# Table of Contents

## Themes and Perspectives

*Mediterranean and Migrations*

**Guest Editor, Teresa de Noronha**

- DE NORONHA, T. & MANGONE, E. - Driving Reflections about the Mediterranean Migrations, 3-15
- BRANCATO, A. - The Settler Colonial Paradigm and the Israeli Official Narrative: an Example of Elimination of the Natives, 17-36
- D’AMBROSIO, G. & PASTORI, V. - Some Indicators for the Analysis of Interculturality in Italy, 37-60
- FISSEHA, M. - The Roles of Civil Society and International Humanitarian Organizations in Managing Refugees Crisis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, 61-80

## Comments and Debates

- VITANZA, V.J. – A Third Wave of Remembering. The Mediterranean Sea as a Septic Tank, 81-86

## Reviews and Reports

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INDEXED IN
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Driving Reflections about the Mediterranean Migrations

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Abstract
The present paper refers to the general theoretical framing upon migrations and Mediterranean. It is an example of multidisciplinary view, which intertwines philosophic aspects and sociological requirements in a clearly political context. It mainly calls the attention of the reader to migrations, a topic that has ruled the history of mankind and involved all populations across the world. The current status of the migration in the Mediterranean has its roots in the history of the relations - not only economical, but also cultural and social - among the people living on the shores of this «sea among lands». Today, the ideas cultivated in the past and the exchanges among civilizations can create a situation of conflict, like is often happening, but also a fruitful encounter, making consider migrations not as a burden, but as a resource. Today, the greatest political challenges concerns the humanitarian aspects of integration of migrant population, particularly in the Mediterranean region.

Keywords: Migrations, Mediterranean, Culture, Multidisciplinarity, History.

The Mediterranean is not merely geography. Its boundaries are drawn in neither space nor time. There is in fact no way of drawing them: they are neither ethnic nor historical, state not national; they are like a chalk circle that is constantly traced and erased, that the winds and waves, that obligations and inspirations expand or reduce. The Mediterranean shores have seen only the silk route but also the crisscrossing of many others: routes of salt and spices, amber and ornaments, oils and perfumes, tools and arms, skills and knowledge, arts and sciences. Hellenic emporia were markets and embassies; Roman roads spread power and civilization; Asian soil provided prophets and religions. Europe was conceived on the Mediterranean (Matvejević, 1999, pp. 7 and 10).

This idea does not appear to have been forgotten. The Mediterranean, known as Mare nostrum by the Romans saw the flourishing of cultures, arts, religions, philosophies. Nevertheless, today the Mediterranean “is no longer a ‘hotbed’ of dialogue but has become a battlefield for a war fought not with weapons but with ‘ideologies’ and where opponents are identified
in Us and Them” (Mangone, 2015a, p. 50). This sea is not a fact, but a process (Ruel, 1991), and it has become a place of closure and not a place of openness to dialogue, which could give an answer to the crisis of European identities and to the pro-independence pressures arisen in this historic moment (think to the United Kingdom with the Brexit and to the Catalonia). This sea of “dialogue and freedom” has become a sea of “closure and death”. Yes, because today the migrants died in the Mediterranean amount to dozens of thousands. Cassano defined the Mare nostrum the sea of human beings (Cassano & Zolo, 2007) as it is the place of the encounter of and with the foreigner: today the Mediterranean is a border that separates the good from the evil: in fact, in the imagery of migrants it is both freedom (the good) and “mortal trap” (the evil).

Despite this negative social transformation, the Mediterranean still plays an essential role for the promotion of pluralism, diversity and freedom, because it could transform itself into a table of peace among the West and the Islamic world and could not be just the “border” of the Southern shore of Europe. The latter, must review its relationship with the Mediterranean along with the other political and cultural protagonists living on the Mediterranean coasts, starting from the Arab people (Hadhri & Mangone, 2016). Laying the foundations for a real and concrete multicultural identity, which passes through Europe - part of the West that defines itself as “cradle of democracy” in spite of what is stated by Sen (2003) - must ease the encounter with the Other, with the awareness that only dialogue can make society open up to the re-composition of cultural differences, respecting the peculiarities of each culture.

Depuis le Mare nostrum uniifié par les Romains jusqu’à la mosaïque contemporaine issue des empereurs coloniaux européens, La Méditerranée, terre d’échanges et carrefour des civilisations, est riche d’une longue histoire contrastée, faite d’affrontements identitaires aussi bien que de dialogues des cultures, d’exclusion et d’intégration, de clivages et d’interprétations. Dans la mesure où les échanges sous-tendent la reconnaissance de l’altérité et impliquent mobilité et circulation, mutations et changements, ils ne sauraient être placés dans une dialectique de la continuité et de la rupture, de l’ouverture et de la fermeture, avec les risques que cela suppose pour les identités méditerranéennes, oscillant entre continuum anthropologique et fracture civilisationnelle. Qu’il s’agisse d’économie ou de droit, d’art ou de littérature, d’histoire ou de religion, la Méditerranée est un laboratoire
privilégié pour une réflexions sur les processus dynamiques à l’œuvre dans les échanges” (Bernard et al., 2016, pp. 5-6).

The social problem is not constituted by the difference, which is ineradicable, but by the meanings associated to this difference: indeed, often the “We” strengthen by defining negatively the Other and this process is particularly significant when individuals stand “in defence of our own world” (Mangone, 2015b). If otherness is an unavoidable dimension of reality, as it establishes processes of identification and recognition, we must promote a reflection on the fact that “difference” cannot be a place of collision, but a basis for a culture of tolerance and respect, also because of the continuous migration flows in the Mediterranean Basin.

Back to the recent history, and although the Mediterranean has a well-defined cultural and historical foundation, World War II created in the region a silent source of political instabilities. Greece and Turkey in the Balkans and Iran in the Middle East should act as barriers to the progress of URSS and the Arab nationalism, not to despise the role of Israel slowly assuming such a task as well. With time, the rise of nationalistic conflicts became evident (of which the case of Cyprus was an example) decreasing the possibilities of a peaceful coexistence amongst the different ethnic groups. Meanwhile, one of the most important steps versus a major step of stability was the integration of some Mediterranean countries in the European concept. Italy, first, Portugal and Spain and finally, Greece, have contributed to change partially some political and economic values that were part of continental Europe (Sappelli, 1995). With this step the Mediterranean region accentuated its gapping conditions and the lack of homogeneity between institutions and structures remains as an obstacle to sustainable development.

Having brought some light into the historical conditions of Mediterranean recent past, it is not surprising that political and economical instabilities have played a major role to determine the delay in many countries development and the consequent desire of populations to search for better living conditions. During the past decades, migration within the Mediterranean region has been accentuating, either because of explicit war or because of increasing poverty, thus stressing the economic wellbeing of
recipient countries but and above all, letting the poorer areas deprived of human resources, capital and hope. Migrations are a consequent of the recent past and the strongest determinant of the future in the Mediterranean region.

Migrations, therefore, are a field of operational work that entails to have a clear framework to calibrate properly the interventions, also trying to interpret the future trends. With reference to the latter action, extremely delicate because it influences the policies on immigration, a choice is starting from a non-ethnocentric reading of immigration, taking into account the diverse territorial areas and individual regions: think, for example, to historic events such as the Arab spring, which have changed flows, channels and even countries of emigration; but also think to a little studied subject, which allows to have an “objective reading” of the other point of view: the social representation of people and society of destination built by the immigrant.

Indeed, if the empirical studies on the point of view of native people on foreigners are numerous, there are few studies that consider the point of view of the foreigner as an actor that, on the one hand, faces the need to keep a tie with the culture of origin, within the resources and constraints provided by the context, and, on the other hand, needs to open up to the values of the society of destination (La Barbera, 2015). The observation of the point of view of the foreigner matches the exigency to join a paradigmatic shift, more and more accepted by researchers, about the way to understand the process inclusion and integration, not seen in a unilateral way, according to the optic of hosting without including and integrating, but, on the contrary, valorising the point of view of who is in conditions of vulnerability and, on the basis of his cultural references, tries to integrate in the Country of destination. In this way, the proposals of the Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals (European Commission, 2016) are confirmed: integration is an “evolutional process” and the integration policies - aimed at removing barriers that prevent to live and work in the Member States and to integrate in the hosting society - must be elaborated according to an approach connected to the local realities, so as to ease the access to services, education, learning of language and fight to discrimination.
The formal breaking down of geographical borders that characterizes the global society - think to the Schengen agreement in Europe, at least until the latter has been involved in a wave of terror (Mangone & Pece, 2017), started from the attempt at the Jewish museum of Bruxelles in 2014, considered the first attack of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Europe - should ease the movement of population in voluntary or less voluntary, peaceful or less peaceful, way, but today de facto it does not happen (think to the construction of the border between Hungary and Serbia in 2015). This provokes different dynamics, in which different cultures are “forced” to meet and coexist, permeating the social and cultural processes of both societies of origin and those of destination.

In the last years, for example, with the process of Europeanization carried out at economic level as well, many resentments arose toward the Southern Europe, often identified with the Mediterranean, forgetting that the South of Europe and the Mediterranean represents, on the one hand, the gate of Europe (from the Southern shore) and, on the other hand, the bridge between two continents, Africa and Europe. The weight of the Mediterranean component and of the closeness of North-African countries is relevant in the whole Southern Europe and, under several respects, this creates many differences with the rest of Europe. The European identity and its geography must necessarily take into account among institutional divisions of the individual nations and within the nations themselves (see the Brexit in the United Kingdom, the pro-independence movement in Catalonia in Spain and, to a very limited extent, in Veneto in Italy), but also the complex divergences of politics and economy, religion and culture, which constitute real cleavages, often within the borders of the Nation State (Eder & Giesen, 2001).

The problem of cosmopolitanism (Beck & Grande, 2007) and of a cosmopolitan Europe is not the Mediterranean, also because civilizations, religions and philosophies, juridical codes and political systems, including democracy and even science, were born in this sea. All the values and knowledge born in the Mediterranean Basin (South of Europe, North Africa and East) can represent the strategic elements to overcome the European crisis that seems to exist since the establishment of the common Europe. They could also become a thrust to review the policies and provide a solid
basis for the rise of a real common cultural heritage of Euro-Mediterranean knowledge and to transmit it to the future generations.

«Only a Europe able to see in the Mediterranean its cradle and to head again those shores for too long delegated to its forgotten periphery, could really find its “natural” (under the historical-geographical point of view) centre of gravity, that sea to look not only with nostalgic regret for the lost centrality in the history of the world, but with the proud awareness to be a “great space” able to play its own role of neutralization of conflicts, preventing the risk of a clash of civilizations» (Resta 2012, p. 104).

The December 2017 data of UNHCR (2018) show that more than 166,000 migrants landed on the shores of Italy, Spain, Greece and, to a very small extent, Cyprus; some 3,000 of them are lost at sea (Unhcr, 2017). The Mediterranean, however, can assume an essential relevance in promoting pluralism, diversity and freedom, by becoming a place of dialogue and encounter.

It is thus desirable that the Mediterranean may become “reflective knowledge” that promotes the building of relations with the environments of life of individuals and among individuals, easing the encounter between North and South and between East and West.

Culture, indeed, is not an absolute, like identity: both are dynamic. The advantages coming from having a culture depend on the process of rebuilding of that culture, and the dominant discourse of culture as an immutable heritage is only a subcomponent (often conservative) of a process (Buruma & Margalit, 2004; Said, 1978).

It is evident that what we call multiculturalism is a new way of understanding and defining the cultural dynamics: a multicultural system is not the result of a multiplication of the number of “other cultures” present in a territory, but a new way of facing the simultaneous presence of cultural diversity on a daily basis (Hannerz, 1996).

The great challenge that society and social systems face with difficulty (and, among them, we find the European society and those of the Mediterranean basin) is choosing if they should constitute “welcoming systems” or “non-welcoming systems”. Pluralism, and particularly the ethnic-cultural pluralism (Savidan, 2009), is not new in the history of mankind and the reflections on the process of identification and recognition involved in the integration of the “Others” focus on cultural
aspects. Particularly, the debate started by Taylor (1992) and Baumann (1999) on multiculturalism as a new way to understand culture and its dynamics is still appropriate for today, although multiculturalism, in many countries, has provoked negative effects such as the further fragmentation of society (Donati, 2016) and a cultural relativism that favours the separation among different cultures.

The debate is thus based on the search for a new way of life that may ensure justice and equality for all groups (diverse for race, sex, religion, etc.), even if some of them could be defined, according to the common sense, as a culture different from that in which they live. Multiculturalism is a new way to understand cultural dynamics and it must not be applied only to the others, but also to themselves.

Culture, indeed, is made by different elements, which allow to strengthen identity and sense of belonging to the group, but identity is not possible without “recognition”: we do not mean the “policy of recognition” proposed by Taylor (1992) because, if we analyzed such a conceptualization, its limit would unequivocally emerge. Multiculturalism, from which interculturality derives, cannot attribute equal dignity and value to only “selected cultures” and recognized for a long time, but such a dignity must be attributed to all cultures, otherwise we would fall in a more sophisticated and intellectualized form of ethnocentrism, but, in substance, not different from the violent forms of ethnocentrism.

Laying the foundations for a real and concrete interculturality certainly requires considering what happened in the past, what is happening now and what will happen in the future in the Mediterranean. Amartya Sen (2003), Nobel laureate in economics, after the shocking attempts of 11 September 2001 in New York, wrote that the support to pluralism, diversity and freedom is part of the history of many societies and this global legacy is a valid reason to question the idea, often reiterated, that democracy is only a Western system and, therefore, only a form of Westernization. This explains very well why the Mediterranean assumes an essential relevance in the promotion of pluralism, diversity and freedom.

This sea, which is always able to turn the collision in encounter, the pólemos in diálogos, can provide an answer to the cultural and identity crisis. The legacy of the Mediterranean is a complex combination of ideas, images, feelings cultivated for centuries and still cultivated in this “sea (not ocean)
among lands”; which was called *Mare nostrum* by the Romans and which could again have called in such a way if we interpret *nostrum* as a reference to human beings. A new idea of the Mediterranean can be built with the help of an approach going beyond the classical oppositions: Europe/Mediterranean, North/South, West/East, etc., and able to configure a new dimension of social space, in which the individual lives their daily experience and build the social reality.

In this respect, Edgar Morin, in a conference held in December 2013, underlined how often the Mediterranean is only considered a border (very labile, but in any case, a border between the South of Europe and Africa), rather than a bridge between two lands:


> Partout, le partenaire nécessaire est de plus en plus considéré comme l’adversaire potentiel et cela de chacun des quatre côtés de la Méditerranée : nord sud et est ouest.

> La Méditerranée s’efface comme dénominateur commun. Nous pouvons aujourd’hui espérer, sans certitude aucune, en une progressive pacification au Moyen-Orient, notamment par l’accession de la Palestine à l’indépendance nationale, mais le trou noir géo-historique y demeure […] Pourrons-nous sauver la Méditerranée ? Pourrons nous restaurer mieux développer sa fonction communicatrice ? Pourrons-nous remettre en activité cette mer d’échanges, de rencontres, ce creuset et bouillon de culture, cette machine à fabriquer de la civilisation? (Morin, 2013).

> The diverse values and knowledge born and developed in the Mediterranean Basin (South of Europe, North-Africa and East) can represent the strategic elements to overcome not only the crisis of the European identity’s but also the conflict of cultures presaged by many mass media. This Mediterranean legacy (ideas, images, feelings, etc.) would configure a new dimension of social space: this is the “Mediterranean approach” or the “Mediterranean mind”, as stated by Barbieri (2016). Three are the ideas from
which to start to put again the Mediterranean in the hearth of the political agenda, but also of the studies of researchers, and to make this sea the main tool for affirming an European identity based on cultural pluralism: a) the open concept of Mediterranean, cultivated and strongly supported by intellectuals such as Camus (1956) and Matvejević (1999); b) the “longue durée” approach to the history of human civilization, which puts aside the contrapositions and rethinks the process of modernization and secularization; c) the new concept of territoriality that is directly tied to the changes in geo-politics and international relations. Rethinking to the “Mediterranean mind” along with the political and cultural actors living on the Mediterranean shores, starting from the Arab peoples and from the representations that they have of the Mediterranean, is necessary.

This “Mediterranean mind” that intercepts social needs and creates new form of social relations - turning in a common practice - allows to rethink the present idea of Mediterranean and Europe: only starting from such a reflection building a real and different European identity is possible. The Mediterranean cultures “must” build the propulsive push to overcome the impasse that involves all Europe; they are the fruitful thrust to review the European policies (mainly those on integration) that allow a new future to emerge from the legacy of different cultures.

In this publication we are opening a major reflection about the Mediterranean region. The chosen topic Mediterranean and Migrations, edited by Teresa de Noronha and Emiliana Mangone searches for an historic and politic justification for the actual migrant phenomena which represents a challenge from the present but that derives from the political past.

The first and introductive chapter, by Teresa de Noronha and Emiliana Mangone, refers to the general theoretical framing upon which this volume is built. It is a great example of multidisciplinary view, intertwining philosophic aspects with sociological requirements in a clearly political context. It mainly calls the attention of the reader to migrations, a topic that as ruled the history of humankind and touched all populations across the world. Todays greatest political concerns focus on the humanitarian aspects of integration of migrant population, in particular in the Mediterranean region, as one of the greatest challenges in the world.

In the second chapter, by Anna Maria Brancato, the author aims to demonstrate how the settler colonial concept of the transfer of the native
population, immanent in Zionist thought, has been translated into narrative and underpinned by historiography. Moreover, it was further investigated on how the official historiography succeeded in remaining predominant over the time since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, influencing the political and social perception of the Palestinian issue all over the Western world.

Gabriella D’Ambrosio and Veronica Pastori wrote the third chapter, relating some indicators for the investigation of interculturality in Italy. The goal of this study was the analysis of migration’s phenomenon in Italy from 2007 to 2014. By focusing the attention on four specific dimensions of the daily life such as: citizenship, education, labour market and marriage, the process of integration of migrants in Italy has been followed. This research emerges from the European migration context and calls for a real policy of inclusion, based on dialogue and interaction among autochthonous and foreigners.

