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The price of refuge. Spanish republican exiles in the US cultural cold war

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Abstract
This article explores the importance of the collaboration of the different groups of European exiles in the United States, after the rise of totalitarianism, in the construction of open and covert American diplomacy at the height of the Cold War. And this, in one sense, was logical. Refugees knew the languages and traditions of their home nations well and many shared their strong ideologies of anti-totalitarianism with the US government. There were synergies between both parties. In addition, we analysed the link and then the confrontation on the part of one group of those European exiles in the US: that of the anti-Franco and anti-Stalinist community of Spanish republican exiles in New York, to American policies and interests during the nineteen forties and fifties.
The United States' unexpected approach to Franco's Spain in 1953 was difficult for them. It caused desolation among this community of Spanish Republican exiles in the United States who, until then, had collaborated with the intelligence services of their host nation looking toward the end of the Franco’s régime. But while a moderate group of those Spanish exiles considered that this approach was a necessary and transitory evil to restrain the Stalinist common enemy, another group of exiles remained faithful to their republican and anti-Franco political trajectory demonstrating their discontent. The Spanish exile community in the United States was deeply divided in 1953 against the Madrid Pacts and the recognition of the Franco’s régime by the US.

Keywords: Spanish Republican Exiles, Covert diplomacy, Cold War, Franco’s Spain, Madrid Pacts

El precio del refugio. Los exiliados republicanos españoles en la guerra fría cultural de los Estados Unidos

Resumen
En este artículo se explora la importancia de la colaboración de los diferentes grupos de exiliados europeos en Estados Unidos, tras el ascenso de los totalitarismos, en la construcción de la diplomacia encubierta en el momento álgido de la Guerra Fría. Este interés por los refugiados por parte del gobierno estadounidense, de alguna manera fue lógica. Los exiliados conocían la lengua y las costumbres de sus naciones originarias y algunos de ellos compartían el fuerte anticomunismo del gobierno estadounidense de esos años. Había, pues, sinergias entre las dos partes. Además, en este texto se analiza la conexión primero y después el enfrentamiento de una parte de los exiliados europeos en Estados Unidos, la de los republicanos españoles exiliados en Nueva York que fueron a la vez antifranquistas y antiestalinistas, con las políticas estadounidenses durante los años cuarenta y cincuenta del siglo XX. El inesperado acercamiento de Estados Unidos hacia el régimen de
Franco en 1953 fue muy difícil para estos exiliados republicanos, causó una gran desolación entre ellos. Hasta entonces habían colaborado con la inteligencia estadounidense pensando que eso contribuiría a la caída de Franco. La nueva actitud de Estados Unidos separó al grupo. Una parte de estos exiliados españoles consideró que esta aproximación era necesaria y transitoria si se quería vencer al estalinismo. Pero la mayoría de los exiliados republicanos españoles sintió que este acercamiento era incompatible con su militancia antifranquista y demostraron su descontento. La unidad de la comunidad exiliada española en Estados Unidos se rompió con la firma de los Pactos de Madrid y el acercamiento de Estados Unidos al régimen de Franco.

Palabras clave: Exiliados republicanos españoles en Estados Unidos, Diplomacia encubierta, Guerra Fría, España de Franco, Pactos de Madrid

Il prezzo della fuga. Gli esuli repubblicani spagnoli nella guerra fredda culturale degli Stati Uniti

Sborsi
L’articolo esamina l’importanza della collaborazione di diversi gruppi di esuli europei negli Stati Uniti, dopo l’ascesa dei totalitarismi, nella costruzione di una diplomazia americana aperta e segreta nel cuore della guerra fredda. I rifugiati conoscevano bene lingue e tradizioni dei loro Paesi di origine e molti di loro condividevano l’ideologia antitotalitaria del governo statunitense. Si sviluppò, così, una sinergia bilaterale.

L’articolo prende in esame anche la relazione di parte degli esuli europei negli Stati Uniti, quali le comunità antifranchiste e antistaliniste degli esuli repubblicani spagnoli a New York, e poi lo scontro con le politiche e gli interessi americani negli anni ’40 e ’50.

L’inattesa apertura degli Stati Uniti verso la Spagna franchista nel 1953 provocò delusione tra gli esuli i quali, fino ad allora, avevano collaborato con i servizi di spionaggio del Paese di accoglienza, aspettando la fine del regime franchista. Ma, mentre un gruppo di esuli moderati considerava questo avvicinamento come un male necessario e temporaneo per affrontare il comune nemico stalinista, un altro gruppo di esuli rimase fedele alla sua ideologia antifranchista e repubblicana, mostrando la propria delusione. L’unità della comunità spagnola esiliata negli Stati Uniti si ruppe con la firma dei Patti di Madrid del 1953 e con il riconoscimento statunitense del regime di Franco.

Parole chiave: Esuli spagnoli repubblicani negli Stati Uniti, Diplomazia segreta, Guerra fredda, Spagna franchista, Patti di Madrid
The price of refuge. Spanish republican exiles in the US cultural cold war.

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Introduction

Many historians insist on the importance and collaboration of the different groups of European exiles in the United States, after the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War, in the construction of open and covert American diplomacy at the height of the Cold War. And this was logical. Refugees knew the languages and traditions of their home nations well and many shared their strong ideologies of anti-totalitarianism with the US government. There were synergies between both parties (Wilford, 2008, p. 29-51).

However, although the exiles from nations of what was later to form a part of the Soviet bloc, saw that the policies of the American giant towards the USSR and its satellites were constant during the fifties, except for a few changes, anti-fascist exiles who had come from dictatorships in European Mediterranean countries witnessed a radical change in US diplomatic relations with their original nations during the Cold War (Mikkonen, 2012, p. 97-127). In the case of Spain, the escalation of the war led first to an embargo and rejection of the Franco regime by the international community, and of any economic, cultural or scientific support; but after the escalation of the Cold War at the beginning of the nineteen fifties, Francoist Spain got the diplomatic recognition by the United States and its allies.

