name of advancing relations with Serbia and Hungary as well as efforts of other sovereigns to block them is indicative of the power of alliances between the Angevins and Balkan leaders.

Some conclusions

The Balkan missions examined in this essay are part of the global policy of the Angevins and their expansionist aims eastward across the Mediterranean world. The Angevins’ sought control of the territories of the Byzantine Empire and of what had been the Latin Empire of Constantinople until 1261. Through their missions, the ambassadors helped the Angevins acquire domains and power in Greece and Albania. Their actions on these missions included the provision of information, support and weapons; transmission of letters and orders; promotion of internal agreements between princes; reconnaissance; and control of the feudal powers. Most importantly, the ambassadors were trusted representatives of the Angevins in the Balkan possessions.

29 Del Giudice, 1863, I, p. 220n.
30 RCA XII, n. 12, p. 26; n. 33, p. 170
The eastern Angevin dominions provided a center of defense, a buffer, and a base from which to organize missions between Naples and Constantinople. As these missions demonstrate, relations between the Angevins and the emperor of Byzantium were continuous. The diplomacy, especially with Andronikos II Palaiologos, was intense. Many of the Angevin negotiations in the East are described in the records as “arduis negotiis” (difficult affairs). Still, they were desired by all parties and marked by attempts to restore peace through marital unions. Indeed, missions to negotiate marriages were a critical strategy for establishing political ties and achieving peace. Thus, they often consisted of large legations.

The terms used in the Angevin registers to identify the recipients of assignments are ambassatores, nunci or procuratores. These terms seem to have been interchangeable or synonymous. Even in some missions where the tasks carried out on behalf of the King can clearly be qualified as missions, the envoys are not referred to with a formal title. Yet, the same men often performed various critical assignments over time, and, in some cases are later noted as nunci, thus indicating that a formal title was not required for the ambassadorial role. During the missions, assignments were typically well-defined; however, the ambassadors performed a variety of tasks.

For the most part, the ambassadors held no specialized roles: instead, they held several positions, frequently highly prestigious positions, granted for their loyalty to the king. Their paths were different, but they had commonalities; their careers were built around a combination of military and jurisdictional assignments, and extra regnum, the men fulfilled the duties of ambassadors.

From the remaining registers of the Angevin Chancery, we can also deduce a set of characteristics of the men charged by the king to carry out missions: we learn their names and titles, and can sometimes track their careers since many were public figures who held other positions in the Kingdom. They were entrusted with various tasks of political importance, strategic military assignments, and mandates to represent the monarchy. Many of the men sent on missions owed their fortunes and assignments as much to establishing close relationships and personal ties to the Angevins as to their professional skills (Morelli, 2005, p. 162; Morelli, 2010). The quality of faithfulness was essential; a king’s trusted man was fundamental for any diplomatic action. Even when men leading missions were not explicitly referred to as nunci, their personal characteristics were considered vital for the success of the assignment. Geoffroy du Port, for example, was defined as a man of “experta fide, industria et legalitate”. Ambassadors who successfully completed their assignments were often rewarded by the king.

Some of the men sent on missions were familiares of the Curia regis (Durrieu, 1887, I, p. 119), that is, people who resided in the Curia worked in close proximity to the sovereign. These include: Lambertino, Pierre de l’Isle, and Nicholas of Saint Omer. The Angevins were extraordinarily generous in granting this title. The nuncius Pierre de Sury also held the title of consiliarius, a position with a stronger institutional role in the Angevin Curia.
There are also many *milites* among these ambassadors of the Angevins: Geoffroy du Port, Erard d’Aunoy, John Chauderon, Giovanni of Gallipoli, Pierre de Sury, Nicholas of Saint Omer, Giracio de Nicotera, and Giovanni, called *Hispanum*. Most were members of knightly nobility of Franco-Provençal origin who supported the settlement of Charles I in the Kingdom of Sicily (Pollastri, 1988; Pollastri, 2013), owned fiefdoms, or were relatives of the prince of Achaea, and later became faithful to the Angevins. Some received land grants in return for their work. John Chauderon became Constable of the Principality of Achaea; Pierre de l’Isle was appointed Captain of the island of Corfu; Geoffroy du Port was Vicar and General *Baillo* of Philip of Taranto in the lands of Romania; Pierre de Sury became *Justicier* in Abruzzo before going on a mission to Byzantium; and Luchisino of Florence was Captain of Aquila.

For marriage negotiations, especially with the Emperor of Byzantium, legations included high ecclesiastics such as Ruggero of Stefanizia, Archbishop of Santa Severina, and Leucio Corasius, Bishop of Bitonto. Sovereigns clearly sought loyal ambassadors who had skills in ecclesiastical matters or were capable of speaking Greek. Ruggero of Stefanizia, for instance, spoke Greek and was a great supporter of the Angevins during the War of the Sicilian Vespers.

Several men with legal backgrounds who had been in charge of managing administrative processes also eventually served as ambassadors including: the notary Leone of Reggio, Rational Master of the Great Court; Etienne de Beaucaire, professor of law; and Riccardo of Airola, a tax lawyer at the Great Court. Such men were some of the most prominent officers of the Kingdom. Over time, the Angevins’ increasing preference for ambassadors with legal backgrounds marks a turning point in the attitudes about the role of ambassadors after the Middle Ages.

Finally, it is important to point out that the missions consisted of trips, involving the organization of routes, means of transport, evasion of dangers, etc. The Angevins devoted great attention to these organizational aspects of the missions, in particular to acquiring royal permission for travel. Most missions involved travel by sea. The king ordered the relevant officers to arrange galleons or ships to transport ambassadors and the necessary victuals (wine, bread, meat, cheese, and chickens). For land trips, ambassadors were provided with horses and saddles as well. Often the king also took actions against *justiciers* who would not freely make themselves available or provide needed money to support the kingdom’s ambassadors and welcome foreign envoys.

Documents specify that prior to receiving remuneration, ambassadors first needed to attest to the accomplishment of their mission before a Treasurer could proceed. One example is found in a document dated to 1292, which contains an excerpt from an expense account made by several ambassadors who were sent to Constantinople and Morea by Charles II between 1291 and 1292. They were received by Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos. The acts also reveal that rates of

32 Minieri Riccio, 1878, I, pp.89-90.
compensation for missions differed, but it is unclear whether this depended upon
the importance of the men involved or on their specific role in the assignment.

We have no material evidence that objects arrived at the court of Naples as gifts
from other sovereigns or foreign ambassadors. Yet, it was common practice among
powerful men to exchange valuable gifts. For example, Charles I ordered his
 treasurer to give a beautiful silver cup with a hundred gold florins to friar
Berengario, ambassador of the king of Alemagna, who was returning to his
sovereign. Some inventories refer to valuable items that may have been gifts
received during the missions, but there is no detailed information to confirm their
status (Leone de Castris, 2014).

The period examined in this paper predates the 15th century when we see the
significant emergence and availability of primary sources revealing the forms and
features of diplomacy. Moreover, the incomplete state of the Angevin archives
restricts further insights into the purposes and outcomes of the Angevin missions.
However, the remaining archives indicate that, like the ambassador and
philosopher Theodore of Antioch who worked in the court of Frederick II, the men
chosen for the Angevin missions served as ambassadors who fulfilled a broad
range of duties and worked in versatile ways to promote the power of the
Kingdom.

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Introduction

The economic, political and social situation of Southern Italy changed radically with the arrival of the Bourbons in 1734. From the start, the ministers serving young King Charles sought to liberalize commerce and encourage the growth of the Kingdom’s mercantile economy. Plans were made to restore ports and to revive trade. In the early 1740s, the military engineer, Giovanni Bompiede, carried out the restoration of the Kingdom’s most important ports: Naples, Castellammare, Brindisi, Bari, Barletta, Trani and Crotone on the mainland, as well as Messina and Palermo in Sicily. In the same period, the Bourbon government granted exemptions from customs duties and actively encouraged the reorganization and strengthening of the Kingdom’s merchant navy. Prior to this time, the Neapolitan merchant fleet had been composed of small vessels, assembled in the shipyards of Piano and Meta, near Sorrento, and on the island of Procida. These vessels could not cover great distances. To secure and promote long distance trade, larger vessels, including “polacche” (polaccas) or “pinchi” (pinks) were built and used immediately along Naples’ burgeoning trade routes. It was also decreed that the foremast of many vessels should be equipped with guns to protect the Kingdom’s commerce against the predations of corsairs. The effort was profitable. For example, during the Seven Years’ war (1756-1763), Gaspare Marchetti, a shipowner from Naples, living in London, created a trading company aimed at maritime commerce: we have evidence that one of his vessels, built in the shipyard of Castellammare, earned a handsome profit carrying Southern Italian products to distant Martinique, a Caribbean island under French rule. Such early attempts at extending Neapolitan trade were followed by more frequent voyages to the Americas, whereafter many more merchant vessels were built on the Sorrento peninsula and in Castellammare.

After 1750, King Charles also began promulgating new laws promoting the development of the Royal Navy as a defense against piracy (Sirago, 2004, pp. 33ss). The threat of attack by corsairs was a long-standing Neapolitan concern. According to Mafrici (1995), Southern Italy had been in a constant “state of war”
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Turkish pirates and Barbary corsairs attacked Southern Italian coasts and engaged in hostilities against the Neapolitan and Sicilian merchants and sailors as well as the subjects of the reigning Spanish Viceroyalty in Naples.

When the new Austrian Emperor, Charles VI, took power in Naples in 1707, he sought to prevent the continuation of abuses suffered during Spanish rule. He gave precise orders for the construction of vessels to defend merchant ships carrying foodstuffs from Abruzzo and Apulia to the capital. Charles VI also engaged in negotiations with the Ottoman Porte intended to secure trade across the Mediterranean world (Sirago, 2016). The approach gained traction. In the first quarter of the 18th century, trade agreements were signed with the Ottoman Porte (27 July 1718) and the Barbary States (Tunis 25 September 1725 and Tripoli 3 April 1726). According to Di Vittorio (1979, pp. 18 and 44.) these agreements were essential for future foreign trade. In accordance with the will of the Austrian government, Emperor Charles rearranged the fleet and laid the foundation for a lasting relationship of friendship and commerce with the Ottoman Empire and the regencies of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. However, formal trade negotiations and progress towards an agreement initially proceeded slowly.

After the Bourbon government came to power in 1734, however, diplomacy advanced rapidly. The Kingdom of Naples expanded its commerce in the Levant through treaties of amity and trade, or “non-aggression pacts,” with the Barbary States, and this cooperation intensified trade relations between European states and the inhabitants of the Ottoman empire. For instance, on 7 April 1740, Giuseppe Finocchietti, an envoy of the Neapolitan Kingdom in Istanbul, and Reis Effendi, an Ottoman envoy, signed a 21-article treaty of peace, commerce and navigation that facilitated commerce and navigation for Neapolitan merchant ships traveling to Istanbul and the Black Sea and for Ottoman ships visiting the ports of the Two Sicilies (Mafirci, 2005, p. 152). The agreement formed the basis for further negotiations and for another treaty signed by the Kingdom of Naples and Tripoli in 1741 (Di Vittorio, 1979, p. 114; Pirolo, 2017). These treaties held such great importance for the Kingdom that King Charles commissioned two celebratory paintings from Giuseppe Bonito, who became the court painter shortly thereafter. The paintings, which now hang in the Royal Palace of Naples, depict: a portrait of Haci Hüseyn Efendi, special envoy of the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud I (1730-1754), at the Court of Naples (Musella Guida, 2016), and a portrait of Mustafa Bey of Derna, special envoy of Ahmed Karaman, Bey of Tripoli, with his escort (D’Amora, 2003). The treaties commemorated by the two paintings promised to open trade in the Mediterranean ports of call to which access had been perpetually denied by the threat of piracy, which was often supported by the Sublime Porte and the Barbary powers.

Further agreements were subsequently made to open Baltic trade with the Kingdom of Sweden (30 June 1742), the Kingdom of Denmark (6 April 1748), and the Netherlands (27 August 1753). The Bourbon monarchy’s interest in the North
Sea and the Baltic region arose from the need for raw materials, particularly wood for ship masts and iron for guns, only available in Northern Europe (Sirago, 2012a, pp. 84-85). These materials were used to build the new Royal Navy, a fighting force that featured vessels with the 50 - 60 or 74 guns deemed necessary to protect the Neapolitan fleet from future attacks by Turkish and Barbary corsairs.

1. Ferdinand of Bourbon (1759 -1806)

When Charles of Bourbon became King of Spain in 1759, he resigned the Crown of Naples, leaving his minister, Bernardo Tanucci, to head the Regency Council that would govern until Charles’ son Ferdinand came of age. During the regency of Tanucci, a great number of mainmasts arrived from the Baltic Sea, carried on Dutch ships (Sirago, 2012a). From 1767 on, the masts were bought and imported by Giacinto Catanti, Tanucci’s brother-in-law, who had been appointed Neapolitan Consul, first in the Netherlands (The Hague) and then in Denmark (Copenhagen, 1766). Through this enterprise, Catanti gained valuable experience in trading Northern European products. In the same period, Michele Reggio, commander of the Neapolitan Royal Navy, ordered many guns for the fleet from Sweden where the iron and steel industries had been flourishing since the second half of the 18th century, thanks to the skill of English, Flemish and German workers. Masts “of the North” were also imported from Sweden. These northern goods were utilized immediately on ships and elsewhere: in the early 1770’s, Ferdinand, now the Bourbon King, elected to build coastal fortifications with a battery of 174 guns. Again, he issued orders to import a large quantity of guns from Sweden between 1772 and 1774, and in 1775, “Masts of the North” as well as anchors were sent to the Kingdom to be used on the new 60-gun vessels. Commenting on these trends, Lo Sardo (1986) notes that, from the beginning of King Ferdinand’s reign, his ministers had promoted economic growth through foreign policy and the expansion of trade in handcrafts and salted fish with England as well as with the Baltic Sea powers and the Americas.

During the late 18th century, the growth of Naples’ merchant navy continued, bolstered by royal patronage. In 1770, the Nautical Schools in Piano and Meta (with their ancient merchant shipyard and a long tradition of sea trade) and the Nautical School for pilots and sailors in Giuseppe a Chiaia in Naples were founded (Sirago, 1999). Further improvements to the Royal Fleet began in 1779 when Queen Maria Carolina appointed John Acton Commander of the Neapolitan Royal Navy (Direttore di Marina). Acton’s main task centered on the organization of the Royal Fleet and on the nautical education of skilled experts, both in the Royal Fleet and in the merchant navy. However, since the Neapolitan shipyard had been built for galleys at the end of the 16th century, it was only suitable for building small boats. Consequently, Acton constructed a new royal shipyard in 1783 in Castellammare di Stabia. Working with French models and a French engineer
named Imbert, the shipyard built vessels with 74 guns. The 15 new vessels constructed in Castellammare were then equipped in Naples with Swedish guns since the shipyard of Castellammare did not yet offer these capabilities. The Royal Arms Industry, located at Torre Annunziata, also supplied balls for guns and plates of iron from Muscovy and Sweden to outfit the Kingdom’s new naval vessels (Sirago, 2012a, pp. 87-107).

While Acton was busy updating the Kingdom’s capacity to build and outfit state-of-the-art vessels, Minister Ferdinando Galiani spearheaded the pursuit of trade agreements. Galiani is described by Diaz (1968, pp. 855-909) as the greatest economist of the Kingdom of Naples. He lived in France for many years, serving as the secretary to the Neapolitan ambassador before he was appointed Counselor at the Commercial Court. Among other initiatives, Galiani negotiated a trade agreement between the Bourbon Kingdom and Russia in 1787 seeking to increase commerce with the Black and Baltic Sea regions. The minister also promoted foreign trade with France, but he was never able to sign a binding agreement (Sirago, 2012b, pp. 203-233.).

Further west, new trade opportunities opened for King Ferdinand across the Atlantic Sea, particularly with the United States (Castellano, 1956, pp. 22-48; Giura, 1967). According to Lo Sardo (1986), soon after U.S. independence from Great Britain was formalized with the 1783 Treaty of Paris Treaty of 1783, diplomatic relations were established with the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Lo Sardo, p. 338). That same year, a Neapolitan expedition sailed to the Americas. Specifically, a “Polacca,” called La Madonna delle Grazie e Anime del Purgatorio, commanded by the Neapolitan captains Antonio Cesali and Tomaso de Martino, landed in the port of Saint Thomas in the Virgin Islands carrying wine, “macaroni” and other foods¹. Also in 1783, Vincenzo Cotini, a Neapolitan merchant, asked to be appointed Consul in the United States after learning of a planned trade agreement with the young country. He was informed that the King was not going to sign any agreement², a position confirmed by Minister Galiani a year later³.

Nevertheless, interest in establishing trade between the U.S. and Naples was voiced by officials on both sides of the Atlantic. In one of his letters to Minister José Moñino, count of Floridablanca, Galiani made a detailed list of goods which could be imported from the United States and Latin America (cinnamon, coffee, cocoa, iron and nails, indigo from Carolina, turpentine, pitch, and mainmasts for vessels) and a list of exportable goods produced in the Kingdom (above all, olive oil, citrus fruits, raisin, wine, acquavite and sulfur from Sicily).

The United States, for its part, was eager to establish trade with Southern Italy, especially after the Sicilian port of Messina was declared a free port on 10

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¹ Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Ministero degli esteri (from now ASN, ME), 1356 I, 3/2/1783.
² ASN. ME, 4210, 12/3/1783.
February 1783 (Castellano, 1956, pp. 209-210; D’Angelo, 2010, pp. 651-667). In 1784, three famous American representatives in Paris - John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson - sent the court of Naples (through Luigi Pio, a Neapolitan representative in France) a draft proposal for a treaty of friendship and trade between the two countries (Castellano, 1956, pp. 34-48). The plan was put forth by Benjamin Franklin, and supported by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.

Naples was a region Franklin knew well; for several years, the Philadelphia-based scientist had maintained a regular correspondence with the Neapolitan philosopher Gaetano Filangieri. In fact, the two men exchanged letters and books, among them Filangieri’s celebrated volume, *Scienza della Legislazione* (Lo Sardo, 1999; D’Agostini, 2011). Gaetano Filangieri’s letters to Franklin showed genuine interest in the newborn nation. According to Lo Sardo (1999), Filangieri sent every book he wrote about legislation to Franklin. Alongside texts by Cesare Beccaria, Filangieri’s writings are purported to have inspired Franklin’s contributions to the U.S. Constitution. As a matter of fact, Filangieri hoped negotiations with the United States would be successful as he sought to be appointed as an American consul (Ruggiero, 2016, pp. 99-130). His dream was never fulfilled though he kept in touch with Franklin all his life. According to Lo Sardo (1999), on 14 October 1787, the American statesman sent Filangieri his final letter regarding the latest developments in the American political situation; Filangieri received it on 27 September 1788, a few days before he died. His wife Charlotte wrote the response to Franklin.

Despite his own documentation of the demand for goods and the cordial friendship cultivated by Franklin and Filangieri, however, Minister Galiani remained strongly opposed to trade agreements with the United States. He believed that the new country sought only international recognition and protection by the Neapolitan Navy against the menace of Barbary attacks in the Mediterranean Sea. He also felt that commerce with the newborn state would not be profitable⁴. Indeed, a month before expressing these ideas openly, Galiani had conducted an analysis of trade with the Americas, and with the Antilles in particular. Over the previous three years, 5 or 6 trading voyages had taken place, and Galiani determined that the Neapolitan entrepreneurs financing the voyages had lost from 15% to 40% of their capital investments. These results confirmed for Galiani that trading with U.S. ports located farther than the Antilles would have been even less profitable. Moreover, he concluded that the U.S. was still an unreliable country in which to do business⁵. Supporting this position, the Bourbon government postponed sending products from Southern Italy to the U.S. until after the arrival of goods, particularly tobacco, from North America⁶.

In 1795, however, Spain and the U.S. signed a treaty of friendship and navigation (Della Vecchia, 1996, p. 35). This re-opened the possibility for diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Naples. In turn, John S. M. Matthieu was

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⁴ BSSPN, ms. XXX D 3, ff. 1-6, Galiani Ferdinando, “Parere”, cit.
⁵ ASN, ME, 4210, 17/7/1785.
⁶ ASN, ME, 4210/15, 24/10/1784.
appointed Consul of the United States in Naples (Della Vecchia, 1996, 35). At the time, there were three other consulates on the Italian peninsula in Leghorn (1793), Rome (1797), and Genoa (1799) (Di Giacomo, 2004c; Di Giacomo, 2004b; Di Giacomo, 2010; Battaglia, 1998; Battaglia, 2007; Marraro, 1951, I, p. 16). The U.S. established these consulates as strategic centers from which to expand their developing trade, particularly in the port of Livorno (Di Giacomo, 2004b). To further advance U.S. commerce in the region, Joseph Barnes, an American citizen, was appointed Consul of the United States in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies on 10 February 1802. Three years later, on 20 March 1805, Frederick Degen was also assigned as a Consul to Naples, and, in 1806, Abraham Gibbs and John Broadbent were confirmed as Consuls by President Jefferson in the Sicilian cities of Palermo and Messina, respectively (Marraro, 1951, I, p. 18; Lo Sardo, 1986).

The appointment of consular officers was related to growing American interest in Mediterranean trade. In 1797, Giovanni Mathieu, the American Consul in Naples, asked the Supremo Consiglio delle Finanze (Ministry of Economy and Finance) to export a large number of goods produced in the Kingdom to the United States (acquavite, liqueurs, wine, refined silk, dried figs, manna, etc.)\(^7\). Even during and after the establishment of the short-lived, French-supported Neapolitan Republic in 1799, the appointment of consuls continued. On 4 April 1801, Barnes was reconfirmed by Acton and called in to handle the imminent arrival of American ships - some carrying timber and two carrying goods onward to Malta\(^8\). A year later, in Sicily, Abraham Gibbs was appointed Consul of Palermo and the successful entrepreneur John Broadbent was elevated to Consul of Messina and Syracuse (Di Giacomo, 2004a; D’Angelo, 1995)\(^9\). Finally, in 1804, Federico Degen was appointed American Consul in Naples, and the merchant, Gennaro Montuoro, from Gallipoli received the long-awaited position of Vice-Consul in his home city\(^10\). (It is surprising that Gallipoli did not host a consul earlier since American vessels of the period frequently sailed from Gallipoli carrying olive oil). As a result of these consular appointments, the American merchant fleet increased its presence in the area from 202,000 tons in 1789 to 939,408 tons in 1800 (Keiler, 1913). Between 1801 and 1804, 36 American vessels arrived in the port of Messina alone (D’Angelo, 2010, pp. 658-667).