A final, fourth chapter by Fisseha Mehari, confronts the different roles of the civil society and international humanitarian organizations in managing refugees’ crisis in the middle east and North Africa region. This is a major topic in what concerns the present global priorities and the author emphasizes how Civil Society Organization (CSO) can become so helpful in the growth and prosperity of every contemporary democratic society. This paper will historically and critically analyze efforts and works of the both of them in managing the catastrophic Refugees crisis in this region; as well as the dynamics of the region’s Refugees crisis. Roles like providing humanitarian assistance and helping the refugees in building their lives in their new locality by bringing their needs to public consciousness have been critically looked at. As well as an examination of how they contribute to the international efforts propelled by the UN and their cooperation with other state and non-state actors in addressing the Refugees crisis. Their successes and challenges would be brought to light. Key emphasis would be placed on Libya, Syria and Yemen as case studies.

These reflections, which define the space of movement within the intercultural relations in the Mediterranean, allow to propose some deductive observations - not real conclusions - in order to draw the theoretical and methodological challenges that the scholars of cultural process have to address in future: a) the Mediterranean, or better, the
countries of its Southern shore, are loss-making within the cultural relations, in spite of the efforts made in the last years; b) the consolidation of the basis of the “Mediterranean mind” passes through a deep work in the Arab-Mediterranean societies and their élites, toward a concrete and open North-South dialogue; c) the great challenges of these first decades of the XXI century for all the Mediterranean and European people is synchronizing their own cultural legacy within the globalization of ideologies, economies and cultures in order to preserve a Mediterranean cultural heritage as a basis for the identification and recognition process.

One of the goals is the reduction of the distance between the Mediterranean countries (both European and African) and those of the rest of Europe. Such a distance grew in the wake of the modernization process of the 1950s and of the post-colonial policies of the last century (Young, 2001). Because of this process, the communities distorted and emptied, incorporating the exterior forms of modernity in a passive or imitative way, without activating path of internal development in the process of growth and valorisation. We are not in conditions to give an answer to the question if this happened because of a weak, non cultivated, identity or, rather, because of an identity lost for the habit of considering the culture tailored by others (colonizers) as their own culture; in any case working together (politicians, researchers, public and private actors, citizens, etc.) is necessary and urgent to rebuild the communities and allow them to face the confrontation within them and the encounter-collision on the outside. The final target would be exactly achieving a better perception of the Other, rediscovering the Other within a new path of intercultural dialogue, sincerer, dispelling misunderstandings, rusting passions and opening the door of hope to a better future of the Mediterranean.

Finally, and as a concluding remark, a major topic that this publication was not able to develop, thus remaining as a challenge for a next volume, is related to the dynamics of growth and development of the region, for which knowledge production and its management are crucial. Under an economic point of view, knowledge is an asset to be produced and used. Supplying knowledge, or producing it, remains as the most efficient tool for social awareness and progress, for sustainable development, equitable rights and political participation of migrant population as well.
References


Driving Reflections about the Mediterranean Migrations


The Settler Colonial Paradigm and the Israeli Official Narrative: an Example of Elimination of the Natives

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Abstract
This article is an attempt to apply the Settler Colonial paradigm to the analysis of the Israeli official-Zionist historiography. This approach leads to identify the Zionist ideology as a settler colonial one and the Zionist historiography as the academic support to the Zionist project. The aim of this research is to demonstrate how the settler colonial concept of the transfer of the native population, immanent in Zionist thought, has been translated into narrative and underpinned by historiography. Moreover, I will investigate on how the official historiography has succeeded in remaining predominant over the time since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, influencing the political and social perception of the Palestinian issue all over the Western world.1

Keywords: Settler Colonialism; official historiography; transfer; natives; New Historians.

Introduction

This article is part of my PhD research, but the question that leads me to investigate on Israeli historiography stems from my previous work and experience in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and other Arab countries. I think some premises are needed, before going on. Let’s start with the fact that Palestinian refugee camps were born immediately afterwards the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and that the same state,

1 “That history has shaped the way Israelis and Diaspora Jews-or at least Diaspora Zionists-have seen, and in large measure still see, Israel’s past; and it has also held sway over the way gentile Europeans and Americans (and their governments) see that past. This understanding of the past, in turn, has significantly influenced the attitude of Diaspora Jews, as well as European and American non-Jews, toward present-day Israel which effects government policies concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict”, (Morris, 1988).
without hesitation, took legal measures to prevent the return of the Palestinians to Palestine/Israel.

Palestinians accuse Israel for having intentionally created the unsolved problem of the refugees by expelling them from their land; on the other hand, Israel rejected all the accusations and blamed some Arab leaders who gave order to the Palestinian population to flee. Consequently, Israel does not want to assume any responsibilities and any commitments for the resolution of this problem.

Generally speaking, in Western countries the most accepted and divulged version of the historical facts is the Israeli one. First of all, because of a general European colonialist attitude which tended to see native populations as inferior and with no historical past; furthermore, in this particular case, the event of the Holocaust played a very important role in shaping the Israeli version as the dominant one².

The supremacy of the Israeli official narrative does not mean that Palestinians have not produced any historical works about the 1948 and the Nakba. It is worth to mention here 'Ā. al-'Ārif’s book Al-Nakba1947-1949 (1952) or C. Zurayq, Ma’na al-Nakba (1948), among the first Palestinian books on the issue.

Sure, at the beginning, Palestinian (as well as Zionist³) historical works were somehow “antiquarian”, as T. Khalidi (1981) defined them, that is to say that “they have no other ostensible purpose than to unearth or record various aspects of Palestinian and Arab history and culture” (p. 64).

No doubts that the Palestinian historiography has been influenced from the political and social context of the moment, in particular from the danger represented by the “Mandate and its clients, the Zionists” (Khalidi, p. 60). As the author noticed, “as one Arab country after another began to negotiate its independence, the volume of Palestinian rhetoric and polemic seemed to increase” and continued: “Palestinian historiography constituted, of course, a special segment of Arab cultural life in the

² Due to the impossibility to develop this argument here, I recommend I. Zertal’s works: From Catastrophe to Power: The Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel (1998) and Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood (2005) or N. Finkelstein The Holocaust Industry. Reflections on the Exploitations of Jewish Suffering (2000).

³ Y. Gelber (2007, p. 47) affirmed: “Early historians of Zionism were, on the whole, amateurs – Zionist activists who under certain circumstances became historians”.

The Settler Colonial Paradigm and the Israeli Official Narrative

Mandate period. But the political pressures to which the Palestinians were subjected were undoubtedly more fearsome than those in any other Arab country of that era” (p. 61). For this reason, nationhood and self-determination were predominant themes in Palestinian historiography.

At the same time, the question of the nationhood was fundamental also in defining Zionist historical and cultural production at the time. Indeed, it has to be considered that the different Jewish communities in Europe felt themselves as a unique people. Following some episodes of intolerance and antisemitism, some of the most influential Jewish intellectuals started to associate the existence of a Jewish people to the need of a nation for its persecuted members. Although different places were taken into account to establish the Jewish nation, Palestine seemed to be the most suitable one, in order to create a real sense of nation among the Jewish communities in Europe. The “Promised Land”, or Eretz Israel, was the biblical land of the ancestors, from which Jews were expelled and to which they were promised to return by God. This divine promise became the main unifying element of the variegated diasporic Jewish community.

To demonstrate the strength and the continuity of this official narrative I have taken as an example some different official Israeli historians: Netanel Lorch, one of the main historian of the Israeli Army. He wrote the famous book The Edge of the Sword (1961) that is a very detailed story of what the

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4 It is worth to mention here that the birth of the Zionist ideology was preceded by a cultural period called Haskalah, developed in central Europe among European Jews. The debate around the Haskalah was mainly about the possibility for the Jews to assimilate into the social context of the country in which they lived. The evolution of the European political events brought some of the intellectuals to the abandonment of this tendency and to embrace the Zionist nationalist ideology. I recommend to read Y. Gorny (2003).

5 S. Dubnow (1903, p. 10) referred to the Jewish people as the most historical one, as if he wanted to stress that the Jews have always been a unique people, despite their diaspora: “A definition of the Jewish people must needs correspond to the aggregate of the concepts expressed by the three group-names, most ancient, ancient, and modern. The only description applicable to it is "the historical nation of all times," a description bringing into relief the contrast between it and all other nations of modern and ancient times, whose historical existence either came to an end in days long past or began at a date comparatively recent. And granted that there are "historical" and "unhistorical" peoples, then it is beyond dispute that the Jewish people deserves to be called "the most historical" (historicissimus)."

6 One of the most symbolic episode was the well-known Dreyfus Affair.
Is Israelis call \textit{War of Independence}, since its very beginning till the creation of the State of Israel in 1948; S. Ettinger and A. Malamat, historians at the Hebrew University; E. Karsh, Professor and Head of the Middle East and Mediterranean Studies Programme at King’s College in London, and A. Shapira, both of them contemporary historians.

Another important pamphlet I have analysed is \textit{Auto-emancipation} (1935), published for the first time in 1882 by Leon Pinsker, one of the pioneers of Zionism. Although he was not a historian and his work is not a historical one, the pamphlet gives an important proof of the early Zionist mind and it is a very interesting analysis of the perception of anti-Semitism among European Jewish communities at the time.

Following the paradigm used nowadays by the Settler Colonial Studies, I will focus on how the official Israeli historiography has served the colonial tendency of the Zionist movement by creating a structured complex of myths and knowledge which tend to hide, negate and deny the Palestinian presence in Palestine.

In settler colonial terms this is called logic of elimination of the natives (Wolfe, 2006), that is to recognize that an attempt to erase and expel the indigenous population, both physically and culturally, had taken place in order to substitute the native population with the settlers’ community.

It is this logic that allows scholars, such as Wolfe, to speak about Settler Colonialism as a structure, not only an event. The structure is understood as a complex and enduring system of relations between all the elements of the colonial system, with a particular reference to the relation between settlers and natives. Indeed, the attempt to eliminate the natives persists over the time and takes different forms, as for example in the case of a

\begin{footnote}
With this expression, Israeli historians indicate the events of the 1948 and the war against the Palestinians and the Arabs for the establishment of the Jewish state. Shapira (2012) wrote: “The closest phrase in English is ‘the War of Independence’, which expresses the most important change that resulted from it—the achievement of Jewish sovereignty. The fighters of the Palmach—the precursor and spearhead of the new Israeli army—called it ‘the War of Liberation’. as if it were another anti-colonial war leading to liberation from the yoke of a foreign ruler, in this case the British. However, the war was not waged against the British, but against the Arabs. It was not a war of liberation, but a war between two peoples striving for control over the same piece of land. For their part the Arabs referred to the war with the neutral phrase ‘1948 war’, implying that it was just one in a series that had been and would be waged”, (p.156).
\end{footnote}
process of assimilation or selective integration, under a strict settlers’ control. At the same time, it collides with the resistance of the native population that simply face the settler logic of elimination by trying to exist and not to be erased. For this reason, Settler Colonialism is also perceived as a zero-sum game (Kimmerling, 1995; Wolfe, 1999).

The temporal dimension in this structure is very important, opposite to the limited dimension of the “event”, as a completed situation of the past. The innovation of Wolfe’s study is thus all in the sentence “Settler Colonialism is a structure, not an event; invasion is a structure, not an event” (1999, p. 2).

In order to historically and morally accept the removal of the native population, the land to be settled has to be imagined as empty. The symbolic removal prepared for the physical removal. In other words, the Zionist narrative served to empty the land from the Palestinian natives at a discursive level, before expelling them physically.

1. Israeli Official (or “Old”) Narrative

Talking about 1948 and the birth of the State of Israel from a historiographical perspective, it could be useful to individuate at least two main moments: the first (from 1948 to 1980s) dominated by what it is known as Old Historiography and the second one (from the second half of the ‘80s) characterised by the appearance of the so called New Israeli Historiography.

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8 Veracini (2010, p. 37) individuates in the process of assimilation another way to transfer the native population. With the assimilation process, indigenous are literally “uplifted out of existence”. By assimilating part of the native population, the settler entity succeeds in eliminating the indigenous authenticity or in controlling it.

9 Since in this article I am going to focus on the Old Historiography, I will explain briefly the main characteristics of the New historiographical tendency. The so called Israeli New Historiography appeared in the ‘80s with the main aim of challenging the traditional vision of Israeli historiography. New Historians tried in particular to shed a light on the Palestinian exodus of the 1948 rethinking the role of Israeli army, thanks to the analysis of some declassified documents found in the Israeli Archives. The strength of the New Historians became, in this way, the professional methodology based on the study of the documents. Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé are among the most famous and well-known exponents of this tendency but it is not possible to consider it as a historiographical school, because of the diversity of positions and ideas that can be found among its members. In the last section of this article I will quickly mention the debate around the New Historians.
It could also be said that the first one has been defined in opposition to the other, although the distinction between them is relatively recent\textsuperscript{10}.

In a sense, all the Israeli historians in the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s who were linked to the establishment, to the army and to the Zionist Movement could be classified as “Old”. These historians have conveyed the official version of the events of the 1948, without taking into account (or trying to soften) what Palestinians named the Nakba (catastrophe), that is the expulsion of the Palestinian people from Palestine\textsuperscript{11}. The Old Historians actively participated in the construction (or the rebuild) of the Jewish State and the Jewish society; for this reason, they could not be considered impartial.

Benny Morris (1988, p. 20) wrote:

> The Old Historians offered a simplistic and consciously pro-Israeli interpretation of the past and they deliberately avoid mentioning anything that would reflect badly on Israel. People argued that, since the conflict with the Arabs was still raging, and since it was a political as well as a military struggle, it necessarily involved propaganda. (…) In short, raison d’état often took precedence over telling the truth.

Considering that the majority of the official historians came from political or military environment\textsuperscript{12} (Gutwein, 2003), Morris’ words cannot be considered odd. The Old History, as Morris (1988) affirmed, was mainly based on interviews and memoirs because the majority of the documents

\textsuperscript{10} The first time the distinction appeared was in an article of the Israeli New Historian Benny Morris, published in the Tikkun magazine at the end of 1988. The New Historians “some of them living abroad, have looked and are looking afresh at the Israeli historical experience, and their conclusions, by and large, are at odds with those of the Old Historians”. In Morris’ opinion two factors contributed to the emergence of this new trend: one related to the possibility to access Israeli archive and declassified documents; the second one is directly related to the historians: “most of them matured in a more open, doubting and self-critical Israel than the pre-Lebanon War Israel, in which the Old Historians grew up”. (Morris, 1988, pp. 20-21).

\textsuperscript{11} The Nakba (an Arab term that means catastrophe) indicates the expulsion of the Palestinian people from Palestine, due to the creation of the Jewish State in 1948. Official Israeli historiography wants Palestinians have fled spontaneously or because they were encouraged by the Arab leaders; on the contrary, Palestinian historiography affirms that they were violently expelled by Jewish forces (Haganah and later the Israeli Army) in the framework of what it is best known as the Plan D, a military strategic plan which involved the destruction and the expulsion of the Palestinian society.

\textsuperscript{12} Such as the Army History Department, for example.
were still censored and it is true that the founding historians of the State of Israel were deeply involved in their mission to rebuild a new state that they were not able to recognize and separate profession from ideology.

The ideology, of course, was Zionism. Born at the end of the XVIII century\(^\text{13}\) in Europe among the Jewish communities, the Zionist movement, through an old-fashioned interpretation of the Bible\(^\text{14}\), aimed to give a “national home”\(^\text{15}\) to the Jews all over the world. Zionism and its nationalist aspirations born also as a reaction to the waves of anti-Semitic feelings and pogrom which spread in particular in East Europe during that period.

As we can read in Leon Pinsker (1935, p. 5):

> The essence of the problem, as we see it, lies in the fact that in the midst of the nations among whom the Jews reside, they form a distinctive element which cannot be assimilated, which cannot be readily digested by any nations.

Since the “amalgamation of the Jews with the original inhabitants of a land is absolutely impossible” (Pinsker, 1935), the only solution to the “Jewish question”\(^\text{16}\) was a national one:

> The proper, the only remedy, would be the creation of a Jewish nationality, of a people living upon its own soil; the auto-emancipation of the Jews; their emancipation as a nation among the nations by the acquisition of a home of their own. (Pinsker, 1935, p. 32).

As stated by the Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling (1995), who has been often associated to the New Historians, “Political Zionism crystallized and emerged on the eve of the European colonial period, which perceived

\(^{13}\) Primly, the Zionist Movement was established during the First Zionist Congress held in 1987 in Basel.

\(^{14}\) I’m referring here to the myth of the Jewish people as the chosen one by God.

\(^{15}\) “National home” is an expression used for the first time in the text of the Balfour Declaration, a letter through which Lord Balfour, on behalf of the British Government, secured his support to the Zionist movement for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

\(^{16}\) The so-called “Jewish question” has been deeply explained by Pinsker in “Auto-emancipation” which, in some ways, anticipated what Theodore Herzl (the founding father of the Zionist Movement) wrote in his famous work “Der Judenstaat” in 1896.
as self-evident the right of Europeans to settle any available non-European land”, (p. 41).

However, contrary to other European colonial enterprises, Zionism did not choose Palestine (or Zion, or Eretz Israel\textsuperscript{17}) because its abundance of natural resources or its wealth; the link between Zionism and Palestine was exclusively bound to the land religious and symbolic value: “it was the only land that could awaken the sentiments needed among world Jewry in order to develop a movement devoted to immigration and the building of a new society”, (Kimmerling, 1995, p. 41).

It was clear, since the beginning of the Zionist enterprise, that one of the necessary requirements for the creation of a new Jewish nation was an empty land or, at least, the transfer of the native inhabitants. As very well demonstrated by the Palestinian historian Nur Masalha in his work about the concept of transfer in Zionist thought (Masalha, 1992), the idea of transfer is something immanent in Zionist mind since the beginning and it could be considered the logical consequence of its colonial aspect. However, until 1937\textsuperscript{18} it is difficult to find the concept of transfer explicitly cited or explained in Zionist historiography and in official documents.

It could be read in Herzl’s diaries (Patai, 1960, p. 88):

\begin{quote}
We must expropriate gently the private property on the estates assigned to us. We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country.
\end{quote}

The transfer idea of the native Palestinian population represented thus the logical outcome of a colonial movement which needed an exclusive land and which did not recognize any property right on the land to non-European populations.