This article aims to explore the link and then the confrontation on the part of the anti-Franco and anti-Stalinist community of Spanish republican exiles residing in New York, to American policies and interests during the nineteen forties and fifties.
1. The Foreign Nationalities Branch and European refugees

It was shortly after the United States entered World War II when it was deemed necessary, by its government, to address the “Foreign political manifestations inside of the United States itself”. In 1941, the US State Department stated the following, in the midst of escalating totalitarianisms, and passed this opinion on to the newly appointed Coordinator of Information, William J. Donovan: “That a systematic reading, from the diplomatic viewpoint, of the foreign language press in the United States would be helpful in the conduct of our foreign relations”¹. It is true that foreign newspapers and their authors had been monitored by the US Department of Justice and other federal agencies – FBI, the Foreign Language and Intelligence Divisions, the Department of War (G-1), the Immigration Service, the CIAA and the OCD –, since the triumph of the Bolshevik revolution and the arrival of refugees after the Great War, for fear of revolutionary radicalisms, but it was done for punitive vigilance purposes. The only reason for this was to see whether radical expressions and their authors violated those considered, in hegemonic discourses, according to American political tradition².

However, since July 1941 there have been new contacts with exile communities for different purposes. The Office of the Coordinator of Information, COI, addressed this reading of the radical press edited by refugees of different nationalities in a positive way in order to learn of the political activities of dissidents who were also, in some way, supporters of the United States in its confrontation with totalitarianisms in the new world conflict. So, for the first time, taking advantage of developing effective political and military strategies, as well as the knowledge and political position of the

¹ DeWitt C. Poole, The Study of Foreign Political Developments in the United States. A New Field of Political intelligence, 31 December 1944 CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010004-2 in Central Intelligence Agency Archives (from now CIA Archives), on line, pp 1-2. I gratefully acknowledge financial support to the Ministry of Science and Innovation for research project. PID 2019-106210GB-100.

² Memorandum to the Director of Strategic Service, February 11, 1943, Handbook of Foreign Nationality groups in the US, CIA-RDP 13X0001R00010018007-8 in CIA Archives, on line, visited September 1, 2019.
exiles for their own benefit, was a topic for discussion in US diplomacy.

The State Department also went further in this new approach to refugees and their publications. He considered necessary, for example, to broaden and deepen contacts with these groups of exiles of different nationalities, residing in the United States and publishing newspapers in their own language; keep track of their political avatars and, above all, establish friendly contacts with the editors and political leaders of the communities that arrived in the United States and that: “As refugees, continued to defend their causes from the American shores and look for the sympathy of both American citizens and political institutions”.

To this end, the US executive created specific institutions that designed and executed the strategies to make these foreigners politically profitable. For many, the idea of obtaining information on the exiles in the United States, not to persecute them but to develop their own and correct political strategies, was not only conceived by the State Department but also, to a great extent, by the person designated by the president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as COI, William J. Donovan, who was already a deep connoisseur of foreign intelligence systems at that time. John C. Wiley, a career diplomat, with extensive experience in European and Latin American affairs, is also believed to have contributed. The two convinced President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the need to improve intelligence work using foreign refugees networks inside and outside the United States. We must not forget that Wiley had experienced many of the massive upheavals in the early part of the twentieth century. He was at the Madrid embassy during the first years of the Second Republic, specifically between 1932-1933; at the Moscow embassy when diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were restored in 1933; at the Vienna embassy when Germany invaded Austria in 1938, and was minister in Estonia and in Latvia when the Baltic countries were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. Throughout his diplomatic career he was a defender of the need to reform the State Department, the US foreign service

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3 DeWitt C. Poole, “The Study of Foreign Political Developments in the United States. A New Field of Political Intelligence.” 31 December 1944. CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010004-2 in CIA Archives, on line, visited September 1, 2019.
and, above all, to centralize intelligence services and to have networks of foreign informants as a means of acting effectively against “serious and unexpected” events⁴.

Although William J. Donovan's professional career was very different from Wiley's – he was not a career diplomat – his knowledge of intelligence issues and his vision of the reforms needed to increase the effectiveness of American intelligence services were similar. Born in Buffalo in 1893, of Irish ancestry, Donovan studied in Catholic schools until he was accepted at Columbia College in 1903. There he was a good student with many interests, including football, where he became a star achieving the admiration of his peers from the final year of the Bachelor of Arts Degree. After graduating, he studied law, also in New York, in this case at Columbia Law School, where he was a colleague of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Until then, nothing predicted that Donovan would become one of the masterminds of American intelligence during World War II and in the early years of the Cold War.

Returning to Buffalo, William J. Donovan began his career as a partner in a law firm and later on created his own firm with his colleague from Columbia, Bradley Goodyear. Donovan was very active and immediately joined forces with other Buffalo lawyers and businessmen to organize their own Army National Guard unit called Troop 1, whose actions, to the surprise of many, became known throughout the country. Due to his past military experience and a certain prestige, Donovan was called to lead the iconic 69th Irish Regiment of New York City in 1916. For many, it was already obvious at that time that the United States would participate in the Great War and that they should prepare themselves. In 1917 and after months of training, the regiment became involved in the war in Europe as part of the US Army and was renamed the 165th regiment as part of the 42nd division commanded by Douglas MacArthur. William J. Donovan led this regiment and, after receiving many decorations – Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal and the Congressional Medal of Honour – which

⁴ Wiley J. Cooper intelligence ideas in The Foreign Service, 1937; Foreign Service reorganization -Morale and Public Confidence; Department of State; Reorganization of the Department of State and Foreign Service, Box, 10, John Cooper Wiley Papers, 1898-1967 in Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum.
increased his fame, among other things, because the New York Times published fragments of his letters to his wife, Ruth Donovan, he returned to the United States a hero (Waller, 2011, p. 22).

After the Great War, when Donovan was already very involved with the Republican Party and was responsible for winning the difficult Catholic vote for them, he became a United States attorney for Western New York and continued working in his private interests. So Donovan started to make a series of trips through Asia and Europe to expand the scope of his own law firm. He soon created a transnational network of businessmen who used informants of different nationalities to exchange information they considered relevant and as a big step forward in world politics. It was during these activities in the interwar period when he became convinced of the importance of detailed, varied, and often secret information in the economic and political decision-making process (Waller, 2011, p. 54).

The Declaration of War on Germany and its allies by the United Kingdom and France on 3 September 1939 took William J. Donovan to Europe. Many of the clients of his law firm, such as the Rothschilds, felt their interests and even their own lives threatened, and chose him to mediate with fascism and Nazism. His curiosity also took him to visit Mussolini and write reports that surprised his recipients by his deep knowledge of the situation in the world. He also visited Spain in 1938 in the middle of the Spanish civil war, worried as he was about the possible alignment of Francisco Franco in the war with Hitler and Mussolini. It was clear that his network of informants was working beyond business. In 1936, Donovan was already the first to speak in public, joining the figures of Hitler, Mussolini and Joseph Stalin as a dangerous axis, warning the United States that it was not the time to turn its back on its obligations as a world power.