After the fall of the Neapolitan Republic (1799), Naples sought to expand its own capacity to engage in long distance trade like that of England. King Ferdinand continued to support the construction of new merchant ships, particularly a style of ship with a “coffa” - a distinctive platform used to support an upper mast. Consequently, the merchant navy increased shipbuilding, particularly the

\(^7\) ASN, ME, 3196, 13/4/1797

\(^8\) ASN, ME, 3196, 4/4, 18/4, 25/5/1801

\(^9\) ASN, ME, 3196, 27/2/1801, Gallipoli; 7/2/1803, Consul Salvatore Corti for Messina and Siracusa.

\(^10\) ASN, ME, 3196, 26/5 and 26/9/1804.
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production of brigs and brigs ‘a palo’, in the mainland shipyards of Naples, Piano, Meta, and Castellammare; on the island of Procida; and in Sicily.

However, after Napoleon’s rise to power, Naples was again invaded by the French in 1806. The King and his court fled to Palermo for the second time. Sicily was then under British protection and foreign trade increased greatly in Messina during the so-called “British decade” (1806-1816). This trend included expanding commerce with the U.S. For example, between 1810 and 1811, 19 American vessels arrived in the port of Messina (D’Angelo, 2010, p. 656). Contrarily, the King’s departure temporarily slowed commercial activity on the Kingdom’s mainland.

2. The French Decade 1806-1816

The Napoleonic regime brought remarkable changes in the Kingdom of Naples, first under the rule of Napoleon’s brother, Joseph (1806-1808), and then by Napoleon’s brother-in-law, Joachim Murat (1808-1815). Murat expanded the royal arsenal at Castellammare and ordered the construction of new docks that would allow 3 vessels to be made simultaneously (Sirago, 2012a). However, commercial expansion was halted with the initiation of the English Continental Blockade (signed on 21 November 1806), which restricted Neapolitan trade with the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Americas.

On 20 September 1808, President James Madison appointed Alexander Hammett from Maryland as Consul in Naples. Hammett was tasked with checking the American vessels entering the city’s port. Although the development of trade was hindered by the war between France and England, the American merchant navy collaborated with the English trading companies working in Naples, and its fleet was allowed to enter the capital city (Lo Sardo, 1986, p. 376). The embargo was only effective for roughly half of its formal duration, which ended on 11 April 1814, after Napoleon's first abdication. A new controversy arose in 1809, when Murat, with Napoleon’s approval, decreed that American ships that ventured out into the Bay of Naples, could be seized and confiscated. The first victim was the brig Nancy, captured by the Neapolitan fleet near the island of Procida while sailing to Gallipoli to load olive oil. In total, 30 American vessels were seized in 1809 (Ilari, Crociani & Boeri, 2016, p. 211). It is estimated that between 1809 and 1812, about 50 total vessels were captured and sold with their cargoes or added to the Royal Fleet. In 1813, when the Continental Blockade finally ended, Consul Hammett presented grievances to Marzio Mastrilli, the Marquis del Gallo and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hammett demonstrated that the losses suffered by American merchants as a result of the seizures under Murat amounted to 6,000 ducats—a figure that included the confiscation of a cargo of cocoa belonging to the

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11 ASN, ME, 5384/2
12 ASN, ME, 4466, note of the 30 seized vessels in 1809.
Consul himself!\textsuperscript{13} Despite these protests, however, the Americans’ claims were ignored by the government in Naples (Radogna, 1978; Lo Sardo, 1986, p. 390).

3. \textit{The Bourbon restoration in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (1815 – 1861)}

A remarkable revival of trade took place when King Ferdinand returned to Naples in 1815 at the end of 10 years of French rule in Southern Italy. The King adopted the trading policy of Murat. He ordered new renovations of the Kingdom’s main ports and the shipyard of Castellammare, and he promoted further improvement of the merchant navy, financing some franchises to build new ships, brigs and schooners aimed at long-distance trade (Clemente, 2011). Ferdinand also ordered the reorganization of the Naval Academy and the nautical schools (Sirago, 2004).

Notably, by that time, the development of steam engines had begun. In 1818, the French trader Pierre Andriel received a patent to build the first steamship (with an English engine) at the Marina di Vigliena, near Naples: it was named “Ferdinando the 1\textsuperscript{st}”. However, the construction was not a success, and the ship was dismantled. Then, in 1823, George Wilding, Prince of Butera, acquired a 10-year patent-right to found a steamship company connecting Naples to Palermo and Marseille. Finally, starting in the 1830s, steamships made with English engines called “cavafondi”, and used to clean the harbors, were built for the Royal Fleet. The shipyard of Castellammare was equipped for the new vessels and a factory in Pietrarsa was built to make domestic steam engines. At long last, the Kingdom was able to build ships entirely on site, from the outer hulls to the engines. These initiatives were supported by the King to increase foreign trade.

To further advance the Kingdom’s commerce, the Bourbon government also moved to re-establish consular representation and negotiate trade agreements with other trading nations. In particular, The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies sought to restore diplomatic relations with the United States and to off-set the damage caused by Murat’s illegal seizure and confiscation of the American ships. Before reconciliation, the American merchants demanded indemnity for their economic losses.

On 28 February 1816, President James Madison assigned William Pinkney, the Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia, “a special mission to the King of the Two Sicilies” to make indemnity requests for the illegal seizure of the American vessels under Murat. Pinkney arrived in Naples on a ship called the \textit{Washington} on 23 July, escorted by the American Navy\textsuperscript{14}. One month later, he appeared in the King’s court with Frederick Degen, Consul of the United States, to discuss “the principal objects of his mission”\textsuperscript{15}. Pinkney urged King Ferdinand to return the ships with their cargoes. However, the King was reluctant. As reported by Tommaso di Somma, the Marquis of Circeillo of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Bourbon

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[13] ASN, ME, 5458/7, 1813 e 13/5/1814.
\item[14] ASN, ME, 4, 23/7/1816.
\end{footnotesize}
monarch considered Murat to be a usurper\(^{16}\) (Marraro, 1948). Although Pinkney’s mission failed in its primary goal, it nevertheless revitalized relations between the U.S. and the Kingdom. Trade with the Americans increased, especially in Sicily (Di Giacomo, 2004a). American ships arrived on the island, and vessels from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies also sailed to the States. For example, on 25 September 1818, Giovan Francesco Mansoni, Consul General in Tuscany, announced “con intenso giubilo” (with great joyfulness), the arrival in Boston of the first Sicilian brig, the Oreto, commanded by Bonaventura Consiglio, a Captain from Palermo. The Consul concluded that “il Regno delle Due Sicilie potrebbe fare un commercio molto vantaggioso con quegli stati” (trade with the U.S. could be very profitable for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies). He also emphasized how skilled American fishermen were in catching cod, noting that, with their 105 vessels, the total tonnage of the American catch was about 350-400,000. Enumerating his findings, Mansoni observed that almost half of this yield stemmed from the work of vessels sailing out of the ports of Salem and New York, among the most important American trade centers. Finally, he commented that the busiest port was that of Boston, where many Sicilian goods were sold. In light of this data, Mansoni hoped to further increase U.S. trade with Italy, especially in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies\(^{17}\).

Formal negotiations between the Kingdom and the U.S. started again only after King Francis I ascended to the throne following the death of his father Ferdinand on 26 January 1825. Under Francis’ rule, new attempts were made to normalize trade between the two nations. On 10 April 1825, Count Ferdinando Lucchesi Palli was appointed Consul General in the United States “per sempre più promuovere la Navigazione della … Reale Bandiera e il Commercio” (to continuously promote navigation and trade in the Kingdom). On 16 September 1825, Luigi de Medici di Ottaviano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a long report addressing Pinkney’s unsuccessful mission and discussing the open question of the illegal seizure of the American vessels. He also revisited the indemnity claims that had been presented again on 18 August 1825 by John James Appleton\(^{18}\), Special Agent of the U.S. in Naples. President John Quincy Adams had sent Appleton to settle the controversy following the principles of an indemnity trade agreement signed between France and the U.S. on 24 June 1822\(^{19}\). Nothing moved quickly. Talks regarding the seized U.S. ships and cargoes were still underway in 1826 when Edward Everett called attention to the matter with his publication of a pamphlet called *Claims of Citizens of the United States of America complaining against Naples, Holland and France for the spoliations committed on U.S. commerce during the Napoleonic wars*. That same

\(^{16}\) ASN, ME, 4465, 28/8/1816

\(^{17}\) ASN, ME, 2408, 25/9/1818

\(^{18}\) ASN, ME, 4465, 18/8 and 16/9/1825.

\(^{19}\) ASN, ME, 4465, s.d.
year, Consul Lucchesi Palli reported that a group of American citizens had formed a partnership for the purpose of demanding indemnity and satisfaction for the claims.  

Still, the ongoing controversy did not prevent the development of trade between the two countries. For example, in 1827, Consul Odoardo Fowles, who had replaced Lucchesi Palli, announced the return to New York of two American brigs – the Washington and the United States – carrying goods from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The cargo included wine, olive oil, citrus and other fruits and silk. One year later, a brig called Felicità, commanded by Captain Vincenzo Lorello, sailed from New York to Palermo carrying different types of American goods, including pitch, sugar, timber, and tobacco.

Relations between the two countries changed when Ferdinand II succeeded his father, Francis I, on 8 November 1830. The new King pursued another program of advancement; he restored the finances of the Kingdom, supported technological improvement, promoted the reorganization of the Royal Navy and the merchant navy, and, finally, increased trade with foreign countries (Sirago, 2004). At the same time, motivated by the prospects of increased trade with the U.S., small entrepreneurs and shipbuilders joined together to construct a great number of ocean-going brigs. According to Clemente (2011, p. 213), this constituency petitioned for the development of Naples’ merchant navy and the resolution of the “American question”. In turn, the U.S. again moved to satisfy its indemnity claims.

In 1831, President Jackson sent John Nelson of Maryland to Naples with explicit orders to settle the dispute (Marraro, 1951, I, p. 20). This time, negotiations brought success. A definitive agreement was reached in October 1832, and Nelson returned to the United States bearing the text of the first convention between the United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Marraro, 1951, I, p. 21). As a result of this agreement, the Bourbon government paid 2,155,000 Neapolitan ducats as indemnity for the destruction of vessels and cargoes. In addition, 7,685 ducats were subtracted from the total amount to reimburse costs incurred when the U.S. Government paid for the return of American seamen from Naples in 1810. The final sum was paid in 9 instalments of 235,000 ducats with 4% interest until 1842. The satisfactory conclusion of the indemnity claims motivated American officials to negotiate a treaty of general commerce between the two countries. This led to the appointment of Auguste Davezac as Minister Plenipotentiary of the U.S. Government in 1833. Meanwhile, a growing number of goods from Sicily and

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20 ASN, ME, 4465, 28/7/1826.
21 ASN, ME, 2406, 24/7/1827.
22 ASN, Me, 2409, 1826, August, 8th and 9th.
23 ASN, ME, 2410, 8/6/1828
24 ASN, ME, 4466, 29/2/1832.
25 ASN, ME, 4466, 14/10/1832, “Convenzione tra S.M. il re delle Due Sicilie e il Governo degli Stati Uniti d’America per terminare le reclamazioni del detto Governo per le prede fatte da Murat negli anni 1809, 1810, 1811, e 1812”.
26 ASN, ME, 4466, 8/6/1833.
Naples were carried to the U.S. by both American brigs and brigs built in the Kingdom, principally in Sicily\textsuperscript{27}.

The increased trade gave rise to debate, in both the U.S. and the Kingdom, about the necessity of a commercial agreement. After two failed attempts in 1834 and 1838, progress was made. In March 1845, William Hawkins Polk, the younger brother of the standing president, James Knox Polk, was sent to Naples as Chargé d’Affaires to meet the Prince de Scilla, who had been entrusted to lead the Office of Foreign Affairs. The treaty of commerce and navigation was finally concluded. It was signed on 1 December 1845, and ratified by the U.S. on 11 April 1846. Several months after the proclamation of the treaty, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies appointed Chevalier Rocco Martuscielli as the first Chargé d’Affaire in Washington.

On 1 May 1847, Mr. Hammett replaced William H. Polk as Consul. During the political revolution that swept through the Kingdom in 1848, the American people sympathized with the local population, and particularly with the Sicilians’ struggle against Bourbon despotism and tyranny. After Ferdinand II’s notorious bombing of Palermo in January 1848, all of the foreign consuls residing in the city, including Mr. John Marston, Consul General of the United States, protested against the Bourbon government. Only the Austrian Consul distanced himself.

Even when the 1848 insurrection ended in failure and repression, both governments maintained mutual diplomatic relationships to increase trade. After Martuscielli’s death in 1853, Baron Francesco Antonio Winspeare was appointed Chargé d’Affaires in Washington. He took office in July 1855, and brought two important international agreements to a successful conclusion: a convention on “Rights of neutrals at sea” (16 July 1855), and a treaty of “Amity, commerce and navigation; extradition” (10 December 1855). The treaty - with its 26 articles based on principles of reciprocity about contraband, types of vessels, navigation rights, etc. - boosted trade (Marraro, 1951, I, p. 27). In turn, the 1850’s witnessed a dramatic increase in trade between the U.S. and the Two Sicilies. In a report dated 1 April 1854, the American Consul in Palermo wrote about the remarkable explosion in U.S. trade taking shape throughout the Kingdom, especially with the island of Sicily (Di Giacomo, 2004a).

The development of steam navigation bolstered this trend, but slowly. The navigation initiative and companies such as the Neapolitan Company (created by the Prince of Butera & the Sicilian Florio), stimulated steam navigation between Naples, Calabria, Sicily and other Mediterranean countries. However, initially, the steamships, with their cumbersome engines, mainly carried passengers and mail rather than commercial goods (Sirago, 2015, pp. 495-511); brigs and schooners with sails continued to be used for trade throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{27}ASN, ME, 2412 in 1833, two Sicilians brigs and four American ships; in 1834, 40 ships, 4 Sicilians (3 in New York, 1 in Boston) and 31 Americans. In 1830, Sicilian goods whose value amounted to 3740 ducats were imported, in 1831 this increased to 144.147, in 1832 to 156.617, and in 1833 to 165.714.
The year 1842 marked the first attempt to establish a steam navigation service between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the United States. It was led by two Neapolitan business men, Domenico Bellini and Enrico Quadri, who were granted permission to sail to the U.S. with a 400-500 HP steamship. The plan was slow in coming, but was carried out in 1852 with aid from two shipowners from Palermo, Luigi and Salvatore de Pace. Together, the group of entrepreneurs soon formed a partnership, called *Sicula Transatlantica*, with the express purpose of establishing regular passenger voyages from Palermo to New York. This partnership’s first ship, a helical iron steamer built in Glasgow and called the *Sicilia*, sailed initially in June 1854 under the command of Ferdinando Cafiero, a Captain from Meta di Sorrento. The *Sicilia* reached New York in 26 days. However, because the enterprise was not immediately profitable, the company soon discontinued its services.

Nevertheless, the advent of steam shipping in the Atlantic Ocean improved commercial and cultural exchange over time. In 1860, a few months before Italian unification, Giuseppe De Luca provided an accurate evaluation of the economic situation in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which suggested the value of trade between the U.S. and Naples was rising. De Luca notes that, in 1854, the export of goods amounted to 15,086,840 ducats, including 121,440 to the United States. Imports amounted to 12,682,430 ducats, of which 1,226,590 was from the U.S. Two years later, exported goods had increased in value to 18,872,410 ducats, of which 118,450 were to the U.S., while imports amounted to 15,665,480 ducats, of which 2,610,500 were from the United States (De Luca 1860, pp. 253-254). In the same period, the United States imported a considerable amount of merchandise from Sicily. For example, in 1857, American imports amounted to 2,991,081 ducats from trade in citrus fruits, *acquavite*, high value wines like Marsala, white wines from Catania, sweet wines from Syracuse, and sulfur.

**Conclusion**

Evidence suggests that after settling the controversy between the United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1832, the two countries increased their bilateral trade. Although Count Ferdinando Lucchesi Palli had been appointed Consul in Washington in 1826, formal diplomatic relations were established only after the indemnity agreement was signed in 1832. En route to the ratification of an official treaty of amity and commerce, Robert Dale Owen, the first U.S. Minister Resident in Naples, presented his credentials on 20 September 1854. At the same time, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies appointed its own ambassador to the U.S, Chevalier Rocco Martuscelli, who presented his credentials as *Chargé d’Affaires* at Washington on 7 December 1846. From this point until 1861, when the process of Italian Unification began, the Government of the Two Sicilies was almost continuously represented in the United States by a *chargé d’affaires*: the last representative of the Bourbon government in Washington D.C. was Giuseppe
Anfora, Duke of Licignano, the acting Chargé d’Affaires ad interim from 24 September 1860 to 15 December 1861 (Marraro, 1951-52, II, p. 747). The U.S. consular presence in Southern Italy changed after the region’s absorption into the new unified Kingdom of Italy in 1861. The new Italian government entirely reorganized the consular system.

References


When Goethe went to Italy, he reached the Mediterranean, not, as he says, when he crossed the Brenner Pass or later in the Tuscan Apennines... but right at the start of his journey, in Frankfurt... If we did not consider this extended zone of influence, the greater Mediterranean, it would often be difficult to grasp the history of the sea. The focal point of trade, of riches accumulated, changing hands sometimes to be lost forever, the Mediterranean can be measured by its wider repercussions (Braudel, 1995, I, p. 170).

Among the “wider repercussions” of what Fernand Braudel (1995) called “the greater Mediterranean” on the geo-politics of the late 18th and early 19th centuries was the rise of an upstart young republic across the Atlantic Ocean, the United States of America. Uncovering the Mediterranean roots of the early American Republic, this essay examines the origins and evolution of what I term Thomas Jefferson’s “Mediterranean Doctrine”. This Doctrine provided an organizing stratagem that guided American foreign policy from U.S. Independence (1783) through the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815). Its fundamental premise was that the economic growth of the United States, and thus, the very success of the American experiment in self-government, depended on gaining open access to Mediterranean markets. Jefferson’s unified field theory of early American political economy proposed that the Americans’ ability to trade freely in the Mediterranean would require an adaptive foreign policy that was both aimed at advancing U.S. commerce through diplomacy, and also equally prepared to employ military force to protect U.S. business interests overseas.

The tenets of Jefferson’s Mediterranean doctrine were provoked by the financial burden and national humiliation of the United States in the immediate aftermath of Independence from Great Britain in 1783; the new country was forced to pay “tribute” to the Barbary regencies along the North African coast in exchange for the safe passage of U.S. merchant vessels trading in Mediterranean waters. To overcome what he saw as a violation of American commercial freedom and to open the Mediterranean to American trade, Jefferson promoted a two-part policy program. First, he called for the construction and deployment of an American naval squadron to the Mediterranean. Second, he called for the formation of strategic alliances with
the governments of the smaller European states, most importantly, the Bourbon monarchy that ruled the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily. Jefferson pursued these policy goals throughout his tenure as U.S. Minister to France (1784-1789) and Secretary of State (1790-1793), and they were realized during his first term as the President of the United States (1801-1805).

In an age of revolution and reaction across the Atlantic world, secular republics and Catholic monarchies made strange bedfellows; even so, soon after the ink was dry on the 1783 Treaty of Paris, ending hostilities between the United States and Great Britain, Thomas Jefferson began encouraging American leaders to recognize the advantages of a diplomatic alliance with Bourbon Naples. Throughout the 1780’s and 1790’s Jefferson sought, but was not able to secure, a treaty of amity and commerce between the U.S. and the Southern Italian Regno. Nonetheless, relations between the U.S. and the Two Sicilies gained traction in 1796. The King granted permission for the U.S. to establish its second consulate in Italy (after Livorno, 1792) in the Neapolitan capital. Friendship between the U.S. and Naples crystalized in the spring of 1801 when the Pasha of Tripoli, Yusef Karamanli, demanded an increase in the amount of payment required from the United States to ensure its merchants’ freedom from harassment by Tripolitan corsairs. Acting in accord with the foreign policy objectives he had been promoting for more than 20 years, the newly elected President Jefferson rejected the Pasha’s ultimatum and instead chose to lead the United States to war in the Mediterranean Sea. The logistical challenges of the U.S. fighting its first foreign war at sea with Tripoli (1801-1805) inspired the Jefferson Administration’s successful pursuit of military assistance from Bourbon Naples in the form of men, material and the use of Southern Italian ports as staging grounds for the war effort. Tracing the diplomatic and cultural relations that evolved between the United States and Naples through Jefferson’s first term as Commander and Chief, this essay demonstrates how the United States engineered a novus ordo seclorum of “free ships and free goods” in the Mediterranean world with the aid of an unlikely ally, “His Sicilian Majesty,” King Ferdinand IV of Naples.

1 From 1734 through 1815, the two constitutionally separate kingdoms of Naples and Sicily were ruled through a so-called “personal union” under the control of the Bourbon monarchy. During the two periods of French invasion in Southern Italy (1799 and 1806-1815), the Bourbons maintained control of Sicily but lost power in Naples. After the restoration of the monarchy at the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the two hitherto separate (yet linked) crowns were merged into a united realm called the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which lasted until the unification of Italy in 1861.