\textsuperscript{17} The expression Eretz Israel in Hebrew literally means “Land of Israel”; while the term Zion was first used to indicate the holy city of Jerusalem and then its meaning has been extended to indicate all Israel.

\textsuperscript{18} In 1937 the report of the Peel Commission was published. It was a commission appointed by the British Mandatory Government in order to investigate the causes and to find a solution for the growing tensions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. The report suggested the partition of Palestine between a Jewish state and an Arab state and the consequent transfer of the Arab population.
2. What kind of role have historians played during this period?

As Kimmerling (1995) noted, in particular before the creation of the State of Israel “historiography was an integral part of the process of nation and collective identity building”, (p. 41).

Indeed, the past had been seen as the only way to legitimate Zionist claims over the Palestinian land, in opposition to that of the Arab population.

In fact, the role of the past in a settler colonial context in general, and in the case of Zionism in particular, is fundamental in order to validate the new enterprise “externally” (in front of the international community and the public opinion), as well as “internally” (to mitigate any possible attempt to diverge). As we have seen before, Zionism was born among the different Jewish communities in Europe, which were eventually far from each other, not only physically but also “culturally”. In fact, Zionism was all but a homogeneous movement19 and in order to reach its aims, the leadership must have been able to create a solid social basis through the use of a common past. The only thing that could unite the European Jewish groups in that particular moment was a “selected arsenal of primordial symbols and myths taken from Jewish religion partially secularized and nationalized to suit Zionist purposes” (Kimmerling, 1995, p. 42).

After the creation of the state, Israeli historiography has tried to achieve a “professional” status, that means it sought to be academic with the use of a scientific methodology; but at the same time historians have continued to be devoted to Zionism, as their immediate ancestors. “However”, affirmed Kimmerling, “when ideological commitments collide with standards of objectivity and impartiality, usually the Zionist orientations receive primacy” (p. 47).

Official historians have tried to find the right balance between “the seemingly impossible combination of a positivist wish to reconstruct reality and an ideological commitment to prove the justness of their cause” (Pappé, 2014, p. 25). But it was this commitment to the cause which has been perceived by the Old Zionist historians as necessary for a complete

and trusty reconstruction of Zionism and the State. In other words, this Israeli generation of historians worked to confirm the early Zionist version, so that the scientific proof became the repetition.

These features are not, of course, peculiar to the Zionist-Israel official historiography, however it could be questioned the way in which the official version served the colonial Zionist aims and how it has influenced the global perception of the entire Palestinian-Israeli question until now.

3. The Settler Colonial paradigm

What makes Settler Colonialism different from other forms of colonialism and why its paradigm can be useful to understand the role of historiography in supporting the Zionist thought?

Undoubtedly, Settler Colonialism is not something new, neither unique and it has some general features in common with other forms of colonialism but, at the same time, it adds some innovations.

The first element to point out is the relation between the settler colonial entity and the land. The settler colonial entity is usually represented by a group of European settlers, searching for an “available” and “empty” land, in which a new society and a new state could be constructed. This new state looks for independence and legitimacy and for this reason does not want to depend on a foreign and far mother country.

At the same time, settlers want to cut any kind of relation with the native population. They do not want to exploit or to dominate it; they simply want it to disappear, in order to replace it with the new

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20 Among the first to analyse this phenomenon we remember Maxime Rodinson’s work Israel a Colonial Settler State (1973), first published in French at the end of 1967 war.

21 The Settler Colonial paradigm is often used to refer to the cases of Australia, United States, South Africa and Algeria, even if scholars are still debating about defining Algeria as a settler colonial case, in particular because of the country success in reaching its independence and expel the settlers. The end of the colonial oppression has been seen as the opposite of a settler colonial context, usually understood as a structure, that is to say a system that is going to last.
community of settlers. Indeed, one of the main attitudes of the settler community is the attempt to “indigenize” itself, in order to overcome the colonial status and become a recognized and legitimized nation.

What is relevant for the purpose of this article is the orientation of the settler entity towards the native population. As I told before, settlers do not perceive it as necessary and simply try to eliminate it. In settler colonial terms this is called the “logic of elimination of the natives”.

As Patrick Wolfe well explained in his work: “The question of genocide is never far from discussions of settler colonialism. Land is life—or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus, contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life” (2006, p. 387). That is not to say that every settler colonial movement requires genocide or, on the contrary, that genocide cannot happen outside a settler colonial context. However, the relation between genocide and settler colonialism is very tight and this relation is summarized in the logic of elimination of the natives.

The elimination of the natives can be justified in different ways: using the spectre of racism, or xenophobia, or ethnicity and so on; but the only important reason of the elimination is the “access to the territory”, (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388).

In this sense, Settler Colonialism is something revolutionary: it “destroys to replace”, affirmed Wolfe (2006), and through the elimination of the native population it constructs a new society.

In the process of eliminating and replacing the native population, settler violence is a fundamental element, since the native population starts to resist to the uprooting process. Settler Colonial Studies define this violence as “foundational”, because it is necessary to the creation of the new state; it means, it is functional to the last purpose of the settler colonialism that is to supersede itself.

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22 “Settler Colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal”, (Wolfe, 2006, p. 387).
For this reason, the main characteristic of this violence is to be denied, by presenting it as a defensive violence: “settler colonialism needs to disavow any foundational violence” (Veracini, 2010, p. 75), because, as every violent act, it could never be considered moral. In fact, “when settler colonial narratives celebrate anti-indigenous violence, they do so by representing a defensive battle ensuring the continued survival of the settler community and never as founding violence per se” (Veracini, 2010, p. 78). Disavowing the foundational violence thus becomes a defensive mechanism and, at the same time, a way to negate the presence of the native population, (Veracini, 2010).

Indeed, the natives are usually perceived as shadows (Said, 1978) or inconsistent presences, that is tantamount to affirm the emptiness of the land.

4. Narrative Transfer

Given the above mentioned characteristic of the settler colonialism and the necessities of the Zionist movement, it is clear how the two things can be linked together. The question remains how the logic of the elimination of the natives has been translated into narrative and historiography?

As I said before, Israeli official historiography is mainly based on the Bible and some myths\(^\text{23}\) have been used by the Zionist leadership, over the time, in order to underpin its projects.

It is now possible to understand how official historiography has adapted some of these myths through the use of what Veracini (2010) has called the narrative transfer, a mean to carry out the aforementioned logic of elimination of the natives. Settlers need to find a moral defence and explanation for their acts of elimination.

\(^{23}\) The term “myth” is here understood as an element, a belief or an event taken from a legendary or a real past and readjust to fit the present. As Kimmerling stated, myths are necessary to build and preserve the collective identity, (Kimmerling, 2001, p. 56).
and, in doing this, they literally transfer the indigenous population away from the official narrative.

Veracini (2010) individuates four different ways in which natives could be “denied” or “ignored”. First of all, indigenous people are represented backward or as primitives and undeveloped “a form of humanity inhabiting pockets of past surrounded by contemporaneity”, (p. 41). As Veracini observed, these pockets of past are the equivalent of indigenous territorial reserves and aim to create a situation in which indigenous are transferred “elsewhen” (in the past).

Zionist historiography has always affirmed that Palestine was inhabited by underdeveloped and uncivilized people:

For centuries Palestine had been inhabited predominantly, though sparsely, by Arabs. Through faulty cultivation or careless administration, large parts of the country had become barren, erosion had carried off soil from once fertile mountainsides, swamps had formed in plains and valleys. (Lorch, 1961, p. 32)

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Palestine was a remote, backward province of the Ottoman Empire, which itself was in decline. Internecine wars and clashes between Bedouins and fellahin occurred every day, and the roads, controlled by robbers and bandits, were dangerous. The country was almost empty, with some 250,000 inhabitants, including about 6,500 Jews concentrated in the four holy cities: Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, and Hebron. (Shapira, 2012, p.27).

Secondly, narrative tries to create a sort of discontinuity in indigenous life between past and present. This discontinuity “between an indigenous past and a post colonial present” (Veracini, 2010, p. 41) makes any indigenous protests or insurgencies unworthy, they no longer subsist. It could be seen an example of this type of narrative the way in which Israeli official scholars refer to Palestinians in Israel as “Israeli Arabs” or, with Karsh’s words (2010), “Arab citizen of the Jewish State”.

Breaking the continuity with the past makes every indigenous claim or protest meaningless. Karsh (2010) pointed out that the new Arab inhabitants of the Jewish State would be equal citizens and would have equal rights, a principle that was also stated in Israel’s Declaration of Independence. In particular:
Arab citizens were urged to take part in the building of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship and on the basis of appropriate representation in all its institutions, provisional and permanent. (p. 236).

Calling for this kind of political assimilation could be viewed as a means to weaken and absorb the natives’ political demands.

Anita Shapira (2012), on the contrary, seemed to be more realistic and describes the situation of the Arab minority in Israel as follows:

Israel seized abandoned Arab property and expropriated Arab land for Jewish settlement. According to some estimates, between 40 and 60 percent of the Arab-owned land in Israeli areas in 1948 was now transferred to Jewish settlement. In the Declaration of Independence Israel assured its Arab inhabitants of equal rights, but in the wake of the war Ben-Gurion was persuaded that the Arabs could not be trusted and military government should be imposed on them for security reasons—meaning that they were excluded from the right to defend themselves in the Israeli judicial system. Ironically this military government was based on the British Mandate Defence (Emergency) Laws that had been used against the Jewish Yishuv. Military government restricted the Arab inhabitants’ freedom of movement. They needed permits to leave their towns and villages, a situation that prevented them from obtaining employment in the center of the country or higher education. The military administration was entitled to demolish buildings and confiscate land if it thought they had been used to perpetrate hostile actions. Employment in education or the municipalities was conditional upon the administration’s consent. (pp. 196, 197).

Shapira added:

The Arab population of Israel underwent a shift in identity and a psychological change as a result of its encounter with the Arabs of the occupied territories. At first the Israeli Arabs boasted of their economic achievements compared with those of their brethren from the West Bank. But as time went by, their identification with the Palestinian people became stronger, while their sense of identity as Israeli citizens weakened. (p. 349).

As Veracini (2010) notes, in this way the “Indigenous survival is thus transferred away, foreclosed” (p. 42).

The third type of narrative transfer recognized by Veracini is, in a sense, the reverse of the previous one and it is the attempt to emphasize the “discontinuity within the settler body politic, claiming its post colonial status”, (p. 42). As we said before, settler colonialism tries to supersede

\[24\] See also: Kimmerling & Migdal (2003).
itself and to abandon its colonial status to reaffirm the “indigeneity” of the settlers. Lorch (1961) wrote:

The association of the Jewish People with the Holy Land dates back to the second millennium B.C. The movement for the return of the Children of Israel to their ancient home began in the early centuries of the Christian Era immediately after the Roman destruction of the Judean State. The return is a recurring note of Jewish Religious ritual. (p. 23).

Abraham Malamat (1976) wrote:

For when Assyria and Babylonia eventually deprived them (the Israelites, n.d.r.) of national independence, the leading citizenry of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah established there a large centre of exile, from which a revitalized nation later emerged, (p. 3).

Shapira (2012) added something more to this claim for a post-colonial Israel: “Of all the states created after 1945, Israel is one of the few that has maintained a democratic regime”, (p. 179). Democracy is thus used as a guarantee to deny the entire settler colonial system.

The last example of narrative transfer, well linked with the one before, exists when claims such as “settlers are also indigenous people are made”, (Veracini, 2010, p. 42) The meaning of this attitude is to focus on the settler continuity over that particular land to demonstrate that the settler community originated in that land. This kind of claim goes along together with the statement “indigenous people are also settlers”, (p. 43).

Netanel Lorch (1961) affirmed:

The Arabs came into possession of Palestine in the seventh century A.D after their conversion to Islam. Thereafter they ruled the country for four centuries. Gradually they replaced or assimilated the original inhabitants and become the dominant element in the population. (p. 23).

At the time of the Muslim occupation of Palestine n the seventh century, the country’s Jewish population ranged in the hundreds of thousands at the very least (…). This forced marginalization notwithstanding, not only was there always a Jewish presence in Palestine, but the Jews’ longing for their ancestral homeland, or Zion, occupied a focal place in their collective memory. (Karsh, 2010, p. 8).

This last attitude in particular can explain the importance of the concept of “Return to a Promised Land” for Jews; they are returning to the Land
they lost, to a kind of Golden Age of prosperity and grandeur. The idea of return is intrinsic to the Zionist ideology. Karsh (2010) explained:

The roots of this conflict date back to the Roman destruction of Jewish statehood, which had existed intermittently for over a millennium in the country that had subsequently been known as Palestine. Since then, exile and dispersion had become the hallmark of the Jewish people. (p. 9).

“Settlers come to stay”, affirmed Veracini (2010, p. 97). In fact, Veracini founded that Settler Colonial narratives has a linear structure: settlers do not discover a new land, they want to settle down in a land that connect their present with their past, a land that they inherited; and, in so doing, they bring with them their sovereignty, their lifestyle and culture. As said before, all the connections with the mother country are cut because they are returning back to the lost and promised land.

Malamat (1976) again:

The bond between the people and their spiritual mission, as well as their affinity to the Holy Land, became sanctified in the people’s consciousness as a supreme religious idea. It shaped the entire corpus of their national and religious values, set the Israelites apart from other nations and served as their expression of selfhood. Thus, emerged the national synthesis to which they aspired and which, even after its disintegration, continued to be cherished in the heart of the nation as a source of inspiration and vitality throughout the long and wearisome years of exile, a strength stemming largely from the notion of their being a Chosen People belonging to a Promised Land (…)

The relationship between Israel and the Holy Land was determined by the Lord’s command to Abraham. (p. 3).

His obedience to this command “transformed the land of Canaan into the Land of Israel, engendering that complex relationship between Israel and the indigenous peoples of Canaan” (pp. 3, 4).

Conclusion

All these narrative ploys explain how the official Israeli historiography has succeeded in hiding and transferring the indigenous Palestinian
presence in a very remote past of backwardness and to strengthen the link between settlers’ history and land, in order to substitute the native population even in a discursively dimension, coherently with the essence of the Settler Colonial paradigm.

The extraordinary success of the spread of the official version and its long-lasting persistence contribute to cover the natives’ historiography, because native Palestinians are usually perceived as a backward people without a history. Morris (2004) complained about the fact that Palestinians, and Arabs in general, were not able to keep and preserve historical documents and that Arab archives are usually impossible to access. Testimonies, interviews and oral proofs are not, in Morris’ opinion, reliable sources.

The fact that the Palestinian version of the 1948 events has been left almost silent until the appearance of the so-called Israeli New Historiography is an example of how little Palestinian narrative has been taken into account, at least to counterbalance the Israeli official one. It appeared only during the ’80s, supported by some of the works of the New Historians, it means thanks to a breakage inside the Israeli academic system.

The New Historiography, as a matter of fact, provoked a heated debate not only, as it is obvious, between old and new historians, but also among Palestinian historians, who viewed the New Historiography as another product of the settler colonial system, something that could be created thanks to the status of its founders. In fact, despite new historians’ researches proved in many cases that Israel and its new-born army played an important role in the creation of the problem of Palestinian refugees, the majority of them (as Benny Morriswell demonstrated) remain faithful to the Zionist ideology.

The persistence of the Zionist historiography has obscured the Palestinian version of the 1948 events, not only in Israel but also in the Western academia and the erasure of the Palestinian history has meant the elimination of the 1948 ethnic cleansing of Palestine and of the refugee

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25 For what concerns the debate between official historians and the New ones I suggest to read S. Teveth (1989); E. Karsh (1997).


27 Read Morris’ interview to Haaretz, by A. Shavit (2004).
problem from the “peace process” and from all the international community discussions about the Palestine question.

To prove the duration and the persistence of this vision it could be sufficient to report that a book about the history of the Palestinian people has been released in 2017 by the Israeli author Assaf AVoll. The book titled *A History of the Palestinian People – From Ancient Times to Modern Era* (Voll, 2017) is totally empty, nothing has been written inside. As reported by the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* (June 2017) the author affirmed during an interview: “The Palestinian people believe they are a people, and someone needs to tell them the truth even if it hurts. Look what happens when they were given the feeling that they are a real people”.

To conclude, the negation of the Palestinian native people stemmed directly from the European ideological imperialist context, in which usually native populations were seen as inferior, violent and uncivilized.

The narrative transfer is the direct consequence of what Edward Said (1979) identified as the orientalist attitude of the Europeans towards the Arab and Muslim populations. Furthermore, the narrative transfer, which underpins the settler colonial logic of elimination of the natives, has been used to support discursively the physical transfer and expulsion of the Palestinian Arab population, whose refugees in Diaspora today number almost 6 million (United Nations Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA], 2016) and, at the same time, to make the original settler colonialist Zionist enterprise a moral and fair one.

References


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28 It is possible to download the “Hebrew” version of the book to the link http://www.jewishpress.com/blogs/muqata/a-history-of-the-palestinian-people-from-ancient-times-to-the-modern-era/2017/06/18 (last visited 23/06/2017), while at the moment it is impossible to find it on Amazon.


Some Indicators for the Analysis of Interculturality in Italy

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Abstract

The goal of this study is the analysis, through secondary data deriving from the main national sources, of migration’s phenomenon in Italy from 2007 to 2014. In particular, the purpose of paper is the description of interculturality focusing the attention on four specific dimensions of the daily life, like citizenship, education, labour market and marriage. Each of these offers a set of statistical indicators useful to observe the integration of migrants in Italy.

So, from this research, it will emerge actual role of Italy in European migration context with the hope that a real politic of inclusion, based on dialogue and interaction among autochthonous and foreigners, will be raise in our country where the foreign presence, in the time span of seven years, is increased by 67.5%. For this reason, the recognition of each individual, independently by national membership, is a fundamental element for building a global community.

Keywords: Secondary Data, Immigration, Integration

Introduction

In the last years, Italy is been characterized, for its geographical and cultural position, to be one of the European countries with the largest number of foreign residents (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2014): more specifically, from the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, it experienced, as with other southern European countries, a «turnaround» from an emigration to an immigration society.