The US première of the film, *The Fighting 69th*, in 1940, based on the history of the regiment commanded by Donovan in the Great War, where his character was represented by Irish actor George Brent, reinforced the popularity of William J. Donovan. That prestige, his accurate analysis of what was happening in Europe, and a similar

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vision of how one could proceed in the face of totalitarianisms led his former Columbia colleague, President Roosevelt, to thinking of him for a special mission in Europe, despite his political differences.

In the summer of 1940, Franklin Delano Roosevelt not only looked more and more worried about the advancement of Nazism but, at home, faced a third nomination as presidential candidate of his party, thus breaking with American political traditions. With a still strong isolationist movement within the United States, Roosevelt did not know if the British would be able to restrain the Luftwaffe and especially to curb a possible invasion of the German navy and army, through the Channel, without US help. The president wanted and needed a capable, expert and rigorous informant and that was, to the surprise of many, the Republican William J. Donovan. Wild Bill, as everyone called Donovan, had to go to the United Kingdom and other European countries and issue a rigorous report on the real situation of the parties in the still incipient war.

However, there was a specific aspect of the German strategy that interested him in meeting Roosevelt and his cabinet. Thus, Knox – the former publisher of the Chicago Daily News, also a Republican like Donovan and Secretary of the Navy, who had been appointed by Roosevelt – in his pursuit of greater political union in those difficult times, sent one of his closest collaborators to help William J. Donovan in his European mission. Edgar Mowrer, leading foreign correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to join Donovan to investigate the German “fifth column” espionage and sabotage operations in Great Britain and in the rest of Europe, with the express mission to inform President Roosevelt and his cabinet (Waller, 2011, p. 59). Since the Spanish Civil War, where a whole network of informants operated in the republican city of Madrid, many of whom had infiltrated the offices and the enemy army, the so-called “Fifth Columns” had been a concern for everyone. The effectiveness, precision and harshness of German espionage and its propaganda systems were already known.

The mission of Donovan and his collaborators in the United Kingdom and in other European countries, which was not simple, flowed smoothly and they often received secret information from British politicians and military as well as anti-fascists and anti-Stalinists from other parts of Europe. William J. Donovan met with
Winston Churchill and gained everyone's collaboration. It was in London where Donovan reinforced his passion for information and especially for secret information. He met with the Director of the British Intelligence Service Stewart Menzies, C for MI6, who, along with his complex network of informants, proudly let Donovan know that he would be aware of the German's intentions well in advance.

Upon his return to the United States, Donovan informed President Roosevelt of this. He was already sure that the United States needed to support the United Kingdom with armaments and strategies and to go to war as the only way to restrain Nazism. They also needed to create a centralized and efficient intelligence service. To this effect, the informants played a fundamental role, especially those of different nationalities who were familiar with the culture and language of the enemies and had immense political, economic and social experience. Not just any refugee would do. They had to be the leaders of their respective communities of exiles in the United States because they had extensive political experience and were very knowledgeable about the ins and outs of complex European politics.

Roosevelt's satisfaction with Donovan's mission was a sign of his decision to create the Office of the Coordinator of Information, the COI, and that it was William J. Donovan who would lead it. President Roosevelt shared with Donovan and, to some extent, with the intelligence services of the United Kingdom, which was already his ally, the notion that there was fragmentation and inefficiency in the US intelligence services between the Army, the Navy, the State Department and the FBI. According to Roosevelt and Donovan, unlike the British secret services, the Americans were poorly equipped, uncoordinated and outdated (Persico, 2001, pp. 90-92).

That is why Donovan's work as COI leader went way beyond that of a mere coordinator and integrator of the information generated by the different Federal Departments and intelligence agencies. The COI's comfortable economic situation also had to support the Research and Analysis Branch. Donovan therefore considered from the beginning that it was necessary to expand the network of informants, both inside and outside the United States, and to count on aid of the political elite from the different exile communities. To meet this new objective, he created a new section, still linked to the
COI, called the Foreign Nationalities Branch, FNB, led by another expert in intelligence and European affairs: DeWitt C. Poole.

Poole was a diplomat who started his career in Berlin in 1911, was later on destined to Paris in 1916 and then returned to the United States to join the State Department. From there he went to Russia, where he was living when the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 broke out. It was during the revolution that Poole became involved in a spy network formed by diplomatic personnel from other embassies and informants – 30 in Moscow and many more in other cities – the majority opposed to Leninist revolutionaries. He also acted during the Russian revolution as intermediary between the Bolshevik Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the US Department of State. However, in 1918, Poole was already exhausted and convinced of the triumph of the revolution. DeWitt C. Poole closed the US Consulate General in Moscow after arranging the evacuation of all US citizens residing in Russia and fleeing, with great difficulty, to Finland in September 1918. Poole returned to northern Russia, to the city of Archangel that was then occupied by the Allied forces, as a special assistant to the US ambassador. He left Russia in 1919 as American chargé d'affaires (The New York Times, 4 September 1952).

In the United States, Poole was Director of the State Department's Division of Russian Affairs and promoted to Consul General. Impressed with Soviet intelligence and especially with the effectiveness of its propaganda, he left the State Department in 1930 and began an academic career as director of the advisory board of The School of Public Affairs that was created at Princeton University, allegedly with economic support from the US government. In 1937, he co-founded his dissemination body: Public Opinion Quarterly, which became a forum for experts in public opinion polls. He was also an outstanding figure for experts in psychological warfare (Simpson, 1966, pp. 48-52).

From there, he was called by the newly appointed COI leader, Donovan, to direct the Foreign Nationalities Branch project. He was his perfect complement. Donovan knew British intelligence services well and to some extent those of Italian fascism and German Nazism, but Poole was the great expert in Soviet intelligence services.

When, in July 1942, due to the difficult situation of World War II, it was considered that the COI should become the Office of Strategic
Services, by militarising it and increasing its competencies, the Foreign Nationalities Branch and its director, DeWitt C. Poole, already one of the great experts in psychological warfare, were also part of the new organization.

The Foreign Nationalities Branch was therefore responsible, when it depended on the COI and when it was part of the OSS, for creating a network of information sources through interviewing leaders of refugee communities. It was also responsible for reading and exhausting the newspapers and magazines, which was essential according to US intelligence for discovering the weaknesses of the enemies and the strengths of the allies, and move forward steadily in the war. This led to measures being proposed and implemented to influence propaganda and covert actions and destabilize enemy nations. Psychological warfare was one of the strong points of the FNB.