2 King Ferdinand lived from 1751 to 1825. Until his second restoration, he reigned as Ferdinand IV of Naples and Ferdinand III of Sicily. After 1816, he was styled Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies.
Few Americans have ever worked harder to forge ties between the United States and the countries that bordered the Mediterranean Sea than Jefferson. But the so-called Sage of Monticello did not create the connections de novo nor on his own. Rather, Jefferson built upon foundations his countrymen had formed while subjects of the British Empire. Throughout the 17th and early 18th centuries, colonial American ships carried codfish and timber products, especially the barrel staves used to make wooden casks for the storage of olive oil and wine, to Mediterranean ports such as Naples and Palermo. As the 18th century advanced, tobacco and grain from the Chesapeake colonies contributed to growing commerce between North America and the Mediterranean lands (Nettles, 1962; North, 1966). The trade of colonial Americans with Mediterranean Europe continued to increase down to the eve of Independence. Through 1775, exchange with the Mediterranean was the only major overseas trade that consistently earned a net credit in the colonial balance of payments (McCusker, 2014).

Even during the War for Independence (1775-1783), the importance of cultivating trade between the future American Republic and the busy ports that lined the Mediterranean littoral were much on Jefferson’s mind. At the end of August 1778, Jefferson shared his vision of the economic future of the United States with his fellow Virginian, Richard Henry Lee, who was, at the time, serving as a delegate to the Second Continental Congress: “The countries bordering on the Mediterranean I think will merit our earliest attention. They will be the important markets for our great commodities of fish (as Roman Catholics), wheat, tobacco and rice”3. Moreover, Jefferson informed Lee, the Mediterranean littoral was more than just a marketplace for goods; it was a region whose natural resources, cultural traditions and human capital would prove essential to building a prosperous and well-cultivated American Republic.

Emigrants too from the Mediterranean would be of much more value to our country in particular than from the more Northern countries. They bring with them a skill in agriculture and other arts better adapted to our climate… had our country been peopled thence we should now have been farther advanced in rearing the several things which our country is capable of producing4.

For U.S. foreign policy, the conclusion was clear: “To negotiate a general reception and on good terms for our capital commodities with these powers and to deduce from thence a number of settlers… would be of great and immediate value”5. In his letter to Lee, the author of the Declaration of Independence voiced what became another enduring Jeffersonian idea:

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4 TJRHL in PTJ, pp. 210-211.
5 TJRHL in PTJ, pp. 210-211.
American economic and cultural development depended upon an open door to Mediterranean goods and ideas. In the years ahead, achieving this objective would mark one of Jefferson’s greatest contributions to American foreign policy as well as one of the defining challenges of his statecraft.

Despite Thomas Paine’s promise that “American products are the necessaries of life, and will always have a market while eating is the custom of Europe,” in the immediate wake of Independence, U.S. merchants had a difficult time finding open markets for their goods. After the peace settlement in 1783, the major European powers - Great Britain, France, and Spain - all issued Navigation Acts restricting American access to markets in their New World colonies. In 1784, Great Britain prohibited American ships from visiting its Caribbean possessions, and banned the importation of all codfish caught by Americans throughout its empire. The same year, France placed an additional duty on American codfish imported into its West Indian islands, and excluded American flour and all grains except “Indian” corn. The loss of British and French Caribbean markets was exacerbated by Spain’s subsequent suspension of U.S. trading privileges in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Hispaniola. Europe’s mercantilist policies meant that the commodities American merchants most frequently sent to the West Indies - fish, flour, and lumber - would need to find alternative outlets (Bemis, 1942, pp. 262-298).

With the nearby Caribbean unavailable, the more distant Mediterranean loomed large. At this time, trade with Genoa, Livorno, Naples and the other ports of Italy and the Mediterranean world appeared vital to the viability of the early American economy. This too proved challenging: beyond the familiar sights and sounds of their home ports in Boston, Salem, New York and Philadelphia, U.S. sailors and merchants discovered that independence had put them out to sea in a dangerous world of hostile empires. The most immediate threat to the re-establishment of trade with the Mediterranean markets was the risk of seizure by the corsairs - flotillas of armed privateers that the Americans pejoratively called the “Barbary pirates”.

Operating out of the North African states of Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli, and Algeria, the semi-independent vassal states of the Ottoman sultan had pursued a policy of extracting tribute from all nations trading in Mediterranean waters since the early 16th century. Foreign vessels sailing without passes to prove their affiliation with a tribute-paying nation were subject to seizure, and their crews to enslavement by privateers acting in the interests of the Barbary powers (R. Davis, 1993). Prior to the Revolution, threats by the corsairs were minimal as colonial crews and cargoes enjoyed the protection of the British Royal Navy. During the War for Independence, the 1778 Treaties of Alliance and Amity and Commerce with France temporarily solved the problem of protecting American merchants from the predation of the corsairs. However, American hopes for the continuation of assistance from France or another
leading European power ran aground shortly after the 1783 Treaty of Paris recognizing U.S. Independence went into effect (Kitzen, 1993).

Lacking support from the major powers, the United States was left to bargain for its own security, or, if possible, to form protective alliances with one or more of the smaller European states. But the early diplomatic efforts of the United States moved too slowly to prevent the seizure of the 300-ton Boston-based brigantine, Betsey, off the coast of Spain in October 1784 by the Sallee Rovers, a sea-born militia of corsairs from Morocco (Hall, 1971, p. 45). The loss confirmed the severity of the situation. In the wake of the attack, the American ministers in the courts of Europe redoubled their efforts to solicit diplomatic alliances to protect their nation’s commerce. From his post as American Minister to France, Thomas Jefferson set out to negotiate treaties of commerce and alliance with the smaller Mediterranean states. He aimed to build what he called an “anti-piratical confederation” dedicated to mutual security and free-trade. Among the prospective enlistments was a country he identified as a critical ally: the Bourbon Monarchy that had ruled Southern Italy since 1734.

As an independent sovereignty, the Bourbon monarchy was less than a quarter-century older than the American Republic at the time Jefferson began his efforts to ally the two. Comprised of an ancient domain dating back to the Greeks and Romans, prior to the 18th century, the Southern Italian Kingdom had been subjected to foreign domination for over 500 years: first under the French House of Anjou (1266-1442); then, under the kings of Aragon (1442-1504); and finally, under a series of royal viceroys appointed by Spain until the end of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). Thereafter, under the terms of the Treaty of Rastatt (1714), the mainland Kingdom of Naples fell under the rule of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, who also gained control of Sicily in 1720. Hapsburg control of the Two Sicilies lasted only 30 years as Naples and Sicily were retaken by Bourbon Spain during the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738). In the wake of the Spanish re-conquest of the Mezzogiorno, Charles, Duke of Parma, a younger son of King Philip V, ascended to the throne of an autonomous, dynastically united, though constitutionally separate, Bourbon Kingdom of Naples and Sicily in July 1735 (Colletta, 1853; Croce, 1970).

Under the reign of King Charles (styled Charles VII of Naples and Charles V of Sicily; see footnote 1), the Bourbon Kingdom assumed its place as a cultural capital of Europe. The city of Naples itself was massive; composed of 5 million souls in the late 18th century, it ranked as the most populated city in Italy, and the third most populated in Europe behind London and Paris. During King Charles’ 25 years on the throne, his Southern Italian Kingdom embodied the principles of “enlightened despotism.” Numerous civic reforms were enacted aimed at curtailing church privileges and expanding state revenue. In 1759, Charles left Naples to succeed his father on the Spanish throne as Carlos
III, leaving the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily in the hands of his third surviving son, 8-year-old Ferdinand and the regent, Foreign Secretary Bernardo Tanucci. The latter essentially governed the realm until Ferdinand’s marriage in 1768 to the Archduchess Maria Carolina of Austria (sister of the Austrian Emperor and the younger sister of Marie Antoinette, Queen of France). Thereafter, with the exception of 2 periods of French intervention (1799 and 1806-1816), King Ferdinand would rule for 66 years until his death in 1825 (Spagnoletti, 1997).

Despite apparent political and ideological differences, mutual interest between the nominally secular, yet predominately Protestant, Republic of the United States, and the Catholic monarchy of Naples and Sicily developed even before the conclusion of the American War of Independence. Surprisingly, it was Naples that made the first commercial and diplomatic advances. As early as 1778, King Ferdinand, operating through his Ambassador, Domenico Caracciolo, Marchese di Villamaina, sent a message to the U.S. commissioners in Paris - Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and Arthur Lee - announcing that his ports were now open to American ships. Among his requests was: “Would the diplomats kindly describe the flag under which their country’s vessels sailed, so that they can be clearly distinguished from the Barbary pirates?” In this missive, King Ferdinand introduced the twin concerns shared by Naples and the United States: maritime commerce and conflict with the North African corsairs.

The government of His Sicilian Majesty was not alone in recognizing that the two nations held mutual interests in promoting trade and commercial security in the Mediterranean Sea. Only weeks after the capture of the American merchant brig, Betsy, in October 1784, the Neapolitan minister Francesco d’Aquino, Prince of Caramanico, wrote to the court from Paris. He reported upon his conversation with the new U.S. Minister to France, Thomas Jefferson, and urgently requested treaties of commerce and friendship between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the United States. Recounting the points raised by the American minister, Caramanico explained that: “Mister Jefferson has demonstrated the profits which might be derived from the Americans shipping goods from Virginia; tobacco, salt fish, grain, and quality wood products, with the royal dominions exporting wine, oil, liqueurs and silk.”

Despite Caramanico’s enthusiasm, back in Naples, Ferdinando Galiani, the ranking advisor at the Tribunale di Commercio received the report on Jefferson’s proposition of a U.S.-Neapolitan trade agreement with skepticism. Urging caution, Galiani suggested that Naples should open trade with the United States but avoid signing a formal treaty. In Galiani’s view, the economic advantages of increased trade were only a pretext; the U.S. had other goals in mind.

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7 Archivio di Stato di Napoli (from now ASN), Segreteria e Ministero degli Affari Esteri, (from now AE), “Caramanico to Naples, 12 October 1784”, file (from now f.) 4210.
Specifically, the minister believed that the American Republic was only seeking Naples’ friendship for the sake of advancing its standing in the other courts of Europe. To go along with this scheme would be to injure national pride and to diminish the Bourbon government’s reputation abroad. “The United States do not propose treaties to improve their commerce” rather, the Neapolitan minister maintained, “They do so because they wish to be a power generally recognized in Europe and to have status among the other powers.” Undaunted by this chilly reception, Jefferson persisted in his efforts to formalize relations with the Bourbon court. In his view, Naples would be willing to align with the U.S. only if the alliance could be proposed through the right channels. In particular, he was confident that the American cause would garner support from the Bourbon government’s rising star, an English aristocrat and internationally respected military commander, Sir John Acton, 6th Baronet.

Before serving the government of King Ferdinand of Naples, Acton had already gained a reputation as one of 18th-century Italy’s premier maritime condottieri. Sailing for Emperor Leopold II in the navy of the Gran Ducat di Toscana, Acton had fought valiantly in the unsuccessful Spanish-led assault on Algiers in 1775. In 1777, Acton was appointed Chief Advisor to the King’s 23-year-old bride, Queen Maria Carolina. Acting as Minister of the Marine, Acton was tasked with reorganizing the army, the navy, and the state finances that paid for the Sicilian Crown’s armed forces. From his post, the English Baronet expanded the Neapolitan Royal Navy into a formidable fleet. Rising through the ranks in the royal court, Acton went on to serve as the King’s Prime Minister. In this capacity, Acton encouraged state expenditures on arms and ironworks factories, improved the King’s highways, and founded the Royal Military Academe while promoting his own power within a strong, independent, modernizing Bourbon State (H. Acton, 1956, pp. 229-245).

With Acton directing naval policy in Bella Napoli, Jefferson was confident that the U.S. could convince the Sicilian Crown to join the “anti-piratical convention” of small states, which he hoped to facilitate as a safeguard for American commerce in the Mediterranean. His intuition proved prescient. In a letter dated 7 February 1785 to Minister John Acton, an “American Gentleman” named “E. Brush” advocated his country’s case for a commercial treaty and for Neapolitan assistance should American vessels come under attack by Barbary corsairs. Eliphalet Brush, as it turned out, was a Yankee merchant trading actively in the Mediterranean during the 1780s. In Europe, Brush became acquainted with John Adams, his son, John Quincy Adams, and other members of the American diplomatic corps. It is therefore likely that his letter to Acton was an unofficial communication encouraged by the diplomat Adams. Whatever the case, Acton was open to the suggestions. In his reply, the Neapolitan official assured Brush of “his Sicilian Majesty’s” desire for

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8 ASN, AE, “Galiani to Naples, 24 October 1784”, f. 4210.
friendship with the United States and willingness to enter into a treaty. But there were conditions. The new republic would have to allow Neapolitan merchants the same privileges in its ports that it extended to traders from other nations. If these privileges were offered, the Kingdom of Naples was prepared to reciprocate the favor. As for aiding American vessels under attack by the Barbary corsairs, Naples would lend military support, but only on humanitarian grounds. A more permanent solution would have to await treaty negotiations.

Perhaps encouraged by word of Acton’s reply to Mr. Brush, in July 1786, Jefferson wrote to his counterpart in London, U.S. Minister to the Court of St. James’s and future President John Adams, urging assistance in solidifying his hope for a coalition of smaller states aligned against the Barbary powers. “So far I have gone on the supposition that the whole weight of this war would rest on us”, Jefferson began, before adding:

but, Naples will join us. The character of their naval minister (Acton), and his known sentiments with respect to the Algerians give the greatest reason to believe it... I suppose that a Convention might be formed between Portugal, Naples and the U.S. ... for the sake of having their peace with the Piratical states guaranteed by the whole.

In his memoirs, Jefferson later explained, “the object of the convention (was) to compel the piratical States to perpetual peace.” As he saw it, “Portugal, Naples, the two Sicilies, Venice, Malta, Denmark and Sweden were favorably disposed to such an association” (Jefferson, 1914, pp. 99-102). All of these enlistments in Jefferson’s “coalition of the willing” were welcome, but Naples mattered most of all; it was the foundation of his plan to break the power of the Barbary states and open the door to free trade.

Letters from Naples to the secretary of the Neapolitan legation in Paris, Don Luigi Pio, indicate that Jefferson’s proposal for Naples to join his anti-Barbary coalition were received by the Bourbon court. Unfortunately for Jefferson, not all Neapolitan officials embraced Acton’s enthusiasm for treaties of amity and commerce with the United States. For the better part of the next year, Naples played hard-to-get; time and again Jefferson’s overtures were stalled by Bourbon officials’ suspicions about the character and motives of the United States. As Antonio Spinelli, Prince of Scalea, dourly observed, “Only a few years ago [the Americans] betrayed the English king.” On what grounds, he wondered, could his Majesty enter into relations with such an ill-defined state? “It remains unclear,” he stated, “what type of sovereign dignity represents this Nation - the ‘American-English United States’ - in common, of what form of government it takes, how each state or province is represented, how many

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12 ASN, AE, “Pio to Sambuca, May 17 1785” and “Pio to Adams, July 26, 1785”, f. 4210.
states or provinces are embedded in this league, what is the legal signing, sealing, etc. that makes valid an act done on behalf of the United States”\textsuperscript{13}.

While the Bourbon court was rebuffing the American offer to treat, the United States was simultaneously in talks with Morocco, and those discussions were progressing toward diplomatic success. In October 1785, Adams and Jefferson agreed to send Thomas Barclay, Philadelphia merchant and American consul in France, to Marrakech where he negotiated a settlement with the Moroccan Sultan Sidi Muhammad III (Roberts, 2008, pp. 189-202 and 254-271). The 1786 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Morocco quelled one threat to American shipping in the Mediterranean, yet others remained.

For the first next 10 years, no treaty regulated American relations with Algiers, Tunis, or Tripoli. As Americans sailed into this limbo, their ships, crews, and cargoes were frequently seized. As a further insult to national pride, the crews of \textit{Maria} and \textit{Dauphin}, American vessels hijacked off the Spanish coast by corsairs operating out of Algiers in 1785, languished in captivity (London, 2005, p. 39). Undaunted, Jefferson redoubled his effort to foster an alliance with Naples, hoping that, in time, the Bourbon government would join the U.S. drive for “free ships and free seas”.

By the late 1780’s, the failures of American diplomacy abroad stirred the political waters back home in the United States. With the exception of its dealings with Morocco, the United States had failed to win protection from the other Barbary states, through alliance with Naples or any other European power - major or minor, or even through treaties requiring the payment of tribute to stave off more attacks. To many citizens, American vulnerability in the Mediterranean underscored the nation’s inability, under the Articles of Confederation, to raise adequate revenue to fund and negotiate treaties with hostile foreign powers. In this context, American merchants’ zeal to enter the Mediterranean, even in the face of repeated confiscations and captures, raised the question of whether or not it might be more cost effective for the United States to defend their commercial interests through the construction of a navy\textsuperscript{14}.

In Jefferson’s view, the choice was clear: to overcome the predations of the Barbary corsairs, the U.S. needed a naval squadron and allies capable of fighting (and winning) a naval war in the Mediterranean Sea. Writing to future President James Monroe, then serving as a Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress, Jefferson had concluded, “We ought to begin a naval power, if we mean to carry on our own commerce. Can we begin it on a more honorable occasion or with a weaker foe?”\textsuperscript{15} But in the short run, the Confederation

\textsuperscript{13} ASN, AE, “Spinelli et al. to Acton, November 23 1785”, f. 4210.

\textsuperscript{14} The Continental Navy, which served the United States during the American War for Independence from Great Britain, was formally created on 13 October 1775. By the end of the war only 11 of the approximately 65 vessels that had served with the Continental Navy survived. By 1785, the Navy was disbanded and the remaining ships were sold.

\textsuperscript{15} “Jefferson to James Monroe, November 11, 1784,” in Boyd, PTJ, vol. 7, 2 March
government lacked the power to collect the necessary funds to build a navy. During the critical period of the late 1780’s, the limitations of the Articles of Confederation to provide for security, both at home and abroad, precipitated a reappraisal of American governance (Maier, 2010, pp. 11-13).

In a radical departure from the decentralized structure of the Confederation government, the ratification of a new form of government under the U.S. Constitution in 1788 gave Congress full control over: the regulation of commerce with other nations and between states; the authority to sign binding treaties with foreign nations and to levy taxes; and the power and means to build and maintain a standing military. Adhering to the strictures of the new government, on 29 September 1789, President George Washington appointed Jefferson to be the first U.S. Secretary of State under the Constitution. After assuming his duties on 22 March 1790, Jefferson’s first actions as Secretary included issuing a “Report on American Trade in the Mediterranean Sea.” In this brief, Jefferson observed, “One sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the United States, and about one fourth in value of their dried and pickled fish and some rice, found their best markets in the Mediterranean ports.”

Jefferson issued a second major policy brief, his “Report on the Privileges and Restrictions of the Commerce of the United States,” to Congress on 16 December 1793. The reports framed a simmering debate: How best to protect and expand this lucrative trade? Should the United States spend its funds on “war or tribute” in order to protect its foreign trade? Throughout the 1790’s, these deliberations split the followers of John Adams’s Federalists and Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic Republicans into opposing camps, the former favoring payment, the latter naval force.

Jefferson’s campaign for the construction of an American navy designed to protect the U.S. Mediterranean trade was realized on 20 January 1794 with the passage of the Naval Act funding the construction of “four ships to carry thirty-four guns each and two ships to carry thirty-six guns each.” Despite intervening delays, by late 1798, Congress funded the completion of these new men-of-war (Toll, 2008). The decision of the United States to build what became the American Mediterranean Squadron had an immediate impact on U.S. efforts to secure an alliance with the Kingdom of Naples. In early March 1795, a fresh proposal for cooperation on regional security and commerce reached Jefferson’s target inside the Bourbon court, Lord Acton.

In the aftermath of the ratification of the Constitution, Jefferson was quick to assure the Neapolitan Crown that under its new consolidated government, the position of the United States in the world was secure and its vast productions were available for sale to the Southern Kingdom. Responding to

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these changed circumstance, King Ferdinand decided to heed Acton’s counsel, and encouraged American merchants to trade with Southern Italy. On 18 November 1795, a milestone in U.S. relations with Sicily was reached when His Sicilian Majesty’s government invited the United States to open its second consulate in Italy in Naples. While the opening of this consulate was no promise of a commercial treaty or military alliance, American merchants were hopeful that the office would showcase the value of American trade in the Southern Kingdom and encourage collaboration between the two countries. On 20 May 1796, Mr. Jean Sabin Michael Mathieu, a French national resident in Naples, took up his duties as the first Consul of the United States in Naples.\footnote{18 Dispatches from U.S. Consuls, Naples, 1796-1901, (from now Dispatches) State Department Series, National Archive Record Administration (from now NARA), Microfilm Reel 1.}

Shortly after Mathieu’s appointment, the U.S. had an opportunity to garner goodwill with their Bourbon hosts. In July 1796, Joel Barlow, the U.S. Agent in Algiers, obtained both the long anticipated release of U.S. captives taken from Maria and Dauphin a decade before, and the concurrent release of more than four dozen subjects of Naples held captive in Algeria. The Americans paid for the transport of the Neapolitan survivors to Livorno (and then on to Naples) aboard the ship carrying their erstwhile American comrades to Philadelphia.\footnote{19 “Richard O’Brien to Thomas Jefferson, April, 1787” in PTJ, vol. 10, 22 June–31 December 1786, pp. 131-2.} Presumably, the humanitarian act showed the Bourbon state the amity and utility of the United States. Relations between the two nations were clearly warming.

In his letters to the Secretary of State, Consul Mathieu listed the arrival and departure of the American vessels that entered the port of Naples every 6 months and provided briefs on the political and military situation in Southern Italy. Despite flourishing trade, regime changes across Europe threatened to disrupt the budding friendship between Naples and the U.S. In late 1798, Mathieu reported that King Ferdinand had been expelled from the mainland by French Revolutionary forces and had fled to Sicily.\footnote{20 “Mathieu to Pickering, January 1798,” Dispatches, NARA, Reel 1.} Led by a young brigadier general named Napoleon Bonaparte, the French army swept through Northern Italy, reaching the Papal States in 1798. In Rome, French troops looted and desecrated churches and palaces. King Ferdinand responded by ordering his army to move north to drive them out. The move backfired when Neapolitan forces were repelled and the French counterattacked. Facing an invading French army and the growing threat of Republican insurrection from within the city of Naples, the King and Queen fled to Sicily on Christmas Eve, 1798.