1 Indeed, the transfers from abroad or requests of residence’s permits by migrant citizens are increased.

2 In more detail, by echoing the words of Bruno Riccio (2000), "immigration into Italy is better understood as a post-industrial phenomenon. There were social changes, often attributed to immigrants, which are instead connected with the broader economic framework receiving such immigrants. These changes from the earlier industrial migration made immigration into Italy a model case, because of the power of its tertiary sector and the
For this reason, the aim of this paper is to analyze migration’s phenomenon in Italy particularly from 2007 to 2014, using secondary data from some national sources (National Institute for Statistics, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education and Chamber of Commerce). The choice to carry out a cross-section research\(^3\) to study the dynamics of immigration, in relation to these specific years, is motivated, on the one hand, for the EU enlargement in 2007 (with the addiction of Romania and Bulgaria) and, on the other hand, for the statistical-demographic data availability.

After the description about the immigration in Italy, this study explores four specific dimensions of the daily life (citizenship, education, labour and marriage) and offers a set of statistical indicators useful to observe the process of interculturality.

1. Theorical Framework of Immigration in Italy

The human migration is a global phenomenon that characterizes and changes our society. When people move, some elements of the pact of coexistence are questioned: in fact, if on one hand the immigrants are a great resource for the development of the host country, on the other hand they involve the institutions to ensure efficient policies of social integration and promote equal opportunities for new citizens. Nevertheless, nowadays, the achievement of these objectives is increasingly difficult if we only think about the interactive nature of this phenomenon\(^4\): the migration is a process impossible to define and it's continuously revised and socially built in the interchange with the host society.

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\(^3\) In cross-sectional research, measurement occurs once for each unit in the study and their measurement applies to a single time interval of period (Menard, 2002; Lewis-Beck, Bryman & Liao, 2004).

\(^4\) Marsella & Ring (2003) wrote that “in all instances, the lives of both the migrants and those who arrived before them are changed by migrations, for migration is an interactive process - both migrant and host are permanently altered by the encounter. A new social and environmental ecology emerges. Values, ideas, and diseases are exchanged, and eventually so are genes” (p. 4).
But what does it mean to be "a migrant"? For the United Nations, an individual is a migrant when three specific aspects coexist:
- the crossing of a national border and the consequent shift in another country;
- the host country has to be different from the one in which the subject was born;
- the prolonged stay in the receiving country (minimum one year).

Thus, migration, as claimed by Ambrosini (2005), known Italian sociologist, “should be viewed as processes, a dynamic evolution which involves a series of adaptations and changes over time, and as systems of relations that relate the starting, the transit and the destination areas, involving a plurality of actors and institutions: the authorities of the country of origin, those of the countries crossed, those of receiving countries, regulatory systems governing the movements, the landmarks of migrants in settlement sites, the relatives left at home, ways that ensure connections and communications, and others” (p. 18).

If we want to investigate why a person decides to emigrate, we have to separate microsociological explanations from macro-sociological/structuralist one: the former, the migratory behavior is the result of subjective choices (for example, they could be based on individual calculations of utility maximization5) so the migration is an aggregate effect generated by individual decisions; the latter, the migration is explained starting from social inequalities that exist among different areas of the world: therefore, many families or just one spouse has to leave the native land looking for a better life (from this point of view, the need to emigrate is connected with some major structural factors like poverty, lack of work or low employment remuneration, overpopulation in third-world countries, wars, famines and oppressive regimes6).

With reference to the nation taking into consideration, we can note that, observing National Institute for Statistics data (ISTAT, 2011), Italy has become an immigration country especially from 2000: in that year, the

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5 This explanation is based on neoclassical economic theory and cost/benefit rationality.
6 At this regard, we can speak about push and pull factors. With words of Codrington (2005) “the factors that encourage a person to move can be divided into push factors and pull factors. Push factors are forces that send a person away from an area. Pull factors are the forces that attract a person into a certain area” (p. 452).
number of immigrants was 1.388.153 and this value is nearly tripled in the space of ten years (3.648.128).

According to recently OECD data (2014), Italy is at 7th in the world ranking about permanent immigration inflows\(^7\) (204.100) and in Europe it is at 4th after Germany (574.500), United Kingdom (311.500) and France (258.900) (Fig. 1).

![Fig. 1 - Permanent immigration inflows](Image)

Source: elaboration on OECD, 2014

Thus, Italy has a primary role in European migration context. With reference to the foreign residents, their presence on italian territory is equal to 4.922.085 units (ISTAT, 2014).

In particular, the highest concentration of foreign residents is in Centre-North Italy (Tab. 1) – together North-East, North-West and Central areas

\(^7\) “Permanent immigrant inflows cover regulated movements of foreigners considered to be settling in the country from the perspective of the destination country. Then cover regulated movements of foreigners as well as free movement migration” (OECD, 2014). The indicator is measured by standardization for cross-country comparison of numbers of permanent inflows.
Some Indicators for the Analysis of Interculturality in Italy

collect 85.5% of those\(^8\) – and, in detail in Lombardy (22.9%), Lazio (12.5%), Emilia-Romagna (10.9%) and Veneto (10.5%).

\textit{Tab. 1 – Foreign residents in Italy, region and areas (%)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Geographical Areas</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Nord-west</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallée d’Aoste</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Nord-east</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardy</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Südtirol</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Isle</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>100.0(4,922,085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friaul-Julisch Venetien</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazio</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzi</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apulia</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>100.0(4,922,085)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaboration on ISTAT, 2014

\(^8\) According to Parati (2005), “that separation between North and South is therefore grounded in an economic superiority of a European North that has also been achieved through processes of migration that are constitutive of the European identity. This is particularly relevant to the case of Italy, whose political, economic, and historical identity is intrinsically connected to present and past migrations” (p. 45).
These aggregated data show the connection between the presence of immigrants and the basic necessities of the local economic systems: in the principal cities of the metropolitan areas and within the touristic areas, the recruitments concern the lower tertiary and the construction industry. However, it is necessary to underline that these percentages are calculated on Italian total and without considering the amount of Italian citizens in each territory (this type of analysis is presented and described further).

If we consider origin’s countries of foreign residents, it’s possible to show that Romania is at the first place with 22% (Tab. 2). This outcome doesn’t amaze after the EU enlargement in 2007, year characterized by addiction of Romania\(^9\) and Bulgaria into European partnership.

After Romania, the other origin’s countries are Albania (10.1%), Morocco (9.2%), China (5.2%) and Ukraine (4.5%). Furthermore, there is the Poland within the group of European Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tab. 2 - Origin’s countries of foreign residents in Italy (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top five (in general)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (22.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania (10.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (5.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine (4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top three in EU</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (22.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (2.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Top three extra-EU</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania (10.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (5.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaboration on ISTAT, 2014

With regard to individual characteristics of migrants, we are going to describe some socio-demographic variables related to foreign residents in Italy in 2014\(^10\).

---

\(^9\) Actually, the immigration from Romania started in the early Nineties due to the political context (more specifically, Ceausescu’s dictatorship), but the only ones that could emigrate were people of Jewish and German origin, thanks to agreements among the Romanian Government, Israel and the German Federal Republic. So, after the transition from State economy to Market economy, Italy, yet known for the presence of Italian businessmen in Romania, becomes a privileged destination.

\(^10\) This is the last survey with data available at the time of submission.
First of all, we analyze gender: the following chart shows that the majority of migrants are women.

In the classic immigration studies the central subject is always been the man. Women, when they were taken into account, are "women who follow the mate", people with little autonomy and influence over others. Only in recent years, women are recognized as protagonists of migratory processes: in 2014, 52.7% (2,591,597) of immigrants are women and the remaining 47.3% are men\textsuperscript{11} (2,330,488).

![Fig. 2 – Percent of foreigners by gender](image)

Moreover, a high percentage of women can be explained with reference to ageing of the italian population, in particular the social assistance has

\textsuperscript{11} Migrants in Italy live mainly in North (59.4% women and 60.8% men). Then the 25.7% of women live in Central Italy and the 14.9% in Southern Italy while 25% of men live in Central Italy and the 14.2% in Southern Italy. The low percentage of foreign women in the South is explained with reference to the labour market, as mentioned before. One need only think, for example, that in 2014 the percentage of unemployed women in the South of Italy was 43.3% against 36.3% in the North (the remain percentage refers to the Central Italy) (Source: ISTAT).
required import of caregivers from abroad (especially, ancient assistant and domestic worker): from this point of view, the migrant women are reconfirmed in the traditional role as custodians of family values and as links to the home culture (Palanca, 1999).

With regard to age group, women are mostly from up to 17 years (20.2%) or from 30 to 34 (12%) while men are up to 17 years too (24.2%) or from 30 to 34 or from 35 to 39 years (12.6%).

**Tab. 3 - Percent of foreigners by age group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 17</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0 (2.330.488)</td>
<td>100.0 (2.591.597)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaboration on ISTAT, 2014

It is interesting to see how, starting from the analysis of this variable, migrants that are up to 17 years ask for a allowed for long-term. Indeed, almost 29% of long-term permits are issued to young immigrants: it’s increasing, so, the number of "second-generation immigrants", children born in Italy that are sons of immigrants or sons of a mixed couple (one parent immigrant and one Italian). The so-called "immigration children" are a key issue that mark the passage of one type of migration to another: from temporary experiences to definitive settlements. This is connected to a new way of “rethinking immigration” (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco, 2001) given that if, in the past, immigrants left their families with hope to came
back, nowadays, immigration is a “collective” phenomenon rather than “individual” since ever more families leave their home country.

As mentioned previously, Italy has been characterized as a country of immigration especially from 2000 and, if on one hand, the foreign presence is growing and distributed throughout the nation, on the other hand people who come here want to have an effective stabilization. To demonstrate this, we analyze the statistical indicator for the type of allowed\(^\text{12}\).

![Fig. 3 – Percent of foreigners by type of permit](image)

With regard to the type of permit, in 2014 most of the permits issued are for long-term (effective from January 2007): the main feature of this type of permit is to be "open-ended" so the period in which migrants can stay in Italy is indeterminate. Analyzing the data in Fig. 3, we note that the allowed for long-term represent 56.3% of the total (the permits with expire are 43.7% of total\(^\text{13}\)).

\(^{12}\) It is worth specifying that the variable "type of permit" refer only to non-EU citizens.

\(^{13}\) Crossing this variable with marital status, we can note that 56.6% of immigrants are unmarried while 42.2% are married. Residual percentage (about 1%) is for divorced or widowed people.
The reasons for ask a permit for non-UE citizens are: family reasons (40.8%), work (23%), humanitarian reasons (19.3%), study (9.8%) and others (7.1%).

In conclusion, in this section, we have drawn a frame for the migration in Italy in all its complexity. Faced with an increasingly phenomenon is, of course, desirable to integrate the foreigners in our national context in order to create cooperation in building a better Italy: in fact, the real inclusion policy is to valorize the capabilities of all its citizens, whether native-born or immigrants from other countries, and overcome the discrimination.

Through valid initiatives and an effective review of wrong images and degrading representations, we can obtain the recognition of similarities among populations and the mutual respect of the principle of equality.

2. Interculturality Concept and its Dimensions

Once arrived in the host country, the foreigner doesn't find the easy life he had imagined but, conversely, he has to live and struggle with the new challenges and the new culture of reference. From this point of view, for example, he has to overcome different obstacles especially in the face of hostility of a society unprepared to accept "black italians", "muslims" or "italians with almond-shaped eyes". In the words of Harman (1988) “strangeness is no longer a temporary condition to be overcome, but a way of life. The group, once formulated as homogenous and self-contained, does not clearly exclude the stranger. Rather, it is the one who is unfamiliar with the language of strangeness [...] who becomes an anomaly when overtures of membership orientation are made in a «world of strangers»” (p. 44).

Therefore, immigrants can be included in a "double bind", a notion conceived by the famous polish sociologist Zygmund Bauman: if on the one hand they are induced to escape from their homeland, on the other hand their access and social inclusion is denied in the destination country. As Bauman (2007) writes, “do not change place; lose their place on earth and are catapulted into a place that there isn't” (p. 49).

So, the general condition of immigrants is characterized by nostalgia of the country of origin and by the uncertainty of life. Continuing with Bauman (2007), it's possibile talk about "future inmates" who “are stripped
of every single element of their identity except one: that they are refugees with no place to stay, no function and no documents. Inside the fence of the camp, the refugees are pressed by a faceless mass and their access is denied for the most basic things which refer to identity” (p. 43).

This hardness of foreigners to live in an unknown land is strengthened by the difficulty of finding people who accept the difference and, with the aim of helping foreigners in the long process of integration, don't raise human barriers and try to build a "community of universal communication" (Bartholini, 2008).

Taking, then, the concept of stigma by Erving Goffman (1963), it's easy to see how, in our globalized world, the immigrant is stigmatized and, very often, it happens that the natives have, for them, closing feelings (like indifference, worry, suspicion, fear) or feelings of exclusion. In this connection, Bauman says that are two impressive phenomena in our contemporary society: on one hand the so-called mixofilia, on the other hand the mixofobia (Bauman, 2007). With the first word the polish sociologist indicates a process by which immigrants become increasingly unknown to the members of the group of natives (in this case, the dialogue and interaction with them vanish); the mixofobia is the fear towards foreigners (in this case, the cohabitation becomes complicated and the minimization of contact will intensify the pressures to segregation). Not only that: these feelings coexist in every town and, in detail, within each of the city's inhabitant.

However, in order to build a global and united society, we have to avoid discriminatory attitudes and start to live with each other: in this sense, our cities should be seen as "laboratories" where the inhabitants of a overcrowded planet learn the ways to appreciate the difference. Furthermore, only through recognition of the other, it's possible build up a "humanity's acceptance of others of mankind" (Bartholini, 2008) and we can share an enlarged citizenship (Kant, 1788).

For this reason, the concept of interculturality becomes fundamental in this analysis. This notion, according to Walsh (2002), is “based in the necessity of constructing relations between groups, as well as between practices, logics and different knowledge, with the urge of confronting and transforming the power relations (including the structures and institutions of society) that have naturalized the social asymmetries” (p. 24).
The prospective of openness, discussion and dialogue among different cultures and human lives sees, therefore, the identity number as a treasure. So, interculturality rejects the idea that culture is a monolithic phenomenon: it represents a set of shared, contested, negotiated narration.

After specify what mean interculturality, we can explain the methodological base of our work.

Starting from Lazarsfeld’s paradigm and process of operationalization (1958), after representation and specification of concept of interculturality, we identify some dimensions, four specifically, of this concept.

These dimensions refer to more important daily life’s areas in which everybody is integrated and these are: citizenship, education, work and marriage. Each of four dimensions is analyzed by construction of some indicators. In this way, it’s possible describe phenomenon of interculturality in Italian context from 2007 to 2014.

To achieve main goal of research, we use secondary cross-section data collected by national sources as ISTAT, Ministries and Chamber of Commerce.

The indicators are based, mainly, on odds between foreigners and Italians and their descriptions are given in the following sections.

Citizenship

The statistical indicator of citizenship grants is, certainly, among the most important in order to measure the integration of foreigners in the Italian context. It doesn’t stop there because acquisition of citizenship status provides, for immigrants, a measure of security from this encroachment on their rights (Aptekar, 2015).

Always, the competence about citizenship is of the Ministry of Interior who, in the law no. 91/1992\(^{14}\), has established that it may be acquired under the following specific conditions:
- by descent (principle of "ius sanguinis");
- by birth on Italian territory (principle of "ius soli");
- by marriage to an Italian citizen;
- in case of naturalization\(^{15}\);

\(^{14}\) This law reassesses the importance of individual intention in the acquisition or loss of citizenship and recognizes the right to hold more than one citizenship simultaneously.
Now, we can observe (Fig. 4) that, in recent years, the number of citizenship grants to foreigners in Italy has more than doubled (from 38,466 in 2007 to 85,526 in 2014). In particular, from the last four years analyzed, it’s possible underline an increment in a sustainable manner (while from 2007 to 2010 the data remains approximatly stationary16).

![Fig. 4 - Number of citizenship grants](image)

**Source:** elaboration on Ministry of Interior, 2007-2014

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15 It’s possible required legal residence in Italy for 3 years for descendents of former italian citizens up to the second degree and for foreigners born on italian soil; 4 years for citizens of a European Union country; 5 years for Stateless persons and refugees, as well as for adult foreigners over the age of 18 adopted by italian citizens; 7 years for children adopted by italian citizens before the entry into effect of Law no. 184/1983; 10 years for non-EU citizens.

16 With regard to 2011, probably the anomaly of this value is due to the political context of this year and, in particular, about the discussion of a law aimed at simplifying the procedure for obtaining citizenship.
Furthermore, if we want to go into more detail in our analysis, we can note that the highest number of citizenship grants is for the female gender (Fig. 5 confirms that the most stabilization in Italy is by immigrant women).

![Fig. 5 - Percent of citizenship grants by gender](image)

Source: elaboration on Ministry of Interior, 2007-2014

With respect to geographical distribution, we know that the Italian regions where there is the largest number of citizenship grants are in the North, probably for more job opportunities (the data, therefore, confirms the empirical evidence analyzed in the previous section).

In conclusion, the study about the citizenship grants is, from a sociological point of view, undoubtedly very important in the same way as the theme of belonging and rights in immigration societies: think, today, the practice of citizenship is the only way through which communities assert their cultural identity and values, reiterating the duty of the citizens to respect them (Zanfrini, 2007).
Education

Second dimension considered is education because the school is an important channel for the socialization and integration of foreigners. Children and teenagers spend most of their time at school, so the foreign presence is an occasion of mutual knowing, of discovery of other cultures, their characteristics and it’s a way to guide toward intercultural conscience.

In the seven school years examined\(^{17}\), overall, the ratio of foreign students on Italian students is increased by more than two percent points (Fig. 6).

\[\text{Fig. 6 – Ratio of foreigners on Italian students %}\]


Focusing the attention on the educational levels (Fig. 7), we note, observing data from Ministry of Education, that the progressive increase concerns each level.

In particular, the change in the longer term (2007-2014) involves especially kindergarten (3.4%), whereas the average increase is of 0.6

\(^{17}\) In this analysis is excluded the data about tertiary education for their peculiarities. For example, there are specific programmes aimed at supporting the international geographical mobility of the students.
percentage points for this level and of about 0.4 for the others. This data is very important if we consider that it is easier build a multicultural conscience for children because they are still far from being prejudiced about diversity. On the contrary, growing become more difficult, because it means to call into question themselves.