However, the path taken to approach refugees and understand the content of their political press was not straightforward. On the one hand, as noted above, the OSS had a different and positive view of the usefulness of these refugee communities for US strategies, but there were already agencies that monitored and penalized them. This hindered the FNB's action and was also the reason why refugees did not trust any government agencies from their host nation.

It is DeWitt C. Poole who recalls in “The Study of Foreign Political Developments in the United States,” that competence problems due to the different interests that intelligence agencies used in their approach to foreign communities were common. “Informal but important steps are in process looking toward closer contact and coordination among the Federal Agencies having to do with the foreign-nationality groups”, Poole informed Donovan. He also reminded him that a joint committee had been created to alleviate these differences between them.

Despite these differences, the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch approached and interviewed – we do not know if this was imperatively in any case – the leaders they identified from each of the foreign communities. The FNB was particularly interested in government members in exile and their ministers, but also those in exile who had political and union responsibilities in their countries. Not only did they want to interview them, but their contacts and
networks, inside and outside their countries, were also essential for
the FNB and for the new US intelligence strategy.

“The governments-in-exile kept as close to their homes as
possible, but in most cases their largest free constituencies –
indeed, their only large constituencies – were here in the US...,”
DeWitt C. Poole wrote to Donovan. “The opportunity thus created
for useful political intelligence has been still further enlarged by the
presence here as political refugees of a large number of European
practitioners of the art of politics, whose intimate knowledge of
situations and trained acumen were found to be worth consulting in
selected instances”, concluded Poole. Among this group of expert
refugee leaders “of the art of politics” whom the Foreign Intelligence
Branch looked at and with whom they “talked” were a good group of
Italians such as Carlo Sforza, Alberto Tarchiani, Alberto Cianca; from
Germans like Thomas Mann, Karl Spiecker, Paul Tillich; Archduke Otto
of Habsburg; from Greeks like Bishop Athenagoras, Emmanuel
Tsouderos, Sophocles Venizelos; Poles like Ignacy Matuszewski,
Stefan de Ropp, Feliks Gross, Wakla W. Bitner; Russians like
Alexander Kerensky, Victor Chernov and Oscar Halecki; Lithuanians
like Antanas Smetona; Frenchmen like Alexis Leger, Jacques Maritain
and Henry Torres.

At the end of the list, from the report issued by Poole, there were
distinguished Spanish refugees such as José Antonio de Aguirre,
Lehendakari (president) of the Basque government in exile; Julio
Álvarez del Vayo, former republican minister as well as writer,
journalist and politician; Diego Martínez Barrio, who had presided
over the government of the Second Republic in exile since 1945; and
Fernando de los Ríos, who had been the ambassador of Spain in
Washington during the Second Spanish Republic and who later on
taught in the New York New School for Social Research. In his report,
Poole insisted on the importance of: “Some systematic and discreet
contact on the part of the United States Government with
unrecognised movements and dissident agitations. Something apart
from the ordinary diplomatic machinery is needed because even
discretion does not stop the regular diplomatic staff from contacts of this type".6

Foreign refugees were seen differently by the Foreign Nationalities Branch. They were the great experts in different European policies, had well-formed networks with politicians, intellectuals and trade unionists in their countries, knew the national language and cultures and all this, according to the FNB, could be used by American intelligence to construct a propaganda and psychological warfare strategy against the enemy in those decisive years of World War II.

2. Spanish refugees in the United States and the Foreign Nationalities Branch

The outbreak of the Civil War, which faced the Popular Front coalition in Spain to an alliance of non-democratic rights that supported the coup d'État of July 1936, deeply mobilised a section of American civil society. The United States government remained distant from this war. Its policy against the Second Spanish Republic was also explicit. From the Neutrality Laws of the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, promulgated in 1935, 1936 and 1937, the legitimate government of Spain knew that no US governmental aid would be given to its cause, at any time. However, US citizenship was mobilised by creating a multitude of aid committees, newspapers, assemblies and even sending to the Republican front volunteers organized around the Lincoln Brigade as well as organizations that provided health care, and care, but were never supported by their government (Guardia, 2019, pp. 173-176).

There were multiple reasons for American neutrality. On the one hand, the Catholic vote was important for Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and although the American Catholic community was much divided – 39 percent of Catholics supported Franco and 30 percent were loyal to the legitimate Republican government – the Catholic hierarchy did support the Dictator (Varela, 2008, p. 243). Furthermore, the movement in favour of isolationist policies remained robust in the

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6 The Study of Foreign Political Developments in the United States. A New Field of Political Intelligence, 31 December 1944. p. 5. in US Office of Strategic Services, US National Archives.
United States despite the arrival of the Democrats at the White House. There was also fear on the part of the international community of an even greater polarization if the European and American democracies intervened in a war where everyone already knew that both Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy did so to support Franco.

Once the war was over, the United States did not help the immense group of Spanish refugees who remained in conditions of extreme harshness in France and North Africa either. Moreover, after the Spanish Civil War ended in 1939, the United States only took two days to recognize Francisco Franco's regime and never granted refugee status to Spanish Republicans.

Even so, as already noted, Spanish Republican exiles entered the United States. Most of these refugees had one element in common: their fierce anti-Stalinism although some were linked to different Marxist groups. It is Maurice R. Davie, in one of the few existing quantifications on refugees from European totalitarianisms in the United States from 1933 until the end of World War II, in 1945, who calculates the total amount of refugees as being 243,862. These had come from Germany, since 1933; from Spain since 1937; and from the rest of Europe since 1938. Out of the majority, or rather 53 per cent were Germans; followed by 11,1 percent of Poles; and 8,9 percent of Italians. Spaniards were only 1,2 percent of the total number of refugees, or political emigrants, who arrived in the United States after the Spanish Civil War and World War II (Davie, 1947).

Without any refugee status, these Spanish Republican “emigrants” used their previous contacts to find a way to enter with the immigration laws in force in the United States that, in the nineteen thirties, established an annual entrance fee – two percent of the number of emigrants of each nationality, since 1924 – following an old census dating back to 1890. Moreover, since the immigration reform implemented in the United States, in the year of the great crisis of 1929, the total quota of emigrants for all countries subject to the quota law was set at 150,000 per year. This meant that Spain had a very small quota because Spanish immigration, at the end of the nineteenth century, was not yet significant; therefore, only 252 Spaniards could enter each year (Varela, 2008, p. 135). In the year that the Civil War broke out, in 1936, 250 Spaniards were
legally admitted, in 1937 even less, 244, and in 1938 the number increased to 2647.