After the Bourbons’ departure, Naples exploded into street fighting between Republican French troops and their Neapolitan sympathizers on one side, and
Bourbon loyalists on the other. The latter included the impoverished, yet fiercely Royalist Lazzaroni, the itinerant homeless of Naples. On 20 January 1799, the Republicans gained the upper hand, conquering the fortress of Castel Sant’Elmo, and three days later, the Neapolitan Republic was declared. It lasted less than five months (J. Davis, 2006, pp. 94-129).

From Palermo, the Bourbons set out to take back their Kingdom. The King was aided by the zealous determination of Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, the warrior priest who sailed from Sicily to Calabria to raise an army of the King’s supporters, the sanfedisti, from among the peasantry as he marched toward the capital. Assisted by a British blockade in the port of Naples, Ruffo’s sanfedisti army entered Naples and executed numerous Republican defenders in the name of the royal family. Peace was officially restored between France and the Kingdom of Naples on 28 March 1801 with the signing of the Treaty of Florence, a measure that reinforced the general peace in Europe achieved by The Treaty of Amiens 3 days earlier. Although the resultant Peace of Amiens lasted only one year (the only period of general peace in Europe between 1793 and 1815), it produced a period of relative calm in Southern Italy (Schroeder, 1994, 100-150).

Back in Washington D.C., the United States had undergone its own quiet revolution in the fall of 1800 when Republican Thomas Jefferson defeated the incumbent, Federalist John Adams, in the presidential election. In his inaugural address, the new president began by commending his fellow citizens for the peaceful transfer of power then taking place despite the divisive election. “Every difference of opinion,” he assured his fellow citizens, “is not a difference of principle”22. For all the polarizing rhetoric of the recent election, Americans still had much in common: “we are all Republicans,” Jefferson said, “we are all Federalists.”23 With its citizens joined together under the Constitution, the young country was destined to prosper:

Kindly separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure the degradations of the others; possessing a chosen country, with room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generations.24

Yet for all Jefferson’s confidence that the new Republic could escape the calamities and the oppression of the Old World, and that it ought to turn

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21 The Lazzaroni were a class of people with a significant role in the social and political life of Naples (both the city and the Kingdom of which the city was the capital). They were often described as street people living under a chief and were frequently depicted as beggars despite the fact that many subsisted as day laborers. As opposed to the Parisian sans-culottes, the Neapolitan Lazzaroni were, on the whole, conservative monarchists fiercely loyal to the Bourbon government, especially to King Ferdinand IV.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.
inward and develop the continent, he also recognized that American prosperity hinged on trade with the wider world. Even as he avowed his desire to guide the United States to “peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none,” the President acknowledged that, in order to sell the products of their fields and forests around the globe, Americans must engage in “commerce with nations that feel power and forget right.”

The tensions between the pacific ideals and the hard realities of early 19th-century trade, voiced in his inaugural address, created a critical problem for Jeffersonian foreign policy: could the United States pursue free trade with all nations on the high seas in an international world constantly disrupted by piracy, blockades, and war, and rigged to favor the interests of those countries with the most powerful navies? In the face of these challenges, Jefferson candidly asked what American foreign relations should be like in a world of hostile and competing empires. As president, Jefferson would employ a range of foreign policy measures, including war, diplomacy and “peaceable-coercion” (e.g. trade embargos), to secure his long-standing geo-strategic goal: the growth of the U.S. agrarian economy through free and unrestricted trade with Mediterranean countries. Once in office, he did not have to wait long for an occasion to put these policies into action.

On 25 September 1800, 2 months before Jefferson’s election as the new U.S. president, Tripolines under the command of Rais Amor Shallie captured the U.S. ship, *Catherine*, and confiscated its cargo. In late October, Pasha Karamanli made an official statement apologizing for the mistake, but the ruler added a menacing proviso: if he did not receive additional tribute from the U.S. in 6 months, Tripoli would declare war on American ships. As the deadline approached, the Pasha made his demands more concrete. A new treaty, he made plain in February 1801, would cost $250,000, and then there would be an annual tribute of $20,000. If these demands were not met, the corsairs would be unleashed on American vessels by April. While the American consul in Tripoli, James Cathcart, stalled the attacks temporarily, on 14 May, the U.S. representative could only watch in dismay as the Pasha’s agents cut down the flagpole in front of the U.S. Consulate. That gesture amounted to a formal declaration of war (Irwin, 1931).

Convinced of the advantages of military resistance over payment of tribute, President Jefferson rebuffed Tripoli’s demands and rallied the country for war. On 20 May 1801, Commodore Richard Dale was commissioned to lead three frigates, *President*, *Essex* and *Philadelphia*, and a schooner, *Enterprise*, to patrol the Mediterranean as a protective measure against attacks. Through the summer and fall, Dale’s squadron engaged the Tripolitan corsairs. These operations included *Enterprise’s* defeat of the Tripolitan polacca, *Tripoli*, off the coast of Malta on 1 August, and a blockade of Tripoli’s harbor. Over the

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25 Ibid.
next year, hostilities flared as Tripoli continued to demand tribute in exchange for peace and the United States increased its military presence in the region (Parker, 2004, pp. 135-6).

When the American navy entered the Mediterranean at the start of the war against Tripoli in 1801, it faced the logistical problem of securing bases and re-fueling stations in order to carry out its mission. While supply stations at Gibraltar, Minorca and Malta offered refuge for international vessels, these bases were under British and Spanish control and hence unreliable as headquarters for the Mediterranean Squadron. From this perspective, the strategically located harbors of Naples, Messina, and Syracuse in the Bourbon Kingdom of Naples promised a vital staging ground for American naval forces. Just as Jefferson had anticipated since 1783, Americans’ pursuit of peace, prosperity, and national honor through trade and diplomacy “amidst the conflicting elements of a troubled (Mediterranean) world” would hinge upon relations with the Regno delle Due Sicilie.

A breakthrough in relations between the two countries occurred in early 1802 when American requests for use of His Sicilian Majesty’s harbors, supplies, and material assistance were granted through a general order issued by General John Acton. The agreement signaled the start of an important strategic alliance. On 9 February 1802, Lieutenant John Shaw, Commander of the brig George Washington, announced the landmark accord between the United States and the Sicilian Crown to Commodore Richard Dale:

> It is the wish of his Neapolitan Majesty to negotiate a Treaty of Commerce with the United States and I am of an opinion it would be much to our interest. His General, Acton, welcomes any Neapolitan prisoners held by Tripoli which fall into our hands, and that it would give him infinite pleasure in giving our fleet every assistance in his power; he has given a general order that our ships of war should be furnished with any or every article in his magazines, and you may be assured of every attention, paid to our flag in Naples.\(^{26}\)

Throughout the next year, the American navy took advantage of Acton’s permission to use the King’s harbors, establishing Messina and Syracuse as their principal headquarters for operations against Tripoli. In August 1803, Commodore Edward Preble reached the Mediterranean and took over as the new American commander. After a period of adjustment through the fall, Preble’s arrival marked a turning point in the American war effort. Under his command, Neapolitan aid and assistance to the American war effort took place through small as well as large-scale contributions by His Sicilian Majesty’s subjects to the U.S. contest against Tripoli.

Because the U.S. Navy did not possess craft small enough to navigate and enter the shallow waters of Tripoli Harbor, Preble believed that the acquisition

of such craft was a tactical necessity. To achieve this objective, the Jefferson administration committed to an intensive lobbying campaign aimed at convincing Acton and the King to loan the United States needed gun and mortar boats. In early May, Preble sailed to Naples, where he was joined by Cathcart, the U.S. Consul stationed in Tripoli, in a bid to solicit the Bourbon court. On 10 May 1804, the American officials met with Acton to discuss the matter. The tactic worked. Five days later, King Ferdinand announced that he would grant the United States’ request. From Naples, General Bartolommeo Forteguerra wrote to Signore Maresciallo Esplunga in Messina informing him of the royal order:

The King having been pleased to accede to the demands made by Mr. Preble Commander in Chief of the Sea forces of the USA in the Mediterranean has ordered that the Department of Messina deliver to him by way of Loan Six Gunboats and two Bomb ketches to be employed in a hostile expedition against the Barbary powers.

In addition to the gunboats, the King also dispatched 100 combat-ready Italian marines and naval officers to serve on the American ships as liaisons and harbor pilots and help navigate the unfamiliar Mediterranean ports. The United States also benefited from the support of dozens of other Neapolitan and Sicilian subjects who joined the U.S. effort as independent military contractors serving in the United States Navy and Marine Corps as soldiers, sailors, and even musicians. With Neapolitan support, Preble gained the confidence to launch his campaign: “His Sicilian Majesty, sensible that we are fighting his battles as well as our own, has readily granted me whatever I have required and I sail immediately to commence my operations”.

Among the ranks of the Neapolitan and Sicilian mariners whose service proved essential to the U.S. war against Tripoli was Salvatore M. Catalano. Born in 1767 in Palermo, as a young man Catalano went to sea as a merchant sailor, visiting the various ports of the Mediterranean. His broad knowledge of the many ports, currents, and maritime customs of the Mediterranean littoral earned Catalano expert status as a pilot: a person hired aboard ship in order to safely guide foreign vessels through unfamiliar waters. Catalano’s knowledge of Tripoli Harbor proved vital when the American naval hero Lieutenant Stephen Decatur Jr. set out to destroy a captured U.S. ship, *Philadelphia*, in 1804.

A year earlier, on 31 October 1803, the 36-gun frigate *Philadelphia* ran aground on an uncharted reef while pursuing enemy vessels off the coast of Tripoli. After a 3-hour fight, Captain William Bainbridge surrendered the ship and was taken prisoner along with 305 other Americans. The capture of

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27 “To Signore M. Esplunga from General Forteguerra, Naples, May 15, 1804”, in Knox, ND, 4, pp. 103-104.
28 A list of the soldiers’ names appears in ND, 4, pp. 359-360.
Philadelphia had not only reduced the fighting capacity of the American squadron, but had also, it was feared, given the enemy a brand new, state-of-the-art war machine that would soon be turned against U.S. forces. Commodore Preble sought a solution to this potentially devastating turn of events. Accordingly, Preble sent Lieutenant Stephen Decatur and a small covert force aboard the ship, Intrepid, into Tripoli’s well-fortified harbor with orders to board and then destroy Philadelphia so as to ensure that it could not be used against the Americans.

The plan was launched from Syracuse on 3 February. Kept at sea for nearly two weeks facing heavy storms, Intrepid finally approached Tripoli on the night of 16 February. With his men below the decks to make his ship appear like a local trading vessel, Decatur entered the harbor, guided by his Sicilian pilot. Catalano called out to the Tripolitan Harbor watch in Arabic. He claimed to have lost his anchors in a storm and requested permission to tie up alongside Philadelphia. When the request was granted, Decatur ordered his men to board. After a brief fight, the Americans set Philadelphia on fire and rowed out of the Harbor. Philadelphia burned and sank. There were no American fatalities, and only one member of the American troops sustained injury (Toll, 2008, p. 209). In the words of British Admiral Horatio Nelson, the burning of Philadelphia was “the most bold and daring act of the age” (Allen, 1905, p. 281). The next day, 17 February 1804, Decatur reported his success to Preble, noting that the operation would not have been possible without the expertise of his Italian pilot:

It would be injustice in me were I to pass over the important services rendered by Mr. Salvatore (Catalano) the Pilot, on whose good conduct the success of the enterprise in the greatest degree depended; he gave me entire satisfaction.30

Unlike the largely forgotten exploits of dozens of other subjects of the Bourbon monarchy, Catalano’s contributions to the United States were recognized and applauded by an appreciative American public in his lifetime. In the spring of 1804, Catalano visited the U.S. Alongside Decatur, he was received as a national hero. Two years later, Catalano returned to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies where he served in the Bourbon Navy. But America beckoned. In 1809, he again journeyed to the U.S. where, with the urging and support of Decatur and the U.S. Navy, Catalano was made a U.S. citizen by a special Act of Congress and given a naval commission with the rank of Sailing Master. In 1813, Catalano married an American woman, Martha Carbery. He worked at the Washington Navy Yard until his untimely death in 1819 (Daily National Intelligencer, 1 January 1846).

Military collaboration between Naples and the United States against the Barbary Powers took other forms as well. When Preble’s fleet resumed its blockade of Tripoli Harbor in June 1804, Bey Hamuda Bassa of Tunis began to make threats of war on the United States since his vessels had been detained by American blockaders. In response, Constitution, Argus and Enterprise were sent to Tunis Bay on 19 June as a show of force (Allen, 1905, p. 182). While the arrival of the U.S. ships appears to have quelled the immediate threat of Tunisian interference with the blockade of Tripoli, the risks of continued hostilities with Tunis lingered. The Neapolitan Royal Navy aided the United States on this front.

Through the late summer and fall of 1804, Sir John Acton ordered His Sicilian Majesty’s ships to cruise against Tunisian corsairs. Concomitant with the surge of American actions against Tripoli, the Neapolitan Navy’s sorties against Tunis proved invaluable to the U.S. war effort. Immediately after the Americans began their 3 August attack on Tripoli, George Davis, the U.S. Consul at Tunis, wrote to Secretary of State James Madison to report that, in the wake of Preble’s success, “Naples, inspired by our daring acts,” was aggressively patrolling the North African coast. Such action freed the American squadron to focus its full attention on Tripoli harbor, with decisive results. The month-long bombardments that began on 3 August were the high water mark of the American naval operations during the First Barbary War. Reflecting on his success, Preble credited the Italian recruits for their contributions to the U.S. victories at sea, noting his appreciation of their courage in a letter to John Acton. Among the many meritorious fighters was Antonio Massene, a Neapolitan bombardier whom Preble singled out for his valor in combat:

I cannot in justice pass over the merits of Antonio Massene assigned me as Bombardier, and the Gunners attached to the different Gun Boats and Bomb Vessels: their intrepidity and good conduct merits my warmest approbation, and I beg leave to recommend them to your notice.

Satisfied that an American victory would soon be within reach, on 22 September 1804, Preble returned to Syracuse where he formally relinquished command to his replacement, Commodore Samuel Barron. Before he returned to the United States, Preble advised Barron to renew King Ferdinand’s pledge of military participation in what promised to be the final campaign the next year. After settling his personal accounts in Sicily on 29 October, Preble left for Naples aboard the John Adams to secure the alliance by addressing the Bourbon court on behalf of the United States Navy. He met Acton in

31 “To Secretary of State from George Davis, U.S. Charge d’Affairs, Tunis August 20th 1804,” in Knox, ND, 4, p. 437.
anticipation of what he expected would, in the spring of 1805, be the definitive collaboration between the two countries. On 15 December, Preble voiced his expectations to General Forteguerra. He began by complimenting the Neapolitans who served under him in the summer attacks on “our common enemy, the Tripolines,” before proceeding to request an additional 18 vessels and 300 troops, “as soon as possible, so that I may leave this Bay” 33.

However, the Bourbon government rejected Preble’s proposal, which indicates that U.S. officials overestimated the Crown’s commitment to American military success against Tripoli. By the winter of 1804, the Bourbon monarchy was unwilling to continue the fight. Naples’ own coastal trade was being threatened by Barbary attacks, and the Kingdom needed gunboats and warships for its own defense 34. When Commodore Barron learned of the Neapolitan King’s refusal to renew its support of American operations in the war against Tripoli, he wrote desperately to John Acton expressing alarm and dismay. Noting the “essential advantage” of assistance from Naples in the last campaign, Barron confessed his fear that, without military aid, “the operation of our squadrons will be comparatively weak and ineffectual” 35. Despite repeated American appeals, however, the Sicilian government was resolute: The U.S. Navy would have to fight the rest of the battles on its own.

Even without the renewal of state-level military aid from Naples, the American squadron’s presence in Sicily encouraged the integration of Southern Italians into the U.S. armed forces. In February 1805, Captain John Hall of the U.S. Marine Corps acted upon orders issued by President Jefferson two years earlier and succeeded in enlisting nearly two-dozen men and boys from Catania and Messina to serve as members of a re-organized U.S. Marine Band. Supplied with instruments in Messina at the Marine Corps’ expense, the musicians eventually sailed to the United States aboard USS President, arriving in September 1805. The majority of the contingent returned to Sicily in 1816. Yet, others stayed in the United States. Among the musicians recruited by Hall was Venerando Pulizzi, who remained with the band for 21 years, serving as Director in 1816, and again from 1818 to 1827 36. But before the band could play any victory songs, the United States had first to secure peace with Tripoli.

The Bourbon government’s refusal to grant the U.S. Navy their requested men and ships shifted the American war strategy in the spring of 1805. Without the ability to bring the full force of a combined U.S.- Neapolitan fleet

34 To Captain Edward Preble, U.S. Navy, from General Forteguerra, Two Sicilies, December 21, 1804,” in Knox, ND, 5, p. 205.
35 To Sir John Acton, Prime Minister of State, Two Sicilies, from Captain Samuel Barron, U.S. Navy, January 10, 1805,” in Knox, ND, 5, p. 270.
36 Captain John Hall to Lieutenant Col. Franklin Wharton, April 1, 1805,” in Knox, ND, 5, pp. 409 and 474.
to bear on Tripoli harbor, the operations of the American Mediterranean Squadron were limited to the enforcement of a coastal blockade. The Navy could not strike a decisive blow against the Pasha’s capital. In turn, President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison consented to execute the combined land-sea campaign being promoted by William Eaton, U.S. Agent in Tunis, and to sue for peace as soon as they could secure provisional advantage. Eaton’s plan called for an American-assisted overland attack on Tripoli, which was to be led by the former Pasha (and current Pasha’s brother), Hamet Karamanli, then living in exile in Egypt (Lambert, 2005, p. 151).

In April of 1805, Eaton and his lieutenant Presley O’Bannon led Hamet, 8 U.S Marines, a navy midshipman and a force of 90 Greek, Arab and Berber mercenaries the 500 miles across the desert along the Mediterranean coast from Alexandria, Egypt to the Tripolitan city of Derna, east of Benghazi. Among Eaton’s troops was an artillery company of Italians, recruited in Rosetta, Cairo and Alexandria. In addition to the 27 Italian “Cannoniers” listed in the company’s ranks, Eaton was accompanied by his personal servant Lorenzo Abbate, a Sicilian man who had entered into the Captain’s employ one year earlier, and the expedition’s physician, Doctor Francesco Mendici (former surgeon of the Bey of Tunis)\(^{37}\).

On 27 April, Eaton’s forces, supported by the schooner \textit{Nautilus}, the brig \textit{Argus}, and the sloop \textit{Hornet}, attacked Derna, capturing the city by 4 in the afternoon\(^{38}\). Tripoli was still 800 miles to the west, but Eaton insisted that a combined ground and sea invasion of the capital would topple Pasha Yusuf and allow the United States to dictate the terms of peace. Despite Eaton’s enthusiasm for an all-out assault on Tripoli, the Jefferson administration observed the cautions advised by the fleet commander: from Syracuse, Commodore Barron advised settling with Pasha Yusuf as soon as possible rather than prolonging the war. Barron reported that without reinforcements from Naples, neither his vessels nor his sailors could withstand another winter of blockade. Despite Eaton’s protests, on 24 May, Jefferson ordered his envoy, Tobias Lear, to sail from Syracuse to Tripoli to offer peace (Parker, 2004, p. 145).

Pasha Yusuf Karamanli was exhausted by the American blockade and pressured by the potentially destabilizing effects of an invasion by his deposed older brother. He was ready to negotiate. By 3 June, the preliminary articles were agreed upon; the final document ending the war was signed on 10 June.

In the end, Tripoli agreed to terminate attacks on American shipping without further demand for money or gifts. However, much to the chagrin of William Eaton and Federalist critics of the Jefferson administration, the terms of the treaty required the U.S. to pay $60,000 for the release of the crew of

\(^{37}\) To the Secretary of the Navy from William Eaton, U.S. Navy Agent for the Barbary Regencies, December 13, 1804,” in Knox, ND, 5, pp. 186-189.

\(^{38}\) The capture of Derna was later memorialized as “the shores of Tripoli” in The Marines’ Hymn, the oldest official song in the United States Armed Forces.
Philadelphia. Despite the partisan controversy it aroused, the treaty with Tripoli was ratified by the Senate in April 1806: the United States had fought for, and won an agreement with a Barbary state that, for the first time, did not include the payment of tribute (Lambert, 2005, pp. 157-59).

After the victory over Tripoli, Americans expected to extend their hard-fought commercial independence by securing “most favored nation” status in the ports of other trading nations, including those of the Kingdom of Naples. In his second term, the President looked forward to signing commercial treaties and perhaps also to establishing a base for the American navy in the King’s domain. These hopes were soon dashed. The Tripoli Treaty (1805) inspired celebration back home about the expanding place of the United States in the world. Remarkably, Pope Pius VII, upon hearing of the peace with Tripoli, claimed that the Americans, “with a small force and in a short space of time, have done more for the cause of Christianity than the most powerful nations of Christendom have done for ages.” However, the American victory did not have the immediate ripple effect on commercial relations with other Mediterranean and European powers that Jefferson had hoped would be the end result. Most European states were too distracted by the resumption of the Napoleonic wars to give the American victory their full attention. Moreover, in the years immediately following the end of the First Barbary War, the security afforded to smaller states by the elimination of threats from North African corsairs was overshadowed by the new threats from the British and French imperial navies.

With the major powers at war across Europe, the Bourbon regime also observed the end of hostilities between the United States and Tripoli without fanfare. Still, Naples had clearly seen that the U.S. attacks on a traditional foe served a common purpose. In 1804, the Sicilian Royal Navy took advantage of American engagements with Tripoli to cruise against Tunis, the combined effects of which helped quell (at least momentarily) the Barbary powers’ threat to Southern Italian trade. Nevertheless, the King’s ministers’ muted response to the Americans’ historic release from Tripoli’s demands expressed a skepticism born of long experience. Time and again they had witnessed “victories” over the North Africans come and go with no lasting changes for the passage of trading vessels across the Mediterranean Sea. Bourbon officials probably thought it was only a matter of time before the Barbary corsairs returned to prey upon foreign ships. Under these circumstances, the viability of the United States as a military and commercial partner remained an open question.