Moreover, in general, the highest percentages relate to the first three levels of education. This general increase of foreign presence into the school system is an important aspect for the interculturality: by the close contact with other nationality from early childhood, it’s possible to teach the respect for other, know their habits and tradition.

**Fig. 7 - Incidence of foreigners per 100 students by educational levels**

![Figure 7 - Incidence of foreigners per 100 students by educational levels](image)

*Source: Ministry of Education, University and Research, ss.yy. 2007/2008-2013/2014*

**Work**

The third dimension that we want to study refers to the labour market. The last decade (2004-2014) has seen an increase in the number of foreign workers, so we evaluate this an essential aspect of interculturality. As a matter of fact, looking at data by ISTAT, in 2004 the number of foreign workers was 965,112 and in 2014 this number was more than doubled
(2.294.120\textsuperscript{18}). However, relatively to the working environment, we analyze only self-employment. The reasons of this choice are mainly two: 1) the availability of all the information considered important for the purpose of this research; 2) the peculiarity presence of the self-employer foreigners into working system\textsuperscript{19}.

Generally, from 2007 to 2014 the foreign self-employments are increased, approximately, three percentage points (from 6\% to 8.7\%) (Fig. 8).

*Fig. 8 – Foreigners on Italian self-employer % odds*

![Graph showing increase in foreign self-employers from 2007 to 2014](source: elaboration on Chamber of Commerce, 2007-2014)

In particular, this growth concerns business ownership (from 9.1\% to 14.9\%) whereas the others categories remain roughly stationary (Fig. 9): foreign manager and partner increase, respectively, of 1.2 and 1.6

\textsuperscript{18} In terms of percentage variation there has been a +137.7\% increase.

\textsuperscript{19} For example, in Italy since 2008, it is established MoneyGram Award, a program dedicated to business of foreigners: every year, the program awards five business people, each for a feature like “profit growth”, “social responsability” or “youth entrepreneurship”. 
percentage points on Italian in the same positions. The other positions increase only 0.3% in seven years.

*Fig. 9 - Foreigners on Italian self employed % odds*

Marriage

Among different social transformation affecting Italy, mixed marriage is an event that, in recent years, has become increasingly important. The "mixed family" is characterized, in fact, to the membership of cultural and different racial groups: so, this is a social phenomenon resulting by the increase in a rate of immigration. Thus, there is a very strong link between immigration and mixed couple: once again, the statistical indicator about mixed marriages shows that the immigration is becoming, with the passing years, a structural fact, a social component that slowly continues to change the ethnic, cultural and religious settings of our Italian cities. For this reason, mixed marriage is defined by Merton (1941) “as marriage of persons deriving from those different in-groups and out-groups other than the family which are culturally conceived as relevant to the choice of a spouse” (p. 362).

From this point of view, men and women coming to Italy from foreign countries are not limited, therefore, to carry out a professional work but
also live the important moments of socialization among them like, for example, a romantic relationship with an autochthon. A relationship that creates a strong element of stabilization in new territory: the mixed marriage becomes absolute symbol of integration and intercultural of foreigner within the host society.

The average percentage of mixed marriages in Italy is about 16% (Fig. 10).

![Fig. 10 – Mixed marriages on Italian marriages % odds](image)

Source: elaboration on ISTAT, 2007-2014

The irregular data of 2010 depends on overall decrease in the number of marriages. From 2007 to 2010 the percent variation of italian marriages is -10.7% while that of mixed marriages is -27.4%.

Analyzing the ISTAT data we can see that, in recent years, there has been an increase of mixed marriages especially in the case whereas an italian man marries an immigrant woman (51.1% in 2007 and 56.3% in 2014). In contrast, the percentage of couples characterized by italian bride and foreign spouse is stable for all the years considered (around 15%) while the percentage relative to the couples formed by both foreign citizens is settled at about 30% of mixed marriages

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20 With regard to the regions, the majority of mixed marriages can be found primarily in North Italy.
Fig. 11 – Mixed marriage by type of couple

![Graph showing mixed marriage by type of couple]

Source: elaboration on ISTAT, 2007-2014

With regard to the nationality of the spouses, there are many differences depending on whether it is foreign bride or foreign groom. In the first case, Italian men marry women from Eastern Europe (specifically from Romania and Ukraine\(^\text{21}\)); in the second case, Italian women marry migrants from Africa (mainly from Morocco) and Albania\(^\text{22}\). Referring to couples in which both spouses are foreigners, in most cases they come from Romania and China\(^\text{23}\).

Regardless the type of mixed marriages, we can observe that most of these are celebrated according to a civil ceremony rather than religious. From Fig. 12 it is possible to note that from 2007 to 2014 civil marriages

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\(^{21}\) The number of marriages celebrated from 2007 to 2014 between Italian groom and Romanian woman is 20,808 while 13,105 are marriages celebrated between Italian groom and a Ukrainian woman.

\(^{22}\) The number of marriages celebrated from 2007 to 2014 between Italian bride and Maghreb is 5,788 while the marriages with a migrant from Albania are 3,052.

\(^{23}\) In fact, during the years taken into consideration, they were been celebrated in Italy 7,880 marriages between two Romanian citizens and 4,704 marriages between two Chinese citizens.
accounted for nearly 85% of the unions while the remaining 15% refers to ties sanctioned by religious rite.

Fig. 12 – Mixed marriage by rite

![Bar chart showing mixed marriage by rite from 2007 to 2014. The chart indicates that religious marriages account for approximately 85% of the unions, with the remaining 15% being civil marriages. The data is sourced from ISTAT, 2007-2014.]

Source: elaboration on ISTAT, 2007-2014

In addition, almost 70% of marriages between two spouses of different nationalities are first marriages while the remaining percentage refers to second marriages (Fig. 13).

Fig. 13 – Mixed marriage by first and second marriage

![Bar chart showing mixed marriage by first and second marriage from 2007 to 2014. The chart indicates that first marriages account for approximately 70% of the unions, with the remaining 30% being second marriages. The data is sourced from ISTAT, 2007-2014.]

Source: elaboration on ISTAT, 2007-2014
To sum up, the mixed marriage can be seen as a structural index and secure gateway to a complete assimilation into the host society: they represent an element of social vitality in the particular historical moment that crosses Italy. So, a mixed marriage is an item that is certainly a factor of integration, confirming the idea that immigrants are more and more stabilized in our country and that their contribution is crucial to the establishment of new multiethnic and multicultural families.

Conclusion

The analysis in this paper has highlighted the changes in the Italian context that have occurred after the increase in the rate of immigration. Through the study of the four dimensions we had observed the constant presence of foreigners. More specifically, our analysis of interculturality in Italy underlines two important phenomena: on the one hand, increase of foreigners on Italian territory and, on the other hand, the stabilization of this people confirmed, by way of illustration, from the number of acquisitions of citizenship, the remarkable presence of second generation (mostly in education system) and from many self-employed foreigners into working system.

It's possible to say that, in a multicultural country, only thanks to the presence of foreigners, that we can build a truly harmonious society, contrary to the prejudices and racial intolerance, whose goal is to share and respect for diversity and ethnicity of others. Thus, interculturality can be considered the first step towards a process of re-appropriation of identity, which doesn't require either the difference either equality among individuals but the similarity, which leads to a citizenship of diversity.

In this regard, evoking the prospect outlined by Bartholini, Italian sociologist, we have to work for an universal recognition of every human being and his rights through the creation of a "trascendent identity" (Bartholini, 2008) that can indicate the way for a post-global project of cohabitation between strangers who respect each other for their individual dignity.
To conclude, it is possible create a social structure based on cooperation (tolerance), in which individuals base their relations on mutual acceptance of diversity and of their immune peculiarities.

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The roles of the civil society and international humanitarian organizations in managing refugees crisis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region

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Abstract
The Civil Society Organization (CSO) can be categorized into domestic and international. This paper will historically and critically analyze efforts and works of the both of them in managing the catastrophic Refugees crisis in this region; as well as the dynamics of the region’s Refugees crisis. This paper would be segmented into: a). A thorough examination of the nature of the conflicts in this region since the Arab Spring as well as the ongoing challenges in leadership, governance; and economic hardships. b). This would be about an analysis of the general roles of the CSOs and International Humanitarian Organizations in managing MENA’s Refugees crisis.

Keywords: Refugees, MENA, UNHCR, Civil Society Organizations, Arab Spring.

Introduction
Since the end of the World War II (WWII), the Middle East and later the Northern Africa have been one of the most unstable regions in the world. The Middle East has had series of conflicts from the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, 1967 Six-Day War, 1967 - 1970 War of Attrition, 1973 Yom Kippur War, 1975 - 1990 Lebanese Civil War, Yemenite War of 1979, 1982 Lebanon War, 1980 - 1988 Iran–Iraq War, the United States Invasion of Iraq in 2003 to the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring was the most intensified and continuous of conflicts in this region which started in the Northern Africa in 2010 and later spread to the Middle East. While products of the Arab Spring like the Yemeni Civil War, Second Libyan Civil War and Syrian Civil War are still ongoing, the Arab Spring has produced one of the most challenging, complicated and apocalyptic refugees’ crisis, displacement of millions and migration crisis since the history of mankind.
The Civil Society (CS) is a combination of non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, trade unions, indigenous peoples’ movements, faith-based organizations, foundations, groups and institutions that champion the interests and will of citizens. It includes the third sector of every society, different from government and mainstream for-profit business. Usually, the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are established by ordinary citizens, and may be funded by private persons, foundations, governments and businesses. Some may avoid formal funding to be run primarily by volunteers to establish independence and gain public trust. They champion several causes from protecting the environment, promoting and protecting human rights, improving healthcare, or engaging in development works. In democracies, they expose governmental recklessness, hold leaders to account on their promises, conduct public awareness and sensitization programs, campaign for the respect of the rule of law, work to guarantee accountability and transparency in public institutions and other imperatives that they engage in. They are also helpful in conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building. They assist refugees through providing humanitarian assistance and advertising their unfavorable conditions. This paper would focus on the roles of some selected international and domestic CSOs in this region, in managing the present Refugees Crisis.

International Humanitarian Organizations (IHOs) are international organizations that are primarily into offering humanitarian aid during disasters and conflicts, and issues regarding hunger, human trafficking and so on. According to the Borgen Project, the top 5 IHOs are: World Food Program (WFP), an organization that is part of the United Nations System and is the largest humanitarian agency fighting hunger worldwide; Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), an organization dedicated to fighting global poverty; and improving basic education, preventing the spread of diseases, increasing access to clean water and sanitation, providing emergency aid for war and natural disasters; Oxfam International, an international confederation of 17 organizations working in approximately 90 countries worldwide to find solutions to poverty and related injustice around the world; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the world’s largest humanitarian network, reaching 150 million people in 189 National Societies tackling issues in like
disaster response, disaster preparedness, health and community care and promotion of humanitarian values of social inclusion and peace; and Action Against Hunger (AAH), an IHO committed to ending world hunger, saving the lives of malnourished children while providing communities with access to safe water and sustainable solutions to hunger. For the purpose of specificity, this paper would focus on the works of this top 5 (excluding AAH), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Rescue Committee (IRC) in managing MENA’s Refugees Crisis.

The CSOs and IHOs have provided immense assistance to Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni refugees that resettled in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Tunisia and Djibouti. They have been helpful in providing shelter, food, clothes, water; medical and psycho-social supports to these refugees as well as enrolling their children in schools. They have also assisted the UN’s international response mechanisms in taking care of these refugees.

Critical analysis - Part one

This Part will be on the nature of MENA’s conflicts from the Arab Spring. It will start with an overview of the Arab Spring and then narrow down to Libya, Syria and Yemen. This is very important as the current crises in these 3 countries are lasting products of the Arab Spring, leading to increasing leadership, governance and economic challenges. These challenges and the existing humanitarian crisis will be well highlighted to establish their necessitation into displacements and conversion of millions into refugees.

1. An examination of the nature of MENA’s conflicts since the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring was a public-styled wave of revolution against several regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and a revolution towards democratization that started on 18 December 2010. It was a series of protests, demonstrations, riots and civil resistance in MENA. It began in Tunisia with the Jasmine Revolution, and spread throughout the countries of MENA.
By the end of February 2012, leaders like Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen had been removed from power; civil uprisings had erupted in Bahrain and Syria; major protests had occurred in Sudan, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq and Algeria; and minor protests had broken out in Palestine, Western Sahara, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Mauritania. Techniques used in the Arab Spring included civil resistance in the form of strikes, marches, and rallies. The social media was also used in organizing, communicating, and raising awareness in the face of state attempts at repression and Internet censorship, most notably used by the youth members of the Arab population (Dainotti et al., 2011). Governments used violence as a response to many Arab Spring demonstrations (CBS News, 2011a), as well as pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators. A major slogan of the demonstrators is Ash-sha’byuridisqat an-nizam ["the people want to bring down the regime"] (Ahram Online, 2011).

The Arab Spring was caused by the public quest for democratization away from dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights abuses, political corruption (Cockburn, 2011), economic decline, unemployment, unequal wealth distribution, poverty, large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the entire population (Radsch, 2013). The trigger factor for the escalation of protests was the self-immolation of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi. Mohamed was unable to find work and started selling fruit at a roadside stand. On 17 December 2010, he had his wares confiscated by a municipal inspector. An hour later he soaked himself with gasoline and set himself on fire. His subsequent death on 4 January 2011 (BBC News, 2011) brought together various groups that weren’t satisfied with the existing governance system, including many unemployed, political and human rights activists, lawyers, labor, professors, students, trade unionists and others to begin the Tunisian Revolution. This Tunisian-styled revolution then spread to Egypt, Libya and other MENA countries with similar political and socio-economic circumstances.

**Libya**

On 15 February 2011, anti-government protests began in Libya. By 18 February, the most of Benghazi (Libya’s second largest city) was controlled by the opposition. The government did its best to recapture it through
sending troops and militia, but they could not. By 20 February, protests had extended to Tripoli (Libya’s capital). Reuters (2011) reported that the increasing death toll, numbering in the thousands, attracted international condemnation and resulted in the resignation of several Libyan diplomats, altogether with calls for the government's demolition. According to Liz (2011), the opposition then set up an interim government in Benghazi to oppose Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s rule. However, despite initial opposition success, government forces subsequently took back much of the Mediterranean coast. On 17 March, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted, authorising a no-fly zone over Libya, and "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. Two days after that, France, the US and the United Kingdom (UK) intervened in Libya with a bombing campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces. The coalition of the willing (a coalition of 27 states) from Europe and the Middle East soon joined the intervention. In late August of the same year, anti-Gaddafi fighters captured Tripoli, dismembering Gaddafi’s government and marking the end of his 42 years of power. CNN (2011) further reported that many government institutions, including Gaddafi and several top government officials, regrouped in Sirte, which Gaddafi declared to be Libya’s new capital. However, Sabha fell in late September (Hürriyet Daily News, 2011), Bani Walid was captured after a grueling siege weeks later, and on 20 October, fighters under the aegis of the National Transitional Council seized Sirte, killing Gaddafi in the process (CBS News, 2011b).

Conflict News reported that post-Gaddafi rule witnessed factional violence from 2011 to 2014 which then graduated into a Second Civil War in 2014. This Second Libyan Civil War is an ongoing conflict between four rival organizations seeking to control Libya. The organizations are: the 2014 democratically elected and internationally recognized government of the Council of Deputies; the Muslim Brotherhood led Islamist government of the new General National Congress (GNC) based in the capital Tripoli; the Islamist Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries; and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Libyan provinces (Foreign Policy, 2015).

According to Mohamed (2013), at the beginning of 2014, Libya was still governed by the GNC after the election of 2012, and in June 2013, Nouri Abusahmain was elected as the president of the GNC. In a coup attempt on 14 February 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, who served under the
former regime of Muammar Gaddafi, called for the dissolution of the GNC and for the formation of a caretaker government committee to oversee new elections. Forces loyal to General Haftar launched a large scale air and ground offensive codenamed Operation Dignity in May 2014 against Islamist armed groups in Benghazi and against the GNC in Tripoli (Mohamed, 2014). In June, the GNC called for new elections to a Council of Deputies: Islamists were defeated, but rejected the results of the election, which saw only an 18% turnout (Libya Herald, 2014).

The conflict escalated on 13 July 2014, when Tripoli’s Islamists and Misratan militias launched Operation Libya Dawn to seize Tripoli International Airport, capturing it from the Zintan militia on 23 August. This continued with other operations and counter operations, attacks and counter attacks, elections and rejections, and factional leaderships until 16 January 2015, when Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn factions agreed on a ceasefire (Reuters, 2015). Libya is now led by two separate governments, with Tripoli and Misrata controlled by forces loyal to Libya Dawn and the new GNC in Tripoli, while the international community recognizes Abdullah al-Thani’s government and its parliament in Tobruk. Benghazi remains contested between pro-Haftar forces and radical Islamists (Aawsat, 2015).

Currently, thousands of Libyans have fled their homes to the neighbouring states of Tunisia, Egypt and Chad, as well as to European countries across the Mediterranean with majority being Arabs and Berbers. The total number of Libyan refugees were estimated at around one million as of June 2011 and most returned after the civil war ended. However, as of January 2013, according to UNHCR (2013), there were 5,252 refugees originating from Libya alongside 59,425 internally displaced persons registered by the UNHCR. According to a Le Monde article dated May 13, 2014, there were between 600,000 and 1,000,000 Libyan refugees in Tunisia (Isabelle, 2014). And according to journalist Barbara Slavin, reporting for Al Monitor on August 5, 2014, Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki commented that two million Libyans, or one third of the pre NATO intervention population of Libya, have taken refuge in Tunisia.