From that small nucleus of exiles, in fact, very few were of interest for the intentions of the Foreign National Branch. If we pay attention to the report that DeWitt C. Poole sent to the director of the OSS as early as 1944, despite recognizing the existence of a greater number of refugees than that defended by Davie, he also stated that only a small number were interested in information and counter propaganda: “While the full count of those who might be called political refugees, arriving from Europe since 1933, may run to half a million, the individuals among them of real political consequences in relation to particular situations abroad are to be counted by tens or hundreds at the most”, acknowledged the report. “In the case of Poland, the count of politically consequential figures, according to the experience of this Branch, would not go beyond 200; France and Italy, each about the same.” From there the number dropped. Out of the Czech refugees, only 100 were of interest to the FNB; the Germans, remember that we are still in 1944, 50; Yugoslavs 40; Russians 30 and from Austria, Hungary and Spain only 20. In the same document, DeWitt acknowledged that: “The emphasis in the case of the refugees has therefore not been on quantity but on individual interest, careful selection, and personal cultivation”. The report also ensured that the most important city for these refugee communities was New York. The FNB decided that in addition to the Washington office, another “very carefully equipped office” would remain open in NYC8. From there, reports were prepared, leaders of the different communities of exiles interviewed, negotiations started, excerpts from the political press published in the languages of the different exile communities were read and translated and their rallies and meetings were attended to develop political, military and propaganda strategies aimed at winning the war.

7 Department of Labour, Immigration and Naturalization Service; Annual Report of Secretary and mimeographed releases in US National Archives, on line.
8 DeWitt C. Poole, The Study of Foreign Political Developments in the United States. A New Field of Political intelligence, 31 December 1944. CIA-RDP89-01258R000100010004-2. P. 15 in CIA Archives, on line.
Among the Spanish leaders who were required to inform the FNB were members of all republican groups in exile except pro-Soviet communists. Thus, socialist leaders; former militants of the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, POUM; the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, CNT; Republicans and also Nationalists were interviewed, and on many occasions they collaborated in other ways with the Foreign Nationalities Branch.

The FNB was also very close to the government of the Spanish Second Republic in exile and the nationalist, Basque and Catalan governments also in exile. In fact, the governments of all nations and regions in exile were of interest for the informative work of the FNB, considering that they maintained deep contacts with the political forces inside their respective nations and that they were well aware of the characteristics of their respective political cultures.9

In some cases, the FNB responded to the request for refuge and even for nationality of some of the Spanish exiles. That happened with the Malaga-born diplomat, Antonio de la Cruz Marín, from whom the FNB asked for detailed information and with whom FNB representatives met on numerous occasions, one of them together with the socialist leader, Indalecio Prieto, in 1944.10

Fernando de los Ríos, a distinguished member of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, PSOE; former Minister of Justice and later on Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, during the Second

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Spanish Republic and, as we have pointed out, in exile in New York, was one of the Spanish exiles considered relevant during the first years of operation of the FNB for his extensive knowledge of the Spanish and international scenarios as well as the fact that his New York home address was the meeting place of Spanish exiles in the United States (Ruiz-Manjón, 2009, p. 75). “Every Sunday, Don Fernando's apartment was open to all friends who were in the New York area. No invitation was required. It was an ‘Open House’, as we say in English”, Carmen de Zulueta reminded us, “A house open to all Spanish and Spanish American exiles sympathizing with the defeated Republic” (Zulueta, 2001, pp. 119-120). Sometimes, those open Sundays were so popular that there was not enough room in the De los Ríos family home in Riverside Drive, New York. “The Spaniards continue to come on Sundays, already known and newcomers, as some present others and there are nights that they don't all fit in the room”, Fernanda Urruti wrote again, this time to her son, José de los Ríos, who was already living in Puerto Rico (Muñoz Rojas, 2009, p. 170).

Foreign National Branch talks with Fernando de los Ríos were commonplace. In the first of them, held on 12 May 1942, the lives of Spanish politicians were discussed. The second was on 7 May 1943. In 1944, De los Ríos only met with representatives of the FNB on 6 November, while in 1945, the FNB and De los Ríos met five times. Four in the FNB's New York office and one at the home of Fernando de los Ríos. He also met once again with the FNB, on this occasion, together with the president of the government of the Second Republic in Exile, Diego Martínez Barrio, on 1 December 1944. The FNB also received a letter in February 1945, in which Fernando de los Ríos showed the OSS his concern over the non-granting of visas by the French government to Spanish Republican refugees in France11.

The FNB also interviewed other former ministers of the different governments of the Second Spanish Republic. They held talks with Julio Álvarez del Vayo Olloqui, a Spanish lawyer, journalist and politician, member of the PSOE, who had been ambassador to Mexico when the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed, and who also became a minister of state. As close collaborator of Juan Negrín since the political crisis of 1937, Álvarez del Vayo shared with him his desire to prolong the Spanish Civil War until the outbreak of World War II in order to obtain allied support against Franco and his totalitarian accomplices. With the Republican defeat, Álvarez del Vayo went into exile in France, in Mexico and then in the United States where he successfully practised journalism. He was expelled from the PSOE in 1946, developing radical political views. He created the Spanish Socialist Union and then, in 1973, he promoted the armed group, Antifascist and Patriot Revolutionary Front, FRAP (Álvarez del Vayo, 1975).

Álvarez del Vayo was also one of the Spanish exiles who was most often contacted by the FNB. They interviewed him four times in all, one of them accompanied by Juan Negrín and another by Indalecio Prieto, but they also had conversations, apart from the interviews, about "Europe and the invasion", on 8 June 1944; he was invited to participate in an urgent meeting to create an emergency action plan in defence of democracy in 1942; and he reported on the feelings of European refugees in the United States towards the State Department.  

The Foreign Nationalities Branch also met with Juan Negrín, the Spanish scientist and politician who was minister of finance, chairman of the Council of Ministers and president of the last government of the Second Spanish Republic during the Civil War. As such, he went into exile keeping the republican government active, first in France and then in London and Mexico. In 1946, he was expelled from the PSOE due to the harsh confrontations between the different political factions of Spanish exiles. FNB archives contain reports about Negrín’s arrival in the United States from Mexico, on 26 January 1945, and on his confrontations with Indalecio Prieto (“Indalecio Prieto in New York and the Present Alignment of Spanish Republicans”) but the FNB also maintained direct contact with him. Therefore, members of the FNB interviewed Negrín and talked to him on three occasions, one of them with Álvarez Vayo.