Domestically, the effects of the American victory on the economy of Southern Italy were mixed. To the inhabitants of Messina and Syracuse, the drawdown of the American fleet was undoubtedly experienced in terms of reduced orders for provisions and a decrease in demand for waterfront work.

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On the other hand, the cartel of merchants who monopolized the Kingdom’s chief *entrepots* at Naples and Palermo presumably received news of the U.S.-Tripoli peace agreement with measured satisfaction: increased visitation by American ships ready to exchange re-exported Caribbean products such as coffee, sugar, and dye-woods for the *Mezzogiorno*’s wines, olives, silks and citrus, would offer an additional channel of commerce at a time of mounting tensions between France and Great Britain. Above all, however, Naples’ ambivalent response to the American war with Tripoli was due to the fact that, in the fall of 1805, the King and his ministers had more serious matters to contend with than the ebb and flow of attacks by Barbary corsairs. Napoleon’s *Grande Armee* was on the march. Events on the Continent overshadowed the upstart Republic’s triumph on “the shores of Tripoli”.

In fall 1805, King Ferdinand joined Austria, Russia, and Britain in the Third Coalition against Emperor Napoleon. The decision to join the alliance sealed the fate of the Bourbon monarchy’s rule over the Southern Italian mainland. After his infamous victory over the Austrians at Austerlitz (2 December), which confirmed Napoleonic’s control of the European continent, the Corsican set his sights on Naples. He issued his Declaration of Schönbrunn (27 December), a manifesto announcing his decision to conquer the Kingdom of Naples and place his older brother Joseph Bonaparte on the throne. He declared that the “Neapolitan dynasty has ceased to reign” (Santore, 2001, pp. 54-59).

Unlike the brief republican experiment of 1799, the decennio of French rule over the southern mainland initiated profound and lasting changes in the structure of government and society in the Kingdom of Naples. Within months of taking control of Naples, the Napoleonic regime remodeled the Kingdom according to the laws and norms established by the French Revolution. In August of 1806, feudalism was abolished and the monarchy was reorganized according to the administrative model of the French Constitution of Year VIII. These reforms reset the tax system around a single land tax, introduced the *Code Napoleon*, and sold off church lands as a means of redeeming the Kingdom’s debt. Napoleonic rule in Southern Italy also transformed the Kingdom’s relations with the wider world. From a sovereign nation operating within the British sphere of influence, mainland Southern Italy was now, at least in theory, a subordinate outpost of Napoleon’s continental empire.

Jefferson, for one, was well aware of the danger that the new regime posed to American shipping (J. Davis, 2006, pp. 130-39). During the reign of Napoleonic Naples, American traders kept a watchful eye on events in Southern Italy: what would trade with the *Mezzogiorno* mean in the face of Napoleon’s evolving continental system and Great Britain’s concomitant effort to control the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea lanes through an ever-growing litany of Orders-in-Council? Was the southern mainland now a colonial satellite whose ports would open or close according to the Emperor’s mercurial decrees and embargos? Or would Naples remain an autonomous state, able to
set its own policies regarding commerce with neutral powers like the United States? Despite the risks and uncertainties Napoleon’s advance across Europe posed for American security in the Mediterranean, the wartime economy promised U.S. merchants an opportunity to profit that they could not resist. In this charged environment, relations with Naples and the Two Sicilies would at once raise and frustrate American ambitions in the Mediterranean Sea.

The dismantling of the *ancien régime* continued through the spring of 1808, when Marshal Joachim Murat, the husband of Caroline Bonaparte, (Napoleon’s sister), replaced his brother-in-law Joseph as King of Naples. Under Murat, the United States’ erstwhile ally Naples began inflicting its own depredations on American vessels, with lasting consequences to U.S. trade and diplomacy. Under Jefferson’s successors, Presidents James Madison (1809-1817), James Monroe (1817-1825) and John Quincy Adams (1825-1829), tensions between the two nations mounted. In May 1813, Alexander Hammett, the U.S. Consul in Naples gave voice to the darkening mood. He wrote to William Crawford, the U.S. Minister in France, with calls for war: “Let American frigates capture Neapolitan vessels wherever they may be found until every American has been fully paid with interest and damage for what he has been so shamefully deprived.”

Actions against Naples would, however, have to wait until 1832, when, under President Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), the threat posed by hostile U.S. warships in the famous Bay of Naples normalized U.S. relations with the restored Bourbon monarchy. In the aftermath of Jackson’s gunboat diplomacy, President James K. Polk (1845-1849) finally succeeded in realizing Jefferson’s goal when he signed a commercial treaty with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1846 (Perrotta, 1926).

The United States’ 1805 victory over Tripoli was a seminal event in the history of the Early Republic that set new precedents for American foreign policy in the Mediterranean and around the globe. First, Jefferson’s decision to fight reversed his predecessor John Adams’ policy of paying for Mediterranean security, and marked the first American military conflict beyond the territorial bounds of the North American continent. Second, the war with Tripoli demonstrated that Americans were willing and able to use force and form military alliances with authoritarian governments to advance their economic interests abroad. Third, the commercial clauses of the Treaty of Tripoli (1805) reflected the visions Jefferson and the Republican Party held about American merchants trading on the basis of reciprocity in foreign markets. Finally, the success of the U.S. war against Tripoli disrupted the marauding of the Barbary corsairs that had been in operation since the 16th century, advanced free-trade

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40 Joseph was reassigned to Madrid where he assumed the Spanish throne as Jose I (1808-1813).

and signaled a new era in the Sea’s “extended zone of influence” around the world. Surprisingly, in nearly all scholarly accounts of the U.S. war against Tripoli, one party that was key to the triumph of the Americans’ commercial independence in the Mediterranean is missing: The Bourbon Kingdom of Naples in Southern Italy.

Despite a small library of works devoted to Jefferson’s foreign policy and the U.S. war with Tripoli, to date, historians have failed to develop and analyze the connections between Naples and the Barbary Powers as the author of the U.S. Declaration of Independence saw them. I contend that such a consideration is essential for it reconstructs the full playing field on which the United States acted, and illuminates the Mediterranean foundations of the United States’ rise to global power. Tracing the dynamics of U.S. relations with Bourbon Naples from the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783 through Napoleon’s invasion of the Southern Kingdom in 1806, this essay recovers a critical domain of transnational American history and helps us chart our way to a new understanding of how the United States was made and re-made through its relations with the Mediterranean world in the “Age of Thomas Jefferson”.

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42 Publications addressing Jefferson’s foreign policies consulted for this study include: Appleby, 1984; Cogliano, 2014; Ben-Atar, 1993; McCoy, 1980; Kaplan, 1987; LaFeber, 1993; Peterson, 1965; Perkins, 1993; Sofka, 1997; Tucker, 1990.


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The American Mediterranean in the Age of Thomas Jefferson


Social, Economic and Cultural Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary States in the Kingdom of Naples under the Hapsburgs and Bourbons, 1707 – 1815

FRANCA PIROLO

Introduction

During the 16th and 17th centuries, Turkish pirates and Barbary corsairs continuously attacked the coasts of Southern Italy (Heers, 2003; Partner, 2003). Both foreign threats wielded expanding power; the increasing naval supremacy of the Ottoman Turks heralded the era of their empire’s greatest power and glory (Murphey, 1999), while the Barbary corsairs - pirates and privateers who operated from North Africa under the protection of the Ottoman Empire - extended their maritime dominance by increasing the size of the fleets with which they besieged the coasts of Mediterranean countries, especially Italy and Spain (Heers, 2003). Southern European nations responded to this period of the so-called “corsair wars” by seeking new methods to secure peace. This, in turn, stimulated diplomacy, commercial exchange, and religious conversion (Ceci, 1906; Bono, 2000; Bono 2008) as well as slavery between Muslim and Christian powers across the Mediterranean Sea (Cardini, 2009; Eslami, 2014). This essay examines some of the causes and consequences of these cross-cultural encounters by tracing a history of relations between Naples, the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary powers from 1707 to 1815.

According to Piacentini (2005), Bono (2008) and Donini (2015), the most significant consequence of Barbary piracy was slavery. By the second half of the 17th century, advances in maritime technology meant that Ottoman and Barbary vessels no longer required a large number of rowing slaves; therefore, when Barbary corsairs captured Christians, they aimed to obtain a ransom for their “redemption,” or return, instead of to employ them as galley slaves (Sirago, 2004a). By contrast, the Muslim slaves captured by Christians had no opportunity for redemption through ransom. Once taken, these Muslim converts to Christianity were primarily used for housework and domestic service (Monti, 1931- 1932; Vitale, 1988; Fiume, 2009).

In Italy, ransom for captured sailors was often collected by institutions established by private or government initiatives (Bono, 1993; Bono, 1999). The cities along the gulf of Naples and Salerno, in particular, regularly promoted the
redemption of slaves. In Naples proper, a Confraternita per la Redenzione dei Cattivi (Confraternity for the Redemption of Prisoners) (Boccadamo, 2010) was established in 1548, and, at the beginning of the 17th century, many communities formed Monti di padroni di barche, marinai e pescatori, mutual aid societies for boat owners, seamen and fishermen. Among other activities, these associations provided the payment of ransom to Turks or Barbary corsairs for the release of Italian prisoners (Di Taranto, 1999 and Sirago, 2004b). The price of the ransom, paid with gold and luxury merchandise, increased over the years: between 1570 and 1580, the average amount paid was around 100 ducats; in the years 1605-1610, it rose to 110 ducats; and, in 1720, the price reached 150 ducats (Ferrandino, 2008).

In 1724, the threat to one group, the coral fishermen from Torre del Greco who fished along the Mediterranean coast of Africa, was considered so great that the group created a new “Fund of Slaves” to offset the expense.

1. Southern Italian relations with Barbary Corsairs under the Hapsburgs (1707-1734)

When the Kingdom of Naples came under the control of the Austrian Hapsburgs in 1707, the consequences of piracy were a matter of great concern for the government. From Naples, the Hapsburgs aimed at expanding trade with the Levant and the Atlantic world (Herrero Sánchez-Kaps, 2017) and pirates threatened this trade. According to Sirago (2016), to increase the protection of trade close to home, precise orders were given for the construction of vessels to defend merchant ships carrying foodstuffs from Abruzzi and Apulia to the capital at Naples. Seeking to trade more securely in the wider Mediterranean, Austrian Emperor Charles VI also engaged with the Sublime Porte and the Barbary States in negotiations intended to limit attacks and create more favorable conditions for commerce (Di Vittorio, 1979). On 22 July 1718, at the end of the Second War of Morea, Charles successfully signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire in Passarowitz granting free trade and freedom of navigation for Hapsburg ships in the Black Sea (Sirago, 2016, pp. 89-98).1 This agreement stipulated that the maximum rate of the duties on exports and imports should be fixed at 3 percent2 (Di Vittorio, 2011). More importantly, it created the foundation for future political and economic relations.

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1 This provision was established through a clause in chapter 8 of the treaty reading, “Sicchè caricate le mercanzie si potessero trasportare in Costantinopoli, nella Crimea, in Trebisonda, in Sinope e in altri empori di quel mare senza impedimento di sorta alcuna” (“so that goods could be carried to Constantinople, Crimea, Trebizond, Sinop or to any other trading places of that sea without any hindrance”).

In the hope of securing more lucrative trade routes across the Mediterranean Sea, the Hapsburg government in Naples followed an Ottoman model seeking to compel the Barbary rulers of North Africa to sign non-aggression pacts. However, the results were limited. According to Bianchini (1971), the only promising treaty between the Barbary rulers and the Hapsburgs was signed in 1725. By 1734, Hapsburg power was waning and, with the rise of Bourbon rule in Naples, long-standing patterns of political and cultural interaction between Southern Italy and the Barbary powers faced new challenges.

2. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (1734-1806)

Charles of Bourbon founded the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as an independent monarchy in 1734. Upon his arrival, the new ruler hoped to improve the economy of his Southern state. His tripartite strategy was to strengthen the Kingdom’s defenses, restore its aging ports and harbors (Sirago, 2004b), and expand the Royal Navy with the construction of 50 new gun vessels designed to combat Barbary corsairs (Sirago, 2012a, pp. 88-107). The actions of the Bourbon government also motivated private shipowners to arm their polaccas, pinks and tartans in exchange for official “letters of marque”. The presence of a new affluent merchant class living along the Sorrento Peninsula by the end of the 18th century suggests the security measures of the Bourbon government and the merchants were a success (Mafrici 2007, pp. 241-245; Sirago 2012a, p. 85).

In addition to strengthening the Kingdom’s defenses, King Charles aimed to lay the diplomatic foundations for a lasting relationship of friendship and commerce with the Ottoman Empire and the regencies of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers (Barbagallo, 1971; Mafrici 2004, pp. 151-172). Pasquale Villani (1973; 2008) argues that “the aim of Neapolitan trade policy during the years 1730-40 was twofold: to open up new opportunities for Neapolitan foreign trade in the Eastern Mediterranean and Northern Europe… and consolidate/renew old trade relations with the countries of Western Europe and the other Italian States”. Villani points out that, by the middle of the 18th century, Neapolitan trade had increased significantly in spite of the Kingdom’s agricultural backwardness, low manufacturing productivity, lack of roads, and heavy system of taxation.

To support increased foreign trade, King Charles also attempted to reduce piracy through a treaty of peace and commerce with Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754). The treaty was signed on 7 April 1740 by the Turkish Ambassador Haci Hüseyen Efendi and Ambassador Giuseppe Finocchietti, the Minister of Plenipotentiary sent by Charles of Bourbon to the Sublime Porte in Constantinople. The Ottoman Porte had previously concluded a trade agreement with Sweden in

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3 These ports included: Brindisi, Gallipoli, and Trani in Puglia, and Messina and Palermo in Sicily (Sirago, 2004b, p. 33).
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1737 (Demiryürek, 2014, pp. 53-74), and subsequently signed treaties with Denmark (1757), Prussia (1761), Russia (1774) and Spain (1782). However, the treaty with the Kingdom of Naples was different from the others because it was a bilateral agreement. Prior to 1740, Neapolitan and Sicilian merchants traded under the French, Dutch and Austrian flags in the Levant, but after 1740, the merchant ships of the two nations could dock at all ports, and the Turks were granted the so-called “Sicilyateyn” (Demiryürek 2014, p. 56).

At the conclusion of the 1740 peace treaty, the ambassadors exchanged gifts on behalf of their respective sovereigns. The gifts sent from Naples to the Sublime Porte consisted of porcelain cups and silver objects produced by artisan craftsmen as well as tortoiseshell items. In turn, the Neapolitan ambassador received a tartar curtain, carpets, jewelry and objects with precious stones and diamonds, luxurious fabrics, horses and an elephant. As impressive as these exotic gifts were, the Neapolitans hoped that the greatest reward would be the terms of the new trade agreement itself. In sum, the Neapolitan government expected great advantages from the treaty with the Ottoman Porte: new markets for its merchant fleet, the regulation of the diplomatic practices of both countries, the right of the Neapolitan Kingdom to appoint its own vice-consuls in the major port cities of the Levant (Smyrna, Thessaloniki, etc.), and the reduction of corsair campaigns (Mafrici, 2004, pp. 152-153). Indeed, the 1740 treaty negotiations suggested that longstanding tensions between Naples, Istanbul and the Barbary powers were beginning to thaw.

Perhaps inspired by his success with the Ottoman Sultan, King Charles quickly signed another treaty of peace and commerce with the Regency of Tripoli in Tripoli on 3 June 1741 (Buonocore, 1976, pp. 257-276). The King recognized that the two diplomatic agreements with the Ottoman Sultan and the Bey of Tripoli promised a new era of trade for Naples. In turn, the King immortalized the two treaties and the correlated visits of envoys from both the Ottoman and Tripolitan sovereigns with two paintings commissioned between 1741 and 1743 from the artist Giuseppe Bonito (who would become court painter in 1751). The first image represents Haci Hüseyn Efendi, the special envoy who had signed the treaty on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud I. The second depicts Mustafa Bey of Derna, envoy of Ahmed Karamanh of Tripoli (1711-1745). Bonito painted the portraits from life, and they were eventually displayed in the throne room of the Royal Palace of Naples (D’Amora, 2003).

The hostility between the Kingdom and the Ottomans states had, for a long time, dictated how the Neapolitan and Ottoman subjects perceived one another. Frequent incursions, sacking, seizing of booty, and enslavement left indelible traces in the popular memory such that, when Haci Hüseyn Efendi and Mustafa Bey arrived in Naples, perceptions of the “Turks” were essentially negative. Over time, however, closer contact, increasing diplomatic ties and shared cultural habits helped diffuse the longstanding tensions. Beginning in the 1740’s, the presence of Ottoman envoys in Naples contributed to Southern Italians’ interest in Ottoman life.
and helped transform the image of the "Turks" as threatening aliens from a mysterious, wealthy and dangerous East into emissaries from a world full of every kind of rarity, luxury and marvel. Neapolitans even adopted new cultural practices such as drinking coffee, encouraged by their contact with Islamic worlds. The "Turkish" drink inspired a growing number of new coffee houses across Italy and Europe where the bourgeois culture of the Enlightenment had begun to take root. In this regard, Bourbon political diplomacy enhanced Neapolitans’ cultural interest in the Islamic world.

According to Formica (2012), the close encounters between Southern Italians, subjects of the Ottoman Empire and their Barbary vassal states in the 17th and 18th centuries also resulted in the significant phenomenon of Christian conversions to Islam, and less frequently, in the conversions of Muslims to Christianity. Conversion and residence in each other’s countries further hastened cultural exchange. Christian converts to Islam brought with them advanced knowledge of their home societies, and they often occupied public offices that helped them facilitate trade with relatives in their homelands.

3. Ferdinand of Bourbon, the first period (1759-1806)

In 1759, the reigning King of Naples, Charles of Bourbon was called to rule over the Kingdom of Spain. Until his son Ferdinand came of age, the Kingdom of Naples would be governed by Bernardo Tanucci, the Regent and Secretary of State. The regency period lasted from 1759 to 1767 and saw a decline in trade with the Ottoman and Barbary powers4. From the time of his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1755, Tanucci had actively maintained regular contact with consul Guglielmo Ludolf, who sent him monthly reports about the development of trade between Naples and the Ottoman Porte5. As Castellano (1956) and Mafrici (2004, pp. 155-159) point out, however, the growth of this trade was blocked by the inefficiency of the Neapolitan merchant navy, the lack of an effective agreement with the Barbary states, and, above all, the absence of factories producing goods that appealed to Levantine merchants. Moreover, due to the continuous state of war with the Barbary states, the treaties were never respected.

According to Mafrici (2004, p. 161), the general economic development of Bourbon Naples was further hindered by notably high import taxes, the ineffectiveness of the judicial system, and oppressive feudalism, all of which

4 During this time, Tanucci was also appointed President of the Regency Council (Mincuzzi, 1967; Ajello D’Addio, 1986; and Migliorini, 1991).

5 Guglielmo Ludolf was appointed Vice Ambassador in 1748, replacing Nicola de Maio who had, in turn, replaced Consul Finocchietti, who had played a critical role in successfully concluding the treaty negotiations. In 1750, Ludolf was appointed as Ambassador, a position he held until 1791 when he was replaced by his son, Guglielmo Costantino Ludolf (Demiryürek, 2014, p. 63). Biblioteca della Società di Storia Patria, Napoli, ms. XII A 3, Correspondence between Ludolf and Tanucci.
restricted the circulation of money and persuaded the wealthy to invest in domestic improvements instead of foreign trade. During a period of economic crisis that began in 1772, Guglielmo Ludolf attempted to advance trade by proposing that the Neapolitan government could supply the Ottomans with much needed grain (Mafreci, 2004, p. 168). However, the proposal came to nothing because the merchant navy of Naples’ remained inefficient and the ministers of the Supremo Magistrato di Commercio (the Bourbon Supreme Magistracy) did not support the initiative. By this time, the royal attitude towards the Ottomans had also shifted. Following his father’s advice, King Ferdinand now approached the Ottoman vassal states along the Barbary Coast as marauding pirates who were not to be trusted to honor agreements.

Indeed, Neapolitan policies with the Ottoman Empire and Barbary states had begun to change soon after King Ferdinand’s marriage to Maria Carolina in 1768. According to Mafreci (2010), Queen Maria Carolina’s mother, the Empress Maria Theresa, demanded a voice in the Council of State. Upon her arrival in Naples, she sent Tanucci on a mission to King Charles to limit his influence on Ferdinand. She then replaced Tanucci with the Sicilian Minister Giuseppe Beccadelli Bolognese, Marquis of Sambuca (Sirago, 2012a, p. 87; Sirago, 2012b, p. 206), and asked her brother, Pietro Leopoldo, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to allow Admiral John Acton to come to Naples to reorganize the navy and increase security for trade.

In 1779, the Queen appointed Acton Minister of the Navy. His first initiative was to coordinate fleet actions against North African pirates. Intending to strike a critical blow, he revisited an old proposal, conceived by Tanucci in 1770. It had been designed to protect the coasts of the Kingdom and repel pirate attacks by creating a defensive fleet primarily composed of Neapolitan ships, and bolstered by French and Spanish ships (Mafreci, 2007, p. 649). To facilitate the plan, in 1783, the Minister proposed to build a new royal shipyard in collaboration with a French engineer named Imbert. It was to be located in Castellammare di Stabia, a port 25 kilometers from Naples (Sirago, 2012a, p. 88), and would be used to build large vessels with 74 guns like those used in France and England. Acton intended to equip 15 new vessels with 10.598 guns, which were ordered from Sweden in 1780.

Despite the Queen’s support, many Bourbon officials opposed Acton’s policies. In the mid-1780s, Gaetano Filangieri’s book, *Scienza della legislazione* (1798, III, 78 – 79), argued that, instead of acting defensively, the “marineria” (navy) should have supported trade activities whose profits could have provided money for ship repair and maintenance. In 1791, Giuseppe Maria Galanti (1969, II, pp. 59-60), “Visitatore generale del Regno” (General Visitor of the Kingdom) similarly opposed Acton’s foreign and maritime policy: Galanti regarded Acton’s naval developments as an unnecessary expense that would provide no greater protection for the shores of Southern Italy and Sicily. According to him, if pirates were the primary enemy, the Neapolitan navy should have protected the merchant vessels as it had under Austrian rule. Ten years later, Vincenzo Cuoco (1998, p. 269) again suggested that Acton’s policy was hampering the development of trade in the Kingdom. Ultimately, rather
than advocating to build a defensive navy, Acton’s critics supported a fresh round of diplomacy with the Ottomans and their Barbary vassals.