Syria

The Syrian Civil War is an ongoing, complicated armed conflict with international intervention taking place in Syria. The CBS News (2012)
reported that the crisis began in the early spring of 2011 within the context of Arab Spring protests, with nationwide protests against President Bashar al-Assad’s government, whose forces responded with violent crackdowns. The conflict graduated from mass protests to an armed rebellion after months of military sieges (Oweis and Solomon, 2012). Due to foreign involvement, the conflict had been called a proxy war between the regional powers. In September 2015, Russia, Iraq, Iran and Syria set up a joint operation room (information centre) in Baghdad to coordinate their activity in Syria. On 30 September 2015, Russia started its own air campaign on the side and at the request of the government of Syria. The resultant proxy war between the U.S. and Russia (VOA, 2015) led some commentators to characterise the situation as "a proto-world war with nearly a dozen countries embroiled in two overlapping conflicts". In July 2013, the Syrian government was reportedly in control of approximately 30–40% of the country’s territory and 60% of the Syrian population; in August 2015, the territory fully controlled by the Syrian Army was reported to have reduced to 16% of the country.

International organizations have accused the Syrian government, ISIL and other combatants of gross human rights abuses, with grave atrocities (United Nations, 2012). The conflict caused a considerable displacement of population. The US, the EU big four, Russia, China and several countries from the Middle East (including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and, for the first time, Iran) have started peace talks in Vienna that are aimed at bringing an end to the conflict.

Plus four million refugees have left the country because of the war. Most of them fled to neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, while thousands also ended up in more distant countries of the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf, North Africa and Europe. As of December 2015, Turkey was the world’s biggest refugee hosting country with close to 2.5 million Syrian refugees; the nation had spent more than 8 billion Euros since 2011 on direct assistance to them according to estimates by Turkish Ministry of Education deputy secretary Yusuf Büyük (Anadolu Agency, 2015).

Yemen

The Yemeni Revolution followed the starting stages of the Tunisian Revolution and occurred concurrently with the Egyptian Revolution of
2011 and other Arab Spring protests in MENA. In its early phase, its protests were initially against unemployment, economic conditions and corruption, as well as against the government’s proposals to modify Yemen’s constitution. The protesters’ demands then escalated to calls for the resignation of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This was followed by mass demonstrations of over 16,000 protesters in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, "Friday of Anger" during which tens of thousands of Yemenis took part in anti-government demonstrations in Taiz, Sana’a and Aden, "Friday of No Return" during which protesters called for Saleh’s ousting in Sana’a where three people were killed and several other coinages and protests. According to Daily Star (2011), on 23 November, Saleh signed a power-transfer agreement, under which he would transfer his power to his Vice-President, AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi, within 30 days and leave his post as president by February 2012, in exchange for immunity from prosecution.

Orkaby (2015) stated that post-Saleh’s rule, the Yemeni Civil War (an ongoing conflict) began in 2015 between two factions claiming to constitute the Yemeni government, along with their supporters. Southern separatists (by far the largest force) and forces loyal to the government of AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi, based in Aden, have clashed with Houthi forces and forces loyal to the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh (New York Times, 2015). The Houthi-led Supreme Revolutionary Committee on 19 March, declared a general mobilization to overthrow Hadi and further their control by driving into southern provinces. The Houthi offensive, allied with military forces loyal to Saleh, began on the next day with fighting in Taiz Governorate. By 25 March, according to Toronto Star (2015), Lahij fell to the Houthis and they reached the outskirts of Aden, the seat of power for Hadi’s government; Hadi fled the country the same day. By 2 May 2015, at least 400 civilians had died in Aden.

Elbagir (2015) noted that Djibouti has received an influx of refugees since the start of the war. Refugees also fled from Yemen to Somalia, arriving by sea in Somaliland and Puntland starting 28 March. Zawya, (2015) further reported that on 16 April 2015, 2,695 refugees of 48 nationalities were reported to have fled to Oman.
2. Challenges in leadership, governance; and economic hardships

The MENA countries have had relative political stabilities cum firm governance structures before the Arab Spring. Pre-Arab Spring, living standards were moderate and there were provision of basic necessities, regardless gross human rights abuses and occasional tensions. Countries like Libya had far reaching public housing and healthcare systems with the best Human Development Index (HDI) in Africa. However, the fast pace of revolutions in this area coupled with the unsustainable ways governments were overthrown radically, posed immediate leadership, institutional and governance challenges, destruction of public infrastructure, as well as increasing food, shelter, water shortages, and instabilities. Economic hardships manifesting through poverty and unemployment worsened. It took Egypt a long time with a lot of political instabilities to become relatively stable under its current President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

In Libya for an example, the rapid and unsustainable way that Colonel Gaddafi was removed from power during the Libyan Revolution has been causing increasing instabilities and lack of coordination in leadership and governance. Since Gaddafi was overthrown, these organizations have been competing in controlling Libya: Government of the Council of Deputies, the Muslim Brotherhood, General National Congress, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Libyan provinces (ISIL Libya). This competition has led to the current Libyan Civil War (2014–present). Since the current war, there have been often electric outages, minor business activity, and a 90% loss in revenues from oil (Anderson, 2015). Additionally, over 4,000 people have died from the war, and some nearly a third of Libya’s population has fled to Tunisia as refugees (Anderson, 2015). The leadership and governance challenges led to the emergence of ISIL Libya, a terrorist organization and a branch of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). There have also been deep restrictions on women and girl’s rights.

In Syria, there have been challenges of leadership and governance as the Assad led government and the opposition compete for the control of Syria. As a result of this and increased fighting, many Syrian children are ill, malnourished and abused; and millions of them have quit school. Diaa (2015) reported that the death toll had risen above 220,000 as of January 2015; and chemical weapons have been used during the
conflict. Additionally, tens of thousands of protesters have been imprisoned and tortured in state prisons. This war has led to the internal displacement of more than 7.6 million Syrians, and millions living in poor conditions with shortages of food and drinking water. With the bombings from different international quarters, and the despicable combatant guerilla activities, economic hardships and unfavorable social conditions, millions of Syrians have been converted into refugees.

In Yemen, since Saleh was overthrown during the Arab Spring, the country has been in deep instabilities leading to the current Yemeni Civil War which began in 2015. The war is a product of leadership and governance challenges, between two factions claiming to be the right Yemeni government. The factions are the Southern separatists (forces loyal to the government of AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi), and Houthi forces and forces loyal to the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

According to the Cable News Network (CNN) on 8 April 2015, almost 10 million Yemenis were deprived of water, food, and electricity as a result of the conflict. And according to UNICEF officials in Yemen some 100,000 people across the country were dislocated, while Oxfam reported that more than 10 million Yemenis did not have enough food to eat, in addition to 850,000 half-starved children. Over 13 million Yemenis were without access to clean water (abi-habib, 2015). On 19th of April, the UN said that 7.5 million people had been affected by the conflict and many were in need of medical supplies, potable water, food, shelter, and other forms of support.

The Arab Spring led to terrible leadership and governance situations in most MENA countries, and the resultant clash of civilizations, the instabilities, harsh economic conditions, human security crisis, radicalization, terrorism, unstable governments, frequent change of governments etc. led to a catastrophic refugee’s crisis.

Part two

This Part will be on the efforts of the CSOs and IHOs in managing MENA’s Refugees crisis with emphasis on Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni refugees. Key emphasis will be on their works through providing humanitarian assistance and helping the refugees in building their lives in
their new locality by bringing their needs to public consciousness in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon (where most of the Syrian refugees resettled), Tunisia (where most of the Libyan refugees resettled) and Djibouti (where most Yemeni refugees resettled). There would also be an examination of how they contribute to the international efforts propelled by the UN and their cooperation with other state and non-state actors in addressing the Refugees crisis. Emphasis will be on the works of few domestic Civil Society Organizations; and WFP, CARE, Oxfam International, IFRC, UNHCR and IRC in helping refugees in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Tunisia and Djibouti.

3. An analysis of the general roles of the CSOs and IHOs in managing MENA's Refugees crisis

Syrian Refugees

Currently, there are 2,500,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey, 1,185,241 in Lebanon, 1,400,000 in Jordan, 120,000 in Kuwait and 247,861 in Iraq as reported by UNHCR (2015). While Thousands also ended up in more farer countries of North Africa and Europe.

International humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees and their host communities in the countries bordering Syria is coordinated by the United Nations Resident Coordinator. Within these neighboring countries, the UNHCR has a mandate of protecting and supporting Syrian refugees in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. The main framework for coordinating the refugee response is the 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) which the UNHCR coordinates. Through the RRP, US$ 4.2 billion was appealed to cover the needs of 4.1 million refugees fleeing Syria and 2.7 million people in host communities in the region from 1 January to 31 December 2014. The RRP covers refugees operations in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon on several concerns from Needs, vulnerabilities and capacities; Response strategy and priorities; Partnership and coordination; Protection; Livelihoods; Education; Health and Nutrition; Shelter; Core relief items; Food; Water Sanitation; and Hygiene. This robust plan also involves partnerships with domestic and international CSOs as well as other IHOs for its execution.
Currently, the UNHCR has registered 2.1 million Syrians in camps in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. UNHCR’s job has been helping refugees to survive and recover: to provide aid and shelter, reunite families, and support people as they struggle to build new lives.

Jordan currently hosts (1,400,000) Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2015) and this would not have been possible without the help of mainly the domestic CSOs. The Jordanian domestic CSOs have played a great role in helping thousands of Syrian refugees pouring into their country. Initially, according to IRIN (2012a) their response had not been organized with refugees concurrently registering and getting assistance from various organizations. But they have been trying to coordinate their assistance as the first point of contact for many Syrian refugees arriving in Jordan. “CSOs are providing most of the assistance going to the Syrians,” a senior international aid worker commented. “They shouldn’t be underestimated. But the government has very serious concerns about some of the groups working there and about what some of their objectives may be,” he added.

There was a reasonable Syrian community in Jordan before the war, and this has been a commencing point for many fleeing Syrians. They initially started staying with families and friends in extra bedrooms or living rooms. Some Jordanian landlords have also been very helpful and generous, allowing many Syrian refugees to stay for free. In the northern Jordanian border town of Remtha, a compound-turned transit facility donated by a Jordanian landlord temporarily houses Syrians who flee to Jordan illegally, until they can find a sponsor and a place to stay.

In 1982, many Syrians fled to Jordan after the Syrian government subdued a revolt by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Hama (IRIN, 2012b). In 2006, some of the Syrians of that earlier influx of refugees formed the Syria Woman Organization to help Syrians in need in Jordan. While their children run around in their office in the capital Amman, women in niqab register new Syrian arrivals and provide them with furniture, baby food, medicine, supplies and cash with which to rent apartments.

Also is the Islamic Charity Centre Society, which has also been distributing aid in border regions and registering refugees. Al-KitabwalSunnah Association is another active player. These organizations appear to have the greatest reach, and certainly more than the UN as some
refugees fear registering with the UNHCR, because they believe identifying themselves as having fled Syria will put them in danger if they try to return. The Syrian diaspora has also played a large role, sending everything from cash to containers of clothes from as far as the USA and Australia. IRIN (2012b) further reported that Syrian activists in Jordan receive the items, but they are so busy smuggling aid into Syria that after the month-long shipping period, donations for refugees sometimes end up sitting in warehouses, waiting to be sorted and distributed.

The Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates has also donated 6,000 food parcels, 1,000 hygiene kits, 1,000 heaters and 10,000 blankets (IRIN, 2012b). Civil Societies from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have also done assessments and are working to help. While Red Crescent aid has been coordinated through the Jordan Red Crescent and the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization, other assistance from the Gulf has been less organized.

Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO) has also been charged by the government to coordinate the aid response to refugees, JHCO is increasingly getting involved in the response. JHCO created a master list of refugees registered with different organizations to avoid “double-dipping” and have the respect of international agencies. UNHCR is also working with JHCO to coordinate the community-based organizations. But the response has plans for projects ranging from cash assistance for vulnerable families to psychosocial support for children.

In Turkey, since 2012, the WFP commenced a partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent for a new food voucher program that will provide 13,000 Syrian refugees in Kilis camp with cash credit on electronic cards with which to buy their own food (IRIN, 2012c). It was later expanded to four camps hosting some 10,000 Syrians in Hatay Province. The food voucher program significantly reduces the high cost of feeding people through hot meals and food parcels, and is covered by WFP and its donors. It has also allowed Syrian families to buy the foods that they prefer and to cook for themselves. The first phase of the program targeted 25,000 Syrian Refugees for 2.5 months with 80 Turkish liras (US$45) per person per month; but WFP has been able to expand and standardize the program across all the camps in close cooperation with the government authorities.
The UNHCR has been giving the Turkish government technical advice on how to register refugees. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have been distributing supplies through the Turkish Red Crescent, which, according to IOM, has allowed the UN agency to be present in the camps to monitor its distributions. The Turkish government has also asked Turkish NGO (Humanitarian Relief Foundation) IHH to top up some of the government-provided services with extras like fridges, fans and the Turkish sweet halva. IRIN (2012c) reported that IHH has also been running a mobile clinic and is helping install container houses. Most of the aid has been administered by the Turkish Red Crescent. But this is beginning to change, as the government opens up to other players.

The Saudi Relief Committees and Campaigns, a group which raises money from the Saudi public for relief work, has invested $10 million in building a camp - complete with water, schools and other services - for 12,000 refugees in Turkey’s border province of Gaziantep.

In 2014, Oxfam reached nearly half a million Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon with clean drinking water, cash and relief supplies, such as blankets and stoves and vouchers for hygiene supplies. Oxfam has helped families get the information they need about their legal and human rights and connecting them to medical, legal and support services. Oxfam has built shower and toilet blocks in refugee camps, informal settlements and on deserted routes used by people fleeing Syria and have installed or repaired toilets in communities hosting refugees. Piped water schemes are being developed for Jordan’s Zaatari refugee camp and in host communities in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Oxfam has also been campaigning and advocating for a sustainable and inclusive political solution since the beginning of the conflict. Oxfam continues to ask for an immediate cease-fire and call for all parties to the conflict to stop any arms transfers and guarantee humanitarian access.

The Syrian Arab Red Crescent together with the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and partners have been doing so much with a response now reaching around 4 million people every month. In Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, Red Cross Red Crescent volunteers are helping support thousands of people. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent, has been providing...
Civil society and international humanitarian organizations in managing refugees crisis

water, food, medical materials and other items to millions people affected by the fighting.

The IRC is currently providing support to Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. In Jordan, the IRC has been providing reproductive health care, cash assistance, and social services to refugee families, as well as counseling and other support for survivors of sexual violence. They have been helping children who have crossed the border alone to reunite with their families. In Lebanon, the IRC operates women’s centers that provide counseling, medical consultations, and group activities to refugees. They are also helping hundreds of refugee families and the Lebanese hosting them with cash assistance for rent, food, utilities and other essentials. The IRC is providing education for refugee children as well as job training for adults.

Libyan Refugees

On 10 May 2011, according to the Week, roughly 746,000 people have fled Libya since the war began. A temporary refugee camp was set up at Ras Ajdir on the Libyan-Tunisian border and had a capacity for 10,000, but was overwhelmed with an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 refugees. By 3 March 2011, the situation there was described as a logistical horror, with the World Health Organization warning of the risk of epidemics. To continue responding to the needs of the refugees staying at the Ras Ajdir, the WFP and Secours Islamique-France upgraded a kitchen that would provide breakfast for families. Separately, the ICRC advised it was handing over its operations at the Choucha Camp to the Tunisian Red Crescent. Since 24 March 2011, the WFP has supplied over 42,500 cooked meals for TCNs at the Sallum border. A total of 1,650 cartons of fortified date bars (equivalent of 13.2 metric tons) had also been provided to supplement these meals. On 1 October 2011, a Red Cross official Abdelhamid al-Mendi said that more than 50,000 Libyans had fled their homes in Benghazi since the war began in February (Al Arabiya News, 2011).

As of January 2013, there were 5,252 refugees in Tunisia originating from Libya. In 2014, the relapsed violence in Libya has significantly spilled over into Tunisia, where thousands of Libyans headed to escape the ongoing militia clashes. The Tunisian Red Crescent (TRC) has mobilised volunteers to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs resulting from the
The Tunisian Red Crescent was able to get donation from the Japanese government which increased its ability to respond to the Libyan crisis and its resulting humanitarian disaster on the border. The Japanese government allocated 13,068 food portions to the displaced on the Libyan side of the border, 3,081 to those staying in the coastal town of Ben Gardane in southeast Tunisia, and 7,177 portions to the 10,780 Egyptians who were waiting at the Gabes airport before being evacuated between 6 and 18 August 2014. The TRC served meals and drinks on both sides of the Libyan-Tunisian border to thousands of foreigners whose departure was delayed due to security reasons or for logistical reasons before their repatriation.

Since August 2014, more than 6,000 people were crossing the border to Tunisia each day, most of whom were migrants who have been stranded on the Libyan side. The Tunisian Red Crescent volunteers were mobilised to support streaming families with food and water.

*Yemeni Refugees*

The UNHCR has said that more than 100,000 people have fled Yemen since the 2015 Yemeni Civil War. Of this number, only around 40,000 are Yemenis. The rest are foreign nationals, mostly from the Horn of Africa, who have returned home. Most of these refugees have fled to Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and Ethiopia.

The case of Yemeni refugees is a worse one and different from Syria’s and Libya’s. Most of them have been resettled in Djibouti’s Desert camp as Djibouti is relatively more stable than Somalia. Djibouti has been facing huge challenges in dealing with these refugees. Obock where the Desert camp is situated at is a very hostile terrain because of the harsh weather and terrible desert conditions; as well as sandstorms and 50C heat. Also, the camp lacks electricity and shortages of drinkable water with non-availability of surgeons.

Meanwhile on 5 October, 2015, Representatives from International Organization for Migration and UNHCR presented a Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RRMRP) to respond to the crisis in Yemen at a
Civil society and international humanitarian organizations in managing refugees crisis

donor meeting held in Nairobi. According to Reliefweb (2015), the RRMRP will cost $36 million from October to December 2015 and may cost a further $119 million in 2016. The RRMRP is the outcome of an inter-agency planning process coordinated by IOM, UNHCR and partner agencies in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. RRMRP aims to deliver protection and humanitarian assistance to an estimated 103,000 people fleeing the conflict in Yemen to neighboring countries by the end of 2015.

Conclusions

Though the CSOs and IHOs have done their utmost best in assisting refugees in Syria, Libya and Yemen, their challenges have been inadequate funding, supplies shortage and overwhelming number of refugees beyond their capacity to contain. Also is the challenge of inadequate number of volunteers to assist in their operations. Since the Syrian crisis began, 40 Syrian Arab Red Crescent volunteers have died, and 7 volunteers from the Palestinian Red Crescent. Every day CSOs and IHOs volunteers risk their lives to help others. The wars in Syria and Libya have led to migration crisis as refugees risk their lives on a daily basis trying to cross over to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea.