Numerous conversations were also held between the FNB and governments in exile, as noted above. Therefore, the FNB met with Diego Martínez Barrio, former president of the Spanish Courts, interim president of the Second Republic, president of the Cortes in exile and, finally, president of the government of Spain in exile from 1945 to 1962 (Álvarez Rey, 2000, pp. 181-205). They held interviews with him, sometimes alone, and others accompanied by Fernando de los Ríos. Among the files of Martínez Barrio are also
reports on various activities carried out by the government of the Spanish Republic in exile.\footnote{Martinez Barrio, Diego [Conversation with Diego Martinez Barrio and Fernando de los Rios] (Dec. 1, 1944) INT-27SP-365 [Establishment of the Spanish Republican Junta for Liberation] (Feb. 7, 1944) INT-27SP-254 Martinez Barrio Tries To Rally Spanish Republican Forces (Dec. 13, 1944) INT-33SP-24 Meeting of Spanish Republicans (Nov. 27, 1944) INT-27SP-364 Spanish Republican Committee of Liberation (Dec. 6, 1943) 1NT-33SPS Spanish Republican Cortes President States His Credo (July 17, 1945) INT-33SP-40 Spanish Republican Politics in Exile (June 11, 1943) INT-33SP-4 in US Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, 1942-1945, Indexes, CIS, Bethesda, MD, Congressional Information Services, Inc, 1988}

Reports and “conversations” with Basque and Catalan nationalists were commonplace. The FNB prepared a report on their activities in exile, their specific actions in Latin America, on some of their publications and also on specific activities of their leaders. It also held conversations with part of their leaders. Meetings were held on 7 April, 12 and 14 June, 21 July and 6 November 1943 as well as on 7 April 1944 and 1 May 1945 with Manuel de la Sota, a member of the Basque Government delegation in New York; with de la Sota, along with Antonio de Irala, on 30 November 1943.\footnote{Basque and Catalan Politics in Exile (Nov. 13, 1944) INT-33SP-20 Basques Reported Withdrawing Opposition to Spanish Constitution of 1931(May 12, 1945) INT-33SP-37 [Foreign-nationality groups in Latin America, studies] (June 23-29, 1944) INT-10EU-426 [Lesser nationality groups, information] (June 17, 1942) INT-IOEU-ÔO Martinez Barrio Tries To Rally Spanish Republican Forces (Dec. 13, 1944) INT-33SP-24 [Mexican foreign publications, further information] C0cr. 12, 1944) INT-10EU-474 Spanish: document series INT-27SP-] to WT-27SP-501 Spanish Republican Politics in Exile (June 11, 1943) INT-33SP-4 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee Meeting; Conference of Solidarity with the Spanish People (Sept. 21, 1943) INT-10EU-259 in US Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, 1942-1945, Indexes, CIS, Bethesda, MD, Congressional Information Services, Inc, 1988.}

Reports, interviews and meetings with José Antonio Aguirre were frequent while he resided and taught at Columbia University in New York. Leader of the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV, president of the Basque government since its establishment on 7 October 1936, first in the Basque Country, then in Barcelona and after in his subsequent exile in France, Aguirre and his government went underground, after being persecuted by the Gestapo. Once he was allowed to enter the United States his status had been legalised, at the end of 1941,
José Antonio de Aguirre openly led the Basque government in exile in New York. With US government support, Aguirre arrived in Philadelphia with his documents in order on 6 November 1941; the Basque nationalists Manuel Ynchausti and Manuel de la Sota were waiting for him to take him to New York, where he led the international relations of the Basque government in exile (Mota Zurdo, 2016, pp. 119-121). Like the other government leaders in exile, Lehendakari Aguirre had to meet with the FNB. He did so three times, one of them with the “Mr. Sota”. The FNB also issued reports on “The Basque movement and José Antonio Aguirre” and on the meeting between José Antonio de Aguirre and the United States ambassador in Madrid, Carlton Hayes.  

Frequent meetings of the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch with Catalan nationalist leaders also took place in New York. The FNB and the Catalan nationalist, J.M. Fontanals met twice, despite information stating that many more meetings had taken place, once in 1943 and again in 1944, with Josep Carner-Ribalta, who had accompanied Macià on his controversial trip to Moscow in 1925 and was closely linked there to Andreu Nin, who acted as guide and interpreter for them. Carner-Ribalta knew the Catalan political trajectory well as the American intelligence services pointed out. Josep Maria Carner-Ribalta participated in the proclamation of the Catalan republic in Olot in 1924, and began his first exile in Belgium after his failure. With the proclamation of the Catalan Government in 1931, he held different political positions at the start of his exile, as he confronted representatives of the CNT-FAI as Commissioner of Spectacles of the Catalan Government in 1938. During his exile, he lived in Paris.

Mexico and New York. Carner-Ribalta participated in the creation of Free Catalonia with the aid of the FNB, in an attempt to fight Franco. Together with Fontanals, J. Ventura Sureda and representing the Consell Nacional Català, he filed an appeal on behalf of Republican Catalonia at the San Francisco Conference\textsuperscript{17}.

In addition to prominent leaders of the Spanish Republican exile, the FNB also interviewed intellectuals and university teachers in exile in the United States. Out of all of them, the one they interviewed the most was Alfredo Mendizábal, the Catholic philosopher who had been able to flee the Gestapo, like many other intellectuals trapped in occupied France, with the help of the American Emergency Rescue Committee. President Roosevelt granted a series of “emergency visas” which allowed several hundred refugees, mostly German Jews but also Catholics and members of other nationalities, to enter the United States. It was Varian Fry, the New York writer and editor, who represented the organization in France and who somehow influenced the departure of Mendizábal and other Spaniards to the United States\textsuperscript{18}.


The US intelligence services also held talks with Ernesto Dacal, Galician and Lusitanist and expert in Pessoa, who had fought in the Civil War with the Galician militias and had been commissioned in the United States since 1938 by the Second Republic. There he remained as an exile at the end of the war, working as a teacher at New York University. They also interviewed the poet, Pedro Salinas, first teacher at Wesllesley College and then John Hopkins; Juan Negrín Jr., son of Juan Negrín, and teacher in the Department of General Pathology at the University of New York; Pilar de Madariaga, who changed during her exile from being a prominent researcher in Chemical Sciences to a Spanish teacher at Vassar College, and many others.