Like Acton, Ferdinando Galiani, a leading minister who pursued intense diplomatic activity with the Barbary states, was another influential figure who shaped Neapolitan relations with the Ottomans. As a young student, Galiani had devoted himself to the study of economic policy. He published the famous treaty, *Della moneta*, in 1750, and, in 1759, Tanucci appointed him Secretary to the Neapolitan ambassador in Paris. In 1769, he was forced to return to Naples to serve as Consigliere del Tribunale di Commercio (Counsellor at the Supreme Court of Commerce). At this time, he wrote his critical essay, *Sulla decadenza della marineria*, in which he discussed what he perceived as the decline of the Neapolitan merchant navy and promoted enlarging it (Diaz, 1968; Guerci, 1975). The essay argued that expansion of the Kingdom’s trade depended on the improvement of the merchant navy. Galiani’s observations were welcomed: according to Sirago (2004), between 1752 and 1762, 454 vessels were built in the shipyards of Piano di Sorrento and on the island of Procida.

During his ten years in Paris, Galiani met many other leading figures of the Enlightenment such as Diderot and d’Alembert. Knowing that Naples was eager to increase trade in the Black Sea, Galiani used his social contacts in Paris to access a wider network of potential allies around the Black Sea region, including Russia and the Ottomans (Cavalcanti, 1979, p. 76). In turn, Galiani attempted to sign two treaties: the first, a security agreement with France, which ultimately failed, and the second, a trade treaty with Russia (Guariglia, 1914).

The latter was one of his greatest achievements and the fruition of years of diplomatic strategizing. At the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War in 1775, Galiani had begun negotiations with Tsarina Catherine II through Friedrich Melchior Grimm, an acquaintance whom he met in Paris. Grimm was the Tsarina’s loyal *factotum*, and, after his time in Paris, circa 1776, he was sent to the Kingdom of Naples as her diplomatic envoy. There he and Galiani met again (Scherer, 1968). The Neapolitan Minister made every effort to use their friendship as an avenue towards realizing Naples’ commercial goals. Consequently, in 1777, plenipotentiary ministers were appointed at both royal courts: Muzio Gaeta, Duke of San Nicola, was sent to the Russian embassy in St. Petersburg, and Count Razumovsky came to the Neapolitan embassy (Mafriici, 2012, p. 37). The purpose of this diplomatic exchange was to strengthen political and trade ties in the Baltic region, where Neapolitan vessels had been traveling since 1764 (Sira 2012a, p. 84), as well as in the Black Sea region, where foreign trade had already taken hold, especially with the French (Giura, 1967; Cavalcanti 1979).

From 1783 to 1787, Galiani increased his efforts to ratify the treaty with Russia (De Madariaga, 1959). He worked with Guglielmo Ludolf and Antonino Maresca Donnorso, Duke of Serracapriola (Croce, 1922), two men who had long advocated for such a treaty. Through their assistance, Galiani’s goal was finally achieved on 17 January 1787, just before he died (Cavalcanti, 1979; Sira 2012b, p. 209).
According to Sirago (2012b, p. 208), Naples was optimistic that this treaty promised the opening of the “via dei Dardanelli” (the route of Dardanelles).

Meanwhile, the Tsarina had decided to build a new port, Odessa, on the Black Sea, and had assigned the task to Giuseppe (Osip) de Ribas, a general of Neapolitan - Hispanic origins. De Ribas had already distinguished himself through the construction of other military and maritime works (Sirago, 2012b, pp. 209-215). He quickly built the new city with an arsenal and warehouses, and declared it a “free port” to increase trade, above all, in wheat. Soon after, Neapolitan ships began to arrive. With the opening of the Tsarina’s new Black Sea port, it appeared that the dream of Galiani had finally come true. Constantine Ludolf, the son of Guglielmo Ludolf, continued to help facilitate trade between Istanbul, the Black Sea and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

A detailed map of the Black Sea, found among the papers of Ferdinando Scarpati, a professor of the Nautical School of Piano and Meta di Sorrento, also documents Naples’ desire for and attempts at commercial expansion in the Black Sea region. The Nautical School where he taught was founded in 1770 by King Ferdinand at the request of the rich mercantile and ship-owning class. The facilities of the school were used to build the new, technologically advanced, large boats that allowed Neapolitan merchants to sail dangerous waters including the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean (Sirago, 2012c). Upon these ships, Professor Scarpati himself was one of the first Bourbon subjects to sail in the Black Sea, reporting his routes on his charts (Sirago, 2012b, pp. 217-221).

In 1798, to encourage the growth of trade, Constantino Ludolf, representing the Bourbon court, asked the Ottoman Porte to ease the passage of Neapolitan merchant vessels through the Dardanelle Straits. Unfortunately, this new avenue for increased trade was interrupted in 1799, when the French revolutionary forces invaded Naples, and created the short-lived Neapolitan Republic. At this time, the Bourbon King Ferdinand was forced to flee to Palermo. The instability of warfare halted foreign trade. An agreement honoring Constantine’s proposal would not be signed until after the rise and fall the Neapolitan Republic, when the Bourbon King returned from Palermo to Naples with the help of the English.

Once back in power in Naples, however, King Ferdinand resumed negotiations to renew a trade treaty with Russia. A proposal was signed by Tsar Paul I on 6 July 1800, but the Tsar was assassinated on 23 March 1801. Though his successor, Alexander I, initially overturned the agreement, after numerous requests, the new Tsar restored the exemption, allowing Neapolitan vessels to travel through the Black Sea for one quarter the customs duties to be paid in the ports of New Russia. He also confirmed the status of Odessa, now under Russian control, as a “free port” (Pezzi, 1992; Saul, 1970, p. 177). In 1803, Felice de Ribas, brother of the wealthy shipowner and merchant Giuseppe de Ribas, was appointed Neapolitan consul for the Black Sea. The appointment of Felice gave new impetus to Southern Italian trade with the Levant and the Black Sea (Sirago, 2012b, p. 221).
Despite these advances, however, Neapolitan commerce with the Black Sea and Ottoman domains was frozen when Napoleon’s troops entered Naples in 1806. Yet again, King Ferdinand fled to Palermo. Only after the Restoration in 1815 was the sovereign able to resume commercial relations with the Russian and Islamic countries of the Mediterranean coasts.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, Naples aspired to play a critical role in both the economic and political life of the Mediterranean world, a process that necessitated improved relations with the Ottomans. Diplomacy between Naples and the Ottoman Empire witnessed the establishment of foreign consulates in the Ottoman ports and of agreements focused on increasing Mediterranean trade. Although this trade would ebb and flow responding to socio-political developments, Southern Italian merchants continued to frequent Ottoman and Russian ports. If and when they encountered problems, they called upon their resident consuls and vice-consuls to help solve disputes. Despite the complications caused by war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 18th century, Neapolitan merchant ships and calculated maritime strategy extended the scope and scale of their foreign trade across the Mediterranean world and into the Black Sea.

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**Chilean Refugees in Italy: a Forgotten Story**

**ERMINIO FONZO**

**Introduction**

Today in Italy, asylum seekers and refugees are often viewed with concern and fear by a significant part of the public and the establishment. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants is one of the most hotly debated issues in the political arena and many Italians are frustrated by the growing presence of foreigners.

In the past, albeit in dissimilar situations, the Italian reaction to refugees was different; for instance, in the 1970s, after the military coup d’état in Chile, many Italians were sympathetic to exiles. Indeed, on that occasion, the Italian embassy in Santiago became a place of refuge for hundreds of victims of persecution, many of whom were also granted asylum in Italy.

The Chileans were not the first refugees to arrive in the country. In the early 1920s, about 20,000 Russians had moved to the Peninsula following the Bolshevik revolution; in the first half of the ‘30s, thousands of Jews and other refugees had arrived from Nazi Germany. A true refugee crisis occurred after the Second World War: from 1945 to 1952, hundreds of thousands of exiles, among whom were many Jews, reached the Peninsula and were accommodated in camps managed by international organizations or by the Italian authorities. After a short stay, most exiles moved to other countries, because the conditions in Italy in the post-war period made it difficult to integrate and find employment (Ferrari, 1996; Sanfilippo, 2006; Crainz, Pupo & Salvatici, 2008; Salvatici 2008; Salvatici, 2014; Di Padova, 2016).

In January 1948, with the establishment of the Republican Constitution, the right of asylum was officially recognized (Article 10), but no law was issued to regulate its implementation. In 1954, Italy ratified the Geneva Convention on Refugees (which included a time constraint and concerned only the events that happened before 1 January 1951), but the Italian government, like several others countries, added a geographical constraint: the Convention was only valid for refugees coming from

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1 The main sources for this article are the documents of the Ministry of the Interior (stored in the Central State Archive), the press of the time, the memoirs of protagonists and the proceedings of the Italian Parliament. Unfortunately, the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject are not accessible.
Europe (which meant from the communist countries of the East); people from other continents were not able to apply for asylum in Italy (Ferrari, 2004).

During the cold war, an average of 5,000 asylum seekers per year reached the Peninsula from various parts of Eastern Europe. After the 1956 uprising, for instance, thousands of Hungarians comprised one of the major flows of refugees to Italy (Ferrari, 1996; Hein, 2010, pp. 33-37).

In 1970, with law 75, Italy ratified the 1967 Protocol on Refugees, which removed the time constraint included in the Convention. The geographical constraint, on the contrary, remained in place throughout the Cold War, but, as the response to the Chilean coup of 1973 proved, it was not always enforced.

1. The asilados in the Italian embassy of Santiago

On 11 September 1973, a military junta, led by Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, seized power in Chile, overthrowing the socialist government of Salvador Allende and giving birth to one of the bloodiest regimes in Latin America (González, 2013; Stabili, 1991; Tutino 1974). Shortly after the military takeover, Latin American and European embassies in Santiago – principally those of Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, France, Sweden2, Italy and the German Democratic Republic – became sites of refuge for opponents of the dictatorship who sought diplomatic asylum (del Pozo, 2006)3. Among the asilados, there were both Chilean nationals and foreigners who lived in Chile because, before 1973, it had been one of the most democratic countries on the continent and had offered a safe haven for people fleeing other dictatorial Latin American regimes. In total, 4,608 people sought asylum in foreign legations between 1973 and 1975 (Smith, 2013). In addition, about 180,000-200,000 Chileans fled in the following years4. Many of them left the country legally and moved to Latin-America (Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba in primis), Western Europe (Sweden, Italy, France, Switzerland and other countries), Canada, Australia and various socialist countries. The regime celebrated their departure, since the exile of enemies was one of its primary strategies for eliminating the opposition (Wright & Oñate Zúñiga, 2007; Angell & Carstairs, 1987).

Italy facilitated the escape of many opponents of the Chilean dictatorship. Shortly after the coup, the building used as the embassy and residence of the Italian

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2 The Swedish embassy was particularly exposed and, at the end of 1973, the ambassador, Harald Edelstam, was expelled as a persona non grata. Sweden also accommodated many Chilean refugees on its territory (Camacho, 2006).


4 Besides the political exiles, hundreds of thousands of people left the country in response to the economic crises of 1973-1977 and 1982-1986. The exact number is disputed and making a clear distinction between economical and political migrants is difficult.
ambassador in Santiago, located on Calle Miguel Claro, became a place of refuge and, some months later, it remained the only embassy that still accommodated refugees. When the junta seized power, the ambassador Roberto Behmann was on leave and he did not return to Santiago, since the Italian government did not recognize the new Chilean regime. In turn, the crisis was managed by two chargés d’affaires, Piero de Masi (between the coup and January 1974) and later Tomaso de Vergottini, assisted by other diplomats. The two were not officially recognized as ambassadors by Chilean authorities (de Vergottini entered Chile with a tourist visa) and had no official contacts with them.

Yet, De Masi and De Vergottini aided hundreds of Pinochet’s opponents who took refuge in the ambassador’s residence. Initially, there were two ways to enter the mansion: walking through the front gate or climbing over the property wall. The front access, however, was quickly blocked by the carabineros stationed on Calle Miguel Claro who checked the identity of all people trying to enter the legation. Therefore, most refugees had to climb over the wall.

The first group of asylum seekers were Italian citizens or people of Italian origin. They began arriving at the residence on Calle Miguel Claro on 14 September (De Masi, 2013, p. 86). Among them were Paolo Hutter, a member of the far-left group, Lotta continua, who had been detained in the notorious National Stadium of Santiago, and Friar Silvano Girotto, a guerrilla called “frate mitra”.

Helping Italian nationals (or, at least, Chilean citizens of Italian origin) was the duty of the embassy. Their presence in the ambassador’s residence was, therefore, easily justified. Very soon, however, Chileans or people of other nationalities, who were wanted by Pinochet’s secret police, the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Dina), began climbing over the wall of the mansion to seek asylum. The Italian diplomats decided to help them, knowing that, in the bloody Chile of Pinochet, their destiny would have been torture and death if they had been unable to escape. The Italian diplomats in Santiago decided to accommodate these refugees despite minimal cooperation from the government of Rome. Roberto Toscano, the young attaché charged with managing the situation, wrote many years later:

Diplomatic asylum is not a principle of the general international law, but only a praxis recognized and codified in Latin America. A praxis which the Chilean junta, even if we were not Latin American, allowed us to be included in. But making it clear to the ministry [in Italy] was not easy and, above all, receiving instructions for the submission of the lists of asilados, necessary to get the safe-conducts for their transfer to Italy, was not easy. And then the prudent De Masi, the realist De Masi, did what, I believe, he has never been forgiven for: he sent to Rome telegraphic dispatches that began: “unless specified otherwise”. Obviously, the ministry never specified otherwise (Toscano, 2013).

After the refugees entered the mansion, the Italian diplomats followed the rules of diplomatic asylum and applied through the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the safe-conducts that would allow the asilados to leave the country. The negotiations to

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5 The story of the asilados in the Italian embassy has been recently told in a documentary film directed by Nanni Moretti, Santiago, Italia (Sacher Film, 2018).
obtain the authorizations were often exhausting, in part because of the uncertain position of the Italian diplomats, but the Chilean authorities typically granted them to avoid diplomatic conflicts. After obtaining the safe-conducts, the embassy needed to find a country willing to accommodate the refugees and, when they had found one, the asilados were taken to the airport. Most of them moved to Italy, though a minority relocated to other European countries, Canada or socialist countries (in primis Cuba, the country often chosen by the members of the Movimiento de izquierda revolucionaria, or the Mir, a far-left movement close to Fidel Castro).

In November 1973, the junta issued 200 safe-conducts for asilados living in the foreign legations and among them there were 37 refugees of the Italian embassy (Corriere della Sera, 17 November 1973). In December, the regime allowed other people to leave, including asilados who moved to Italy (Avanti!, 29 December 1973). The Chilean government, however, stated that it would issue safe-conducts only until 31 December. This deadline scared the refugees, who started a hunger strike. The majority of the refugees in the Italian embassy participated, alongside the asilados in the legations of Sweden, Norway and Mexico (L’Unità, 22 December 1973). To avoid diplomatic conflicts, the regime re-evaluated its decision and issued safe-conducts until April 1975.

Nevertheless, the asilados remained worried. On 31 December 1973, after his first meeting with them, Tomaso de Vergottini wrote a note in his diary:

> Men with thick mustaches, women with unkempt black hair look at me with intense expressions, inquisitive, full of suspicion. Children with greedy and eager big eyes could be traded for the “guaglioni” of Naples, but their faces have not the light of fantasy: they look at me with stunned expressions. All of them, while moving forward and forming a group, clearly reveal their tragedy. While I, with my better smile, ask questions to put them at ease, they rally around me, get acquainted, show arms and bellies signed by ignominy. They beg for help to leave, far from a homeland that no longer belongs to them, in search of freedom (de Vergottini, 2000, pp. 20-21).

After the first wave, other refugees reached Calle Miguel Claro. As Roberto Toscano highlighted many years later, they were more traumatized than the initial wave:

The first (apart from the very few who were not refugees in the embassy, but only passed through it after we had taken them from the Stadium) were frightened but “intact”, and escaped before the soldiers could arrest them. Many of them were intellectuals: in those days, I remember, the three foremost experts of Neruda’s poetry were our guests, along with the son of the great novelist Francisco Coloane. Not a few believed that the “thing” would be solved in short time (“here we are in Chile, not in Bolivia”). And the atmosphere was serene, with deep political debates about why things had ended up in that way, and guitars that appeared in the evening, under the trees of the garden.

The second wave, some months later, was very different. People who had been detained, often tortured, freed, threatened again, or who had lived hidden for months. People psychologically and sometimes physically broken, who needed help and required patience (Toscano, 2003, pp. 111-113).

The number of refugees on Calle Miguel Claro fluctuated. It first grew to 221, then decreased to 44 in March 1974 because the junta had issued many safe-conducts
(Corriere della Sera, 16 March 1974), and then grew again to nearly 250 in the following months. The asilados were either Miristas, namely members of the Mir, or Upelientos, supporters of Unidad popular, the electoral coalition of Allende, which included the socialist, radical and communist parties, the Catholics of the Movimiento de acción popular unitaria (Mapu) and some other minor political forces. The refugees spent months together on Calle Miguel Claro and during this time they completely transformed the space of the embassy. Enrico Calamai, an attaché who arrived in November 1974, described the mansion in these terms: “It looks like an occupied university. The walls show graffiti praising Unidad popular. The living rooms, once sumptuous, have been transformed into dormitories, a series of mattresses against the walls. Furniture has disappeared” (Calamai, 2016, p. 62).

Unable to move about, the asilados devoted their energy to political discussion, but the atmosphere was often tense since different parties blamed one another for the fall of Allende. The refugees did not hide their political ideas and, on some occasions, they sang hymns such as El pueblo unido jamás será vencido and The International. On 4 and 11 September 1974, they also celebrated the anniversaries of the rise to power and the death of Allende by exhibiting flags outside the embassy, which frightened the Italian diplomats who were afraid of a possible reaction from the police (de Vergottini, 2000, pp. 98-106).

Most of the asilados living in the legation were young men and women, but among them there were also children. Some refugees brought their sons and, on 13 September 1974, de Vergottini authorized Operation Kinder, aimed at saving some children who had been hidden in local churches. The operation undermined the rules of diplomatic asylum, according to which asylum seekers must reach the foreign legations autonomously. Nevertheless, the diplomats did not refuse to save the children, who were brought to the embassy in the trunk of a car (de Vergottini, 2000, pp. 106-111). Alongside genuine refugees, there were also ordinary criminals and, quite possibly, infiltrating agents of the Dina (Barbarani, 2012, pp. 31-32).

Together, the asilados lived at the expense of the Italian embassy, which provided them with food and other supplies. The embassy even offered condoms, hoping that sexual activity could reduce the risk of brawls and accidents (Barbarani, 2012, p. 174; Calamai, 2016, pp. 74-75). According to the rules of diplomatic asylum, refugees had to live in complete isolation, without external communications. Thus, they organized themselves for cooking, teaching children and fulfilling other needs. They even established a committee, composed of representatives from several parties and headed by an elected president, to regulate life in the embassy (Corriere della Sera, 18 March 1975).

While the police strictly monitored what happened in the embassy and intercepted its communications, Italian diplomats allowed the asilados to use the telephone (Corriere della Sera, 22 August 1986). According to Calamai (2016, pp. 68-69), the refugees did not forget the comrades who had remained outside and made every effort to allow other people to enter the embassy by sending encoded messages
over the telephone. When new refugees arrived at the wall, the asilados helped them to climb over.

Many refugees reached the legation thanks to the clandestine network established by Fernando Ariztiá, the “red bishop” of Santiago, who also founded a legal organization, the Committee for Peace, to help the victims of the regime (Monteforte, 2003). One of the main members of the network was the secretary of the bishop, Valeria Valentin, an Italian nun who personally escorted many refugees to Calle Miguel Claro. She told her story in an interview:

Bishop Ariztiá established the Committee for Peace shortly after the coup and we, a very united group of missionaries, decided to create a clandestine network to save the victims of persecution. I was the secretary of the bishop and had a very good relationship with Cardinal Silva Henriquez. I had the task of organizing, coordinating, directing and extending the network of our collaborators. The central core was formed by a dozen people. One of the ways was hiding the fugitives in the houses or inside the slum, in the hospital or in the convents. Later we allowed them to reach the embassies or the Mission of the Holy See in the night, helping them to cross the security wall. By that time they were safe.

The work of Valeria Valentin was discovered and she was forced to leave Chile.

Obviously, the Chilean authorities were irritated by the activities of the Italian embassy. Shortly after the military takeover, the press started to criticize foreign diplomats and, in particular, the Italian attachés. Speaking of De Masi, one radio station stated: “El encargado de negocios de Italia. ¡Y que negocios!”, (the chargé d'affaires of Italy. And what affairs!) alluding to the alleged funding by the USSR (De Masi, 2013, pp. 161-162).

The behaviour of the junta was unpredictable as it sought to use the asilados to normalize diplomatic relations with Italy. In April and May 1974, the Chilean authorities promised to authorize the departure of the refugees shortly thereafter, but they also sent an ultimatum to the Italian government, demanding the normalization of relations in exchange for the issuance of safe-conducts (L’Unità, 20 June 1974). In June, the regime forbade Alitalia airplanes to land in Chile and threatened economic retaliations if the Italian government did not normalize relations (Corriere della Sera, 27 June 1974). Soon after, during a press conference held on 5 September 1974, Pinochet criticized Italy and stated that it was in the same bad situation as the Chile of Allende (Corriere della Sera, 6 September 1974).

Although reluctant, the Chilean authorities respected the rule of diplomatic asylum because they needed to improve their international relations. However, the situation was becoming more and more delicate. By mid-1974, the Italian embassy had become the only foreign legation still accommodating refugees, so it was continuously targeted by the regime. At the end of September, the Italian

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government decided to halt the departures of asilados to Italy and about 200 people remained in the embassy.