For decades, Syria and the Syrian people have humanitarianly hosted thousands of refugees from the Arab World majorly. In 2012 for an example, Syria was the third largest asylum country in the world. This is the time for the international community to extend the same support to the Syrian people in their difficult times.

Since September 2013, international responses and assistance to the refugees have been encouraging. This was after the UNHCR got overwhelmed by hundreds of thousands in their camps, established in Syrian and Libyan neighboring countries. For Syrian Refugees, Sweden was the first EU-country to offer temporary residency to 8,000 Syrians (The Local, 2013). This was followed by the countries in South America (mainly Argentina and Brazil) deciding to offer refuge to thousands of displaced Syrians. Moreover, Brazil is the first country in the Americas region to offer humanitarian visas to Syrian refugees. In the first half of 2015, large numbers of Syrian refugees crossed into Europe, reaching 313,000 UNHCR
applications across Europe by early August 2015. James (2015 reported that currently, on 21 September 2015, the European Union approved a plan committing itself to taking in 120,000 refugees. As of November, largest numbers were recorded in Germany, Sweden, Netherlands and Austria. As of September, 2015, about $10 billion worth of humanitarian aid has been given to Syrian refugees with the EU and US as main donors.

International solidarity must be deeply reinforced to help Syria, Libya and Yemen. By taking in thousands of new refugees, the neighboring countries are doing MENA and the world, a remarkable service. Helping them deal with the consequences of the refugee crisis is important. Yemen needs help most importantly as realities there are being sidelined by the Syrian Crisis and as most Yemenis do not have the means of fleeing from the war. Paradoxically, most of the refugees fleeing Yemen to Somalia and Sudan are those that became refugees in Yemen from same countries. Yemeni refugees’ condition is so terrible that it needs assistance from IHOs especially in the Desert camp in Djibouti with shortages of medical supplies, water, food and electricity.

Though the international response has been encouraging especially in the case of Syrian refugees, highly industrialized and rich countries like the US, France and UK should assist by taking in more refugees. The Arab nations should also bring up their regional response. The United Nations Security Council should also end the differences within the major powers and finger pointing, and make clear, urgent and real commitments to help resolve the Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni Civil War through high-powered, pragmatic negotiations and commitments.

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Civil society and international humanitarian organizations in managing refugees crisis


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A Third Wave of Remembering
The Mediterranean Sea as a Septic Tank

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Abstract:
The argument focuses on the differences in methods of historiographies as put forth by David Abulafia and Fernand Braudel. Their object-of-study is the Mediterranean Sea. Abulafia focuses primarily on human beings making history, while Braudel focuses on the Sea making itself, not primarily, as Abulafia insists in his title “A Human History.” Their vocabulary, as assumed, focuses on latitudes and longitudes. In a radical turn, Kenneth Burke focuses on the third as attitudes toward history and on casuistic stretchings. Gregor y Ulmer, following-rethinking Burke, develops para-methodologies in the entitlement of “MEmorial,” that also combines both horizontal-vertical histories. Ulmer’s thoughts piggy-back on Burke allowing also for the excluded third by way of the reality, as well as the metaphor, of the Mediterranean Sea, as a Septic Tank, with the casuistic stretching of the Sea, as a Skeptic Tank. Hence, the writing is better performed than a writing of exposition, which the latter would only be a performative contradiction!

Keywords: Mediterranean, Septic-skeptic, Latitudes-longitudes, Yet attitudes.

A quick dis-orientation: What I will present desires to be the makings of a full-blown book and an others. I will, however, in a lecture style in print, from orality to literacy, focus on the sections of that desire to link, paralink, whatever wants to be said. In third waves. As Kenneth Burke reminds us: A Way of SEAing is a way of Not SEAing (1984, p. 70). Therefore, I will write as presenting to an audience before me at sea.

To Begin, let us take a Gestural Examination of Selected Titles of Books about the Mediterranean Sea:

The Making of the Middle Sea
The Great Sea
The Middle Sea
And so, what do you make of these titles and their suggested entitlements! For me, they are a Heraclitian crazy salad. Inviting me to jump into the crazy waves. Let’s look a little closer by way of a Synopsis:

My interests lie - and I disengage in an extra-moral sense (like Nietzsche) - in the differences in methods of historiographies as put forth, say, by David Abulafia (2013) and Fernand Braudel (1998).

In respect to his own book in comparison, dialectically, Abulafia (2011, p. xxvi) says: “At the heart of Braudel’s approach was his assumption that ‘man is imprisoned in a destiny in which he himself has little hand.’ […] [Abulafia continues] Whereas Braudel offers what might be called a horizontal history of the Mediterranean, seeking to capture its characteristics through the examination of a particular era, this book [i.e., Abulafia’s] attempts to provide a vertical history of the Mediterranean, emphasizing change over time”.

Put more simply: Abulafia focuses primarily on human beings making history, while Braudel (1998, p. 3) in his book focuses on the Sea itself, not primarily, as Abulafia insists in his title “A Human History.” Braudel writes: “Should we care that the Inland Sea is immeasurably older than the oldest of the human histories it has cradled? Yes, we should: the sea can only be fully understood if we view it in the long perspective of its geological history”.

In this dialectical exchange, I experience the eternal return of the word “memory” in Braudel’s book title. There are many historians working/playing with memory: For example, Jacques Le Goff (2006), Paul Ricoeur (1996), and Geoffrey Cubitt (2006). As for myself, an academic, I am drawn to memory because it is one of the canons of rhetoric. I am drawn furthermore to memory for its material memorials of all kinds: gravestones, memorial plaques, war memorials, as well as for its virtual memorials.

As an example of the virtual, I turn to Gregory Ulmer’s para-
methodologies and his work towards what he refers to as “MEmorial,” that combines both horizontal-vertical histories but more so all that traditional philosophy refers to as the law of excluded third. Specifically, I would bring forth Kenneth Burke and Ulmer’s notions of casuistic stretchings, allowing for excluded thirds by way (or waves) of realities, as well as the metaphor, of the Mediterranean Sea, etc., as a Septic Tank.¹ Hence, my presentation of writings is better performed than explained, and yet, I myself would be dis-informed by a performative contradiction!

Now towards the outrageous! We will ride the excluded third waves. Our primary image, additionally, will have become more so the Septic, yet Skeptic, tank. Gregory Ulmer, on Facebook, April 23, 2017. Theory Hobby (DIY Electracy) … Presented an image of a “SCEPTIC System” … The image:

Ulmer writes:

The image is found and modified, following basic dada photomontage poetics. It is a diagram illustrating septic tank function, ‘septic’ puncepted into ‘sceptic’-- tv set replacing washing machine in the original. Modifications make it ok for fair use. It is part of ‘theory hobby’ practice, discussed in a couple of the essays in our book, Electracy. You are welcome to use it, of course!

Thrusting third turds. Keep that mix of tropes in your mind, for we are working toward Kenneth Burke. And let’s keep in mind that Hayden White (1978) in his Tropics of Discourse calls on Burke’s master tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony), while we cannot but focus on perspectives of incongruity toward the excluded middle (or rather third-turd). Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Towards History
Without hesitations, let us turn towards Burke’s *Attitudes Towards History*. ATTITUDES! not Latitudes nor longitudes! But again, towards thirds. The excluded turds. KB is infamous with his scatological approaches at times, focusing on septic, yet sceptic, attitudes which refer to his “perspective by incongruity.” It is all best summed up in his “The Thinking of the Body” (1966, pp. 308-43). And let us not forget: Burke develops the notion of “the Demonic Trinity: ‘excrement, blood and flowers’ as ‘three essential oils’ of the human plight” (1966, p. 251). Hence, when reading-thinking Burke, let us accept, his *Grammar of Motives*, where he says: we human beings are perpetually “Making peace with [our] feces” (1969, p. 23). You read, study, KB, then, you and others study Burke’s *Scatology*.

Let’s also, so briefly, turn ever again to Burke’s *Counter-Statement* as he mixes streams of aesthetics into his discussion bringing about “a conflict of attitudes” that, in turn, brings forth a “liquidity” (1968, p. 20). Burke takes on streams of aesthetics in his discussion of flow and flux, recalling Heraclitus’ “everything flows” bringing forth a “vocabulary of flux” (1968, p. 15).

*Gregory Ulmer*, Electronic Monuments

To the points, remaining time, not tic-tocs, but the spaces left far between Toc . . . Tic: Ulmer (2005, p. 43) explains: the oddity of subjects and abjects. Those who are recognized for serving a good cause and those who are not read as serving anyone. Ulmer writes: “What memorials are to ideals, Memorials are to abjects”. We move in this instance from subjects, objects, in the Mediterranean to abjects, those thrown out of the major cultures of the nightmare of endless violence. The issue here, I’m bringing to the discussion, is that of the refuges, those fleeing the hell of Syria, etc. By way of the Mediterranean Sea. This is an endless topic. But for this moment in time the question is how to acknowledge and remember them. What would a Memorial be in the Sea itself for the thousands? The Abjects?

Ulmer’s works-and-plays are in an exceptionally setless of flows; hence, his works are difficult to follow, for he thinks paralogically as much as Jacques Derrida and Helene Cixous and others have done so. About death

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1 Kenneth Burke adds: “By ‘demonic trinity’ I refer to a concept I first developed in my *Grammar of Motives*. It concerns the terministic fact that the three persons of the Trinity have been burlesqued analogues in terms of the fecal, diuretic, and genital respectively” (1966, p. 251).
not just for *self* but for *others*. Whom do we celebrate with a Memorial. For those who are in between and consequently abjects!

The pointless again is to bring back all that has been flushed out of what we see as someone’s (but whose?) shit. *Merdre!* Certainly, no God! Not even Pagan gods! Ulmer following Derrida and others, in the name of *electracy*, brings forth the *traces* . . . *drippings*. . . . *drippings*. . . . of shit . . . that have, again, been flushed from us to a *septic tank*. In a word, Ulmer is focusing on a *septic tank* for the flowing of ideas and whatevers. But to the point here, Ulmer would think of ways to recognize the refuges today and for times to come. Why *septic* tank of the Mediterranean! Those who more so die at sea and those who survive, Ulmer might invite us to recognize that they die of “formless value” (2005, p. 49). How then, to acknowledge those left behind in the cruel sea?

And then, let us not forget, the *Corrupting Sea* (“a radically pluralistic space of flows”):

Of All that I’ve read-studied is Concannon and Maurek (2016) *Across the Corrupting Sea: Post-Braudelian Approaches to the Ancient Eastern Mediterranean*. Why? For the contributors, according to the editors and my readings, take *Post-Braudelian* to mean *Post-Modern approaches*. There is a section in their introduction named: “Looking Forward: A Postmodern Connectivity.” They, of course, as I would arrange, to add to the post-historiographies of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (2013). The editors write: “Deleuze and Guattari’s vision might prompt us to rethink the Mediterranean as a radically plural space of flows” (2016, p. 13). And as for maps of the Mediterranean, I would suggest a study of Guattari’s *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* (2013).

And as far as temporalities, I Love All, including, the Septic-Sceptic Tank, where in the excluded turds are brought to the sea, the scene. How can I or you or anyone forget the refuges! And yet, there’s more and more endless ways awaiting us to think of them, as us. Now I have researched, reclaimed the right to think through Henry Miller who writes:

> I love everything that flows,’ said the great blind Milton of our times [J. Joyce, yet way earlier by Heraclitus]. Yes, I said to myself, I too love *everything that flows*: rivers, sewers, lava, semen, blood, bile, words, sentences. I love the amniotic fluid when it spills out of the bag. I love the kidney with its painful gall-stones, its gravel and what-not; I love the urine that pours out scalding and the clap that runs endlessly; I love the words of hysterics and
the sentences that flow on like dysentery and mirror all the sick images of the soul. . . . I love everything that flows, even the menstrual flow that carries away the seed unfecund. I love scripts that flow, be they hieratic, esoteric, perverse, polymorph, or unilateral. . . . I love everything that flows . . . the violence of the prophets, the obscenity that is ecstasy, the wisdom of the fanatic, the priest with his rubber litany, the foul words of the whore, the spittle that floats away in the gutter, the milk of the breast and the bitter honey that pours from the womb, all that is fluid, melting, dissolute and dissolvent, all the pus and dirt that in flowing is purified, that loses its sense of origin, that makes the great circuit toward death and dissolution (1961, pp. 257-58).

References

The Representation of Terror and Moral Panics: The Media Frames of the European press

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Abstract
People’s attitudes and behaviours are influenced by their perception of Others and expectations towards them, in connection with their social and cultural context. These dynamics are strongly influenced by the information transmitted by the mass media, in their dual role as both mediators of reality and opinion leaders. Sometimes, the information transmitted can be a “distorted reflection” of reality; for example, news about terrorist attacks by more or less organized groups or the murderous anger of a single individual (in our cases, a motor vehicle rammed into the crowd) often serve as a sounding board for certain social issues, such as crime and security for people and communities. This work aims at illustrating, through an analysis on media frames (both iconographic and textual), which types of representations the European press offers to its readers in the narration of certain events linked to terrorism and how such representations can affect (or not) the creation of generalized alarm phenomena (moral panics).

Keywords: Communication, Mass media, Moral panics, Terror, Terrorism.

1. Moral panics between representations and media frames

In their dual role of mediators with reality and filters of information, the mass media introduce in their narrative circuit some episodes that are, in turn, “transformed” into news (the so-called newsmaking process – Wolf, 2001). However, in everyday life there are events and problems that prevail and assert themselves for their uniqueness and importance; furthermore, in this continuous flow of events people are unable to have a first-hand experience and a direct knowledge of what is happening. The mass media play an important role in filtering these events, representing slices of reality (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) to an audience that often has no direct nor indirect knowledge of them. Within these representations there are events and/or people who, in some cases, can contribute in forming images of a cultural Other with which people establish a form of relationship. The modalities of perception for these types of relationships are various and
they are often linked to a series of factors, mainly social and cultural ones; therefore, the perception of a cultural Other as a threat can influence, in some cases, a given relationship. In general, the perception of the Other as a threat to one’s own security, to that of the community to which one belongs or to society in general is connected to the cultural system of reference; however, it must be pointed out that the perception of a risk does not always correspond to a “real” danger. For example, Stephan and Stephan (1996) envisage four types of threats: stereotypes, realistic threats, symbolic threats and inter-group anxiety. Realistic and symbolic threats refer to the perception of a threat to both security and the cultural system coming from groups of individuals who have different interests (economic, political and material) and lifestyles.

In these situations, the perception of a danger can be influenced and amplified by the presence of the mass media which, voluntarily (or not), contribute to moral panic processes. The term moral panic refers to the perception of a widespread climate of concern and social alarm and is often linked to the presence of certain groups described as deviant, dangerous, or as a general threat to the security and values of a society (Maneri, 2001). This perception inevitably influences the relationship with a cultural Other and with all those who are considered as belonging to the Others out-group (Gili, 2009). But moral panic rests its existence on “concrete” bases, that is, on problems and themes that exist in people’s daily lives but are perceived as general, social problems. According to Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) all “real” problems can potentially be social problems; civil society, is considered as a real arena within which a competition takes place between situations that can be defined as social problems. When some of these situations are selected as social problems they may respond to specific characteristics: they can therefore be dramatized, they deal with themes rooted in a culture, or they are linked to powerful interest groups (ibid.).

In the above dynamics, the mass media can not only help in reducing or reinforcing the distances in the relationship with a cultural Other, but they can also over-expose and over-dimension some episodes. In turn, the latter may not only provide a distorted representation of reality (Gerbner & Gross & Morgan & Signorielli, 2002), but at the same time they can create widespread alarm within society. Terrorism shows how “real” episodes, i.e. terrorist attacks, can give rise, in some cases, to psychosis and generalized alarm.
Therefore, one can no longer speak exclusively of the communication of “risk” or danger, but in some cases, there is a real communication risk (Mangone, 2015). One risk is without doubt the possibility of perverse effects (Boudon, 1977) produced by a communicative event: unwanted or at least unanticipated effects and consequences of media messages on individuals, which can create further crisis situations that need to be managed. An example of a perverse effect correlated to the increase of generalized panic and uncertainty is the multiplication of false bomb alarms or alarmism due to the presence of individuals or vehicles in a certain place (Mangone & Pece, 2017).

Since 2001, moreover, terrorism has evolved its communication strategies, relying more and more on visual communication (Morcellini, 2015) focused on the use of images (e.g. the videos of executions, death and devastation) to vehicle contents and information.

If we consider the images of individuals produced and re-produced in the representations of terrorism-related events and episodes, we notice that the “human figure” becomes an essential element when the narrations raise the presence of an anti-subject (Cosenza, 2007), an enemy against whom one fights, an Other who must (or should) have very specific physical characteristics and in whose absence the perception of risk and fear inevitably tends to amplify. In 2001, for example, Osama Bin Laden represented the evil against whom Americans and the rest of the world were called upon to fight; conversely, today it is increasingly difficult to define and trace the identity and faces of “the enemy”. For this reason, episodes linked to terrorism can become “activators” of moral panic, strengthening the idea of what we might call the “society of fear” (Morcellini, 2015).

2. Terrorism: an analysis of media frames

This pilot study takes into consideration some of the major cases directly or indirectly related to Islamic terrorist actions in Europe, united by a same mode of action: a truck rammed into the crowd. In chronological order, we have: Nice, 14 July 2016; Berlin, 19 December 2016; London, 22 March 2017; Stockholm, 7 April 2017; London, 3 June 2017 and, finally, Barcelona, 17 August 2017.
The analysis takes into account the way in which the Italian and European press have dealt with each case, considering, for research purposes, the two days following the event. For the collection of the front pages of the newspapers we consulted the Googlenews research archives using as keywords the “place” and the day after the event took place (e.g. Nice, July 15, 2017). The newspapers considered are representative of each reality, as they are the larger ones by circulation. In particular, we have examined: Il Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica (Italy), Le Monde and Le Figaro (France), El País and El Mundo (Spain), The Guardian, The Independent and The Times (United Kingdom). The research looks at the media presentation of the cases, paying particular attention to the interpretative frames encasing each event, which may or may not influence their interpretation and which, in some cases, may help in creating (or strengthening) a sense of generalized alarm (moral panics). The latter aspect will be evaluated taking into account some contemporaneous surveys, estimating, as far as possible, the perception of the phenomenon of terrorism and the risk of attacks in one’s own country.