In addition to personal contacts and collaboration with leaders in exile, the FNB was also interested in periodicals published in foreign languages in the United States. Newspapers in other languages, including those published in Spanish, and printed in the United States were listed in the “Handbook”, which was one of the first reports issued as director of the FNB by DeWitt C. Poole for other agencies. We know from the Handbook that in 1944, fourteen political newspapers written in Spanish were published. The most important for Spanish exiles was España Libre, which was considered the vehicle for disseminating Spanish republican exile and how well it has been studied by Montserrat Feu (2011). But there were many more. Pueblos Hispanos, El Antifascista, Cultura proletaria, Justicia, La Prensa, La Traducción-prensa, La Esperanza, among others.


21 Spanish-Language Press in the U.S. Sept. 22, 1944. INT-33SP-16. Descriptors: España Libre (newspaper); Pueblos Hispanos (newspaper); El Antifascista (newspaper); Cultura Proletaria (periodical); Justicia (newspaper); La Prensa
These contacts with the Foreign Nationalities Branch by both politicians and newspaper editors did not seem to be difficult for part of the Spanish Republican exile as evidenced by the records of the reports and conversations with them, kept in the OSS Archives, and the newspapers and correspondence of Spanish exiles themselves. During World War II, Spanish refugees expelled by Franco supporters living in the United States were hopeful and grateful to the nation that had welcomed them. When the United States entered World War II, their satisfaction with Roosevelt’s policies was even greater. Now the United States was the nation facing Nazism and refugees expressed their satisfaction with the American political and social system. The “Americanism” of this Spanish exile community was a buzz with hope. “The war has completely changed with the wonderful entry of Americans into North Africa”, Fernando de los Ríos wrote to his brother José de los Ríos from his New York exile in 1942 (Muñoz Rojas, 2009, p. 145). “The war is going very well from a military perspective”, Fernando de los Ríos told his brother in another letter, “And I think it will be even better soon because production and the spirit here improve every day and create very high ethics of war” (p. 160).

However, this monitoring and even this joy as the war progressed was not free. Somehow, the Spanish exiles wrongfully linked the allied victory in World War II to the possibility of ending Franco’s regime in Spain: “Happily, the war is going very well”, Fernando de los Ríos insisted from his exile in December 1942, “Like in other European countries, in the end a regime of freedom and democratic respect will be imposed in Spain”, he concluded hopefully (p. 180).

Spanish exiles were not inactive either. With the knowledge of the FNB, many Spanish exiles in the United States and Mexico signed the Declaration of Havana and created the Spanish Liberation Board whose purpose was to present itself as a united bloc and influence...
so that allies would help to restore democracy in Spain. Among his victories are the inclusion in the United Nations Charter of an amendment that prevented access to international organizations of regimes formed with the support of the Nazi-fascist powers and therefore the Franco regime. Somehow they contributed to their isolation. Spanish republican exile was also behind all the diplomatic and political work that achieved the condemnation of the Franco regime at the United Nations in November 1946.

3. Other refugees. The beginning of the Cold War

The allied victory in World War II initiated a process of change and reorganization of American intelligence and also of relations with the different exile communities in the United States and in Europe.

“On 20 September 1945, despite the efforts of General William Donovan, President Truman issued an executive order (E.O. 9621) terminating the OSS, effective 1 October”, confirmed by the Guide of General William J. Donovan Selected OSS documents, in its introduction. And that was what happened. The OSS was closed – the Research and Analysis section was passed over to the State Department and the rest to the Armed Forces – and the FBI saw its budget cut. Donovan's discontent with the measure was obvious and he tried to stop it until the end but Truman faced huge costs with the repatriation of all US troops deployed around the world and he was also determined to review the entire intelligence strategy (Waller, 2011, p. 360).

The disappearance of the OSS did not mean the end of the collaboration of the exile and refugee communities, in the United States and in Europe, with the US intelligence services. However, with the beginning of the Cold War, the United States faced another enemy. Fascism and Nazism had been defeated and Soviet communism was rising as the danger to the new peace in the eyes of the United States. It was foreign experts in Marxism, and in most cases from the communist world, who seemed the most interesting to American intelligence agencies that remained.

Spanish exiles as a block, as well as the other refugees from the Mediterranean Countries, lost importance for the United States as the new Soviet enemy emerged on the horizon. It is true that some Spanish refugees maintained their interest in the secret services but now it was more to do with their status as anti-Stalinists and their knowledge of the Soviet world because of their former communist militancy. They were not interested in former republicans or socialists, all of them fierce anti-fascists, but rather those who were more radical, had participated at some point in the Soviet revolutionary spirit, and had faced Stalinism in one way or another. It was the moment of former POUM militants or anarcho-syndicalists such as Joaquín Maurín or Julián Gorkin, both very active in American cultural diplomacy (Glondys, 2007). This approach to refugees also became increasingly pragmatic. Past or previous political commitments to former enemies did not matter, so long as it helped to fight communism.

In the same way as US occupation forces in Germany had used informants, many of them linked to Nazism, to obtain information about the Soviet Union, and the Department of War had allowed Nazi experts to enter the United States, George Truman believed that it was also time to use the knowledge of refugees from Eastern European countries already dominated by the USSR or Soviet dissidents. However, as the Office of Special Investigation showed, these were sometimes war criminals in the operation known as “Paperclip” (Feign, 2019).

It was necessary to reorganize US intelligence to make this new task of ideological and political struggle against the USSR effective. Strangely enough, despite Donovan's political uprooting, his staunch defence of the need to maintain active and effective intelligence services in peacetime was heard. As there was already a clear confrontation with the USSR and the world was starting to be separated into blocks, President Truman promulgated the National Security Act in 1947 to correct what his team considered as vulnerable points of the American military and intelligence organization. The new law reorganized the command structure of the three US armies, the decision-making procedures in international politics as well as all intelligence services, creating a counsellor and a National Security Council. The Council included a Central Intelligence
Agency, the CIA, to direct “intelligence services” as well as international activities related to US National Security. The CIA had to collect information on foreign governments, corporations and individuals. It used this information to prepare reports on national security and boost the effectiveness of US policies. The agency also developed and executed undercover actions.


This change in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union also showed the change in attitude of the United States towards the Franco dictatorship. At the end of that same year, 1947, in which American intelligence was restructured, there were already manifestations of a change of course in relations between the United States and Spain. The United States considered the alliance with Iberian countries necessary, due to their strategic and advantageous positions. Besides, the fierce anti-communism of Francisco Franco was now viewed positively by the US government. It was beginning to be a common element between democracies and their former fascist enemies.