Another problem arose on 5 October 1974, when Eduardo “Humberto” Sotomayor, one of the leaders of the Mir, took refuge in the embassy after a gunfight with the police, during which the secretary of the movement, Miguel Enriquez, had been killed (Ensalaco, 2010, p. 78). Sotomayor was a high-profile political militant and the Chilean authorities were desperate to detain him.

In the middle of October, the press launched a hard campaign against the Italian embassy. On 15 October, shots were fired against the wall of the mansion, and in the same period, the Italian diplomats received threats by telephone (Corriere della Sera, 16 October 1974).

A clear signal of the discontent of the military came the night of 2 November 1974, when agents of the Dina threw the body of Lumi Videla Moya, a young militant of the Mir, into the embassy. Videla had been arrested in September and later tortured and murdered by the agents (Ensalaco, 2010, pp. 77-78). According to the official story released by the Chilean government, the woman had been killed in the embassy during an orgy. On this pretext, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to halt the issuance of safe-conducts and about 250 people were confined in the mansion. Roberto Toscano reported the matter to the police, indirectly implicating the military. Though his departure was already expected, he was forced to leave the country immediately. In his place, the government sent Enrico Calamai, another young diplomat who only spent one month in Santiago and, in December, was replaced by Emilio Barbarani.

For Italy, the situation was becoming unsustainable. The government was ambiguous: it refused to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Chilean regime and officially condemned the coup d’état, but it did not close the embassy in Santiago and it continued to trade with Chile, above all to sustain the import market for copper (Nocera, 2010, pp. 72-73). The crisis provoked by the asilados needed to be rapidly resolved for several reasons: economic interests; the support of Italian-Chilean citizens who urged the government to normalize relations; and the close

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7 In 2008, a Chilean court sentenced the chief of the Dina, Manuel Contreras, and five agents for the murder of Lumi Videla (Barbarani, 2012, p. 303).
8 Toscano stated that the body had been thrown during the night, when, due to the curfew, only soldiers and policemen could circulate.
9 In the following years, Italy continued to refuse to establish normal relations with the Chilean regime and only unofficial diplomats remained in Santiago. This is different than Chile’s relations with most Western European States, which established regular relations shortly after the coup. According to the Italian government, this situation damaged economic interests (API VII Camera Commissioni, session of 29 January 1981, p. 20). Still, during Pinochet’s dictatorship, the business between Italy and Chile continued.
10 About 25,000 Italian nationals and 180,000 Chileans of Italian origin lived in Chile in the 1970s. The Italian-Chilean community believed they had been hurt by Allende and openly supported the military takeover. They also protested because the government of Rome did not establish normal relations with the regime and, in December 1973, organized a demonstration against the embassy (De Masi, 2013, pp. 144-154; Corriere della Sera, 21 December 1973 and 16 March 1974).
alliance of Italy with the United States, which was known to be a major sponsor of the military junta. On 19 November 1974, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aldo Moro, wrote a letter to the Ministers of the Interior and Treasury, Paolo Emilio Taviani and Emilio Colombo, urging them to receive asilados in Italy. Moreover, Rome sent two officials to Santiago, Giacomo Profili from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Colonel Pasqua from the Secret Service. Formally, they had to conduct an inspection in the embassy, but, in truth, their task was to make contact with the Chilean authorities and solve the crisis. Profili and Pasqua arrived on 22 November and spent three days in Santiago, where they met the Italian diplomats, the asilados and the Chilean authorities, promising that Italy would accommodate the refugees. According to de Vergottini (2012, pp. 188-193), the two officials carried a proposal for the regime: the junta should issue safe-conducts for all of the asilados, who would be accommodated in Italy; in return, the Italian embassy would ensure, with the cooperation of the Chilean carabineros, that no one else sought asylum in the ambassador’s residence. Calamai (2016, p. 79) suggests that an agreement was reached.

The presence of Eduardo Sotomayor was, however, a problem, as the regime intended to get its hands on him. A proposal of simulating an accident, which would occur while Sotomayor and some other Miristas were driving to the airport, was rejected by de Vergottini. The Miristas, therefore, were not delivered to the Dina.

The agreement negotiated by Profili and Pasqua, in any case, entered into force. Reaching the mansion became much more difficult and, a few days later, a man was caught by the carabineros while climbing over the wall (Calamai, 2016, p. 79).

The softening of relations between the Chilean authorities and the embassy is also demonstrated by the inquiry on Lumi Videla. At the beginning of January, Judge Araya ruled that the woman had not been killed in the mansion and the regime accepted the verdict, probably either because it was part of the agreement or because it was afraid that refuting the story could further jeopardize the weak relations between Chile and Italy. On 6 January 1975, the issue of safe-conducts resumed and, in a few days, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted them to all the asilados. Italy, in turn, agreed to accommodate all the refugees not able to find another country to accept them (Calamai, 2016, pp. 83-84). The ambassador’s residence on Calle Miguel Claro started to empty, although new asilados arrived in the following days and were still welcomed in the mansion. Even Sotomayor and the Miristas were allowed to leave and, in February, they moved to Cuba. The security wall of the mansion was elevated, so that no other asylum seekers could enter.

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11 The letter is stored in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato - Central State Archive (from now ACS), Ministero dell’interno. Ministry of the Interior (from now MI), Gabinetto - Cabinet, (from now Gab.), 1971-75, file (from now f.) 17278/106-2«Profughi dal Cile».

12 According to de Vergottini (2000, pp. 122-129), the idea was launched by the Chilean Ministry of foreign affairs; according to Calamai (2016, p. 78), the proposal was made by one of the Italian officials who had arrived from Rome.
The last group of *asilados* (26 people) to be hosted by the Italian embassy arrived on 3 April 1975, but they took refuge in another building of the embassy located on Calle Triana. They were allowed to leave a few days later, on 8 April. Thereafter, no refugees remained in any part of the Italian legation and the Chilean government stated that it would issue no further safe-conducts (De Vergottini, 2000, p. 247), thus concluding the story of the *asilados* definitively.

In total, about 750 people (Barbarani, 2012, p. 226) passed through the Italian legation from 14 September 1973 to 8 April 1975. Some of them waited a few weeks, others stayed there for months, but all of them were allowed to leave Chile alive.

Between 1973 and 1975, the Italian diplomats also risked their lives by participating in illegal operations to assist opponents of the dictatorship. Many years later, the democratic government of Chile acknowledged the importance of their work: in December 1990, the president Patricio Aylwin granted De Vergottini an honour, the Cross of the Order of Bernardo O’ Higgins (*Corriere della Sera*, 18 December 1990); in 2016, the Chilean embassy in Rome honoured Toscano, Barbarani, the widow of De Vergottini and other officials (*The Independent*, 3 March 2016).

The challenges that the refugees would face had only begun when they received asylum in the Italian embassy; thereafter, they needed to find a country that would accept them and then begin a new life.

### 2. Exile in Italy

In Italy, and throughout the world, the 1973 coup had a strong impact. In the 1970s the country was in political turmoil as it was combating attempts to establish an authoritarian regime and the presence of terrorist groups. Almost no one in Italy appreciated the military takeover in Chile, but the political parties had diverse interpretations of the events. On 26 September, the Chamber of Deputies discussed the Chilean situation and the different political forces expressed their ideas (API VI Camera, pp. 9149-9189)\(^\text{14}\). The main Italian party was the Catholic *Democrazia Cristiana* (Dc), which condemned the coup, but also criticized the Allende government, arguing that it had ruined the country. The Liberal party (Pli) endorsed a similar position. On the other hand, the left was unreservedly against Pinochet. The Socialist party (Psi) expressed its indignation in the Chamber and, on 2 October 1973, one of its leaders, Bettino Craxi, travelled to Chile with a delegation from the Socialist International Party and attempted to visit the grave of Allende, then located in Viña del Mar (Craxi, 2013; De Masi, 2013, pp. 131-133).

\(^{13}\) However, some months later Daniel Ramírez Montero, an officer of the Chilean Air Force, wanted by the Dina, took refuge in the venue on Calle Triana and spent some years there with his family (Barbarani, 2012, pp. 252-279).

\(^{14}\) A similar debate was held on 13 February 1974 in the Senate, where all the parties reiterated their ideas (API VI Senato, pp. 12684-12721).
The Communist party (Pci) also condemned the coup without reservation. Contrarily, the neo-fascist Movimento sociale italiano (Msi) endorsed the official position of the junta and stated that the coup had avoided the establishment of a communist dictatorship.

The Italian government was composed of members from the Dc, Psi and some other minor parties. Consequently, its position on the Chilean regime was split, which, in turn, affected its attitude toward refugees. Initially, the government refused to accommodate the Chilean exiles on national territory, citing the geographical constraint added by Italy during the ratification of the Geneva Convention. In the ‘70s, only Monaco and a few non-European countries implemented a similar limitation, but the refusal to receive Chilean refugees was not a unique case, since many countries were reluctant to accommodate Marxists and leftist people. Canada and Ireland, for example, were reticent to host refugees and only after civil protests did they agree to it (Peddie, 2014; Healy, 2006).

A similar scenario transpired in Italy. Diplomats in Santiago spurred the Italian government to welcome the opponents of Pinochet. In October 1973, Giulio Andreotti, the president of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber, travelled to Argentina, where the Italian journalists residing in the country warned him about the political situation in Chile and the position of the Italian embassy (Corriere della Sera, 16 December 1973).

The visit was influential. At the end of October, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to accommodate the first group of refugees in Italy. From Santiago, the embassy immediately applied for 43 safe-conducts of which the Chilean government granted 37, but delayed the other 6. In turn, the first group of asilados, composed of Chileans and 10 Italians, was able to move to Italy, where they arrived on 17 November. Among them was Silvano Girotto, who soon began collaborating with the Italian police and was instrumental in the detention of several leaders of the Red Brigades.

Upon their arrival in Italy, the group of exiles, including the Italians, was housed at the motel Agip on Via Aurelia in Rome at the expense of the Amministrazione per le attività assistenziali italiane e internazionali (Aai), a governmental institution. The Aai proposed to transfer the Chileans to a refugee camp in Capua, one of three camps in Italy at that time (along with those of Padriciano-Trieste and Latina), where the exiles were subject to strict rules (Angeletti, 2012). After a series of civil protests, however, the move was cancelled and the exiles remained in the motel.

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15 The delayed safe-conducts were issued for the most prominent asilados. The government allowed them to leave the country, but only after the police investigations (Smith, 2013, p. 21).
16 The list is in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile».
17 Very probably, his cooperation with the police started immediately after his arrival from Chile. He was picked up and separated from other refugees at the Turin airport (De Masi, 2013, pp. 112-113).
18 See the telegrams stored in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile». In September 1974, the proposal was put forward a second time, but, once again, it was canceled. See the communications between the Aai and the Ministry of the Interior, which are stored in the same file.
In December, the Unhcr and other organizations urged the government to admit more Chileans. Some senators of the Independent left filed a parliamentary question on the matter (API VI Senato, session of 29 November 1973, p. 11117) and many politicians and newspapers expressed their disdain for the behaviour of the authorities (Il Messaggero, 17 December 1973). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered affirmatively, stating that the refugees would be received and priority would be given to those hidden in the embassy of Santiago (L’Unità, 18 December 1973; Corriere della Sera, 18 December 1973). During December, many asilados reached Italy in groups of 10-20 people and were accommodated in two hotels on Via Aurelia, the motel Agip and the Hotel Imperator\(^\text{19}\). In total, 126 refugees from Chile arrived in Italy that month\(^\text{20}\).

The government, however, continued to be very doubtful and it did not genuinely welcome the Chilean exiles. Rather, it believed that some of them were only economic migrants and that the others were militants, whose political activity in Italy could be dangerous\(^\text{21}\). Moreover, there were financial problems: their accommodation was expensive and the Aai often complained about the lack of funds. Therefore, in September 1974, the government decided to halt the transfer of asilados, including the transfer of those who had already obtained safe-conducts\(^\text{22}\). The decision was, however, revised again in November, in the wake of the agreement negotiated by Pasqua and Profili, such that additional groups of refugees would continue to reach the Peninsula until the spring of 1975. In total, from 17 November 1973 to 31 December 1975, 780 people arrived in Italy from Chile.

Most exiles (402 by the end of 1975) were able to find autonomous accommodation in Italy; 126 emigrated abroad and, by 31 December 1975, only 42 were still assisted by the Aai. Several of them (164) arrived for family reunification following relatives that had reached the Peninsula\(^\text{23}\).

Almost all of the exiles were university students, teachers at universities or secondary schools, journalists, physicians, engineers, lawyers, or clerks; only a minority belonged to the poorer social classes of blue-collar workers and craftsmen\(^\text{24}\). Some refugees arrived in Italy alone, others brought their families with

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\(^{19}\) See the lists in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile».


\(^{22}\) See the table filled by the Aai in ACS, MI, Gab., 1976-80, p. 454, f. 17273 «Profughi stranieri».

\(^{23}\) All the lists are in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile».

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them. Almost all were Chilean nationals, though some among them were people of other nationalities and 25 were Italian citizens.

Upon arrival, the refugees were granted a permit of stay lasting 5 days. The government had doubts about their permanence in Italy and initially believed that they would move abroad. However, most of them wanted to stay on the Peninsula and the authorities, in part responding to pressure from civil society and political groups, were forced to grant them asylum and allow their permanent stay.

A second group of Chilean exiles arrived illegally, passing through other countries. Their position was different. While the police did not typically disturb them, they were not officially recognized as refugees. After 1975, a third group of Chileans arrived for family reunification with refugees living in Italy.

In total – including asilados, family reunifications groups and people who arrived in other ways – about 900 exiles came to Italy from Chile during Pinochet’s dictatorship (almost all during the first years after the coup), according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (API VIII Camera Commissioni, session of 29 January 1981, p. 18). All were political refugees; their migration was not motivated by economic reasons, but rather by persecution.

The exiles from Chile were an exception because so many remained in Italy. Generally, asylum seekers only passed through the Italian territory and had to leave after obtaining refugee status. This was, in part, because, until the ‘70s, Italy was a country of emigration and, for refugees, finding a job was very difficult. According to a circular issued in 1963, the offices of labour had to first check if there were Italian workers and, only if none were available, could they hire foreign people. For Pinochet’s opponents, the situation was different: in March 1974, the Ministry of Labour communicated to the provincial Offices of Labour that those refugees should be employed regardless of the availability of Italian workers. Thus, the

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25 See, for example, a report of the Aai, 31 October 1974, in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile».
26 Asylum was granted by the Commissione paritetrica di eleggibilità (Cpe), a committee composed of representatives of the government and Unher, charged to evaluate the asylum applications. The first meeting of the Cpe was held on 22 December 1973 and granted asylum to the first 57 refugees. See a note of the Aai, 5 January 1974, in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-2° «Profughi dal Cile». The permit of stay given to the Chileans had to be renewed each year. In 1982, this provoked some problems and the secretary of Chile democratico, Benjamin Teplizky, asked Senator Margherita Boniver to solve the question. The letter is in ACS, MI, Gab., 1981-85, p. 502, f. «Profughi stranieri in Italia».
27 In 1977, Senators Bonazzi and Pieralli proposed to grant them the status of refugee, but their parliamentary question went unanswered (API VII Senato, session of 17 May 1977, p. 5377).
28 In those years, the refugees living in Italy numbered about 13.000-15.000 in total, most of them from Eastern Europe.
usual rules were not enforced and, unsurprisingly, only a minority of the Chileans moved abroad (often to Soviet States\textsuperscript{30}).

The refugees were aware of their privileges. In February 1975, a typographer and socialist refugee named Boris, stated:

\begin{quotation}
We are well aware that we are privileged compared to other exiles who escaped from the fascist dictatorships of their countries and arrived in Italy. Finding a job is difficult for us too, but we avoided the terrible experience of refugee camps, clandestine existence and blackmail. In a short time, we can get the documents to move freely. Both the Italian embassy and government have always been sensitive to our problems. Antifascist forces are really sympathetic to us (\textit{La Stampa}, 9 February 1975).
\end{quotation}

The situation of the exiles was still not ideal, principally because they lived far from their homeland, where they wanted very much to return. Moreover, they carried the marks of political defeat and were in a difficult psychological situation. Lastly, their material conditions were not always good since they sometimes lacked permits for work, health care, etc. On some occasions, the refugees asked the Ministry of the Interior to improve the conditions\textsuperscript{31} and, in 1984, Deputy Laura Finçato Grigoletto filed a parliamentary question on the matter (API VIII Camera, session of 11 July 1984, p. 15632).

Still, generally speaking, the Chileans lived in better conditions than the exiles coming from other countries because they were not accommodated in the camps. After the exiles’ accommodation in the two hotels on Via Aurelia, in March 1974 the Aai moved them to the hotel Traiano of Grottaferrata, close to Rome. A few months later, some were again moved and accommodated in hotels in cities of the Centre-North, such as Milan, Verona and Imola. In the beginning, the Aai, with the cooperation of the International Red Cross, provided the refugees with accommodation and food as well as health care and social assistance. On some occasions, they were also given an economic subsidy. In general, they were better integrated in all respects (economical, social, cultural, etc.) than other foreigners. Sometimes, the generosity shown to the Chileans provoked complaint from other refugees, including those from Africa, who believed they received inferior treatment (Colucci, 2018, pp. 64-65).

After the initial period (a few months), however, Chilean exiles left the hotels to look for jobs and live at their own expense. Many of them moved to the Centre-North to work in companies, municipalities, cooperatives and political parties. Some refugees moved to Emilia-Romagna, one of the “red regions” of Italy, and in 2017, an exhibition, titled \textit{Tempo d’esilio. L’Emilia-Romagna a fianco del popolo cileno 1973-1988}, and hosted in the venue of the Regional Legislative Assembly in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[30] For example, on 29 April 1974 a group of nine exiles moved to Jugoslavia. See the report of the Aai in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile».
\item[31] See a letter sent in November 1974 and stored in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile».
\end{footnotes}
Bologna, was dedicated to their story\textsuperscript{32}. Particularly warm was the welcome they received in the province of Modena, where a committee of solidarity was established (\textit{Avanti!} 28 December 1973; 16 January 1974).

About 20 Chileans are known to have moved to Novate Milanese in Lombardy where they continued to be politically active and even printed a journal, \textit{Liberación}. One of them, 25-year-old Adriana, described the situations in these terms:

Many of us work there as warehousemen, carpenters, [etc.]… In our homeland, [the exiles] were teachers, university students, intellectuals. In Italy today, we are 500, but only a few can continue to study or undertake activities appropriate to their skills and experiences. In our country, these people had responsibilities – at the industrial, political, and local level; here we are forced to do unskilled, poorly paid, hard jobs. […]

The situation of the exiles is transitional and we will go back […]. We want to be treated without paternalism. We hope not to suffer from any discrimination. We want to be considered human beings, mainly by the Italians, who know Fascism and exile, who know how hard is the situation of people forced to integrate into a reality different in language, law and customs. We believe also that in exile, we are all political beings (\textit{Corriere della Sera}, 6 June 1975).

The Chileans took advantage of the support of many political forces, mainly leftist parties and associations. The most important organization was the \textit{Associazione Italia-Cile "Salvador Allende"}, headed by the writer Ignazio Delogu. Its main sponsor was the Pci, but other parties also participated in its initiatives, as did intellectuals and journalists. The Christian Democracy joined the \textit{Associazione} as well, though it did not appoint a representative. This partial commitment reflected the different positions of the Catholics in Italy and elsewhere in the world about Chile: the most progressive factions openly supported the resistance movement, while the conservatives were less sympathetic to refugees (Christiaens, Goddeersis & Rodriguez García, 2014, pp. 28-30).

In any case, the \textit{Associazione Italia-Cile} emerged as the most important association of solidarity. According to the Questura of Rome:

The activity of this association consists of the organization of public manifestations and meetings: exhibitions of painting and other graphic works, offered by their authors, which are sold to the benefit of the Chilean resistance movement; paid shows, organized with the participation of left-wing theatre companies, whose proceeds are devoted to the same cause; propaganda against the Chilean military Junta, carried out at all levels: rallies, flyers, posters, etc.

The main activity of the \textit{Associazione Italia-Cile} is the support to Chilean refugees living in our country: the association, indeed, directly manages the funds, received by political parties and other democratic organizations\textsuperscript{33}.


\textsuperscript{33} Report of the Questura of Rome, 1 March 1974, in ACS, MI, Dipartimento pubblica sicurezza - Segreteria del dipartimento - Ufficio ordine pubblico (from now DPS), Series G - Associations, p. 293, f. «Associazione Italia-Cile Salvador Allende».  

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The association inaugurated offices in many Italian cities and cooperated with the Ministry of the Interior to find accommodations and jobs for the exiles. In 1976, it also sent a delegation to Chile to meet the archiepiscopal vicarage\textsuperscript{34}. The extra-parliamentary left founded another organization, the \textit{Comitato di sostegno alla resistenza del popolo cileno}, joined by several groups, among them the \textit{Partito comunista (marxista-leninista) d’Italia}, \textit{Avanguardia operaia} and \textit{Lotta continua}. The \textit{Comitato} mainly supported the extra-parliamentary Chilean left and launched a campaign, “Armi al Mir” (Weapons to the Mir), aimed at collecting funds and weapons for the \textit{Miristas}. Furthermore, on 16 December 1973, the \textit{Comitato} organized a great rally in Milan with the participation of about 8,000 people and the presence of representatives from foreign organizations. However, the \textit{Comitato} did not hold the same relevance as the \textit{Associazione Italia-Cile}: in Italy, as in the rest of Europe, the traditional left played a greater role than the new left in the support of Chilean refugees.

Many intellectuals also showed their solidarity. For example, in December 1973, an exhibition, titled \textit{Gli artisti italiani per la libertà del Cile}, which included some important Italian artists, was inaugurated in Rome (\textit{L’Unità}, 19 December 1973). Meetings between Italian and Chilean intellectuals were also organized in Reggio Emilia (\textit{Avanti!}, 13 June 1974). Even the judiciary supported the exiles: in December 1973, several judges from Florence founded a committee to help the Chilean jurists persecuted by the regime\textsuperscript{35}. Trade unionists and workers were also sympathetic. For example, in January 1976, the longshoremen of the Trieste harbour refused to unload a Chilean ship in order to boycott the regime\textsuperscript{36}.