The inductive methodology adopted is linked to the so-called grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), applying a “funnel-like” structure to the data, starting from details to reach a wider explanation, a universal. In this method, the derived theory defines a number of concepts that explain specific events (Silverman, 2000) – such as, in this case, moral panic phenomena.

The organisation of the contents of the various articles share a fixed narrative structure across all newspapers, characterised by three main points: 1) description of the episode in line with the “5W rule”; 2) attention to the reconstruction of the dynamics of the actions and the roles of the “protagonists” (reconstruction of the profile of the perpetrators of the attack, of the victims and the wounded); 3) presence or absence of in-depth analyses linked to social themes and problems connected to the matter (for example, the discourse on the security of the cities, on the strategies for the prevention of future attacks and on the measures adopted for the fight against terrorism).

Particular importance was given to the iconographic aspect: images and videos (especially amateur ones) seem to dramatically “enrich” each event by suggesting the descriptive tones of the newspapers (Pece, 2018). Based
on this specificity, we identified three types of photos that suggest three types of media frames. We should remember that media frames are a multidimensional concept described as a set of verbal, visual and symbolic contents, which, reorganized in a text, constitute a pivotal moment in the construction of meanings (Reese, 2001).

On the basis of the above, we identified the following types of frames. We will start with what we defined as Human Drama Frames. This type includes photographs that focus mainly on the reader’s emotions, underlining the dramatic nature of the event and reinforcing the human dimension. The images also illustrate the “faces” of the victims, while the texts add, in a few lines, short biographies. In addition to the quantitative dimension (dictated by expressions, such as: hundreds of dead, many wounded) there is a purely qualitative dimension providing elements that help to define the specific identity of each victim (such as, for example, the name, the age of the person). The process of personification of the victims thus accentuates the human dimension of the frame within which the entire story is told and represented (Figures 1a and 1b).

The textual component that strengthens the dimension of the “human drama” is mainly constituted by terms and expressions such as strage;
massacre; terrore; terror; “the night of terror”; horror; “l’horreur au coeur de Berlin”; “la terreur un 14-juillet”; “lacrime italiane per Fabrizia”.

The representation of the human dimension, linked to the seriousness of the episodes, is reinforced by the presence of images illustrating the despair of the survivors and the moments of commemoration of the victims (Figures 2a, 2b and 2c).
The second type of frames refers to a group of images capable of independently representing the news (Papuzzi, 2010) followed by short, essential captions. We have defined this type as Reality Frames; in this sense, the media frame represents a window onto the world (Tuchman, 1978) within which the narrative of events is entrusted to the role of images trying to give a sort of “objectivity” to the news (Figures 3a, 3b, 3c).

Photos play an important role because the readers may see in them places and environments that are “familiar” to them (shopping malls,
squares, streets, restaurants); consequently, the perception of risk and the relative fear may increase.

The last group consists mainly of images (and titles) that evoke, in some ways, a narrative stereotype closely linked to a “war scenario”. Thus, there is a clear contrast between the “good” (Figures 4a and 4b) and the “bad” in which attempts are made to reconstruct the profile of the bomber(s) (Figure 4c), the “weapons” (Figure 4d) – such as, for example, the very truck rammed into the crowd – and, finally, the places where the “clash” took place (Figure 4e). These elements define a third and final frame type: The War Frames.

Fig. 4a – The Guardian, 5 June 2017
Fig. 4b – Le Figaro, 16 July 2016
Fig. 4c – La Repubblica, 19 August 2017
As for the textual aspect, some words and expressions frequently recur in the representation of events, all closely related to the semantic sphere of war, such as: attacco, truck attacker, attack, attentato, terror strikes; “El terror del IS golpea España”, la matanza de Berlin. As far as the terrorists’ profile is concerned, together with more “neutral” and generic words, among which the attacker, l’attentatore, the killer, the terrorist cell, the young terrorists, we find more detailed descriptions: the attacker of the Nice massacre of 14 July 2016 is a “franco tunisino di 31 anni” [31-year-old Franco-Tunisian] (La Repubblica, 14 July 2016), or, that of 22 March 2017 in London is a “un assassino di 52 anni” [a 52-year-old killer] (La Repubblica, 22 March 2017). The attempt to give terrorists “a name and a face” is explained by the fact that the enemy increasingly assumes the characters of an invisible threat (Farci, 2006), to the point of considering the terrorist threat intrinsically spectral and invisible (Žižek, 2005). Furthermore, from an idea of the enemy as foreign and external (if we think, for example, of the Twin Towers attacks in 2001), we move to a perception of an enemy that is “nearer”, “closer”, thus it can be a Muslim convert (The Times, 24 March 2017), or a homegrown terrorist (The Guardian, 23 March 2017): the “closeness” of the enemy greatly increases the perception of a danger that is more “near” and, therefore, real. Moral panic is not only linked to the perception of a real danger that threatens people’s daily
lives; so, terror (and not the terrorist, as a “natural person” author of possible attacks) affects “Christmas” as it was in Berlin, or July 14 has become for the French the Bastille Day massacre (The Times, July 15, 2016).

3. Final considerations

The media representation of terrorism seems to stand on two main concepts, hypermediation and immediacy (Bastiani, 2012). The first refers to the use of various means of communication, integrating different communicative levels and languages (films, icons, texts, sound). The second to the immediacy of the news, that is, to the immediate response that the mass media try to offer to the various publics, conveyed in ways that allow, to those who communicate, to come into direct contact with public opinion. These two elements can activate moral panics, given that a greater “closeness” towards certain events and personal experiences (above all those of the victims and their families) corresponds to higher self-identification, thus “other people’s pain” becomes one’s own and the perception of threats and dangers to one’s security becomes more and more concrete.

Since September 11, 2001, the problem of security has undoubtedly worsened, with the emergence of a global threat (and enemy) capable of undermining the stability and security of individuals (Mangone & Pece, 2017). Starting from the US Patriot Act, there has been a continuous evolution and redefinition of policies on the subject, above all because terrorism “has adopted the tactic of guerrilla warfare that makes unpredictability its strategy. The diversity of terrorist groups and their non-territorality makes it difficult to identify and control them: anyone could be a fighter and the attacks can come from any point and by any means”1. The sense of uncertainty and instability is, therefore, one of the elements behind the fear and the constant alert; all aspects that can be measured through the figures produced by statistics and surveys.

For example, in 2016, according to a Eurobarometer survey\(^2\), European citizens drew the attention of public institutions to the issue of personal and occupational safety; their priorities were the fight against terrorism (82\%) and that against unemployment (77\%). In addition, fear of new terrorist attacks was high; about 40\% of Europeans believed that the risk of terrorist attacks to be “real”. Citizens also called for a stronger presence of the European Union in preventing the financing of terrorist organisations (42\%), as well as in eradicating the roots of terrorism and radicalisation (41\%) and strengthening controls at the Union’s external borders (39\%). From the point of view of the perception of a terrorist threat, the situation in Italy has, for some aspects, evolved; the latest ISPI survey (Institute for Studies in International Politics, 2018)\(^3\), at the question “What are the major threats at global level?”, reports that in 2017, only 11\% of experts believed that “Islamic terrorism” can be considered a threat, in stark contrast with 2014 when 31\% of them considered Islamic terrorism as a threat to global security. To date, the perception of risk, again in the opinion of experts, is represented by a variety of other factors, such as political tensions in North Korea, the crisis in the Middle East and inequalities in the world. On the issue of security in Italy, experts say that the main threats are represented by the economic crisis (30\%), the European fragility (26\%), immigration (16\%) and the unstable situation in Libya (19\%). For what concern Italian citizens, it is significant the development of a greater interest in international politics, with an increase of eight percentage points: from 26\% in 2014 to 34\% in 2017. This interest has grown not only among the normally more informed categories such as entrepreneurs, managers and freelancers, but also among those who were historically less informed such as pensioners (from 30\% to 42\%) or housewives (from 28\% to 36\%)\(^4\). Italians perceive as a threat mainly economy-related issues (48\%); immigration holds second place with 22\% of


\(^{3}\) https://www.ispionline.it/it/tag/sondaggio (accessed on 10 May 2018)


Journal of Mediterranean Knowledge-JMK, 2018, 3(1), 87-99 – ISSN: 2499-930X
DOI: 10.26409/2018JMK3.1.06
the respondents mentioning it. Terrorism-related worries are not comparable to those of 2015 (26%), year of the first and most dramatic attacks in Europe (first of all, the Paris attack in November 2015) and the figure has slightly dropped (12%), but it still holds third place as “most serious threat to Italy”. But if Italians do not perceive terrorism as a threat to their own security, a very different situation emerges when we speak of terrorism as a “global” threat; in this case, 23% of Italians put terrorism first, followed by North Korea (16%) and only 12% mention the economic crisis. According to the survey, the decrease in the perception of terrorism as a threat seems to be connected to the territorial defeat of the Islamic State both in Iraq and in Syria; 71% of Italians seems to consider the loss of territory as “the best news of the year”, the one that has apparently given “greater hope in 2017”. It follows that the sample also has a positive view on the role of the institutions, first of all the Italian government: 56% of Italians evaluated positively the management of the Terrorist alert by the Italian government. This figure grew from 2015 to 2017, with a substantial increase, from 17% to 21%, in those who report a very positive evaluation of the government’s performance on the issue.

References


Review of Franco Ferrarotti, La vocazione del Mediterraneo, Chieti, Solfanelli, 2018

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Abstract

Keywords: Mediterranean, Europe, Euro-centrism, History, Future.

The importance of the Mediterranean Sea in a post-ideological European Union: this is the topic proposed by Franco Ferrarotti in his latest book La vocazione del Mediterraneo, a thorough and omni-comprehensive reflection on how the EU should establish a new positive role in the dynamics of a globalised world through the reaffirmation of the historical principles of the Mediterranean. From the very first pages of the book, Ferrarotti acutely affirms that the Mediterranean should rediscover its “vocation” by being a bridge between the North and the South and between the East and the West. References to Victor Hugo’s studies on the “Mare Nostrum” and to Fernand Braudel’s, as well as to philosopher Niccolò Macchiavelli’s and politician Edward Gibbo’s enrich Ferrarotti enlightening analysis: “Il Mediterraneo è il mare fra le terre che unisce popoli e culture – Ferrarotti writes – che ne garantisce la convivenza, ne esalta l’interscambio e la reciproca fecondazione” (p. 5).

Known in English as the sea "between the lands", the Mediterranean has played a major role in favouring the communication of the peoples around it throughout the centuries; as a result, it has prevented clashes between its diverse populations. Glorious and prosperous civilisations scattered all around the Mediterranean, and have formed a sound base for world civilisations from North to South, from East to West, from Mesopotamia to Egypt, from Carthage to Rome and from Alexandria to Babylon. Ferrarotti distinctly reminds us that it is not possible to imagine a history of the world
without the Egyptian, Hellenistic, Roman and Ottoman civilisations. He recounts diachronically the history of the Mediterranean Sea, and analyses - not without criticism - the role that the Mediterranean Sea played in the affirmation of a Euro-centric conception of the world. This Euro-centric conception combines the effects of the Scientific Revolution, the Commercial Revolution, the rise of colonial empires, the Industrial Revolution and a Second European colonization wave: Ferrarotti wisely states that no other such basin exists. The impulse that emerges from Ferrarotti’s book is that nowadays the Mediterranean needs to be seen as a simulacrum of “relational plurality, based on exchange and reciprocity” (p. 17), in which intercultural communication plays a central role in allowing diverse cultures to interact on the same basis. According to Ferrarotti - and this is one of the most astonishing aspects of the book - we must move from asymmetric relations between cultures and individuals to a synchronous coexistence of people at a global level,

Si richiede oggi un tipo diverso di cultura, una cultura che sappia riesprimere i criteri di eccellenza e i termini dell’autovalutazione critica in una società di massa e in un mondo caratterizzato non più dal processo storico diacronico, bensì dalla compresenza sincronica di tutti gli esseri umani su scala planetaria (p. 21).

The crisis of global ideologies and the consequent collapse of the historical contrast between East and West, is reigniting the dialectic between the North and South divide. In this regard, the Mediterranean must rediscover its vocation of being a “zip” between the North-Atlantic region (Europe, U.S and Canada) on one side, and the African-Asian countries and Latin America on the other: “È una grande sfida, in cui gli uomini e le donne dei Paesi bagnati dal Mediterraneo potranno, ancora una volta, dare la misura piena della loro statura storica e della loro maturità cultura” (p. 20).

Ferrarotti affirms that there is no doubt that the region of the Mediterranean Sea constitutes one of the priority areas for the EU in terms of policy, political measures, cooperation and security. For instance, the region is characterised by numerous actual and potential flash points for conflicts and crisis. These may have large transnational implications because they affect the stability and resilience of many States. Taking into account this concept of trans-nationalism, Ferrarotti acutely claims that we
need to redefine the conceptual categories with which we have interpreted the social processes so far. Sociological concepts and interpretative categories like “center”, “periphery”, “local”, “global” and others need to be readdressed and reformulated. Also there is a need to observe, study and analyze the actual flow of the real social processes as they are today. We live in a a-centred world, without traditional centres capable of realising and addressing the problems and challenges of people. According to Ferrarotti, neither politics nor politicians or society and intellectuals have been able to grasp the new dimensions of reality. The “bureaucrats” of the EU, for example, are too busy and concerned with resolving budget surpluses to deal with the real and daily problems of EU citizens.

What is missing, according to Ferrarotti, is the initial spirit of the “European Dream”. This is due to an underestimation of history and to the marginalisation of the role of the European Dream. People do not study history, Ferrarotti acknowledges. Without history, without the understanding of the historical plot and its development over space and time, it is not possible to be aware of the present. “History as historical life” (p.59), Ferrarotti claims: “Senza la memoria storica, un individuo, come del resto un intero Paese o una compagine di Paesi e tutta una cultura sono completamente disorientate” (p. 59). Starting from the vocation of the Mediterranean Sea and reaffirming the role that the Mediterranean has played for centuries, it is possible to rediscover a potential common European consciousness. The Mediterranean culture unites different ethnic groups and languages, united diverse peoples in a common destiny, and has the potential to play a central role in “actualizing the glorious past of the Continent” (p.68). To Ferrarotti, the vocation of the Mediterranean can contribute to the creation of a functioning conglomeration of nation-states.

Europe was a magnificent undertaking in its early incarnation, a “dynamic propulsive force” (p.61). Its construction allowed for the revitalisation of national cultures in the spirit of European cosmopolitanism, disappearing borders, common institutions and shared prosperity. Despite the diversity in languages and culture, European States began to pull together, in peace and ostensible harmony. Ferrarotti firmly warns the European Union against its arrogance and Euro-centrism: “La storia d’Europa non è la storia universale. L’Europa non è tutto il mondo. La boria dell’euro-centrismo è solo polvere e acceca” (p.63).
Ferrarotti reasonably argues that European politicians, European commissioners and European intellectuals are not able to address the fast-changing societal dynamic because they are not aware of them. Meanwhile, Europeans everywhere, from Stockholm to Lisbon, from Dublin to Budapest, from Rome to Crete, are feeling let down by EU institutions. Many are attracted by the idea of tearing up the EU. Ferrarotti is very critical of those who intend to leave Europe. To him, Europe, despite being a “headless democracy” (p.102) is the only possible scenario to survive in a globalised, hyper-connected and post-ideological world. Ferrarotti’s analysis of the present is acute and its vision of the future is forward-looking. Ferrarotti is conscious that the EU as it is today does not function properly: “La struttura dell’Europa odierna è burocratizzata (...) Abbiamo un’Europa che non rappresenta gli Stati, che non costituisce gli Stati Uniti d’Europa perché priva di un esercito comune, di un potere politico centrale e di un orientamento comune” (p.100). He argues that the EU as a conglomeration of nation-states is not able to handle current geo-political challenges and is incapable of addressing the demands of its citizens. Nation-states are experiencing an unprecedented crisis due to the diminishing of common actions and to the lack of common roots. It is true that in the globalised and hyper-connected world we live in, common action should be simpler and more immediate thanks to the technological means of communication, but the dominance and pervasiveness of communication has paradoxically “dried up” (p. 69) our society.

Being an acute observer and a profound connoisseur of society, in his last book, once again, Ferrarotti originally illuminates the social dynamics of current times. Millennials’ generation is growing up with mass media, with TV, with computers, with the internet. We can communicate quickly and immediately, but the “stupidity” (p. 77) of the internet and the computer lies in their stunning speed, which fails to allow people to stop, think, to pause and to reflect. The analysis of Ferrarotti is extraordinarily accurate: “Ci stiamo avviando verso un futuro con un popolo di informatissimi idioti, se è vera la definizione dell’idiota come di colui che tutto sa ma niente capisce”, says Ferrarotti critically (p. 79). The society of communication and information we are living in does not inform and does not communicate, but it deforms and nullifies. To Ferrarotti, the EU does not inform and does not communicate as it should, therefore European
citizens have a deformed and void vision of reality. Reality, that includes the basis of human experience, has failed.

Starting from the past glories of the Mediterranean and its vocation, the EU must rediscover the human experience of its citizens. Ferrarotti predictively argues that we must rebuild Europe on the founding values of the fathers of Europe: access to all and excess to none. The EU, which owes its origins to the experience of the Mediterranean, is being a pioneer in the new scenario of a conglomeration of different nation-states. Diversity is the wealth of Europe. “United in diversity” is the motto of the EU. Europe should find the common denominator to deal with its diversity.

In this book, Franco Ferrarotti proves, once again, to be a great anticipator of our time, a lucid and far-sighted mind that is able to look beyond the contingent and to trace the paths of the future-being. Ferrarotti reconstructs the vocation of the Mediterranean in an extraordinary and suggestive vision of Europe and of the world: “Un pianeta unitario ma legato profondamente alle proprie radici. In una parola, vuol dire riuscire ad essere abitanti del villaggio e cittadini del mondo”.