Thus, in November, the United States opposed a new condemnation of Franco's regime at the UN and succeeded. Four months later, in February 1948, France reopened the border with Franco's Spain. The Cold War favoured the dictator. In addition, between May and June 1948, Spain signed trade agreements with France and the United Kingdom. After the outbreak of the Korean War, in 1950, the Senate listened to a proposition by party leaders to reopen relations with Franco's Spain. Many of them were traditional Catholics, all encouraged by Franco's envoy to the United States, Félix Lequerica, and they gave new credit to Franco's Spain. A short time later, on 4 November 1950, in the middle of the Korean War, the UN General Assembly revoked the condemnation of the Franco regime of 1946 by a large majority on account of the support of the United States and the abstention of France and the United Kingdom. Many Spanish republican exiles saw their expectations and support diminish. However, the process of
rapprochement between the United States and Franco's Spain was not yet over. Ambassadors of different western nations gradually returned to Madrid and their presence was commemorated as another victory of the Franco regime (Viñas, 2003).

During this process of rapprochement between Franco's Spain and the United States, Spanish republican exiles in New York ceased to be united. Clashes and debates escalated both in social spaces of the Spanish community and in the media.

With the signing of the Madrid Pacts between the United States and Spain in 1953, which restored diplomatic normality, strengthened collaboration between Spain and the United States and boosted the international recognition of Franco's regime, Spanish Republican exiles in the United States split into two groups.

The most moderate was led by the former director general of prisons of the Second Republic, a deputy in the Republican courts and lawyer, Victoria Kent, who had begun her New York exile in 1950 and was linked to the New York anti-Communist networks together with her partner, Louise Crane. She was joined by moderate Republicans and also many Basque and Catalan nationalist exiles (Guardia, 2016). In the other sector, a large part of the government of the Republic was placed in exile, especially the Socialists, and those most radical Republicans linked to trade unions and class parties. Each had a different understanding of the new American policy, although only in the first years that followed the Madrid Pacts. Later, fatigue and, for many, resignation, somehow united them (Feu, 2011, p. 94).

An event marked the beginning of that split of Spanish exiles in view of the new American and world attitude towards the Spanish dictatorship. On 16 May 1954, the president of the government in exile, Félix Gordón Ordás, travelled to New York and the US authorities detained him without allowing him to tread the soil of the United States. This was a measure of extreme harshness for a head of government in exile who, until then, had been considered a friend, like many other heads of government of the exile communities, and this reflected the new relations between the United States and the Franco regime. A short time later, Gordón Ordás wrote to Victoria Kent harshly condemning the new American attitude towards Franco's Spain. “I will not stop again in New York, or anywhere else in
North America, while it is ruled by the police which, over and above
the great democratic and liberal tradition of that country, has set up
the psychopathic state in which its ruling classes are located,” he
stated flatly in his letter. “They have communism (in the United
States), a childish terror similar to that which children in Spain have
of coconut... for men of my spiritual formation going through the
humiliations that I had to endure when I stopped there last time is a
torture we do not want repeat,” he concluded.

The confrontation between these two groups in New York was
radical. Victoria Kent, who had been appointed as an informal
representative of the Government of the Republic, in exile in the
United States, presented her resignation to the President of the
Republic for no longer sharing their political views. For her, although
the United States’ policy approach to Franco was painful, it was
necessary to restrain something she also hated: Stalinist
communism. “Please accept my resignation as an accomplished fact
and inform the Department of Justice on this date”, Victoria Kent
wrote to the president of the Spanish government in exile on 7
September 1954. After this, as evidence of that new phase, she
published a review, in Spanish and English, with Louise Crane, where
her political position and that of her group was pro-American, anti-
communist and anti-Franco. It was Iberica for a Free Spain, that was
released for the first time in January 1954. “The increased interest
in Spanish affairs in the United States has led a group of Americans
to create IBÉRICA Publishing Co., with the purpose of publishing
IBÉRICA, a monthly review focused solely on Spanish affairs”, said
the inaugural manifesto. Many Spanish exiles in the United States
who supported this position like an anarchist writer, Ramón J.
Sender, the Basque nationalists, Pedro Pagés, Pedro Marcos, Jesús
de Galindez, and many more collaborated in the new review. They
were also supported by an important group of American activists
and renowned European intellectuals, all of them active collaborators
of the US government in the cultural Cold War, mainly covertly

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24 Announcement of the publication of Ibérica, Año 1953-1954 in Instituto José Cornide de Estudios Coruñeses, Archivo Salvador de Madariaga.
directed by the CIA (Saunders, 2001). Spanish Democrats from the interior also participated. The majority were supporters of Enrique Tierno Galván who, together with Raúl Morodo, was one of Victoria Kent’s most constant correspondents. For a lot of people, the review, like many other publications, was financed by intermediate agencies including the CIA.

The historical review of Spanish exiles in the United States, España Libre, which had been monitored by the OSN FNB during World War II, and the strongest association of exiles, the Confederate Hispanic Societies, CHS, showed their opposition to those who supported the United States in this approach to Franco's Spain as a lesser evil, personified in the group leader: Victoria Kent. “I was verbally abused on 22 December 1953 by representatives of the Confederate Hispanic Societies who went to my Ibérica office, with the sole intention of preventing the review from being published in its Spanish edition,” wrote a hurt Victoria Kent to Manuel Dorado, General Secretary of the Confederate Societies. “They drew up a purely inquisitorial act, which the four gentlemen who formed the commission sealed, a copy of which is in my possession,” she concluded. However, things went even further, when the CHS wrote a letter to Louise Crane in which, if we pay attention to Victoria Kent, “Abuse directed towards me, Miss Crane, whom you have more than one reason to thank … It is too much, Mr. Gold. You have managed to exhaust my patience and I've had enough”, concluded Victoria Kent in that letter.

The tension prevailed between the two political positions and their reviews and, in 1961, both Victoria Kent and Louise Crane dropped out of the CHS.

The United States' approach to Franco's Spain caused desolation among the community of Spanish Republican exiles in the United States who, until then, had collaborated in many cases with the intelligence services of their host nation. While a moderate group considered that it was a necessary and transitory evil to restrain the Stalinist common

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26 Carta de Kent a Madariaga, 27 de octubre de 1961 in Fundación S Salvador de Madariaga, Instituto José Cornide de Estudios Coruñeses, Archivo Salvador de Madariaga.
enemy, other exiles remained faithful to their political trajectory demonstrating their discontent. The Spanish exile community in the United States was deeply divided in 1953 against the Madrid Pacts and the recognition of the Franco’s regime by the US.

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