On many occasions, Italian institutions, both local and national, showed active solidarity with the regime’s victims. In particular, local authorities headed by leftist parties were very sympathetic to exiles: for instance, on 19 April 1974, the Mayor of Bologna, Renato Zangheri, met them and promised the support of the municipality\textsuperscript{37}. Likewise, in 1976, the regional administration of Tuscany, headed by Loretta Montemaggi of the Pci, promoted a fundraiser for the exiles, provoking a complaint

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{34} Telegram of the Ministry of the Interior, 26 April 1980, in ACS, MI, Gab., 1976-80, p. 454, f. 17273 «Profughi cileni».
\item \textsuperscript{35} Report of the Prefettura of Florence, 16 December 1973, in ACS, MI, DPS, Series G - Associations, p. 403, f. «Comitato per l'assistenza e la difesa dei giuristi e dei magistrati cileni perseguitati». The committee did not, however, have a great impact.
\item \textsuperscript{36} The documents on the subject are in ACS, MI, Gab., 1976-80, p. 109, f. 11020/21 «Avvenimenti esteri. Cile». See also the Trieste newspaper \textit{Il Piccolo}, 24 January 1976.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Report of the Prefettura of Bologna, 22 April 1974, in ACS, MI, DPS, Series G - Associations, p. 293, f. «Associazione Italia-Cile Salvador Allende». Many municipalities sponsored the initiatives of the \textit{Associazione Italia-Cile}, such as the \textit{Settimana della cultura cilena} (Week of Chilean Culture) held in Umbria in December 1974 and in other localities in the following years (see the Report of the Prefettura of Perugia, 7 December 1974, stored in the same file).
\end{itemize}
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by the Ministry of the Interior, which believed that the initiative fell outside the purview of the administration\(^3\). Some entities even offered jobs to exiles\(^4\).

Sympathy for the Chilean exiles was not exclusive to Italy; they found support across the globe as the atrocities committed by Pinochet’s regime shocked the world and created a sense of solidarity in support of the victims (Ferry, Galloro & Morales la Mura, 2004; Hirsch, 2012; Bastías Saavedra, 2013; Christiaens, Goddeeris & Rodriguez García, 2014; Jones, 2014, pp. 181-199).

In the case of Italy, the parallels between the Italian and Chilean political systems also fostered sympathy. In the Latin American country, as in Italy, there was a Christian Democracy, a Communist Party and a Socialist Party. Many Italian parties had held close relationships with their Chilean counterparts since before 1973 (Toscano, 2007; Stabili, 2012, pp. 369-371). Therefore, the Italian political forces felt close to the Chilean parties. Moreover, the memory of Mussolini’s regime spurred the Italians to help the victims of a similar dictatorship and, unsurprisingly, the experience of fascism was often recalled during debates about Chile.

Many Chilean refugees were politically engaged, eager to know what was happening in their country and to participate, from Italy, in the resistance movement against Pinochet’s regime. They were in contact with the underground parties in their homeland and they even drew up a list of Dina agents working in Europe (La Stampa, 26 October 1975).

The refugees founded an Italian section of Chile democrático, an international association of Chilean exiles, established in Cuba in October 1973, which attracted Upelientos and Christian Democrats. The group’s office in Rome was the most important in the world and was headed by a former ambassador for Allende in Italy, Carlos Vassallo Rojas, who had been removed by the junta after the coup and had remained on the Peninsula as a refugee. In spite of some disagreements with local parties and associations, the office cooperated closely with them. Its main activities were fundraising for the resistance movement, coordinating with the refugees living in other countries, supporting exiles and campaigning against the regime\(^5\).

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\(^{3}\) The documents on the subject are in ACS, MI, Gab., 1976-80, p. 109, f. 11020/21 «Avvenimenti esteri. Cile».

\(^{4}\) For example, in February 1974, the municipality of Reggio Emilia hired some of them as clerks. See the report of the Prefettura of Reggio Emilia, 29 March 1974, in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, f. 17278/106-1° «Profughi dal Cile».

\(^{5}\) It is significant that, when Chile was ruled by Allende, the Italian right supported its Chilean counterpart and established a solidarity committee, the Comitato di solidarietà per il Cile, founded by the Msi and some Catholic associations. The Committee held no great relevance, but, on 11 November 1972, it organized a rally in Turin, with the participation of about 150 people, to express its protest against the government of Allende. See the reports of the Prefettura of Turin in ACS, MI, DPS, Series G - Associations, p. 318, f. «Comitato di solidarietà per il Cile».

\(^{5}\) Report of the Questura of Rome, 1 March 1974, in ACS, MI, DPS, Series G - Associations, p. 293, f. «Associazione Italia-Cile Salvador Allende». See also a report received by the Ministry of interior on 24 February 1974, in ACS, MI, DPS, Series G - Associations, p. 293, f. «Associazione Cile Democratico». The office of Chile democrático was located in the same building of the
The exiles continuously denounced the violation of human rights in their country in order to sensitize European public opinion. A number of conferences, rallies and public debates were held, often with the participation of the Associazione Italia-Cile. Some demonstrations were organized on the occasion of anniversaries, mainly that of 11 September. For instance, in 1975, the Italian trade unions called a rally in Milan, with about 8,000 people. The refugees also published a magazine, Chile-America, printed in Rome, which became a sort of official paper of the Chileans who had escaped to Italy. It was published for 9 years.

In short, the Chileans were the most politically active refugees living in Italy. This was the case in many locations – such as Lorraine - where the Chileans continued the fight against the dictatorship, often with the support of local political forces (Ferry, Galloro & Morales la Mura, 2004). Italy, however, emerged as a principal center of the resistance movement in Europe.

Among the refugees, there were prominent politicians. Foremost among them was Bernardo Leighton, a leader of the Christian Democracy, who had been Minister of the Interior and Vice-President of Chile during the presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970). Unlike Frei, Leighton belonged to the faction of the party most opposed to Pinochet’s coup and he was forced to leave Chile some months after September 1973. Leighton arrived in Italy in February 1974, thanks to his ties with the Democrazia Cristiana, and soon became a leader of the resistance movement in Rome.

Also active in the resistance movement was Antonio Leal Labrín, today a prominent politician, who took refuge in Italy in 1975 after two years of detention. Leal was a communist, but, in his 15 years on the Peninsula, his ideas evolved and, when he went back to Chile, he joined the more moderate Partido por la democracia.

More generally, contact with Italian politics influenced the refugees, many of whom developed new ideas and proposed new strategies for the struggle against the regime (Rebolledo González, 2010, pp. 129-133). Indeed, from their exile, a

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Associazione Italia Cile, on Largo Torre Argentina no. 21, where, in 2015 the Chilean president, Michelle Bachelet, unveiled a plaque to remember the work of the exiles against dictatorship.

42 Many other initiatives took place in different cities. The reports received by the Ministry of the Interior are in ACS, MI, Gab., 1971-75, b- 71, f. 11020/21 «Avvenimenti esteri - Cile».

43 The Christian Democratic Party did not hold a unique position on the coup. A faction, represented by the former President Frei and the future President Aylwin, praised the overthrowing of Allende. Another faction, the so-called “Group of the Thirteen,” condemned the coup. During the regime, the Christian Democracy did not support Pinochet.

44 Leal told his story during the conference Tra storia e memoria: l’esilio cileno in Italia, University of Roma Tre, 13-14 November 2003. The proceedings are not published, but some extracts of Leal’s speech were reported by the newspaper Europa, 16 November 2003.

Among the other politicians who took refuge in Italy were Esteban Tomic, a Catholic progressive and son of the presidential candidate of the Christian Democracy in 1970, Radomiro Tomic; and José Antonio Viera Gallo, a leader of the Socialist party and later, from 2007 to 2010, Minister Secretary General of the presidency.
new configuration of Chilean politics arose: the Socialist party abandoned the Marxist line and, at the end of the 1980s, formed a coalition, the Concertación por la democracia, with the Christian Democracy and some other minor parties, which elected the first four presidents of democratic Chile between 1990 and 2010 (Wright, 2014, pp. 58-61).

In turn, the Chilean events and the presence of exiles spurred the Italian political forces to question their political line. The 1973 coup had a strong impact on the Pci, whose secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, put forward the idea of the “historic compromise” in order to form a coalition government with the Dc: for Berlinguer, the Chilean events proved that the United States would never accept a communist government in Italy and, therefore, the Pci had to form a government with the Christian Democrats to gain power. The extra-parliamentary left, on the contrary, interpreted the Chilean events in the opposite sense, believing that they confirmed the necessity of the armed struggle (Quirico & Lomellini, 2014, pp. 243-245).

In other words, the encounter between Chilean exiles and the Italian left catalyzed the development of new ideas in both parties (Stabili, 2013). This phenomenon was by no means exclusive to Italy. In many countries, the encounter between Chilean and local activists provoked debates and discussions and, above all, encouraged the dissemination of the culture of human rights, which, after the 1973 coup, spread in many European and American countries (Christiaens, Goddeeris & Rodríguez García, 2014, pp. 26-27; Bastías Saavedra, 2013). It therefore demonstrates an important example of the fruitful exchanges that can occur when people from different political contexts come together.

Like their comrades displaced in other countries, the Chilean exiles living in Italy were sure that the dictatorship would soon fall. They lived between dream and reality. Carlos Vassallo Rojas stated: “The dream is the ‘true’ Chile, democratic and tolerant. The reality is the fight to fulfill the dream, cooperating with the resistance movement that acts in the homeland to overthrow the junta of terror” (La Stampa, 26 October 1975).

The resistance movement in Italy was also aided by the power of music. A famous band, the Inti Illimani, for instance, was in Italy when the junta seized power and, unable to return to Chile, remained in the country. They were one of the most well-known bands (along with the Quilayayun) of the Nueva canción chilena, a musical movement that sought to rediscover traditional and folk music incorporating political and social themes. From Italy, the band animated the resistance against Pinochet, giving many concerts that turned into moments of solidarity for the victims of the dictatorship, even in the smallest and most isolated towns. The band also gave some concerts abroad, including in the United States, Japan and Australia, bringing the voice of free Chile to international audiences.

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Chilean Refugees in Italy


As a whole, the work of the exiles in Italy was essential for the struggle against the regime, all the more so because, in Chile, the opposition parties were almost completely destroyed. The main resistance came from abroad.

3. The shock, the normalization, the return

In the autumn of 1975, an event shocked the Chilean refugees living in Italy: on 6 October, Bernardo Leighton and his wife, Anita Fresno, were attacked in Rome in front of the residence where they lived with other exiles. A man armed with a 9-millimetre handgun shot Leighton in the head and Fresno in the spine; both were seriously injured and Fresno remained permanently disabled\textsuperscript{46}. It was immediately clear that the attack had been executed by people connected to the Chilean regime (\textit{Avanti!}, 8 October 1975; \textit{La Stampa}, 8 October 1975). It is likely that the order to murder Leighton came from Pinochet himself, since a decision of that gravity would not be made without the consent of the highest authority, and that it was part of the notorious operation Condor, aimed at eliminating the opponents of the Latin American regimes\textsuperscript{47}. Indeed, Leighton was not the sole Chilean politician to face an attack abroad: General Carlos Prats, former Chief of Staff in the army, was killed in 1974 in Buenos Aires; and Orlando Letelier, Minister of the Allende government, was murdered in Washington in 1976.

Leighton was targeted because the Chilean regime was afraid that, thanks to his prestige, he might promote an alliance between the Christian Democracy and the left, and urge the European Christian Democrats to take a stand against Pinochet (Mayorga, 2003, p. 30; Dinge, 2004, pp. 130-134). Although he was not killed, the attempt on his life put an end to his political career. The event shocked the Chilean refugees, who regretted not being able to protect Leighton. In turn, the Italian political forces protested and, on 11 October, the Dc organized a rally in Rome with the participation of thousands of people (\textit{Corriere della Sera}, 12 October 1975). The leftist parties criticized the government, which had not protected the man; the Ministry of the Interior replied that the police monitored the presence of infiltrating agents among the refugees, but the investigation was extremely delicate (API VI Camera, session of 14 October 1975, p. 24020). Leighton, in any case,


\textsuperscript{47} In June 1995, after the death of Leighton (on 21 January of the same year) an Italian court ruled that the attempt was ordered by Manuel Contreras and by General Iturriaga (Chief of External Operations of the Dina), that it was organized by the CIA agent, Michael Townley, and that it was carried out by Italian neo-Fascists (\textit{La Repubblica}, 8 March 2000; Mayorga, 2003, pp. 143-161).
stayed in Italy until 1978, when Pinochet allowed him to return to Chile (La Stampa, 21 June 1978).48

After the attempt, the fear of new attacks grew among both the refugees and their Italian supporters. This fear was magnified by the fact that the Italian neo-Fascists had close relations with the Chilean regime and could act on its order (Mayorga, 2003). In 1976, the murder of Letelier provoked alarm, and in 1977 the news that the Dina was increasing its activity against the exiles raised new concerns (API VII Senato, session of 24 September 1976, p. 525; session of 16 February 1977, p. 3592). Nevertheless, the refugees continued to be politically active. In 1978, for example, Pinochet called for a referendum to legitimize his government, and the exiles, who, like all of the opponents of the dictatorship, interpreted it as a farce, issued a protest statement (La Stampa, 5 January 1978; Avanti!, 13 January 1978). The actions of the Chileans reveal their worry for the future of their relatives and comrades who remained in the homeland. In May 1978, a group occupied the office of Amnesty International in Rome and started a hunger strike to urge the junta to give news of the desaparecidos (Corriere della Sera, 27 May 1978; Avanti! 27 May 1978). The refugees also joined some initiatives launched by the resistance movement in Chile, such as another hunger strike in 1979 (Avanti! 7 September 1979). At times, the demonstrations arrived at the Chilean consulate, located in Rome on Via Panisperna (L’Unità, 12 September 1979).

Among the most important of the refugee activities was a national conference organized in Cuneo in January 1976, with the participation of Laura Allende, sister of the late president.49 Two other important meetings were held in Ariccia, close to Rome, in 1979 and in 1980, following the initiative of the Socialist Senator Lelio Basso. Many representatives of the exiles, most of whom were members of the Chilean Socialist party, participated in the meetings, searching for unity among the democratic forces against Pinochet (La Stampa, 14 January 1980).

The Chilean refugees were integrated into Italian society thanks to their jobs and the good relations established with Italian political parties and associations. Over the years, their lives followed a normal routine and their political engagement decreased, but it did not cease completely. In 1983, for example, when protests against the dictatorship erupted in Chile, the exiles called a meeting in Rome with the participation of Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists, and created a type of united front against Pinochet (Corriere della Sera, 16 July 1983).50 However, ironing out differences was not easy and the conflict among the political groups continued.

48 In the autumn of 1976, another event increased the attention on Chile: the Davis Cup Final in tennis. The Italian team had to compete against the Chilean team and the match was to take place in Santiago in December. In Italy, a harsh debate arose about the opportunity to boycott the competition, so as not to recognize Pinochet’s regime, but, in the end, the Italian players were allowed to play in Chile where they won the Cup (D’Angelo & Fonzo, 2017).
49 See the documents stored in ACS, MI, Gab., 1976-80, p. 109, f. 11020/21 «Avvenimenti esteri. Cile».
50 Some Chileans were also suspected of terrorism because several militants arrived from Cuba in the 1970s, allegedly after having been trained in terror attacks (Avanti!, 5 January 1983). In truth, the
The refugees continued to benefit from the support of significant sections of Italian civil society. For example, on 11 September 1983, the tenth anniversary of the military takeover, the Italian national television company, RAI, broadcast a special program with the participation of Hortensia Bussi, the widow of Allende, and many other initiatives were held all over the country (Avanti! 9 September 1983) 51.

Even as they integrated into Italian society, the primary goal of the exiles remained to return to their homeland, but the regime, on the basis of a decree issued in 1973, intended to keep them away. In the 1980s, protests in support of the return grew and some refugees even tried to go back without a visa, but they were prevented from entering the country. For example, in 1983, Francisco Ramon Diaz Gonzales left Germany, where he was living, and went to Chile on an Italian flight, but he was sent back (API VIII Camera, Session of 3 November 1983, p. 2908). The same thing happened to two members of the Inti Illimani in 1984 (Wright & Oñate Zúñiga, 2007, p. 44).

Still, the movement of Chileans in Europe to return was becoming stronger and stronger (Avanti!, 23 September 1983; La Stampa, 4 January 1985). Ultimately, Pinochet was forced to relinquish his resistance in the face of internal and international protests and, with decrees issued in 1984 and 1985, he allowed most exiles to return (Wright & Oñate Zúñiga, 2007; Angell & Carstairs, 1987). The refugees living in Italy took advantage of the new developments and the majority moved back to Chile 52. Only a few remained on the Peninsula for the rest of their lives. Likewise, most Chilean refugees living in other countries eventually returned to their homeland (Ferry, Galloro & Morales la Mura, 2004).

The return of the exiles contributed to the defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 referendum, which catalysed a gradual return to democracy 53.

Conclusion

The presence of Chilean refugees in Italy did not immediately change the country’s asylum policy, which remained bound by its geographical constraint.
However, the Chileans were the first group of non-European refugees accommodated on the Peninsula (apart from some individual exceptions).

It was through the presence of these people that the Italian institutions began to discuss modifying their legislation on asylum. In May 1975, the Ministry of Justice prepared a draft law to remove the geographical constraint\(^54\), but it was not discussed by the Parliament. That same year, Umberto Terracini, Senator of the Pci, promised to submit a legislative proposal (Corriere della Sera, 11 July 1975; La Stampa, 26 October 1975), which was put forward on 11 May 1977 in the next legislature (API VII Senato DDL). Although the proposal was not approved, the debate had begun.

In the 1970s, Italian society was evolving and new political measures were needed. The country’s migration patterns were in a transitional phase and Italy began to receive large numbers of immigrants from abroad (Corti, 2005, p. 125; Colucci, 2018, pp. 49-52). In addition to the Chileans and economic migrants, other non-European refugees also reached the Peninsula. For instance, more than 3,000 exiles arrived from Vietnam in 1979, some rescued by the Italian Navy and others aided by the International Red Cross (Ferrari, 1996; Dinunno, 2006). More non-European asylum seekers arrived in the 1980s from African countries, such as Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, as well as from the Middle East. These latter groups faced greater challenges as they did not receive any assistance from the Italian government, and the Unhcr only provided them with accommodation and food for 6 months (Ferrari, 1996).

The precedent of the Chileans was significant and was often mentioned in debates about granting asylum to non-European refugees. Indeed, it was recounted many times in support of the Vietnamese arriving in 1979 and the Eritreans in the 1980s. In turn, the examples of the Chileans and the Vietnamese prompted the Italian government to continue discussing the possible removal of the geographical constraint\(^55\). Several parliamentary questions were filed\(^56\) and, in 1982, Minister Emilio Colombo assured the Unhcr that the government was ready to remove the constraint (Corriere della Sera, 25 June 1982). Still, nothing happened. In the following years, many politicians declared again that the Geneva Convention had to be extended to all refugees; among them was Giulio Andreotti, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Andreotti, 1984). Another draft law was prepared in 1984\(^57\) and further appeals were made by intellectuals and journalists (Corriere della Sera, 13 November 1986).

Yet, part of the Italian elite continued to be suspect about the benefits of removing the constraint. Sadly, a victim was needed to persuade the doubtful. On

\(^{54}\) Stored in ACS, MI, Gab., 1976-80, p. 454, f. 17278/12 «Profughi stranieri in Italia».

\(^{55}\) The memorandum of the Unhcr, dated 23 April 1981, is in ACS, MI, Gab., 1981-85, p. 502, f. 17278/111 «Profughi stranieri in Italia».

\(^{56}\) For example, see API VIII Camera, session of 3 November 1981, p. 35390; session of 10 November 1981, pp. 35902; API VIII Senato, session of 9 July 1981, p. 15482. See also Corriere della Sera, 1 December 1981.

\(^{57}\) A copy is in ACS, MI, Gab., 1981-85, p. 502, f. 17278/111 «Profughi stranieri in Italia».
25 August 1989, Jerry Essan Masslo, an asylum seeker from South Africa, forced to leave his country because he was an anti-apartheid activist, was killed in Villa Literno, close to Naples, by a criminal gang that wanted to rob him. Masslo had arrived in Rome in 1987 and had applied for asylum, but his application had been rejected because of the geographical constraint. In turn, he was forced to live in Italy illegally, accepting temporary jobs in agriculture. Masslo’s assassination shocked the public, since the poor conditions in which he lived and the refusal to grant him asylum were seen to have caused his death.

The Italian Parliament finally addressed the question of refugees in 1990. The so-called Martelli law (law no. 39 of 28 February) removed the geographical constraint and regulated many aspects of migratory phenomena. It was the first organic law on immigration and, although it was criticized by both the left and the right, after its enactment, the country was allowed to sign the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention, thus entering the broader European dialogue on migration (Colucci, 2018, pp. 86-92).

Events that occurred in the following years – the collapse of the Albanian regime, civil wars in Yugoslavia, crises in Africa and the Middle East – provoked a massive increase in the number of asylum seekers (Hein, 2010, pp. 101-172).

There is no question that the challenges of hosting refugees in Italy today are different in terms of the number of applications, the reasons for asylum requests, the varying intentions of refugees to return to their homelands, etc. Thus, it is impossible to take the story of the Chilean exiles as an exact model. Nevertheless, what happened after the 1973 coup – the reception of refugees in the embassy in Santiago and the solidarity of Italian citizens – should reveal that accepting refugees can be beneficial for both migrants and the hosting society, creating the potential to produce real and lasting global change that can save the lives of others without imperilling the local way of living.

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**Parliamentary sources**


The Mediterranean is far more than a sea. For millennia, it has created space for contact and cross-fertilization between the many cultures which have met, negotiated, battled, traded and shared knowledge and experiences on its waters and along its shores. This volume contains a collection of essays by international scholars of history, art and culture investigating interactions between diverse societies across the Mediterranean world from the Medieval period to the present.